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(For SECRETARY'S NOTES, see commencement of Notes.)

THE BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT.

Accounts of the victory on the 14th February, 1797, of the British fleet under Admiral Sir John Jervis over the Spanish fleet under Don Josef de Cordoba, from the Journals and Memoranda Books of Lieutenant William Bryan Wyke, R.N., in the Royal United Service Institution.

SIR JOHN JERVIS'S Account of the Action on the 14th of February 1797.

SIR,

"Victory," in Legos Bay, February 16th, 1797.

THE hopes of falling in with the spanish fleet expressed in my Letter to you of the 13th Instant, were Confirmed that night by our distinctly hearing the report of their signal Guns and by Intelligence received from Captn. Poole of his Majesty's ship the "Niger," who had with Equal Judgment and perseverance kept Company with them for several days, on my prescribed Rendezvous which from the strong South East Wind I had never been able to reach, and that I anxiously awaited the dawn of day, when being on the Starboard Tack Cape St. Vincent bearing E. by N. 8 Leagues, I had the satisfaction of seeing a Number of Ships extending from S.W. to South, the wind then W. & S. at forty nine minutes past ten, the weather being extremely Hazy. La Bonne Citoyenne made the signal that the Ships seen are of the Line, Twenty five in Number. His Majesty's Squadron under my Command consisting of the fifteen ships of the Line named in the Marjin happily

formed in the most compact order of Sailing. By carrying a press of Sail I was fortunate in getting in with the Enemy's fleet at 1/2 past 11 o'Clock, before it had time to connect and form a regular order of Battle. Such a moment was not to be lost, and Confident in the Skill, Valour, and discipline of the Officers and men I had the Happiness to Command, and Judging that the Honour of His Majesty's arms and Circumstances of the War in these Seas, required a Considerable degree of Enterprise I felt myself Justified in departing from the regular System, and passing through their fleet in a Line formed with utmost celerity, Tacked, and thereby separated one Third of the main Body after a Partial Cannonade, which prevented their conjunction till the Evening, and by the very great Exertions of the Ships, which had the good fortune to arrive up with the Enemy on the Larboard Tack the Ships named in the Margin were captured and the Action ceased about five O'clock in the Evening. . . .

I enclose the most correct List I have been able to obtain of the Spanish Fleet opposed to me, amounting to 27 Sail of the Line; and an Account of the killed and wounded in his Majesty's Ships as well as those taken from the Enemy; The moment the latter almost totally dismasted and his Majesty's Ships the "Captain" and "Culloden" are in a state to put to Sea, I shall avail myself of the first favourable wind to proceed off Cape St. Vincent in my way to Lisbon. . . . Captain Calder, whose able assistance has greatly contributed to the Public service during my Command is the Bearer of this, and will more particularly describe to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the movements of the Squadron on the 14th and the present State of it.

I am, Sir, etc.,

J. JERVIS.

To Evan Nepean, Esq.,
Admiralty Office.

A List of the Spanish Fleet opposed to the British the 14th of February, 1797.

	<i>Guns.</i>		<i>Guns.</i>
"Santa Sinnatrinidad" ...	130	"Pelayo" ...	74
"Mexicano" ...	112	"San Genaro" ...	74
"Principe de Austeras" ...	112	"San Ildefonso" ...	74
"Conception" ...	112	"San Juan Nepomucens" ...	74
"Con de Regla" ...	112	"San Francique de Paula" ...	74
"Selvidore del Mundo" ...	112	"San Isidro" ...	74
"San Josef" ...	112	"San Antonio" ...	74
"San Nicholas" ...	84	"San Pablo" ...	74
"Oriente" ...	74	"St. Firmin" ...	74
"Glorioso" ...	74	"Neptune" ...	74
"Atlanta" ...	74	"Bahama" ...	74
"Conquestator" ...	74		74
"Seberano" ...	74		74
"Firme" ...	74		74

List of Killed and wounded in the Squadron under the Command of Admiral Sir John Jervis in the Action with the Spanish Fleet the 14th of February, 1797.

"Victory."—Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. First Captain Robt. Calder; 2nd Captain George Grey; 1 Seaman killed, 2 Seamen, 3 Marines wounded. Total 6.

"Brittannia."—Vice Admiral Thompson. Capt'n. Thos. Foley. 1 Seaman Wounded. Total 1.

"Barfleur."—Vice Admiral Honble. W. Waldegrave. Captain James Decras. 7 Seamen Wounded. Total 7.

"Prince George."—Rear Admiral Parker. Captain John Irwin. 7 Seamen, 1 Marine Killed; 7 Seamen wounded. Total 15.

"Blenheim."—Captain Thomas Lenox Frederick. 10 Seamen, 2 Soldiers Killed, 2 Officers, 40 Seamen, 7 Soldiers wounded. Total 61.

"Namur."—Captain James H. Whithead. 2 Seamen Killed, 5 Seamen wounded. Total 7.

"Captain."—Commodore Neilson. Captain R. W. Miller. 1 Officer, 20 Seamen, 3 Soldiers Killed; 2 Officers, 50 Seamen, 4 Soldiers wounded. Total 80.

"Goliah."—Captain Sir C. H. Knowles. 4 Seamen, 4 Marines wounded. Total 8.

"Excellent."—Captain C. Collingwood. 1 Officer, 8 Seamen, 2 Marines killed; 10 Seamen, 2 Marines wounded. Total 23.

"Orion."—Capt'n. Sir James Saumarez. 7 Seamen, 2 Marines wounded. Total 9.

"Colossus."—Captain G. Murray. 4 Seamen, 1 Marine wounded. Total 5.

"Egmont."—Captain John Sutton. None.

"Culloden."—Captain Thomas Trewbridge. 1 Officer, 7 Seamen, 2 Marines killed; 39 Seamen, 8 Marines wounded. Total 57.

"Irresistable."—Captain Geo. Martin. 4 Seamen, 1 Marine Killed; 1 Officer, 12 Seamen, 1 Marine wounded. Total 19.

"Diadem."—Captain G. H. Towey. 1 Seaman, 1 Soldier wounded. Total 2.

In all.—3 Officers, 59 Seamen, 6 Marines, 5 Soldiers Killed; 5 Officers, 189 Seamen, 21 Marines, 12 Soldiers, wounded. Total 300.

OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

"Blenheim."—Mr. Edward Liddy, acting Lieut. wounded; Mr. Peacock, Boatswain, wounded; Mr. Joseph Wixon, Masters Mate, wounded, since died; Cap'n. Major Wm. Norris, Marines, killed; Mr. James Godench, Midshipman, killed; Commodore Neilson Bruised but not obliged to quit the Deck; Mr. Carrington, Boatswain, wounded boarding the "St. Nicholas"; Mr. Thomas Lund, Midshipman, wounded.

"Excellent."—Mr. Peter Peffers, Boatswain, killed; Mr. Edward Augustus Down, Masters Mate, wounded.

"Orion."—Mr. Thomas Mansell, Midshipman, wounded.

"Culloden."—Mr. G. A. Livingston, Lieutenant Marines, killed.

"Irresistable."—Sergeant Watson, Marines, killed; Mr. Andrew Thompson, Lieut. wounded; Mr. Hugh McKinnon, Masters Mate, wounded; Mr. Wm. Balfour, Midshipman, wounded.

J. JERVIS.

A List of the Killed and wounded On Board the Spanish Ships taken by the Squadron under the Command of Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B., on the 14th of February, 1797.

<i>Ships' Names.</i>				<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>
"San Ysidro."	{	Officers	4	8
		Artillery: Seamen & Sold.		25	55
				<hr/> 29	<hr/> 63
"Salvidore del Mundo."	{	Officers	5	3
		Artil. Seamen & Soldrs.	...	37	121
				<hr/> 42	<hr/> 124
"San Nicholas."	{	Officers	4	8
		Artil: Seamen & Sold.	...	140	51
				<hr/> 144	<hr/> 59
"San Josef."	{	Officers	2	5
		Artil: Seamen & Sold.	...	44	91
				<hr/> 46	<hr/> 96
Killed				261	
Wounded				342	
				<hr/> 603	Total

N.B.—Among the Killed is the General Don Francisco Xavier Winthuysen, Chef D'Escadre.

The Following is the substance of the account given by Don Josef de Cordoba, Commander in Chief of the Spanish Fleet, of the Action fought with the English off Cape St. Vincent, on the 14th February 1797, in a letter addressed to his Excellency Don Juan de Langara. Dated 2nd of March Bay of Cadiz.

"From the time I stood to Sea on being Joined by the Ships of War in Algiceras, I had Winds from E.N.E. to S.E. which drove

me towards the Latitude of Cape St. Vincent, however on the Morning of the 14th of February, the Wind favouring a Point, I Shaped my Course E.S.E. forming three Divisions in the order of Sailing; about the Morning some Ships on the Larboard Tack made Signal of a Suspicious Sail in sight, upon which I ordered the Prince of Austrias to look out, as being the best sailing ship. Not long after, the "San firmien" and the Perla Frigate made Signal of eight Suspicious sail in sight; and altho' the haziness of the Weather prevented the 'Trinidad' from Seeing them, I ordered the fleet to crowd Sail, and discovering (about 10 o'Clock) from 15 to 18 Ships of the Enemy with several frigates, I ordered to form as convenient in an accidental Line of Battle, keeping the Wind on the Larboard Tack, with a view of thus obtaining the Windward and performing the evolution on that tack with the utmost dispatch. In doing this, the 'Prince,' 'Regla,' and 'Oriente,' got so much to Leeward that they could not form in the Line, without Danger of its being Cut thro' by the Enemy, who in an opposite direction in regular order and with Press of Sail were Standing towards us. In consequence of this, I ordered those Ships to Ware by which means they might fall into the Tail of the Line, and altho' the two first Effected it, the 'Oriente' could not, and her only Recourse was to Run to Leeward of the Enemy.

"The meeting of the two Lines fell out so that the headmost Ship began his fire, at $\frac{1}{4}$ before having her Bowsprit towards the Prow of the 'Trinidad,' from which Ship as a point our rear moved, bearing up largely in Succession.

"I omitted mentioning that the 'Trinidad' was amongst the sternmost Ships of the Line, the Centre and Van of which remained out of the Action.

"The rear of the Enemy sailed considerably astern, and in order to bring the fire of our Van to bear upon them in some measure, I made the Signal at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 11 for headmost Ships to Wear Round, to fall in with the Centre of the Enemy and Double upon them in the Rear, this seemed to me the Most Securable for many weighty Considerations, which determined me to adopt it. However not being able to effect it by reason that the Ships to whom it was Addressed, did not understand it, I regarded the loss of the 'Prince,' 'Regla,' and all our Rear as irretrievable. The Critical moment of this being Lost, I made Signal for the whole Fleet to Wear together, with a design of increasing the Distance between us and the Enemy in order to bring some more Ships of the Centre and Van into Action, and to make the Engagement more general in wearing, which some of them had already began, from the time of bearing up, the 'Trinidad' was Engaged by the Enemy within Musquet shot from which resulted consequence of much moment, being exposed to the fire of the Whole English Line; Thus their headmost ships passed athwart our Rear, and five or Six more effected the same by Doubling us to Windward. In Conclusion the last of their Ships destined for this object having Wore, all the rest wore quite Round together and running forward on the starboard side of our Line, continued in Consequence of our firing

on us from the other side in an Excellent and well kept line, by which means they decided the Action in their favour.

"This design had been foreseen by me from the beginning and in Order to obviate it, I had Directed the Ships a Head to Double to Leeward on the Enemy's Rear, and had six or Eight of the Van been able to Join themselves in time to the 'Prince,' 'Regla,' 'Oriente' & 'Firmin,' they would have placed the Enemy between two Fires, and decided the Action in a Different way. When the Enemy commenced their movement—of wareing—the 'Prince' and 'Regla' could not get up to fall in with the Tail of our Line, but taking notwithstanding all Possible Advantage of their Situation they Incommoded and fired on them during the time of their Evotation, until they were unable to Come abreast of our Fleet; after the English Ships had Wore they ran Down our Line as far as the 'Trinadada' discharging their fire particularly on that Ship which by the Damaged condition of her Sails fell to Leeward, I gave Orders both by Voice and Signal for the 'Selvidore,' 'San Josef,' 'Soberano' and 'St. Nicholas' to shorten Sail and form upon our Quarter, which movement they Executed with Dispatch considering the fire they had to support; at 2 always keeping the Van division to Windward, Signal was made to bear up shorten sail and make the attack on the Enemy General; the 'Mexicano' was able to form on our Bow about 3 O'Clock and Engaged with the most formadouble ship of the Enemys line which was Employed the most of the Evening against the aforementioned 'Trinidad,' 'San Josef,' 'San Nicholas' and 'San Isidro,' who sustained by themselves alone the chief and hottest part of the Action against the whole fleet of the Enemy. In this Situation it would have been expedient for our Centre and Van to ware in order to support us, but wanting in our Ships Haulyard Ropes and every other means of making signals, I was not able of making known this movement. I ought not to withhold the praise due to the Gallantry with which the above Ships (formed upon my Quarter) distinguished themselves in the Action; at length however, dismasted and destroyed, some were obliged to strike and other abandon the Combat. The 'Trinidad' was attacked the whole Afternoon by a Ship of 3 Decks which did her the most serious Mischief and by 3.74⁵ that fired on her from stem to stern within Pistol Shot; having more than 200 killed and wounded she was rendered incapable of steering, yet with this Imperfect Crew she continued the Action for more than another Hour, such was the disastrous situation in which the 'Trinidad' was placed after 6 Hours of uninterrupted action, when she was succoured by the 'San Parbla,' and 'Pelayo'; which having Dropped astern in the Morning, by my Order bore up with all sail upon the enemy's Fleet. The moment they were engaged the reinforcement of these two Ships was strengthened by the timely joining of the 'Con de Regla,' the 'Prince' too came up shortly after and the Van began to Tack which being seen by the Enemy they formed in retreat bearing up together and covering the Ships which had struck, which were the 'San Josef,' 'San Selvidore del Mundo,' 'St. Nicholas' and 'St. Isidro,' considering the forces of fortunate occurrences which befriended the Enemy the Consequence of the Action cannot appear

surprising particularly if we take into Account that as they were Cruising on the very spot the Action took place it was Natural for them to sail in order better adapted to form in Line of Battle than it was Possible for us to do in our lines of sailing holding our Course with the Wind large and hence it was that no sooner had they Discovered us than they were formed in Order of Battle, and in Immediate preparation to Engage, which obliged me to form the readiest line without regard to Stations, notwithstanding the bad Distribution which must irreparably ensue amongst private ships and flags. To all of which is to be added the 'Pelayo' and 'San Parblo' and 'Oriente' remained to Leeward of both lines, that the 'Prince' and 'Regla' notwithstanding their diligence and alertness of their manœuvres, were not able to form with us till the Evening and that the 'San Firmin' was scarcely able to affect it being without her foretopmast, in as much as only 17 ships of my Fleet were able to form in line of Battle (including the 'San Domingo' laden with Quicksilver and of very little force) of these 17 some fought at Intervals, and many could not get up to bring their Guns to bear, the Consequence of all of which was that the whole line of the Enemy was exclusively Engaged with Six Spanish Ships, whose resistance is well deserving of applause, in as much as they wanted the Complement of Men Necessary to work them. The 'Trinidad' becoming absolutely Dismantled, and without the Power of using either Colours or Lights for the purpose of making signals, that Lieutenant General Don Juan Joachin Moreno came up to form instead of her, and re-establish the order of Battle on the Larboard bearing, and measures were taken to fit up Jury Masts for the 'Trinidad' and to have her towed by the 'Mercedes' Frigate in her course to Cadiz according as the Wind may serve, and her Damaged Condition allow. In Consequence of this I shifted with my Major General and Adjutants on Board the 'Dianne' Frigate ordering several Frigates to pass the signal along the line for all the ships to observe the prescribed order of sailing and repair their Damages with all speed in Order to Continue the Action. The Fleet remained all Night in line of Battle standing on the Larboard Tack with the Wind from W. to W.N.W. till 6 in the Morning of the 15th when I ordered them to wear round on the new line of Bowling; after this I took the earliest opportunity to Enquire by signal the Condition of the Ships for Action, when the 'Conception,' 'Mexicano' and 'Soberano' replied *'that they were not in the Condition to renew the attack.'* The 'Regla,' 'Oriente,' 'St. Parblo' and 'St. Antonio' *'that they were'*; it was not Possible to make out the Reply of the Rest without determining at all. I continued to keep as near as possible on the Point on which the Enemy was standing who to the Number of 20 were in sight at 8 O'clock, at S.S.W. my opinion continuing altogether divided as to the Condition of the Ships of the Fleet, I Enquired in the Evening whether it suited them to attack the Enemy, the 'Conception,' 'Mexicano,' 'St. Parblo,' 'Soberano,' 'St. Domingo,' 'St. Idefonso,' 'Nepamuceno,' 'Atlante' and 'Firme' answered 'NO', the 'Glorious,' 'Paula' and 'St. Firmin' *'that it suited them to put off the affair'* and only the 'Prince,' 'Conquistador' and 'Pelayo' replied in the Affirmative *'that it suited*

them to attack'. Thinking it my Duty in this Diversity of opinion to regard the reply of each Commander as the just Account of the Particular state of his own Ship, I did not hold it expedient to Crow'd sail upon the Enemy especially as the 'Mexicano,' 'St. Domingo' and 'Soberano' Informed me by voice that they had sustained several Damages and that the 'Atlante' was short of Men, the circumstance of the last Ship being common to all the rest. At 3 In the Evening the Enemy were at E.S.E. and I ordered to Steer S.E. which point was altered at 5 o'Clock to S.E. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. in Order to be able to Double Cape St. Vincent in those Ships whose Damages could be repaired; they worked Day and Night with Zeal and activity and to get time for those operations I ordered at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 11 of the same Night that the fleet should stand on the Starboard Tack formed in Order of Battle; on the 16th we could only see some small ships of the Enemy at S.E. $\frac{1}{4}$ S. to which point I Commanded to steer at 7 in the Evening with a favourable S.W. wind, the ships standing on the Starboard line of Bowling. I had hopes of being able to see the Enemy on the following Day supposing they had Shaped their Course for Gibraltar, however, by 10 in the Morning the 'Conception' made known by signal that the Enemy had Anchored on the Larboard side and Informing me by Voice they had seen 4 Large Ships in Legos believing the whole of the Enemy were there also, I ordered to form a Line of Battle to Starboard and placed myself in the Front of it, having used the utmost Dilligence in this arrangement I Dispatched the Frigate 'Bridida' to reconnoitre the ships at Anchor, which confirmed my conjecture; she having reckoned all the Enemy's Ships the Fleet wore, and afterwards in sight of Shore on the Starboard, and remained in that position all the Evening and part of the night, till a Breeze springing up at S.E. it moved under an Easy Sail.

"A Return of the Killed and Wounded had not been given in when the Admiral wrote, the Commanders of the several ships not being able to make out their respective reports, however he adds that he has learnt from casual Information that in the 'Conde de Regla' was killed in the Commencement of the Action the Admiral Count de Amblimont by a Cannon Ball, the splinters of which wounded a Brigadier D. Geronimo Bravo, Captain, and Don Carlos Sellery, Lieutenant, that in the 'Seberano' was killed Don Francisco Leis, Captain, Don Bernardino Antillon, Lieut. and other Officers whose Number has not yet been ascertained and in the 'Mexicano' was Dangerously wounded Brigadier Don Francisco Herraray Cruzat, Captain, who died 4 Days after; the killed in the 'Trinidad' were Don Hercules Guchi, Lt. and a Midshipman; the wounded were Don Francisco Alvarez, Captain, Don Juan Josef and D. Domingo Reynoso, Lieuts., Don Joachin Camacho, Master, and Don Antonio Castelanos, Subaltern; from the return which Brigadier D. Pedro Pineda who commanded the 'St. Josef' has sent from Legos of the losses sustained by her and the other 3 ships taken by the English in the Action, we learn further that 10 minutes after the Action commenced the Admiral Don Francisco Winthusyen lost both his legs, of which wounds he Died the same Night; that there was killed in the same Ship ('San Josef') Don Miguel de Doblas, Lieut. and Dangerously wounded Don

Santiago Campomar, Master, and of less account Don Francisco Eidiaguez and Don Bartolme Morquecho, Subalterns, having altogether 46 killed, 56 dangerously wounded and 50 slightly wounded. That in the 'Selvidore Del Munda' was killed Brigadier Don Antonio De Yepes, Captain, Don Miguel Roldan, Lieut., Don Luis Corneillon, Subaltern, Don Joachin Manso, Master, Lieutenant Don Manuel Illescas, 2nd Master, hurt, Don Manuel Ruiz, 2nd Captain, and the Purser Don Juan Francesco Martinez, having altogether killed and wounded 200.

"In the 'St. Nicholas' (which was boarded by one of the 3 ships which Engaged her) was killed about the same time Brigadier Don Thomas Geraldino, Captain, 2 Subalterns and 1 Midshipman, wounded 1 Lieut., 1 Subaltern, the Master and a Subaltern of Infantry of Mercia, and hurt another Lieut., being altogether 120 killed and wounded and lastly in the 'St. Isidro' were killed Don Manuel Paulo, Subaltern, Don Angel, Maria de la Laneilla, Purser; wounded Don Theodore Argumoso, Captain, Don Philippe Tournelle, 2nd Captain, Don Firmin De Argumoso (Desperately), Don Felipe Acevedo and Don Augustus Roncale, Lieut., Don Raymon Moyua, De Joachin Verdugo, Subalterns, Don Genero de Auria, Midshipman, and Don Ramon, Don Amaya, Master, having altogether 11 killed and 63 dangerously wounded.

"A. TRUEL."

(Translated from the Spanish by the Rev. Mr. Ward, Chaplain of His Majesty's Ship "Prince George.")

Particulars of the Action off Cape St. Vincent on the 14th of February, 1797 between the British Fleet consisting of 15 Sail of the Line under the Command of Admiral Sir John Jervis, K.B. and the Spanish Fleet consisting of 28 Sail of the Line, as taken on Board H.M. Ship "Excellent."

At Day break saw some of the Enemy's Ships to Windward. Soon after perceived 5 Sail of them on the Lee Bow, and more Ships to Windward bearing down towards us, But it being Thick and Foggy Weather could not distinguish their Number; At 20 Minutes past 11 Formed the Line of Battle as most Convenient on the Starboard Tack per Signal. The Enemy to Windward formed their Line on the Larboard Tack. At 50 past 11 The Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to Engage the Enemy, when the Action commenced between the Van of both Fleets. At Noon the whole of the Fleet were engaged. At 5 past 12, We (the "Excellent") fired on a Spanish two Decker that was passing our Line to Leeward. 25 past 12 "Victory" made signal for the Fleet to tack (The Enemy having passed us on the other Tack). Tacked. The Spanish Fleet apparently in great Disorder. The "Culloden," "Captain," "Blenheim," "Prince George," and "Orion" Engaging instantly to Leeward of the Enemy, the Van Ships attempting to Veer on the Larboard Tack. We kept our Wind and got to Windward of the Enemy. 40 past 1 "Victory"

made the signal that tho' having the Weather Gage of the Enemy He meant to pass through their Line and Engage them to Leeward. Signal Engage the Enemy. Saw a Spanish two Decker with her Fore Topmast gone. "Victory" made Signal for the Fleet to Come to the Wind on the Larboard Tack. "Prince George" made Signal to make Sail after Laying by. 40 past 1 "Victory" Signaled for the Van Division to make Sail after laying by. 50 past 1 Came with Wind on the Larboard Tack per Signal. At 2 saw a Spanish Rear Admiral with his Main Topmast gone. The "Prince George," "Captain," "Blenheim," and "Culloden" Engaging to Leeward ahead of us. 5 past 2 "Victory" made "Colususs" signal to make all possible Sail. 10 past 2 "Victory" made signal to Engage. 20 past 2 Answered our Signal (the "Excellent") to break the Enemy's line. Made more sail; bore up; and run between a Spanish 3 and 2 Decker. Sail and commenced a heavy fire on the 3 Decker, who immediately replied and after we had shot ahead of Her She hoisted her Colours and passed to Leeward fired over Us and several of her Shot struck us and the "Irresistable" and "Diadem," being to Leeward and firing Over us. The Admiral made the Signal to *Discontinue* the Engagement. 50 past 2 the "Diadem" still continuing to Fire over us. The Admiral made her Signal to Make more sail. We ran alongside a Spanish 2 Decker and Engaged her closely. 50 past 2 the 3 Decker that had struck to us Surrendered to the "Victory." At 3 the 2 Decker struck to us, seemingly in very great Confusion, and having her 3 Topmasts. 5 past 3 made the Signal to the Admiral that the Sternmost Ships of the Enemy were not secured and passed on. At 15 past 3 We (the "Excellent") were Closely engaged with a 2 Decker and a 3 Decker. Observed the 3 Decker's Mizon Mast to go. Saw another 3 Decker with her Mizon Mast gone. Shot ahead of the two Ships, and commenced a heavy Fire on a 4 Decker to Windward. 35 past 3 Saw the "Captain" Engage the 2 Ships We had Fore-reached. Soon after saw the "Captain's" Fore Topmast Gone. We were still Engaging the 4 Decker. Our Ships to Leeward still Engaging and Firing Over us. At 57 past 3 saw the "Lively" with Our captured ship in Tow. Answered the Signal for the Fleet to bring too. Saw the 3 and the 2 Decker we had Engaged surrender to the "Captain." 10 past 4 We were still Engaging the 4 Decker. 20 past 4 Admiral made Signal for Frigates to take the Captured Ships in Tow. 40 past 4 Came to the Wind on the Larboard Tack per General Signal, and left off Engaging the 4 Decker. 40 past 4 Answered the Signal to form in Close Order. At 5 Admiral made "Lively's" Signal to Come to the Wind on the Starboard Tack. Frigates to Leeward with 4 Captured Ships in Tow. 5 past 5 the "Captain" made Signal for Boats to Tow and Assist her in Distress. 30 past 5 "Victory" made Signal to Form in Close Order, the Enemy Consisting of 31 Sail standing from us on the Larboard Tack.

Minutes of the Signals made in the Action with the British and Spanish Fleets off Cape St. Vincent, February 14th, 1797. Taken on Board H.M. Ship "Excellent":—

Time.		By whom made.	To whom addressed.	No. of Signal.	Purport.
H.	M.				
11	50	Victory	General	5	To Engage the Enemy.
12	25	"	"	80	To Tack.
12	30	"	"	—	The Van Ship of the Enemy.
12	40	Victory	General	40 & 5	To go to Leeward and Engage the Enemy.
1	5	"	"	41	Engage as you arrive up to the Enemy.
1	25	"	"	85	Come to the Wind in Succession of Sail.
1	35	Prince George	"	66	Make sail after (rest illegible).
1	40	Victory	Van Division	66	Ditto.
1	50	"	General	85	Come to the Wind (rest illegible).
1	50	"	Colossus	65	Illegible.
2	5	"	"	65	Illegible.
2	10	"	General	5	(With a Red Pendt. Over) To Engage Closer.
2	20	"	Excellent	40	To pass thro' the Enemy's Line and Engage to Leeward.
2	30	"	Irresistable	66	Make sail after laying bye.
2	35	"	Excellent	91	To bear up.
2	40	"	Irresistable and Diadem	52	To Discontinue Battle.
2	50	"	Diadem	66	Make Sail after laying bye.
3	5	Excellent	Victory	26	The Sternmost ships of the Enemy are not secured.
3	10	Victory	General	66	Make sail after laying bye.
3	15	"	Lively	23	Keep in more Open Order.
3	57	"	General	92	Fleet to bring to.
4	20	"	Frigates	154	Take the Captured Ships in Tow.
4	30	"	General	83	Come to the Wind on the Star-board Tack.
4	50	"	"	27	Form the Line in Close Order.
5	0	"	Lively	83	Come to the Wind on the Star-board Tack.
5	5	Captain	Victory	10	In want of boats to Tow; and Assist her in Distress.
5	10	Victory & Blenheim	Fox Cutter	93	Come within Hail.
5	30	Victory	"	27	To Keep Closer.

British Fleet.

	<i>Guns.</i>		<i>Guns.</i>
" Victory "	100	" Goliah "	74
" Britannia "	100	" Colossus "	74
" Blenheim "	90	" Captain "	74
" Barfleur "	98	" Culloden "	74
" Prince George "	98	" Irresistable "	74
" Namur "	90	" Orion "	74
" Egmont "	74	" Diadem "	64
" Excellent "	74		

The next four names are missing; it then continues with

" Southampton "	32	" Bonne Cityonne "	18
" Lively "	32	" Raven " Brig	16
" La Minerve "	36	" Fox " Cutter	12
" Niger "	32		

Spanish Fleet.

<i>Guns.</i>		<i>Guns.</i>	
" Santissima Trinidad "	130	" San Antonio "	74
" Mexicano "	112	" San Pablo "	74
" Concepcion "	112	" San Firmin "	74
" Conde de Regla "	112	" Neptune "	84
" El. Salvidore "	112	" San Ildensanso "	74
" Princep de Austrias "	112		74
" San Josef "	112		74
" San Nicholas "	84		74
" Oriente "	74		74
" Glorioso "	74	" Perla "	34
" Atlanta "	74	" Ceres "	34
" Conquestadora "	74	" Matilda "	34
" Soberano "	74	" Pay "	34
" Firme "	74	" Atooka "	34
" Pelayo "	74	" Mercedes "	34
" San Genazo "	74	" Diana "	34
" San Juan "	74	" Dorotia "	34
" San Francis "	74	" Brigada "	34
" San Isodore "	74	" Vigilante " (Brig)	16

Spanish Ships Captured.

	<i>Guns.</i>
" El Salvadora del Mundo "	112
" San Josef "	112
" San Nicholas "	84
" San Isidora "	74

Copy of a Letter from Mr. John Wilkie, Master of His Majesty's Ship "Prince George" to his Friend in England giving an Account of the Action on the 14th Day of February 1797. Between the British and Spanish fleets Off Cape St. Vincents, Dated " P. George " in the Tagus, March 10th, 1797.

The unvaried attention you have shewn to me ever since I had the pleasure of being Introduced to your acquaintance, by our late and much Lamented Friend Stocker, lays me under such obligations as to claim every thing and any thing which I can think may be a Gratification to you.

I am aware you have many Naval acquaintances, but lest it should happen that neither of these had transmitted you a Detail of the Action of the 14th February, 1797, I am willing to use my Endeavour to make the Transaction of that Day as well understood to you as the observations which fell under my notice, Compared with the Minutes taken During the Action, can throw upon it.

You will have heard I hope before the Receipt of this Letter, that on the Morning of the 14th February, '97 the Fléet under the Command of Sir John Jervis Consisting of 15 Sail of the Line, 4 Frigates, 2 Sloops and 1 Cutter, got sight of a Spanish Fleet which he got Intelligence of a few days before, being South of Cape St.

Vincents, that we gave chase to them without regard to their Superiority, before noon brought them to Action, and a little after 4 o'Clock got Possession of 4 of their Ships of the Line, while the remainder of their fleet, 23 Sail of the Line, 12 Frigates and a Brig stood off with all the Sail (some of them being much disabled) could carry, leaving us in unmolested Possession of the Prizes, with an Inferiority of Numbers which I think will incline Posterity to Doubt the Narrative of the Transaction.

Having then given you the outline and result of that Day's business, I will now lead to the detail from our parting with you off Ushant the 18th January with Contrary Winds. We, I mean the Squadron, of 5 Sail of the Line and one Frigate beat our Passage to Lisbon by the afternoon of the 30th where Rear-Admiral Parker had Orders sent him on Board by the Minister from Sir John Jervis, these I presume were pressing, for we sailed again the Day following, so soon as the tide would permit, and got off Capt St. Vincent the 1st February, where we Cruised for Sir John Jervis untill the 6th when we Joined him with the Remnant of the Mediterranean fleet, which with the "Culloden" and "Colussus," who joined a few days after, made altogether 15 Ships of the Line, Frigates, etc., where daily joining and parting from us. We continued looking out for, with a faint hope with meeting with 2 Galleons, daily expected home under Convoy of 3 Sail of the Line, our expectations were wound up high on the Evening of the 7th by the Sight of a Squadron of Ships of War in N.W. We chased and closed with them by 2 in the Morning, of the 8th. They proved to be Portuguese. On the Morning of the 11th a Convoy Passed within us to the Northward, we found they convoyed our Naval Stores from the Mediterranean and were bound to Lisbon. By the Frigates which protected them, the Admiral Received Intelligence of the Spanish fleet having come from Carthagea thro' the Straights of Gibraltar, that Day we cleared for Action per Signal from the Admiral, and from that Period he carried as much Sail as the "Britannia" in particular and the "Diadem" could keep company with; in Beating up against a Strong S.E. Gale on the 13th about 10 A.M. Commodore Nelson Joined in the "La Minerva." The Fleet was then brought to, Rear Admiral Parker then sent and obtained the Intelligence got out of the Enemy, with Sir John Jervis's determination to see them at all Events and to attack them if an Opportunity offered that appeared to our Advantage, Some hours after we got this Intelligence "La Bonne Citoyane" Joined and undoubtedly brought fresh Intelligence of the Enemy, for soon after (say about 4 O'Clock) the Admiral again made Signal to Clear for Action. Commodore Nelson's Pendant was then Shifted on Board the "Captain," and soon after the fleet filled with the Breeze much moderated and Drawing to the Southward, which it continued to do until Midnight as far as S.W. Our Fleet was got upon the Starboard Tack about 11 O'Clock; between $\frac{1}{2}$ past 1 and 2 in the morning of the 14th, the report of 15 Heavy Guns were heard in the S.W. quarter, I have since concluded it was their Signal to Ware, by that Evolution being performed 3 or 4 Hours later than us, and their loosing much ground in the performance of it, brought

their fleet so near that some were in sight at Day light, in the Intervals between Hazy Clouds, the Breeze was then so light that with single Reefs and T.G. Sails set we did not go three Knots until $\frac{1}{4}$ past 9 o'Clock, when we and some others made all Sail per Signal to chase S.W.; the wind was then about West. The strange fleet bore from S. to S.W. the nearest about 6 miles from us but many 3 or 4 Leagues off; about 10 o'Clock we observed them closing with each other, and about $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 they began to form in order of Battle as if from Necessity to meet us; on our Closing up so fast with them they attempted to Draw upon the Larboard Tack, I say attempted, because they form'd that Evolution so Ill, that on viewing them with a Seaman's eye, it was sufficient to Inspire us with a Confidence of success in spite of the superiority of their numbers, which we could then observe corresponded with the Intelligence we had received. About that time it did not appear that any plan of Attack or defence had been adopted by them, nor did it appear to me there was sufficient skill or Discipline to Execute any Orders their Commander might have given for either Purpose. While they (for about this time they shewed Spanish Colours) were in this confused and apparently perplexed state hauling up to the N.N.W. we closed fast with them steering for the Centre of their fleet, 15 minutes past 11 the Chasing signal was in part superseded by Signal for a Line of Battle as could be formed in a S.S.W. Bearing. In a few minutes we were pretty well and close formed in the Van, "Blenheim" leading "Prince George," "Orion," "Colossus"; I cannot name the followers. The "Culloden" was unfortunately, I cannot help thinking so, above half a Mile to Windward and but little abaft our Beam. In consequence she was exposed to the fire of our ships in the Van when we came to close with them, which we were doing fast on different Tacks. 30 minutes past 11 Signal was made to bear up one Point to port, this Important signal was made at a most interesting Period, a few minutes before, two of the Enemy's 3 Deckers and 1 two decker who had been a good mile off about 2 to 3 Points on our weather bow, had wore, bore up and at the very time that signal was then thrown out was passing athwart of the "Blenheim" and us at no great Distance, and soon hauled up on the same Tack with us about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile, a point or two on our Lee bow, under Top Sails only, and so Ill trimmed that we closed fast up with them, inso-much that we were at a loss to decide whether we would have occasion to fire our Weather Guns or no at the Ships crossing to Windward or these three dallying on our lee bow; these three latter decided our Doubt by setting their foresail and Immediately after their Main Sail and edged away; our Commander in Chief observing this at 40 minutes past 11 made Signal to alter again 1 point to starboard and 42 minutes past 11 to Cut through the Enemy's line; this signal served to confirm the Object which the Van had for some time been aiming at, and by this time had affected, for the 3 ships who had come to Leeward were now edging down under all Sail to join 4 more of the line and some frigates who were from 3 to 6 miles off and about 2 to 3 points on the Lee bow; about $\frac{3}{4}$ past 11 the Enemy commenced firing at our Van, 48 past 11 the Admiral made Signal to Engage. The "Culloden"

having then entered the thick of the Enemy and to windward of some of them commenced a heavy fire, the "Blenheim" also, and in a few minutes we commenced, the "Orion" next, etc., etc. We had to run under the lee of 9 or 10 of their ships in this manner, which we found we passed in about half an hour, during which we received a bad shot through the Bowsprit and some other Damages of trifling consequence; on the smoke clearing away we found the "Culloden" on the weather Bow of the "Blenheim" in apparent good Order. 20 past Noon the Admiral made Signal to Tack in succession Headmost ships first. The "Culloden" Immediately obeyed, she had not trimmed on the Larboard Tack before one of the Enemy's three deckers bearing a Rear Admiral's flag who had mismanaged it so grossly about an hour before as to get upon our Lee Bow, put in stays under all Sail. The "Blenheim" tacked and stood after the "Culloden," we also put in stays in our turn, and the lee Division of the Enemy led by the 2 three deckers were closing so fast up, that before we had trim'd on the Larboard Tack opened their fire upon us, but without much effect; they were soon Diverted from us by our followers who Exchanged fire with them, the "Orion" Tacked in her turn after us, the "Collusus" also put in stays, but before she got head to wind her fore Yard gave way in the Slinger and brought down the Top Sail Yard along with it; she was obliged to ware, which from the lightness of the breeze and the wrecked state of her head Sails, she did but slowly; she was however completely protected by the "Victory" and two other of her followers who went under her Lee between her and the Rear Division of the Enemy, giving them so warm a reception as they attempted to Close, that they again edged away, Wore and soon after One o'Clock, I observed they were standing off a Second time to the Southward. Our Centre having then affected the Double purpose of giving protection to the "Colussus" and separating so great a part of the Enemy from their main Body, were left at liberty to follow us in the Van, I mean the "Culloden," "Blenheim," "Prince George" and "Orion," who had drawn away about a Mile, or nearer two from their Followers while they were Engaged as before mentioned; our leaders nevertheless continued under all Sail to Close up with the main Body of the Enemy who were now much Crowded by their rear we had exchanged fire with, pressing up towards their Van, this body Consisted of (some say 18 Sail) I counted only 17 Sail of the Line and some Frigates, but it was difficult to reckon them from being so much Crowded together. I must here refer back to a Circumstance so deserving of Notice, that it would in my opinion be Criminal to omit it. His Majesty's Ship "Captain" bearing the Commodore's Pendant appeared to have been *Impatient* of her station (which was the sternmost of the line, except the "Namur") but got to Windward a little abreast of the Second or third Ship a Head, when the Rear Division of the Enemy about one O'Clock were to the Southward, the Captain then wore when about a Mile on our Lee Beam, and under all Sail looked up towards the Enemy's fleet, our small Division, the van by keeping a Point from the Wind closed up fast under the Lee of the Enemy, who were still huddled together but protected in some measure by four of their 3 Deckers, being decently formed to

Leeward with two of their two Deckers on their Weather Quarter; against these the "Culloden" recommenced the Action about 20 or 25 minutes past one O'Clock, about 10 minutes after the "Blenheim" recommenced and a few Minutes after the "Captain," who had then got a little Ahead tho' to Leeward of the "Culloden," opened a well Directed fire but by what appeared to me some misapprehension she backed her Main Top Sail, thereby hampering the followers from closing up without the risque of suffering by fire of our own Ships, that Circumstance occasioned an anxiety, I may say uneasiness, on board her, for some Minutes. The Enemy's rear were firing on us, we could not return our fire without Edging away, therefore would have gone to Leeward from a Situation which we had reason to flatter ourselves would contribute to Decide the fate of the Battle. It is under such Circumstances that a few Minutes appeared long to those Interested; Our Worthy Commander, Rear-Admiral Parker, appeared to me to have feelings During that Short Period congenial to those I have Expressed, to avoid the hazard of suffering by the fire of our own Ships, and to allow our followers to act as they came up, he made the Signal for the Headmost Ships to fill and stand on at 43 minutes past 1 o'Clock these Signal flags then became the Compass by which I steered, aided at Intervals by a Glimpse of the Enemy's mast Heads to windward, and the "Blenheim" on the Lee bow; for at that period we bore up a little and recommenced a very heavy fire by Broadside on the 3 Ships in the Enemy's Rear, luffing up on the "Blenheim's" weather Quarter, to reload and bear up alternately to fire on the Enemy, backing the Mizen Top Sail occasionally to keep astern of the "Blenheim's" fire; the "Orion" about a Cable length astern and to windward acted in a similar manner astern of her, there was still so Considerable a space in our line unoccupied that we could not ascertain who was the next follower. About 2 o'Clock being fairly abreast of the Enemy's rear ship, Manœuvring became unnecessary on our part, except to keep astern of the "Blenheim's" fire; our people after that time maintained so unremitting a fire that few were the observations we could make untill about 3 O'Clock, about which time in a clear of the smoke, it appeared to me the "Culloden" had got a Head of the "Captain." We had then passed the "Salvadore del Mundo" a three Decker, and the "San Isidro" a two decker, who appeared to be much sickened from their treatment; the "Orion" was handling them roughly while we were getting abreast of another 3 Decker, the "San Josef," bearing a Rear Admiral's Flag. She then bore evident marks of the "Blenheim's" fire, but at first maintained a brisk fire against us; on our coming up with her an Eighty Gun Ship also annoyed us more than the 3 Decker; our leaders were then Engaged with a Ship of the most Tremendous appearance bearing their Admiral's Flag, who got support from two 2-deckers then on her weather bow and Quarter; while our van was thus situated, at 3 o'Clock our Admiral made the Signal (we had all along kept up, except when once shot away) for the Headmost Ships to fill and stand on; alas our Van then bore strong marks of being unable; however, our Centre had then closed up so much that the Headmost of them

was observed to be about $\frac{1}{2}$ mile off and broad on our weather Quarter; a few minutes after 3 o'Clock the "Excellent" acted a Distinguished part by Drawing out a head from our Centre under all Sail, and passing to Windward of a three Decker, the "Salvadore del Mundo" we had left astern, and under the stern of the two Decker "St. Isidro" raked her, then hauled up in a Seamanlike manner, hove too under her lee, and gave her so complete a Dressing in addition to what she before had, that in less than a Quarter of an Hour she struck; but being still fired at by some of these Ships newly come up, she soon after, say 25 past 3, hoisted the Spanish Jack under the Union; the "Excellent" had by that time filled and made signal the prize was not secured, and again stood on under all Sail. We ceased firing to avoid the risque of injuring her, while she passed quietly to Windward of our Antagonist ("St. Josef") with like regard to us; we could then observe that our Centre had in General bore up towards the "Orion's" wake, thereby falling close in with the three Decker ("Salvadore del Mundo"), we first passed, now much dismantled from these fresh Ships. She sustained further injury, while she scarcely maintained a Shadow of Resistance; we were so much clouded by smoke that our observation about that time could not be extensive or very accurate. I however concluded from the firing having ceased astern ("Orion" excepted) about 40 past 3 that a second ship, the 3 Decker (Salvadore del Mundo) had fallen into the hands of our friends astern; at that Instant we could also observe the "Excellent" had got under the lee of the Spanish Admiral, where fresh proofs of good conduct were exhibited, and the fire of the Enemy taken off in a great measure from the Ships who had led ahead of us, and already maintained so noble a part, but now appeared unmanageable; about the same time also, or a few minutes later, 45 minutes past 3, the Mizzen Mast of our Antagonist ("St. Josef") went over the stern, her main topmast being shot away before, but her head Sails being all set and full. She from that time fell fast down upon us, suffering severely every minute by her pride in delaying to strike. It is true she had a right to look for support, but it was Distant, and to me appeared forlorn; it was the Division which was forced to the Southward in the first of the day, who during the time we were Engaging had tacked and were coming up on our Weather Quarter under all the Sail they could set, but were still some Miles off. Several of our Ships also were still to Windward of us, the "Namur" in particular, whom I omitted mentioning in due place, that she followed in the "Excellent's" wake about 20 minutes or half an hour after her; at the same time I must observe she did not follow the *Example* of the "Excellent" precisely, for when coming up on the Weather Quarter of our Antagonist ("St. Josef") and before she was near to her about $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 o'Clock, she, the "Namur," hawling up to the wind commenced a Brisk fire with her Starboard guns; we could have dispensed with that aid which occasioned us uneasiness, for several of her shot went over us, some struck us and many were observed to fall round the "Culloden," a Cable length ahead of us. She fortunately ceased soon, and stood after the "Excellent"; the

"Blenheim" had by this time (40 minutes past 3) fallen to Leeward about a Cable's length on our Lee Bow; the "Culloden" was as far ahead of us, Engaged with an Eighty Gun Ship about a Cable's length to Windward. The "Captain" was ahead of the "Culloden" and about 2 Cables' length from her, using every apparent Endeavour to cling to the Spanish Admiral, until 50 minutes past 3 when her foretopmast went over to Leeward; it was the first mast that came down on our side. She soon dropt astern in consequence of that Disaster, which was followed almost immediately and connected with some important incidents that gave a decision and put a Close to the labours of the Day; these were the "Captain" keeping close to the Wind as if with design to hook the "Culloden's" Antagonist, which event took place about 6 or 8 minutes after by her. The "San Nicholas" falling with her Mizzen Chains on board abaft the "Captain's" larboard or weather Cat head; the "Culloden" passed on under their lee and just clear of them; we followed with a renewed fire, while at the same Instant our Antagonist ("St. Josef") Dropt down with her Main Chains on the weather Cat head of her *unfortunate friend*, thus entangled there was no other prospect from them but that of Dropping among the Body of our Fleet, now near astern and to windward and closing fast up with them; notwithstanding this some hardy or I may rather say rash people on Board these two ships fired several Guns at us, so soon as we were opened to them ahead of the "Captain"; the fire of our Batteries were reserved until we were fairly clear of our Gallant Friend, when such a Dose was poured into the Bows of these Ships as must have made them suffer severely for their temerity, we were hailed by the "Captain" that both had struck, we ceased fire and observed the Crew of the "Captain" were boarding the 2 Decker who was foul of her; this happened at 4 or 5 or 6 minutes past 4 o'Clock, during this cessation of fire we rove braces afresh which had been cut and rendered unserviceable, got fore runners, set up the stay and spring stay having been shot away, set what sail we could, and Directed our Course towards the Spanish Admiral who appeared to be about falling into our hands an easy prey. The Signal was then hove out for our fleet to bring to, sternmost ships first; about 5 minutes past 4 o'Clock our Squadron had changed their Position, some Ships in Particular; the "Captain" who had been ahead in the Beginning was now left a little astern of us; with the ships before described foul of her; the "Blenheim" was on our Lee beam with rigging (particularly forward) cut up; the "Culloden" was close on our Weather bow, we could not get past her; the "Excellent" was nearly half a mile ahead of us; and the "Namur" was edging down towards the "Excellent's" weather Quarter, both were firing at the Spanish Admiral's ship, who was nearly a mile from us, and about 4 points before our beam. Our hopes were great on seeing the "Namur" come up under her lee, but she was not keeping *so close* as we thought she might have done, her fire tho' well maintained, was not so decisive as the "Excellent's" had been on the two Decker, which first surrendered; we were interrupted a little in our intention of getting up with the Spanish Admiral

by the "Culloden" on our Weather Bow, with all her sail set, or rather hanging loose; she hailed us and desired we should not regard her as intending to go farther on, being unmanageable. In consequence we were obliged to back the Top Sails to allow her to get athwart our Bows, when clear of her, we again filled and set what Sail we could to pursue our former intention of closing with the Spanish Admiral who was then the only object to attract the attention of the Ships ahead. When the "Namur" came up with her she had all Sail in their places, either set or hanging full spread, which with the light breeze made her shuffle pretty well on; She sustained the fire of the "Excellent" and "Namur" with a patient perseverance which appeared to me to be bordering upon Desperation; she Careen'd so much to Leeward that her lower deck Ports were dipping nearly with the Water, her fire had slackened almost to Silence, and her Masts were tottering without any apparent support. The Main mast in particular threatened every little roll to give way below the Hounds, but it was eased by the Main Top Mast falling to Leeward. I Concluded by the "Namur's" Shot about $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4 o'Clock nothing in my opinion could have justified her keeping any Colours aloft or returning a Gun (which was done but seldom, tho' to the last) except a Dependance on the Support of the Division, who were then so close up that by that time they had opened their fire upon the "Britannia," who was then a Mile to Windward of the "Captain" and the Prizes. She had been following after the "Namur," but on the Signal being made to bring too, had hauled her main sail up; by her remaining to Windward the Disabled Ships received a great Protection and the Rear Division of the Enemy kept off at a more respectable distance from us than they would have probably done; at $\frac{3}{4}$ past 4 o'Clock I observed 4 or 5 of their Ships coming down from the Van, as if with Intention to protect their Admiral, whose Honourable and persevering sufferings and defence deserved a Display of more Valour and Discipline in his support. By this time there was not any of our Ships except the "Excellent," "Namur" and "Britannia" maintained any fire worth of Notice, we made but small Progress in closing up as we intended, our T.G. Sails were furled on account of the Topmasts being badly wounded near the Head or Hounds, and the Use of our Jib was lost; we stood on now with intent to form some kind of Connection with the "Namur" and "Excellent" and to serve as a Cover to our Disabled Ships untill about 5 o'Clock when we hove to.

The Enemy soon Drew away from us, and about 6 o'Clock our Van wore after our main Body, and hove too in the Order of Battle as well as could be formed. The three deck ship was clear but the two decker still foul of the "Captain's" head and stern still under her lee. They got clear $\frac{1}{4}$ past 6 o'Clock.

The Names and forces of the Prizes, also of the fleet which went off from us, you will have learnt correctly from the Public Letter. To it I beg also to refer you for other Particulars which in my Situation I could not obtain; I have only attempted a Detail of these Events

which fell under my Notice since Compared with the Minutes during the day.

I shall feel gratified if my Endeavour produces in any degree the Intended purpose of Conveying to you the Idea of the Evolutions of our Squadron in the Execution of that attack on the Spanish fleet. The Success with which it was attended we hold sufficient Proof of. It will serve hereafter for the Historian to enrole in his page as an Additional proof of the Superiority of our Navy against other Powers; when it is Considered among Naval Men, I am of opinion it will not suffer by a Comparison in point of Brilliancy with any action now on Record. In point of Importance it may be classed below some, unless the arrival of the news came on purpose to Cheer up the Spirits of the People at home where I am sorry to have heard they were somewhat Drooping and Discontented. I wish sincerely it might have produced so desirable an affect.

Under such Circumstances it is likely the Hearts of the Nation will glow with Gratitude towards our Commander in Chief, for having conducted this affair so ably; in my opinion they may justly glow. I know not what part of his Conduct most to admire, his unremitting endeavours to get upon the ground to meet with them, his adverting to give timely notice to the fleet of his Expectations to meet the Enemy, by his signals to prepare for Battle; his spirited dash among them when he got sight, after having entered among them, his Judicious Conduct in taking all advantage of their Confused and unprepared state, and last tho' not least his prudent forbearance and withdrawing from Action at the time he did with such Distinguished Trophies, obtained with so small a loss on our side. Our Squadron were all Capable of action on the Defensive and, except the "Captain" and "Culloden," able and ready to act on the offensive.

There cannot remain a Doubt but that our Commander was fully satisfied with the Conduct of every Ship under his Command; his Orders were Executed every where with alacrity and firmness, and in some Cases it appeared to me they were *anticipated*.

It is unnecessary to Remark the Evolutions of the Centre and Rear are not much noticed by me, from the Situation in which I was placed they could not be observed with accuracy; but as the Van bore the most Distinguishing part in Deciding the fortune of the Day I hope what I have said will Contribute to give you some Idea of the whole.

A circumstance came to my knowledge since the Action which may be worthy of notice. When our Squadron crossed the Enemy's main Body of 17 Sail of the Line about noon one of the Enemy's Two Decked Ships ("Oriente") passed Close under the lee of our Line, and then hawled up and Joined the Seventeen who had crossed us to Windward. The seven sail also who bore away to the Southward a second time about one o'Clock were joined by 2 more two deckers who had not composed a part of their fleet the Day before.

ENGLISH LINE OF BATTLE.

Frigates.		Line.	Guns.
Lively	1	Blenheim	—
	2	Prince George	98
Niger	3	Orion	74
	4	Colossus... ..	74
Southampton	5	Britannia	100
	6	Diadem	64
La Minerve	7	Irresistable	74
	8	Eggmont	74
Bonne Citoyenne	9	Victory	—
	10	Culloden	74
Raven (Brig.)	11	Barfleur... ..	98
	12	Excellent	74
Fox (Cutter)	13	Goliath	74
	14	Captain	74
	15	Namur	90

SPANISH LINE OF BATTLE.

Frigates.	Guns.		Line.	Guns.
Brigada	34	1	Bahama	74
		2	Pelays	74
Casilda	34	3	San Pablo	74
		4	Neptinio	84
Perla	34	5	Conception	112
		6	San Domingo	74
Mercedes	34	7	Conquistador	74
		8	San Juan Nepomuceno	74
Paz	34	9	San Genaso	74
		10	Mexicano	112
Doistea	34	11	San Terrible	74
		12	Oriente	74
Guadaloupe	34	13	Soberano	74
San Teresa	34	14	Santissimo Trinidad	136 on 4 Decks.
Vigilante (Brig.)	34	15	San Nicholas	
		16	San Isidro... ..	74
Matilda	34	17	Selvidore del Munda	112
		18	San Idifonso	74
Diane	34	19	Conde Regla	112
		20	San Fermin	74
Atocha	34	21	Firme	74
		22	Principe de Asturias	112
Ceres	34	23	San Antonio	74
		24	Glorioso	74
		25	Atlante	74
		26	San Francisco de Paula	74
		27	San Josef	112

THE WAR IN POLAND AND EAST PRUSSIA, 1806-07.

By MAJOR G. M. ORR, 11th King Edward's Own Lancers, Indian Army.

TO understand how Napoleon came to invade Poland and enter on a campaign against the Russian armies, it is necessary to look back to the events which led to the campaign in Prussia in the autumn of 1806.

After the invasion of Austria in 1805, which ended in the decisive victory at Austerlitz over the Russian and Austrian armies, Austria was compelled to withdraw from the coalition formed by England, Sweden and Russia against France. Prussia had hesitated to join this coalition in 1805. However, in 1806, she was persuaded to do so, and, egged on by her people and her army, found a pretext in the threatening position of the French army cantoned in South Germany, to deliver an ultimatum enjoining Napoleon to withdraw his corps to the Rhine. Napoleon's answer was to march against the Prussian armies. The double victory of Jena and Auerstadt, followed by the relentless pursuit resulting in the surrender of Prince Hohenlohe at Prenzlau and of Blücher at Lübeck and of the fortress of Magdeburg, placed the whole of Prussia up to the river Oder at his feet. Ever since the victory of Austerlitz he had already looked beyond Prussia, and had seen in his wonderful imagination that opportunities would arise to break for ever the coalition. Sweden, he looked on as in a position to play only a secondary part. It was to bring England to abandon "the tyranny of the sea," that he issued from Berlin on 21st November, 1806, his famous decree, by which he forbade England all commercial intercourse with the Continent. To compel obedience to his policy on the Continent, however, it was necessary to beat Russia as completely as he had beaten Austria and Prussia.

From his position along the Oder he saw his opportunity to do this, since the Russian armies, summoned too late by Prussia to her aid, were now advancing towards the Vistula. Napoleon therefore determined to advance at once into Poland against them with his victorious corps. Poland with its fine granaries looked suitable as a theatre for operations, in spite of the rigorousness of its climate; moreover, its people had always said France was their friend. He looked therefore to them to rise in his aid, and he led them to believe he would restore to them their former independence. Austria had been compelled to declare herself neutral, though she belied her words by organizing her armies anew. Turkey had been induced to create a diversion in the S.W. of Russia and thus draw away an army from the main theatre of war.

France, Italy and the Confederated States of the Rhine gave recruits to Napoleon, while Austria and Prussia added immense sums of money for the maintenance of his armies. On the other side, to aid

Russia against him, Sweden could do but little. England eventually promised money, arms and an expedition, none of which, however, arrived in time to be of use; Prussia had but one remaining corps intact in her last remaining province of East Prussia.

To secure East Prussia by obtaining Königsberg was Napoleon's object, while on the other hand the Russian and Prussian armies advanced to prevent it. To accomplish his object Napoleon first had to cross the Vistula and crush the enemy's armies, and then he would have to turn his attention to the principal strategical points. By the success of the campaign just concluded he had gained the advantage of the Oder as a new base, and he prepared to advance at once against the Russians before they had time to make further preparations. The theatre of war in which the operations were about to take place was bounded on the north by the Baltic, on the east by the Niemen, on the south by the Bug, and on the west by the Vistula. (See Map I). The principal strategical points were Danzig, Thorn and Warsaw on the Vistula, and Königsberg on the Pregel.

The country was peculiar, being nearly level, generally of sandy soil much cut up by marshes and woods; to this soil succeeds a clay, which after a few days rain, becomes changed to a vast sea of mud. Military movements and combinations are not practicable except in summer, when the ground is entirely dry, or in winter when the frost has hardened the ground and frozen the lakes. Thiers describes the country as consisting of a moving soil alternately sand and mud, covered more with woods than cultivation. The rivers formed the principal lines of defence. In the southern portion of the theatre there was the Vistula with its tributaries, the Warka, the Narev, and the Omulev. In the northern portion, besides the lower waters of the Vistula, were the Passarge, the Alle, the Pregel, and the Niemen.

From the line of the Vistula three main roads converged on Königsberg :—

1. Warsaw—Pultusk, whence ran the great road to Wilna and St. Petersburg—Eylau—Königsberg.
2. Thorn—Lichstadt on the Passarge—Heilsberg on the Alle—Eylau—Königsberg.
3. Danzig—Elbing—Braunsberg on the Passarge—Königsberg and thence on to Tilsit.

Danzig was joined to Warsaw by two roads :—

1. Left bank of the Vistula, via Thorn.
2. Right bank, via Marienwerder, Soldau and Pultusk.

From Warsaw main roads ran due east to Moscow, south to Cracow, south-west to Breslau, west to Posen and Berlin.

For the purposes of narration it will be convenient to divide the war into the two campaigns of Eylau and Friedland, separating each into two phases.

The Campaign of Eylau.

FIRST PHASE :—The march to Poland. 1st November—31st December, 1806.

SECOND PHASE :—Winter quarters and the march to Eylau. 1st January—27th February, 1807.

The Campaign of Friedland.

FIRST PHASE :—Quarters on the Passarge and the siege of Danzig.
1st March—31st May, 1807.

SECOND PHASE :—The march to Friedland and the Niemen. 1st June—1st July, 1807.

THE CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU.

FIRST PHASE :—The march into Poland. 1st November—31st December, 1806.

On November 1st Napoleon's various corps were in the following positions (Map I).

Lannes (5th corps—18,000) at Stettin.

Davoust (3rd corps—23,000) at Kustrin and Frankfurt.

Augereau (7th corps—17,000) at Berlin.

Jerome (9th corps—14,000) being formed at Berlin.

Reserve of cavalry 10,000 at Berlin.

The Guards 8,000 at Berlin.

Bernadotte (1st corps—18,000) near Lübeck.

Sault (4th corps—23,000) near Lübeck.

Ney (6th corps—20,000) at Magdeburg.

Cavalry in the north, about to be put under the command of Bessières, 8,000.

Mortier was with the 8th corps in Hanover.

At this time the Allies' forces consisted of :—

The Prussian corps under Lestocq, 15,000, at Thorn.

A Russian army of four divisions under Bennigsen, 45,000, approaching Warsaw.

A second army of four divisions under Buxhowden, 30,000, in rear of the 1st.

A reserve of two divisions under Essen, 18,000, on the Niemen.

Another army of 50,000 or 60,000 under Michelsen was about to operate against the Turks, but sent up as soon as possible some 12,000 men to swell the reserve under Essen.

Having decided to make an advance against the Russians, but uncertain either of their strength or their whereabouts, Napoleon sent Davoust's corps as an advanced guard to Posen. He supported him with Augereau on his left rear and Jerome on his right rear, while Lannes was directed to come up on the left of Augereau. He had meant to concentrate these corps with some cavalry at Posen before the 18th of November, but finding the Russians were by no means advancing rapidly, Napoleon at once directed his leading corps on to the line of the Vistula, placing the whole under the command of Murat. Murat was to push on with the cavalry and Davoust's corps to Warsaw, to be followed by Lannes via Bromberg and the left bank of the Vistula. Augereau was directed up the Netze to Bromberg, and thence up the Vistula to Plock and Mödlin. Jerome, who was at Kalich, was sent to Silesia to occupy the fortresses on the Oder still in the hands of the Prussians, and thus further extend the base of the Oder. The remaining

corps, as they became free, came into Berlin for a short rest and were thence despatched to Posen, thus :—Ney, followed by Bernadotte, to Thorn, Soult to Plock, while Napoleon himself with the Guards marched to Warsaw. Thus Napoleon had in first line about 70,000, and a little less in second line. As the first line approached the Vistula, Bennigsen withdrew to Ostrolenka, calling Lestocq towards him; but on being joined by Buxhowden he advanced again to Pultusk and sent Lestocq again towards Thorn. On the 7th December, Ney, followed by Bernadotte, was marching towards Soldau from Thorn; Soult and Augereau towards Pultusk via Plonsk; Murat and Davoust were bridging the Narev near its confluence with the Warka, having in rear of them Lannes, the Guards and the reserve of cavalry which up to now had covered the advance. From the 7th to the 20th December, movements were practically put a stop to, owing to the bad weather. A complete thaw accompanied by sleet and rain had broken up the ground. On the 23rd December, after a personal reconnaissance by Napoleon, Davoust successfully crossed the Warka, and on the 24th together with Augereau, the Guards and the reserve of cavalry was directed on Golymin, where Napoleon felt convinced the main force of the enemy was. Lannes was sent as a right flank guard towards Pultusk; Soult was given the task of moving against the Russian communications in the direction of Ostrolenka, while Ney and Bernadotte pushed back Lestocq to the north, and separated him from Bennigsen. On the 25th, Napoleon saw he had broken the line of the Warka and that the enemy were not concentrated, but he was still uncertain where their main force was. Indeed reconnoitring in a country by turns covered with mud or thick forests was impossible. Meanwhile Bennigsen, with part of Buxhowden's force, had retired to Pultusk leaving only two divisions under Prince Galitzin at Golymin, consequently on the 26th, Lannes, on arriving before Pultusk, was opposed to 43,000 Russians with the result that his attack was repulsed with severe losses. Meanwhile at Golymin, Napoleon's main body had merely to drive in a rearguard. To the north Soult had been successful over Lestocq at Soldau on the same date. Next day the Russians retired to the upper Narev, but no pursuit was attempted, Napoleon having resolved to look on the campaign as over. The weather had been, and was still, frightful; pursuit would have been practically impossible considering the lateness of the season, the condition of the roads, and the exhausted state of the army. Napoleon had shown before, after Ulm and Jena, that he did not spare his soldiers in the pursuit of a flying enemy, but on this occasion the roads were such quagmires that he could not move his artillery. The supply question, too, was most difficult, as the country had been drained by the Russians and now offered scarcely anything.

Uncertain of the enemy's movements, Napoleon had thought that, by advancing on a front of 80 miles against the line of the Warka, he would discover their intentions. If he found the Russian army at Pultusk he would turn it with his advanced left wing—Ney, Bernadotte and Soult—and force it on to the Austrian frontier, which at that time ran along the Vistula to a point 5 miles above Warsaw and thence to the confluence of the Bug and the Narev. If he found the Russians at

Golymin, as he thought they were, his intention was to cut them off from the great road through Pultusk with his right wing under Lannes, then to penetrate with his centre, consisting of Murat and the corps of Davoust, Augereau and the guard, to Ostrolenka where he would be between the Russians and their frontier; meanwhile Ney and Bernadotte would interpose between Lestocq and the Russian main body and throw the former back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blücher, to surrender.

We see that at the commencement of this first phase Napoleon was groping for the enemy's forces and he advanced with his first line spread out; then from his position along the Vistula, from Thorn to Warsaw, he attempted to round up the Russians and surround them on all sides, though at the time he did not know where their main force was. This was not the principle on which he had looked for the enemy's main body on entering Prussia in 1806; then he had kept his columns close together, ready to fight the main body whenever and wherever he found it. In this campaign the wings of his army were advancing on two separate lines, from Thorn and from Warsaw, and could not effect a junction; further after crossing the Warka, he separated his corps still more by sending Lannes to Pultusk and Soult up to the north.

SECOND PHASE:—Winter quarters and the march to Eylau. 1st January—27th February, 1807. (See Map II.)

On 1st January, 1807, Napoleon returned to Warsaw to arrange the establishment of his winter quarters. Lannes was placed between the Vistula and the Bug, covering Warsaw with headquarters at Sierock. Davoust was between the Bug and the Narev, with headquarters at Pultusk. Soult was behind the Omulev as far as Willenberg on the road Warsaw—Eylau, with headquarters at Golymin. Ney was between the head waters of the Omulev and the Passarge, with headquarters at Mława, near Soldau. Bernadotte was on the extreme left behind the Passarge from Osterode to Elbing for the purpose of covering the siege of Danzig, which was to be undertaken by a newly formed 10th corps under Lefebvre; Augereau was on the Warka behind Soult and Ney, with headquarters at Plonsk. The Guards and Oudinot's grenadiers were at Warsaw. The light cavalry covered the entire front, while the heavy cavalry were cantoned along the Vistula.

Thus each corps had a base on a river in order to avail itself of water carriage.¹

The army by this plan was to rest, and he cautioned his corps commanders expressly not to incite the enemy to attack by making offensive movements. He himself devoted his time to regulating the supplies, obtaining reinforcements and especially horses, administering Poland and organizing Polish auxiliaries. Thiers says that at this

¹ Thiers, the French historian, remarks that Napoleon's dispositions and arrangements for the winter quarters from Thorn to Warsaw form a most admirable example.

time the total numbers of the whole French army was 580,000, raised to 650,000 with auxiliaries. Out of these, 300,000 were east of the Rhine, of which 150,000 only could come into line on the Vistula, while 80,000 from among them again only could be brought to the field of battle.

The Russians under Bennigsen had retired north and were joined at Bialla by Buxhowden and Lestocq, their united forces, according to Alison, being 75,000. Meanwhile Essen's force, raised to 30,000, advanced to the upper Narev. As soon as Bennigsen saw Napoleon's dispositions for his winter quarters, he resolved on an offensive movement against Bernadotte and Ney, whom he hoped to surprise in their cantonments, overthrow in detail and then, based on Danzig, he could spend the rest of the winter in East Prussia. Starting from Bialla on the 15th January, and screened by the lakes and forests of East Prussia, Bennigsen reached the Alle in the vicinity of Heilsberg. There his advanced cavalry suddenly came on Ney's cavalry, who were moving ahead of Ney with the intention of perhaps surprising Königsberg and at any rate obtaining supplies and booty from a tract of country hitherto untouched. Ney fell back to Niedenberg and warned Bernadotte, who at once endeavoured to concentrate his scattered forces at Mohrunen, where he was attacked on the 25th, and forced back to Osterode. Napoleon, convinced by the 27th January that the Russians meant business, issued orders for a concentration of the cavalry, and the corps of Davoust, Soult, Ney, Augereau and the Guards towards Allenstein. Lannes, supported by Oudinot's grenadiers, was to cover Warsaw and the right rear of the army from the line of the Narev, which was menaced by Essen. Bernadotte and Lefebvre were to fall back and cover Thorn.

Von Wartenburg in his book, "Napoleon as a General" points out how important Thorn was in Napoleon's eyes. If he advanced into East Prussia, he considered he would be unable to keep up his direct line of communications with Warsaw, for it would be exposed to a flank attack from Russia, and the further the line extended the more would the danger increase, he therefore determined to ensure the shorter and safer line to Thorn and to hold on to it at any cost.

Alison gives the total strength of the troops across the Vistula in January, 1807, as being as follows:—

<i>With Napoleon.</i>				<i>Detached.</i>			
Guards	12,938	In Pomerania :			
Oudinot's grenadiers			6,046	Mortier	17,122
Bernadotte	19,023	In Silesia :			
Davoust	19,757	Jerome	20,439
Soult	27,824	Danzig :			
Augereau	10,000	Lefebvre	23,795
Lannes	18,119	Hanover	7,587
Ney	16,039				
Murat's Cavalry	15,621				
Total				Total			
147,367				68,943			

In addition to Murat's cavalry, 24,000 light cavalry are included in the corps numbers. If we deduct from this mass of 147,000 infantry and cavalry on the Vistula, the 19,000 under Bernadotte, 18,000 under Lannes, 6,000 under Oudinot, there will remain 104,000 in Napoleon's main body.

On the 1st February, when Napoleon's corps were approaching the point of concentration, he sent instructions to Bernadotte to draw forward the Russian army, and then to slip back under cover of a rearguard to join the left of the main army. This message fell into Russian hands, with the consequence that Bennigsen on the 2nd concentrated at Junkowo with the intention of falling back before Napoleon's superior strength, as he himself had now only about 70,000. On the 3rd February Napoleon's army was concentrated in front of the Junkowo position. Soult and Davoust were at once directed down the Alle to cut Bennigsen's communications by turning his left, but Bennigsen succeeded in holding off Soult, and on the night of the 3rd retired in the direction of Heilsberg. Napoleon pursued in three columns; Davoust by the right bank of the Alle; Murat and Soult, followed by Augereau and the Guards, in the centre; and Ney on the left keeping Lestocq from joining the Russians.¹ On the 7th February, Murat and Soult overtook Bennigsen's rearguard at Eylau, with the result that Bennigsen resolved to await battle on a chosen position in rear of the village of Eylau. Before beginning the description of the battle of Eylau, it will be well to note some points as to Napoleon's concentration at Allenstein.

If his despatch to Bernadotte on the 1st had not fallen into the hands of the Russians, he would have been on the 3rd February to the east of Bennigsen, and from this position would have menaced Bennigsen with an attack in flank by superior numbers, and would have cut his communications with Russia and Königsberg; while Bernadotte, turning on Lestocq, would have separated him from the Russians and pushed him back to the sea. The movement to Allenstein was Napoleon's usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in rear of the enemy during his advance.

One of Napoleon's maxims was: "At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not is a matter of grave consideration, but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity."² In this case this axiom was faithfully followed, for though Bennigsen had initiated the offensive, Napoleon at once assumed the offensive himself, and by his advance regained the initiative.

THE BATTLE OF EYLAU.

(See Plans III., IV., V.)

The position selected by Bennigsen, on which to give battle to Napoleon, was about one mile to the north-east of the village of Eylau

¹ Bernadotte, through not getting the message, was far behind on the Thorn road.

² Maxim No. VI. Translation by General D'Aguilar.

along the summit of a slope. This slope rose from the foot of the small eminence on which Eylau itself was situated. A low ridge running north-west from Eylau for a short distance gave cover to anyone approaching from the south-west. The country, nearly level, was dotted over with lakes, which at this time were frozen and effaced by the snow, and in no way distinguishable from the rest of the plain. The road coming from the south-west into Eylau ran almost due north by the small villages of Schloditten and Schmoditten on its way to Königsberg. Another road starting from Eylau ran at first north-east to the hamlet of Anklappen, then east past the villages of Kutschitten and Lampasch on its way to Dommau and Friedland. The road from Bartenstein approached Eylau from the south-east close to the village of Serpalten. On the whole the ground was firm for infantry and well adapted to cavalry.

Authorities differ greatly as to the numbers engaged in this battle. If we deduct from the 104,000, which Alison says Napoleon concentrated at Allenstein, 14,000 as having been lost or left behind on the march, we get 90,000, which is the number Wilson gives in his history. On the other hand Thiers says 63,000. Alison strikes a mean and says that probably 80,000 with 350 guns was what Napoleon had. Undoubtedly the straggling on the march up to Eylau had been tremendous. The Russians are put at 65,000 with 460 guns in Alison's history, to which should be added 9,000 Prussians under Lestocq. Thiers on the other hand, says the Russians and Prussians together came to 80,000. At the commencement of the battle, if we exclude 14,000 for Ney's corps and 9,000 for Lestocq's Prussians, we get 66,000 on the French side and 65,000 on the Russian. The French were superior in cavalry, but had less guns, though they were of better quality and more ably served.

The Russian right, under Touchkoff, lay on either side of Schloditten, athwart the Königsberg road. The centre, under Sacken, was on either side of the hamlet of Anklappen, which was the key of the position. The left under Ostermann, rested on the village of Serpalten, with the hamlet of Klein-Sausgarten in its rear. Between the centre and Eylau, Bagration had 10,000, the Russian late rear guard. In rear were two divisions in reserve, under Doctoroff, in two close columns behind the centre. The infantry of the army was drawn up in two lines with the foot artillery along the front; the cavalry and Cossacks were disposed behind the centre and wings. Lestocq was, on the night of the 7th, about nine miles away from the right flank, and was expected to join before the battle was far advanced. The fighting between Soult and Bagration on the 7th had been severe and had lasted into the night, when Eylau remained in possession of the French. Napoleon seeing the possibility of a battle on the morrow had sent word to Davoust at Bartenstein to march at once on Serpalten, so as to be able to fall on the left flank of the Russians next morning. Ney, too, was sent for, but it was not expected that he would arrive in time.

Early in the morning of the 8th February, Bennigsen commenced the battle with his artillery. Napoleon massed the whole of his corps artillery to reply to it. Soult's three divisions were disposed, Leval at

Eylau, Legrand to his left, and slightly in advance, St. Hilaire a mile to the right by the village of Rothenen. In the interval, Augereau's corps of two divisions, Desjardins and Heudelet, were drawn up in two lines. Further in rear were the infantry and cavalry of the Imperial Guard, and the divisions of dragoons and cuirassiers under Murat. Napoleon's design was to turn the Russian left with Davoust's corps, and throw it back into the middle of the army, and then attack the Russian centre and left with Augereau's corps and the division of St. Hilaire, using Eylau as a pivot to wheel to the left.

About 9 a.m., a part of the Russian right advanced against the French left, which was slightly withdrawn, but otherwise held its ground. Friant's division of Davoust's corps now appeared on the right and occupied Serpalten, but was at once assailed by one of the reserve columns of infantry under Doctoroff, and the cavalry of the Russian left wing. Morand's and Gudin's divisions of Davoust's corps now arrived in turn, and Davoust caused the Russian left to fall back to Klein-Sausgarten. When Napoleon saw the Russian reserves directed against Davoust, he at once ordered forward Augereau and St. Hilaire to fling the Russian left back on its centre. It was 10 o'clock when they advanced, but owing to a sudden and violent snow storm they lost their direction and became separated; St. Hilaire, caught in an isolated position near Serpalten, was driven back, while Augereau bearing to his left met the whole of the artillery of the Russian centre, was repulsed, nearly annihilated, and driven and pursued to the hill where Napoleon stood. Napoleon at once ordered Murat to advance to the counter attack with all his cavalry, arrest the retrograde movement of the right wing, and fill the gap between St. Hilaire and Augereau, while a battalion of the Guard was brought forward to check Augereau's pursuers. St. Hilaire joining hands with the left of Davoust's corps again pushed the attack on the Russian left and successfully gained the line Anklappen—Kutschitten after most severe fighting. The Russian left wing was now drawn up, facing outwards, nearly at right angles to the centre. It was in this position when, about 4 o'clock, Lestocq arrived at Schmoditten, and passing behind the centre threw his Prussians, in conjunction with the Russian left, on Davoust and forced him out at Kutschitten and Anklappen, back to Klein-Sausgarten. Darkness had now come on and the battle seemed to be over, when Ney's arrival at Schloditten caused a renewal of fighting on that flank, with the result that Bennigsen decided to withdraw his army, since he considered Ney's position endangered his communications with Königsberg.

It was not till next day that the retreat of the Russians from the position was realized.

The losses on both sides had been very heavy; Alison computes the French losses in killed and wounded at 30,000, while 10,000 left their Colours and fled to the rear. On the Russian side the total of killed, wounded and prisoners amounted to 25,000. No attempt was made to pursue on the 9th owing to the exhausted state of the French troops; consequently it was not till the 10th that Murat was ordered to follow the enemy towards Königsberg, supported by Ney.

During the night of the 8th, Napoleon is reported to have been extremely anxious about his position. Not knowing of Bennigsen's retreat, but conscious of his own great losses, and believing the Russians would attack the next day, he had given orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to Serpalten. The distance from his base, too, caused him anxiety, and he despatched orders to Lefebvre to move up to Osterode as a general reserve, and pointed to the road to Thorn as his new line of communications, instead of to Warsaw.

Some points to be noticed in this battle are that Napoleon disposed his troops in less depth than usual, and thus gave a lesser mark for the enemy's numerous artillery; that the great counter attack by Murat's cavalry, amounting to about 12,000 horsemen in 80 squadrons, which pushed back the Russian centre, but was unsupported by infantry, failed to defeat it; the success with which Lestocq evaded Ney and arrived on the battle field several hours before him.

After sending Murat and Ney in pursuit, Napoleon remained several days at Eylau to rest and reorganize his army. The remains of Augereau's corps, which had suffered so severely, was broken up and distributed among the others. Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau, and orders were sent to put all the bridges over the lower Vistula in a state of defence, for Napoleon already had decided to draw back his army in that direction and rest them in cantonments. His advanced corps were recalled from the Frisching, and on the 16th February he issued orders for the retrograde movement to the Passarge, west of which his army spread itself into cantonments. Bennigsen hastened to occupy the country evacuated, and on the 25th February his outposts were in touch with the French along the Passarge.

THE CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND.

FIRST PHASE:—Quarters on the Passarge and Siege of Danzig.
1st March—31st May, 1807. (See Map VI.)

As soon as Napoleon had returned to Warsaw on the 1st January he had seen the necessity of besieging Danzig, and had formed a special corps under Lefebvre for that purpose. In order to cover the siege he had been obliged to leave the corps of Bernadotte at a great distance from Warsaw, with the consequence that, when he advanced, he not only had to leave one corps covering Warsaw, but another covering Danzig. The siege of Danzig had now, at the end of February, become in Napoleon's eyes an operation of the utmost necessity. Its importance lay in the fact that its possession would prevent the French left being turned; that it commanded the lower Vistula; that it enclosed a spacious harbour. The advantages of a position along the Passarge were: that the whole army covered the siege without sending away any part of it for that purpose; that, if the Russians moved straight on Danzig, he could oppose them with his whole united army; that he could shorten his communications by shifting the line from Warsaw—Posen to Thorn—Posen; that, if the Russians moved on Warsaw, he could strike at Königsberg, then,

turning on the Russian Army, throw it back on the Narev or the Vistula.

Napoleon, then, placed himself between the Passarge and the lower Vistula. His first care was to organize the commissariat and form an immense magazine at the centre of his cantonments. He made the most strenuous exertions to fill up the gaps in his army, and above all to increase the strength of his cavalry. He formed a second army from among his allies with a backing of 40,000 veteran French troops; so that he had under Marshal Brune upon the Elbe an army of 100,000, which ensured his communications to France and was a warning to the threatening attitude of Austria. The army in Prussia was disposed as follows in villages, with the outposts comfortably housed in timber barracks:—

The numbers given below are those to which the corps were raised previous to the resumption of hostilities in June after the dispersal of Lefebvre's corps among the others:—

Bernadotte	...	27,391	Braunsberg to Spanden.
Soult	...	31,565	Liebstadt to Deppen.
Davoust	...	29,570	Osterode to Allenstein.
Ney	...	17,000	In advance at Guttstadt.
The Guard	...	9,127	First at Osterode and then at Finken-stein.
Reserve Cavalry		21,428	Lower Vistula and the Passarge.
Mortier	...	15,000	Brought up from Pomerania to the lower Vistula.
Lannes	...	15,340	At Marienberg (a newly-formed reserve corps).

A total of 166,321, of which 21,428 was reserve cavalry and 10,410 was corps cavalry. The command of the Vth Corps, which was to continue guarding the extreme right flank on the Narev, was handed over to Massena and was reinforced by a Bavarian division under Wrede. Massena's instructions were to cover Warsaw, to form the right wing of the army, and to assume an offensive attitude in order to occupy the attention of the enemy. In order to carry out these instructions he was bidden to form an entrenched camp at Ostrolenka. To prevent the Cossacks penetrating between Osterode and Warsaw a small corps of Poles with 1,000 to 2,000 Polish cavalry was placed at Neidenberg under Zayonscheck. The siege of Danzig itself was conducted by Lefebvre with 20,000, while Colberg and Graudenz were blockaded by 7,000 auxiliaries. On the completion of the siege Lefebvre's corps was distributed among the others.

Danzig was surrounded on all sides by a rampart, wet ditch and strong palisades, and in most parts by formidable outworks. The fort of Weichelsmunde, commanding the opening of the Vistula to the sea, required a siege for itself. On the west the most important outwork was the fort of Hagelsberg. The garrison consisted of 12,000 Prussians and 6,000 Russians, under Kalkreuth. On the 20th March communication with the land, *i.e.*, by the Nehrung Peninsula to

Königsberg was completely cut off, but it still had the means of receiving succour by the sea. To stop this it became necessary to capture the island of Holm at the mouth of the Vistula. When this was successfully accomplished on the 6th May, Danzig became invested on all sides. Meanwhile an attack on Hagelberg had failed, so that the French decided to continue the siege by the more tedious method of approach by sap. Bennigsen, not deeming himself in sufficient strength to attempt the raising of the siege by an offensive movement against the line of the Passarge, resolved to attempt a combined land and sea attack from the Nehrung Peninsula and the mouths of the Vistula. In the middle of May, while 5,000 men under Kamenski sailed to the mouth of the Vistula and 2,000 Prussians advanced along the Nehrung peninsula, feints were made along the line of the Passarge and against Massena so as to prevent succour being sent to the besiegers. Owing to the late arrival of some of the ships Kamenski's attack was delayed so that Napoleon received ample warning of the intended expedition and was consequently able to reinforce Lefebvre with parts of Mortier's and Lannes' corps, with the result that the attempted relief was a failure. On the 26th May Kalkreuth capitulated with all the honours of war, owing to the ammunition in Danzig having come to an end. As soon as Danzig was taken Napoleon shifted his communications for the third time from the line through Thorn to lines through Marienwerder and Danzig. During the months that his army had been on the defensive covering the siege of Danzig, he had paid great attention to securing its position. All the bridges on the Passarge had been destroyed except one for the use of the corps of Bernadotte at Braunsberg and another for the convenience of Soult at Spanden. Two bridges over the Vistula, one at Marienberg, the other at Marienwerder, made a safe communication with the besiegers at Danzig, and two vast defences were added to each bridge end. With regard to these *têtes de pont*, Napoleon in his maxims says "It is essential that they should be constructed upon the principle that an army can form and rally between them and the river, otherwise they will prove a very inefficient assistance to protect the passage of an army over a large river."¹ So long as Thorn remained his principal advanced base, he was most attentive to its fortifications, and as soon as Danzig was captured it, too, was refortified and garrisoned. Napoleon laid great stress on fortresses and considered them equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. "They would not in themselves arrest an army, but they were excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a victorious enemy."² He considered they should be capable of defence by a few men and those men should be recruited from the population and not from the armies in the field, in fact, a Militia. These permanent fortifications secured certain important points and that was all, but in a system of frontier fortification he also considered they had spheres of influence, that is, that their positions gave them influences beyond the range of the guns on their

¹ Maxim XXXIX., D'Aguilar's translation.

² Maxim XL., D'Aguilar's translation.

walls. In addition to the value Napoleon put on temporary fortifications, as exemplified by his *têtes de pont*, and permanent fortifications or fortresses, he laid great stress on the art of field fortification. One of the five things that he said a soldier should never be without was his entrenching tool.¹ He laid down that "in a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a superior army, it was necessary to entrench every night; that the natural positions ordinarily met with were not sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers, without recourse to art."² It was thus that he defined the different uses to which the art of fortification should be put.

SECOND PHASE:—The march to Friedland and the Niemen. 1st June to 1st July. (See Map VI.)

During these months the Russians had been reinforcing their principal army, which was now disposed as follows:—

The right wing under Lestocq, 18,000, in front of Bernadotte.

The centre under Bennigsen, 88,000 on the Alle.

The left wing under Tolstoi, 15,000, on the Narev.

A reserve of 30,000 was coming up from the interior under Labanoff, but could not arrive before the end of June. Bennigsen's headquarters were at Heilsberg, where he had formed an entrenched camp.

After the capitulation of Danzig, Napoleon returned to his headquarters at Finkenstein and prepared to commence hostilities on 10th June by advancing against the Russian right, taking Königsberg and throwing their army back on the Niemen. However, just as in the commencement of the year, he was forestalled by Bennigsen, who, attracted by the apparently exposed position of Ney's corps, had resolved to overwhelm it, and had set his divisions in motion on June 5th. The main body in three columns was directed against Ney; the Cossacks, under Platoff, were to attack between Ney and Davoust; two columns under Doctoroff were to attack Soult's bridges and prevent him from succouring Ney, while a column under Kamenski demonstrated against the bridge of Spanden, and another under Lestocq against Braunsberg; the Imperial Guard was held in reserve behind the main body. This formidable attack would doubtless have succeeded if the French troops had remained scattered in villages, but with wonderful foresight Napoleon had ordered on the 1st May all the corps to come out of their cantonments, and encamp by divisions within reach of one another, on well chosen ground, and under protection of good earth works. On the 5th, Ney was attacked by double his numbers, but effected his retreat to Ankendorf with comparatively little loss, resuming this movement next day closely pressed to Deppen on the Passarge. When Napoleon on the 6th was assured that the Russian move was more than an affair of outposts, he ordered his corps to concentrate, drawing back his more advanced corps and advancing those in rear. He pointed to Saalfeld as the central point of concentration, on the principle that "an army being driven from its first

¹ Maxim LIX., D'Aguilar's translation.

² Maxim XVII., D'Aguilar's translation.

line should rally its retreating columns sufficiently in rear to prevent any interruption from the enemy."¹ Napoleon himself hastened to Saalfeld, and on the night of the 6th, found Ney holding the Passarge at Deppen. No further attacks had been made on the other marshals, so that he was still in possession of the line of the Passarge, while Bennigsen's offensive seemed to have come to a stop. Napoleon had under his hand Murat's cavalry and the corps of Davoust, Soult, Ney, Lannes, and the Guard, while Mortier was a day's march in rear; Bernadotte, on the lower Passarge, was ordered to watch the Prussians for a day or two. As soon as Bennigsen saw that his purpose of attacking Ney in an isolated position had failed and that he now stood with inferior numbers before Napoleon's army, he resolved to fall back on his entrenched camp at Heilsberg. The position of Heilsberg was an important one, as it commanded roads from the north, west, and south, and blocked the road to Eylau and Königsberg. As long as the Russians retained both it and the course of the lower Passarge, their position was unassailable; but directly the enemy interposed between Heilsberg and the sea, threatening Königsberg and Eylau, then the advantages of Heilsberg were lost.

Napoleon had three courses open to him. Firstly, he could advance against the fortified camp, and by storming it hope to terminate the war in a single bloody battle. Secondly, by advancing on the right bank of the Alle with his right forward, he could throw the enemy back on Königsberg and the sea and cut him off from his frontier. To carry out this latter operation Napoleon would have had to act in a difficult country, already exhausted, and he would probably have had to change his base from Danzig again to Thorn. Thirdly, he could advance against the entrenchments of Heilsberg by the left bank of the Alle, and, if he found them too strong to force, thrust his left wing forward and menace the enemy's communications with Königsberg. This doubtless would expose his own left wing to be crushed between the sea and a superior mass of the enemy, and also tended to push the latter back to their own frontier; but he did not fear for his left wing, and calculated Bennigsen would, while endeavouring to relieve Königsberg, give him an opportunity of inflicting a great disaster on him on the way. Further, his line of communication would remain with Danzig through a fertile country.

To understand how this choice of country came to be one of more than secondary consideration it is necessary to realize that the country, in which the armies were, consisted of a succession of lakes, which extend from the Vistula to the Pregel, and are formed by a long chain of downs, parallel to the sea, retaining the waters; on the side towards the sea the soil was well cultivated, while toward the interior the country was scantily peopled and covered with thick forest, in an advance through which Napoleon had earlier in the year experienced the misery arising from want of food. Napoleon therefore on the 8th, when the Russians commenced to retire on Heilsberg via Guttstadt under a rear guard skilfully commanded by Bagration, directed Murat, Soult,

¹ Maxim XXVII. D'Aguilar's translation.

and Lannes by the left bank of the Alle on Heilsberg followed closely by the remaining corps. On the 10th, Murat and Soult coming on the Russians at Heilsberg, attempted to attack them in their entrenchments and were severely repulsed, while a second attempt with some regiments of the Guard and Lannes was similarly driven back with great loss. On the following day the Russians were still in their position, so Napoleon resolved to compel them to evacuate it by manœuvring on their flank. To accomplish this Davoust was pushed past their right flank, while orders were sent to Victor, who was now in command of Bernadotte's corps owing to the latter having been wounded on the 5th, to push back Lestocq. Davoust's movement so alarmed Bennigsen, that he evacuated Heilsberg that night and retired to Bartenstein. Napoleon at once sent Murat's dragoons in pursuit up the right bank of the Alle while he directed his whole army on Eylau, whence he pushed Murat, Davoust and Soult along the road to Königsberg, and called Victor up to him. This movement cut Lestocq and Kamenski completely off from Bennigsen, so that they retired to Königsberg. From Eylau Lannes with some cavalry under Grouchy, followed closely by Mortier, was sent to Dommau to discover whether Bennigsen was quitting the Alle or not, and whether he was or was not on the march to relieve Königsberg. Ney, the Guard and Victor remained at Eylau.

Meanwhile Bennigsen on the 13th reached Schippenbeil, and, learning that the French had appeared at Dommau, had hastened to reach Friedland, the point where the Alle approaches nearer to Königsberg than in any other part of its course. On the evening of the 13th, Lannes had reached the village of Posthenen in front of Friedland with 7,000 of Oudinot's division, and 3,000 cavalry under Grouchy, but was there checked by the enemy's strong advanced guard of cavalry. Meanwhile Napoleon, from the reports he had received, had put the Guards, Ney, and Victor in motion to Dommau. Bennigsen, arriving on the bank of the Alle at daybreak on the 14th, and thinking Lannes' corps was isolated and without support, decided to cross over, crush it, and continue on his way to Königsberg. As the morning advanced Lannes' force, increased by Mortier's to a total of 10,000 infantry and 7,500 cavalry under Grouchy, maintained himself on the line Heinrichsdorf—Posthenen—Wood of Sortlack, thus holding the road to Königsberg in the face of 50,000 of the enemy until Napoleon arrived about 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

THE BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.

See Plans VII., VIII., IX.

The River Alle in its course to the Pregel at Wehlau is very sinuous and it is within an angle formed by one of its bends, open towards the French, that the little town of Friedland is situated on its left bank. The road from the right bank, after crossing the Alle and entering Friedland from the south, forks, sending one branch to the north-west to Königsberg, and the other to the west to Dommau and Eylau. On the Königsberg road at a distance of four miles from Friedland lies the village of Heinrichsdorf, while at the same distance

along the Eylau road is the village of Posthenen. These two villages lie on the eastern slope of a ridge running parallel with the Alle. This slope before finally reaching the river bank rises again just to the west of Friedland. A brook called the millbrook runs from Posthenen towards Friedland, where it forms a pond on its northern side before finally joining the river, after having divided the rolling downs into two unequal parts. To the north and north-east of Heinrichsdorf the ground is more open and level; while to the south and south-east of Posthenen is the Wood of Sortlack. The slopes are everywhere gradual and at this time of the year covered by high crops of rye.

The strengths of the French corps engaged at Friedland were Guard, 7,500; Lannes, 15,000; Ney, 14,000; Mortier, 10,000; Victor, 22,000; cavalry, 11,500; a total of 80,000.

The whole force of the Russians on both sides of the river, according to Alison, did not exceed 55,000, of whom about 10,000 were cavalry. Thiers says the Russians had 72,000.

North of the millbrook, bending back to the river bank, and covering the Königsberg road, Bennigsen had disposed four divisions under Gortchakoff. The greater part of the cavalry under Uvaroff was on the right flank and slightly to the front. South of the millbrook, as far as the Wood of Sortlack covering the Eylau road, were two divisions under Bagration with the remainder of the cavalry under Kolagriboff. The Imperial Guard formed the reserve at Friedland. The 14th Russian division had been left on the other side of the Alle to rally the army. There were besides a number of guns on the right bank. Thus the Russians stood on the arc of the segment of a circle formed by the Alle in their rear, which was crossed by few bridges, while their front was to be assailed by superior numbers.

As soon as Napoleon arrived and saw the Russian position he decided on his plan of battle, which was to engage the Russian right wing with his left, push the main attack against their left wing, seize Friedland, capture the bridges and cut off their line of retreat. He placed Ney's two divisions with Latour Maubourg's cavalry on the right between Posthenen and the Wood of Sortlack to inaugurate the attack. In support of Ney were Victor's two divisions and La Houssaye's cavalry. Just north of Posthenen Lannes' two divisions formed two lines. Between Lannes and Heinrichsdorf were Mortier's two divisions; while on the left flank in the plain of Heinrichsdorf were Grouchy's dragoons, Nansouty's cuirassiers and Beaumont's and Colbert's light cavalry, all under the command of Grouchy, making a mass of 7,500 horsemen. The Guard infantry and cavalry were kept in reserve at Posthenen. At 5 o'clock Ney's divisions emerged from the wood, and, driving in the Russian left wing, were about to storm the town when they were charged by the Russian Imperial Guard and driven back on to Dupont's division of Victor's corps which was coming up in support. Rallying on it, the three divisions again advanced, supported by all the cream of both Ney's and Victor's corps under Senarmont which was pushed well to the front. By 8 p.m. they had fought their way into the town of Friedland, and all the bridges were in flames. Meanwhile north of the millbrook neither side had gained any advantage, but when Gortchakoff

saw Friedland in flames and his own left exposed, he directed a column against Ney and Dupont. The assault by this column failed, and then, attacked in front by Lannes and Mortier and in flank by Ney and Dupont, the Russian right wing was driven back into the River Alle. The cavalry and Lambert's division on the right managed to make their retreat by the left bank to Allensburg, to which place the remainder of the army arrived by the right bank.

The failure to pursue is unaccountable; Savary, in his memoirs, and he was an eye witness, says, "The Russians had on their right 22 squadrons of cavalry who covered the retreat; we had more than 40 with which we should have charged them, but, by a fatality without example these 40 squadrons received no orders, and never so much as mounted their horses."

Alison puts the losses at 17,000 killed, wounded, and drowned on the Russian side, and 10,000 on the French. The Russians had fought with the utmost stubbornness, and rather than surrender had preferred to be drowned.

Bennigsen's resolve to cross to the left bank was the first mistake he made; having crossed, his second mistake was his failure to push Lannes aside; his third, to await Napoleon on a field of battle which had a river immediately in his rear. Napoleon caught him in the most disadvantageous position possible, and at once took advantage of the chance given him. "When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all the advantages are in favour of the latter. It is then a general should show boldness, strike a decided blow and manœuvre on the flank of his enemy. The victory is in his hands."¹

The most distinct feature of the battle was the massing of the guns of Victor's and Ney's corps under Senarmont, and the tactical skill with which this general supported Ney's second attack.

By the morning of the 16th June, Bennigsen had put the Pregel between his force and Napoleon, and destroyed the bridges; in this position he awaited Lestocq and Kamenski. Meanwhile Soult had pushed up to the walls of Königsberg, while Murat and Davoust, apprised of the victory of Friedland, moved to the Pregel and crossed at a point half way between Wehlau and Königsberg, hoping to cut off Lestocq and Kamenski who had abandoned Königsberg and retreated on Tilsit by the forest of Baum. On the 18th June the whole of the Russian army was across the Niemen, while Napoleon's corps approached it from the south. However, on the 19th June, the Russians proposed an armistice which led to the famous meeting between Napoleon and Alexander on the raft in the middle of the Niemen, on the 25th June, 1807.

By the peace of Tilsit Napoleon entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia; but it was at the expense of Prussia, the former ally of Russia. Napoleon could well have afforded to be generous and should have endeavoured to have drawn the people of Prussia to him, but by taking the other course and by leaving the

¹ Maxim XXV. D'Aguilar's translation.

King of Prussia little either of land or money, he merely laid the seeds of that revenge which the Prussians eventually wreaked in the year 1815, to which 1813 and 1814 were the preliminaries.

It may be noted that the ill-timed parsimony of the British Government had withheld all subsidies from Russia during this struggle. Alison says that 300,000 Russian Militia, whom even a small loan would have clothed and armed, might have averted the catastrophe; while 20,000 British troops as auxiliaries would have converted Friedland into a glorious victory.

In conclusion, let us try to answer the question "In what way would the modern conditions of railways and the electric telegraph have affected the plans of campaign and the operations?"

It is probably known to all readers of Napoleon's campaigns that his great principle was to move his army concentrated, that is to say, he moved on a narrow front with one or perhaps more corps following each other on the same road, so that he could concentrate for battle either the whole or the greater number of his corps in one day. The reason he did this was that inter-communication between widely extended columns was never certain, and consequently there was the danger of failure in any preconcerted action. The electric telegraph has almost completely removed this objection, for though an enemy may succeed in placing himself between two columns so that even a horseman cannot pass through from one to the other, yet by means of the telegraph the two columns can inter-communicate by a circuitous line far in rear and many hundreds of miles in length.

As to whether the principle of movement in masses is better than the principle of movement on a broad front *under modern conditions*, we cannot do better than quote what Moltke, the great strategist of the latter half of the 19th century, said in his "Memorandum to Superior Commanders of Troops"¹ in 1869. In the beginning of it he pointed out that an army which remained concentrated was difficult to supply and to billet, but that for the decisive battle the last battalion should be summoned; consequently to remain separated as long as possible while operating, and to be concentrated in good time for the decisive battle, was the task of the leader of large masses of troops. Allowing that the mere frontal attack was not likely to be attended with success, but very likely with a great deal of loss, it became necessary to turn towards the flanks of an enemy. To turn the flank of an army of more than 100,000 men would necessitate a day's march if the turning column had to be detached from a force already concentrated, which would necessitate the battle being put off for another day. Further, the separation with the object of turning the enemy's flank would necessitate a flank march within his striking distance. However, if the operations have been conducted in such a manner that a final short march from different points lead all available forces simultaneously upon the front and flanks of the adversary, then things would shape themselves much more favourably on the day of battle.

¹ Vide translation from the German of "Development of Strategical Science," by General Von Caemmerer.


It may be deduced from this that had Napoleon had the use of the telegraph by which to keep his corps in acquaintance with his plans and the turn of events, he would have adopted the principle of moving on a broad front, and, instead of concentrating beforehand for a battle, he would have concentrated his forces from different points on to the battlefield itself. It has already been pointed out that Napoleon's advance from the Oder to the Vistula and thence to the Warka, on a broad front, was an exception to his principle of moving with his army concentrated. However, we see he returned to it for his concentration towards Allenstein and subsequent march to Eylau in February, 1807, and again in June, 1807, for the campaign of Friedland. If Napoleon had sent his instructions along the wire via Thorn to Bernadotte, they would not have fallen into Bennigsen's hands on February 1st, and the great battle would have been fought near Allenstein. If we suppose that Napoleon would have advanced towards Bennigsen on a broad front with the intention of enveloping him near Allenstein we can picture that he would have directed Ney to act with Bernadotte from behind the lakes of Osterode, and Soult and Davoust to move on the front, Neidenberg—Ortelsberg; while Augereau and the Guards in reserve threw their weight towards his left wing by advancing along the line Warsaw—Soldau—Osterode.

As regards railways we will first consider their influence on the strategic concentration of the French and the Russians towards one another, in November, 1806. We may assume that Napoleon's position in Prussia was so secure that he might regard it as his own country as far as a line north and south through the Goplosee. On the 1st November Napoleon had available on or near the Oder the corps of Lannes; at Stettin, Davoust, Augereau; the Guards and Jerome at Berlin and Frankfurt. The Russians had Bennigsen on the Niemen (we will assume at Grodno) with Buxhowden close behind him. The only lines of rail leading across the Niemen towards the Vistula are the St. Petersberg—Grodno—Warsaw line and the St. Petersberg—Kovno—Bartenstein—Allenstein line. Warsaw is, however, connected with central Russia by the line to Moscow, and to S.W. Russia by the line through Brest—Litovsk. The farthest line to detrain on, which would have been safe for the French was Bromberg—Jarotschin, and the lines that the corps above mentioned would have probably used would have been, Davoust from Frankfurt to Wreschin, followed by the Guards, Jerome to Lissa and Jarotschin, Augereau via Küstrin and Landsberg to the Goplosee, and Lannes via Stargard and Schneidmuhl to Bromberg. Soult, Bernadotte and Ney, when they became free about the 9th November, could have been brought into Berlin and thence despatched to prolong the front, or strengthen a wing, as might have been required. The distance from Grodno to Warsaw is the same as from Frankfurt to Wreschin, but Napoleon would have had the advantage in the number of lines for his strategic concentration. We may assume that Napoleon's columns would have started on their march from their rail-heads before Bennigsen and Buxhowden had detrained. However, these latter, conscious of their inferior numbers, would have been content to stay on the

I.


Map showing approximate positions of French Corps on 1st November 1806 and subsequent lines of advance up to the battles of the 26th December (Pultusk-Golymin-Soldau).

N.B. The cavalry was divided into two corps—one under Murat covering front of move on Warsaw, the other under Bessières covering front of move on Thorn.



II.

Positions of Headquarters of French Corps during January 1807, showing lines of march and concentration in front of the Russian forces at JU-KOW-O on 4th February, and subsequent pursuit to EYLAU.




Positions of French Corps during offensive. Dotted lines show positions 19th June. Firm lines show positions 26th June.

N.B. The light cavalry was in rear.




IV. EYLAU 8-2-1807

Positions at 4 p.m.



V. EYLAU, 8-2-1807.

Positions at nightfall



VI.

of French Corps □ on 5th June when Russians ■ assumed the dotted lines show movements to Friedland and the Niemen on lines show attack and line of retreat of the Russians.


t cavalry was across the whole front, the Reserve of Cavalry



VII. FRIEDLAND, 14th June 1807.

Dispositions at commencement (5 p.m.).


Scale of Miles.



VIII.

Defeat of Russian Left and capture of Friedland (7-8 p.m.)

Scale of Miles.




IX.

Friedland, 14.6.1807 10 p.m. Positions at nightfall Route of Russians.


Scale of Miles.





III.

EYLAU, 8.2.1807. Positions up to mid-day.




light cavalry was across the whole front, the Reserve of Cavalry



IX.


Friedland, 14.6.1807 10 p.m. Positions at nightfall Route of Russians.

Scale of Miles.



The Theatre of War, 1806-'07.

With lines of railway as at present day, according to the 7th edition of the World Wide Atlas.



line of the Vistula and await Napoleon in a selected position. They could hope, too, that, by means of the lines from St. Petersburg, Moscow and South-West Russia, the Imperial Guard, the reserve under Essen and the reinforcement from Michelsen's army in South-West Russia would arrive to swell their numbers before the decisive battle took place. Thus we see that the railway system would have favoured Napoleon in deploying on a broad front, while on the other hand the railways in Russia would have brought reinforcements to the Russian Army at Warsaw. The decisive battle would have still taken place near Pöltusk, but the Russians would have had greater numbers on their side than they mustered in 1806.

If we assume that the Russians were beaten, and had retired to the lake district, they would certainly have rendered the line to Grodno useless, though the line from Warsaw to Allenstein, and those in East Prussia, would have probably remained available for Napoleon. However, the railways would not have helped the movement of troops either in the march to Eylau or in the campaign of Friedland. On the other hand the supply question would have been made more easy. The supply question with Napoleon was always a difficult one, and he paid the greatest attention to it. His thoughts were always being turned to where he could safely form large magazines, and, when he had formed them, how he could protect them. With the railway he would not have had to concern himself about this, as his reinforcements of men and horses and his daily requirements of material and victuals could have been carried to any required point from the remotest districts. With assured and adequate lines of supply by means of the railway behind it, the army in its march to Eylau would not have been weakened by the absence of the immense number of stragglers who fell out from want of food, and not from foot weariness. Thiers states that after Eylau the number of men absent from the army, and shown as sick or marauding, was 60,000, that of these not one half were sick in hospital, while the remainder were marauding. They had to pillage in order to live, since there were no supplies.

(It should be noted that this paper was compiled some three years ago.—ED.)

THE FOUR-COMPANY BATTALION IN BATTLE.

By BREVET-MAJOR HEReward WAKE, King's Royal Rifles.

(Originally given as a lecture to the London units of the Territorial Force).

THE subject of this paper is the four-company organization recently adopted for the infantry of the Regular Army, and which will shortly be also adopted for the Territorial Force.

I.—HISTORY OF THE CHANGE.

It may be of interest to start by giving a short account of how this important change has come about. Before the last century almost every army had small companies of about 100 men.

Foreign Armies.—The French had six companies to a battalion and so had Frederick the Great. In the wars of the French Revolution the Prussians had eight companies to a battalion, but they changed to four companies immediately after the disaster of Jena in 1806, and have adhered to four companies ever since. They have been imitated by every other country in the world, the last to do so being Great Britain.

British Army.—In the British Army, infantry battalions in the field have consisted of eight, ten, eleven, twelve or even thirteen companies, but not less than eight as a rule.

Cromwell's new model army had battalions of ten companies, Marlborough's battalions twelve or thirteen companies, Wellington's ten or eleven. In 1821 an order was issued fixing the establishment of all infantry battalions at eight companies.

Re-organization not a Recent Idea.—The question whether an eight-company organization was best suited to our military requirements is by no means a new one within the last few years. Ever since the Crimean War, in fact, the matter has been more or less continually under discussion. But our army, from 1857, had been entirely engaged in small wars and expeditions against uncivilized enemies, and the eight-company organization had not proved unsuitable for the operations in hand.

Influence of South African War.—It was not, in fact, till after our early experiences in South Africa that the advocates of a change began to make themselves more and more heard, and since that time the wave of military opinion gained in force continually, until a change became sooner or later inevitable.

It is not intended to lay the blame for any failures that occurred in South Africa to the eight-company organization, for we should probably have done no better at the start with four companies. To put

the matter differently, this was our first experience against the small-bore rifle with smokeless powder, and one of the direct results of this experience was to teach us the necessity of a radical change in our infantry tactics. Our organization has now had to be altered in order to make it possible to carry out the new tactical methods laid down in the Field Service Regulations.

Tactics and Organization.—First come tactics—that is, how are we going to fight and win? Then comes organization, the handmaid of tactics; that is, how are we to organize our army in the most convenient manner for fighting? The question was simply whether a battalion of eight small companies was or was not the most efficient fighting machine for the modern battlefield.

It may be the case that many distinguished officers in our army are still of opinion that our new organization is not a change for the better, and that some of the warmest advocates of the four-company organization were, and are, chiefly in favour of it because of the advantages it is admitted to confer from an administrative point of view, or for purposes of training in peace.

War, Training and Administration.—But the requirements of peace training and of administration, whether in peace or war, are entirely secondary to the requirements of the battlefield. And unless the case for four companies were clearly proved as far as tactics and fighting are concerned, we cannot doubt for a moment that the Army Council and the General Staff would have left things as they were.

Reasons for Change.—That they did not do so, that they changed the organization, that they faced the difficulties and discussions which were bound to ensue, is sufficient proof that in their opinion the eight-company organization was a bad one for fighting purposes.

Whatever our private views on this question may be, the four-company organization is now an accomplished fact; we shall never go back to eight companies any more than the cavalry will abolish the squadron organization to go back to troops. It would, therefore, be a mere waste of time to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the four-company organization as compared with that of eight companies. The subject is no longer controversial, for the thing is settled. But a clear understanding of the conditions which have led to the change is of great assistance to everyone who has to work under the new system, and with this object it is proposed in this paper to consider the working of the four-company battalion in the various phases of the modern battle.

II.—COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP IN BATTLE.

Leadership in Action.—Before modern weapons necessitated dispersion in battle, the commander of a company kept all his men throughout the day under his personal control, that is to say, every man could see and hear him, and obeyed his voice. A company of 100 men could easily be led by one officer under those conditions. The company was the fire unit. At the present day the problem of

leadership, or rather command, in action assumes a very different aspect. Human sight and hearing have not improved, but the extent of ground covered by 100 men in battle is now far greater.

The Smallest Unit.—Hence we find that command by voice and signal has to be delegated to subordinates from the very start, till at length, when infantry are under fire, the largest number of men that can personally be commanded by one man is limited to a dozen at most.

For this reason the smallest unit of men in our organization is the fire unit of ten or twelve men (now called the section), and the question is how to group these sections, of which there are 64 in a battalion, into larger units.

Organization of a Company.

Platoons	No. 1.	No. 2.	No. 3.	No. 4.
Sections	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
	•	•	•	•
Subalterns	○	○	○	○
Sergeants	○	○	○	○
Buglers	↓	↓	↓	↓
Coy Comr Mounted		○		
Junior Captain		○		
Coy Sergt.-Major and Q.M. Sergt.		○ ○		
Bugler		↓		
Rangetaker Corpl.		○		
Ammunition Pack Horses with two drivers, one corpl. and one man per platoon as carrier.			○ ○	

Number of Units that can be Commanded by one Man.—This question is settled by asking how many units can be conveniently commanded in battle by one man. Everyone will admit that the fewer subordinates a commander has the easier will be his task. For instance, it would be easier for a colonel to control three companies than six. But he must be given as many as he can manage or else you will multiply the number of battalions and brigades.

It has been found that four is a convenient number, and in the new organization each platoon has four sections (or fire units), and each company has four platoons.

So the battalion commander has four companies, plus the machine-gun section, which makes five.

Officers must command Units, not Men.—The chief point to remember all through is this. Under the fire conditions of the battlefield of to-day, officers cannot command *men*—they must command *units*. If they try to command men, they will succeed in commanding so few that their influence over the majority will be lost. We must leave the commanding of *men* to section leaders. Each subaltern who commands a platoon has four sections; he must command four section leaders. Each company has four platoons—the officer commanding a company must command the four platoon leaders. When once this fact is fully understood, the advantages of our new organization will doubtless be admitted by everyone who puts fighting where it should be put, namely, first. It is not difficult to spend time demonstrating the unsuitability for fighting purposes of a battalion divided into eight companies, with each of these companies divided into two half-companies. But that would be merely flogging a dead horse, and therefore waste of time.

Let us now consider one or two imaginary situations on the battlefield such as will frequently occur, and let us follow the fortunes of an imaginary battalion, supposing it to be organized in four large companies.

III.—IMAGINARY ATTACK BY A BATTALION.

Invasion and Mobilization.—As we are told so often that the Territorial Army exists for home defence and not for purposes of aggression, the scene of action must not be where we would all prefer to have it, in some foreign country. We must bring the enemy over here in order to get up a fight. England, then, is invaded. The Territorial Force is mobilized. Troops are rapidly assembled, and in due course the defending army advances on the foe, drives in his cavalry and advanced troops, and the battle begins.

Opening Phase. Situation of Battalion.—Let us imagine that your battalion is lying assembled under a small hill about 3,000 yards from a long, low ridge which appears to be the enemy's main position. The enemy's shells are whistling and screeching overhead—they *all* seem to be overhead, though, as a matter of fact, most of them are over other people's heads. Some of them are bursting on the ridge behind you from which some of our guns have opened fire, though you cannot see them.

Commanding Officer sends for Company Commanders.—Presently the adjutant, who has been out with the colonel to see the brigadier, comes riding back and tells the officers that the colonel wants company commanders to come up to him at once. Everyone realizes that the time for action has come. The company commanders call for their horses and, with the senior major, the signal officer and the machine gun officer, canter off to the adjutant without loss of time.

Advantage of being Mounted.—You will observe that the four company commanders are mounted and the Commanding Officer

would have to wait some time if he had to give his orders to eight officers who had come out to him on foot, and would, I fear, in some cases, want five minutes to recover their wind.

Well, the party make their way through a couple of gates up the shoulder of the hill, dismount behind some trees to which the horses are tied, and are led by the adjutant to some bushes from the other side of which a clear view can be obtained of the ridge held by the enemy and the ground between. We will describe it in more detail later.

They join the Commanding Officer.—They find the colonel looking intently through his glasses from the cover of a bush. Silently they all lie down on either side of him, keeping well out of sight, and get out their glasses and take careful stock of the view in front.

After asking a few preliminary questions in order to satisfy himself that the extra ammunition has been issued, that all the men have their rations and their water bottles filled, that the horses have been watered; in a word, that the battalion is in an efficient condition for the fight, the colonel proceeds to point out the important points and explains the plan as follows:—(The general character of the country resembles Hampshire).¹ “The enemy’s guns are firing from behind that distant ridge, which is 3,000 yards away. His infantry are holding that ridge, and one can just make out lines of concealed trenches along the top of it and about half-way down the forward slope. His right appears to be near those three trees on the skyline, and a good many cavalry have been seen moving out to the west over Big Hill.

Says what Orders he has received.—“The brigade has been ordered to attack the enemy’s right. We shall be on the left of the brigade (the Blankshire Regiment on our right) and our objective is from the house on the ridge (called Ridgeway House on the map) to the three trees, both inclusive. Just in front of this objective and, I think, about 400 yards from the top of the ridge you will notice a long hill with telegraph posts across the top. We will call this ‘Telegraph Hill.’ It looks to me from here as if that hill will be our final fire position, and it seems probable that after leaving it you will find a certain amount of dead ground at the foot of the ridge itself.

“The enemy are probably holding Telegraph Hill with their advanced troops.

“You will notice the small wood and on its left the farm on this side of Telegraph Hill. I see they are called Plain Wood and Plain Farm on the map. They are both about 500 yards from the top of Telegraph Hill and therefore about 900 yards from the top of the main ridge and are probably also occupied by the enemy, but not in strength.

“Between us and Plain Wood is the low hill with the Red Inn on it. This is about 1,000 yards from the edge of Plain Wood. On our left front is the hill with the dead tree, which we will call One

¹ See Sketch No. 1 at end.

Tree Hill. This is 850 yards from Plain Farm and 950 from the near corner of Plain Wood.

"One squadron of the divisional cavalry will operate on our left and protect that flank to some extent. The attack will be carried out as follows:—

Commanding Officer's Orders for the Attack.—"At 10.15 a.m. A and B Companies will move from where the battalion is now, A Company to occupy the Red Inn Hill, B Company One Tree Hill.

"As soon as B Company (which has furthest to go) is in position, C Company will move round the west side of One Tree Hill and seize Plain Farm, supported, if necessary, by the fire of A and B Companies. B Company will be careful to watch Plain Wood and be ready to check the enemy, should he interfere from there with C Company's advance.

"As soon as C Company is in possession of the farm, D Company will be ordered by me to move between Red Inn Hill and One Tree Hill and to occupy Plain Wood and establish itself on the front edge of it. The other three companies will all be prepared to direct their fire on to Plain Wood in order to assist D Company to advance and take it.

"As soon as D Company moves, my headquarters will go to the Red Inn, or near it.

"C and D Companies will now be in front and I anticipate that both will be engaged with the enemy holding Telegraph Hill.

"I shall then probably order B Company to leave One Tree Hill and to advance through the gap between Plain Wood and Plain Farm and to attack Telegraph Hill, supported on both flanks by the fire of C and D Companies, who will be careful to bring a cross fire to bear on the point of attack.

"As soon as this attack begins to develop, I shall myself move with A Company from Red Inn Hill to some suitable spot this side of Plain Wood.

"D Company will, if necessary, co-operate in the attack on Telegraph Hill on C Company's right, and will in any case go on and occupy the right end of this hill, prolonging D Company's firing line.

"I regard Telegraph Hill as our probable final fire position.

"C Company will be at Plain Farm, and must hold that place to protect our left flank. It is impossible to say from here whether it will be necessary or advisable for C Company to send a platoon, or perhaps two, forward to the hill in front. I must leave that to the Captain's judgment, but you must clearly understand that the job of C Company is the protection of our left and I do not therefore wish this company to co-operate (except by fire) in the final assault on the ridge."

The colonel winds up his instructions by giving orders to the machine gun officer how to use his guns. The signal officer, the sergeant-major who has charge of the ammunition carts, and the medical officer with his battalion stretcher-bearers will also want

some instructions, and the company commanders will want to know these arrangements before they start, but these details will be omitted, as they make the story too complicated.

IV.—REMARKS ON COMMANDING OFFICER'S ORDERS.

Your attention is drawn in the first place to a few points about the colonel's orders to his company commanders.

His General Method (1).—First you will notice that there is no stereotyped form of attack. He does not say, "A and B Companies firing line and supports, C and D reserve," and order the battalion to march straight on to the objective. That terrible phrase, "Firing line, supports and reserve," which is responsible for so much bad tactics! As a matter of fact, the two companies that start first are not the two that reach the enemy's position first. The method of detailing certain troops to find the firing line all through is only suited to a perfectly flat piece of ground like a billiard-table, which is very rarely met with. Instead of that, he uses his four companies as four units. He gives to each a definite job, and he so arranges their movements, and the order in which each job is done, that they all act together under his direction, and assist one another in their tasks.

Details left to Subordinates (2).—The second point is that the colonel does not tell a company officer *how* he wants a thing done. He simply tells him *what* he wants done and leaves it to him how to do it. Field Service Regulations I., page 132. "The choice of the manner in which the task assigned to each body of troops is to be performed, should be left to its commander."

The only legitimate exception to this rule would be where the colonel had an officer he could not trust to do things in the best way. A company commander who receives detailed instructions from his colonel, how to advance and occupy a hill, for instance, might be justified in concluding that the colonel would rather someone else than he were in command of one of his companies.

Exactly the same remarks apply to the orders given by a company commander to his four platoons, which we shall come to later.

Fire to Support Movement (3).—The third point refers to covering fire. You all know how much is made nowadays of "fire to support movement"—in fact, it is the gist of the attack. All subordinate leaders are taught that they must help the advance of their neighbours by fire.

Now you will notice that in these attack orders the colonel has been able, by his use of the ground and the progressive nature of his plan of attack, to go one step further in the matter of covering fire. Instead of merely leaving it to subordinates to provide covering fire when they see an opportunity, he has actually been able to *arrange* for covering fire, and to *order* it to be given, from the very start. And each company, as it moves, knows that it will be covered and supported by fire, and from where.

It is not pretended that the plan of attack which has been here invented on the colonel's behalf is the best possible. There are doubtless many better solutions. But in the method described an endeavour has been made to show a feasible plan of attack, combining fire effect with an intelligent use of ground, and with due regard to the organization of the battalion.

Plan compared with the Eight-Company Organization.—This only may be added: if you try and work out an attack of this kind with eight small companies, you will find it a very different business, and, in the author's opinion, at any rate, you will find it next door to impossible to get anything like the same co-ordination and control, or indeed to carry out the base principles regarding use of ground, fire and direction which are laid down for us in our Field Service Regulations.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the sketch is taken from an actual piece of country, and that the ground has not been entirely invented to suit the plan.

V.—HOW COMPANIES CARRY OUT THEIR ORDERS.

Now let us follow out the fortunes of one or two of our companies and see how they carry out the colonel's instructions.

B Company's advance.—Let us take B Company first. It will be remembered that B Company's initial task was to occupy One Tree Hill and from there to be ready to support the advance of C Company to Plain Farm.

Considerations.—The officer commanding B Company took a good look at One Tree Hill and the intervening ground before he rejoined the battalion. He made up his mind that the hill contained none of the enemy, but he saw that his company would be unavoidably exposed in their advance, for a distance of 300 or 400 yards, to view from the enemy's main position, and therefore that artillery fire might be expected. The question was merely "what was the best formation to move the company across the open ground, so as to avoid being seen, or, if seen, to avoid heavy casualties?" This is the first problem he has to solve.

Orders by Officer Commanding Company.—The officer commanding the company goes back, calls up his four platoon commanders and the junior captain, and gives his orders thus:—He points out One Tree Hill, and explains as much as necessary of the plan of attack. Nos. 1 and 2 platoons will lead, Nos. 3 and 4 follow in support under the junior captain. Company-scouts¹ (two from each platoon including the non-commissioned officers in charge) precede numbers 1

¹ It is understood that company-scouts are not included in the next edition of Infantry Training. Battalion scouts could be attached to companies, if required. But every soldier should be capable of acting as a company scout in such a situation as that described.

and 2 at a distance of about 400 yards, working in pairs, one pair out to the left front; they are not to expose themselves over the far side of the hill; the two pack-horses with ammunition under a non-commissioned officer with one man per platoon as carrier to follow No. 3 platoon. The officer commanding the company himself, with his company sergeant-major, range-taker and bugler, goes on with the two leading platoons. Nos. 1 and 2 advance in two lines of section columns, each section in fours or file, at 50 yards interval, 200 yards distance between lines. The lines to be irregular.

The company commander warns his officers that the company may be shelled crossing the open ground, and recommends section columns for the first two platoons, the others moving in double section columns in one line instead of two.

He must give his own instructions to the scouts.

B Company advances.—Let us suppose then that the company very nearly escapes observation and only gets a few shells which do very little harm, as small moving columns are very difficult to see and very difficult to hit. As soon as the scouts reach the top of the hill, they signal back, "All clear!" and the officer commanding the company at once gallops on up to them in order to decide how to occupy the hill before the troops come up.

Method of Occupying a Position.—Now the order to occupy the hill does not mean that he is to put the whole company in one firing line along the crest. In fact, to march men up to the top would be certain to bring punishment in the shape of a heavy artillery fire.

The scouts are on the look-out over the top, so he just halts the whole company behind the hill under cover, ready to come up in a minute or so if required. The range-taker goes to the top, takes ranges to Plain Farm and Plain Wood and makes a little range chart, of which, if he has time, he will give one copy to each platoon.

Covering Fire for C Company.—Now to arrange for covering fire to support the advance of C Company on Plain Farm.


The officer commanding the company directs No. 1 platoon to occupy a position from which to fire on to the edge of Plain Wood, No. 2 platoon to engage Plain Farm.

Platoons occupy Positions.—What do the two platoon commanders do on receipt of this order? Do they say, "Platoon, quick march!" and bring the whole lot up at once? Not if they are wise. No, they each go quietly up and have a peep over the hill, accompanied by their four section leaders, and there point out where each section is to lie and what points they are to be ready to fire at when ordered.

The section leaders make a note of these points and the range, go back to their sections and lead them up independently by the best way to the positions they are to occupy. If advisable, the men crawl up over the sky-line.

The other two platoons will also be given fire positions, but they may not be required, so for the present they are left under cover behind the hill.

Meanwhile, the company commander has signalled back to battalion headquarters that he is ready (the colonel will have seen for himself that there has been no opposition so far) and presently C Company is



seen moving out round the west side of One Tree Hill past B Company's left.

C Company move off.—We will now follow C Company. The commander of this company has doubtless watched the progress of

B Company and he will probably move off in the same formation to start with.

Officer Commanding the Company goes forward.—Leaving the captain to bring the company on, he will be prudent if he gallops forward to One Tree Hill and, leaving his horse under cover, goes to the top and confers with the officer commanding B Company as to the best way to go for Plain Farm.

This is what he sees of Plain Farm from the top of One Tree Hill. (Sketch No. 2). He also is able, by means of his glasses, to spot one or two of the enemy in the farm buildings

Orders by Officer Commanding Company.—He goes back down the hill to where his company is now halted behind the shoulder, calls up his officers and non-commissioned officers to a spot where all can see without being seen, and thus briefly gives his orders for the attack and occupation of Plain Farm.

"The company is to occupy that Farm and the small hill to our right of it.

"No. 1 platoon will first of all occupy that low hill with the tall trees 400 yards from the Farm.

"As soon as No. 1 is established there, No. 2 will move round its left and occupy the bank and hedge which runs away to our left from the Farm road. No. 2 will also send one section out to the left to protect that flank.

"When No. 2 arrives at the bank, I shall bring on Nos. 3 and 4 in rear of No. 1.

"No. 3 will then move out to the right and occupy the small hill overlooking the Farm, covered by the fire of Nos. 1 and 2.

"If necessary, I shall send on No. 4 to assist No. 3 if the latter cannot get on.

"As soon as that hill is in our possession, the enemy will probably have to evacuate the Farm, which will then be occupied by No. 2, who will still leave one section, or, if necessary, two, to guard the left flank. B Company will cover our advance from this hill and will protect our right by bringing fire to bear on to the edge of Plain Wood, if necessary.

"The two pack-horses will remain here till the Farm is taken, when they will be brought up to it.

"My orders are to hold Plain Farm and guard the left flank, so the Farm and the hill close to it will be put in a state of defence directly we get there.

"Is that quite clear?"

Officer commanding No. 2 platoon:—"Supposing when I get to the bank I find the enemy has left the Farm. Am I to go straight on and occupy it?"

Officer commanding the company:—"I think it will be better to wait till No. 3 are in position on the hill to the right."

Officer commanding No. 1:—"Where will you be, after Nos. 3 and 4 have gone on to attack that hill?"

Officer commanding the company:—"I shall be with No. 1. The junior captain will please stop with me for the present."

Remarks on Orders of Officer Commanding Company.—Please observe again that the officer commanding the company has merely told his platoon commanders *what* he wants them to do, and has left it entirely to them *how* to do it.

Also he has *arranged* for covering fire and not left this important matter to his subordinates.

Platoons Move.—Now, to complete the picture, let us see how the platoon officers in their turn carry out their respective tasks. They know the Farm is occupied by the enemy and it is only 850 yards distant. They will also be exposed to view directly they leave the shelter of the hill where the company is now assembled.

Formation.—Under these circumstances it would be dangerous to move the leading platoons in small columns as this formation is highly vulnerable to infantry fire under 1000 yards range, and, in order to return the enemy's fire, the columns would have to deploy into extended order in full view and under fire.

No. 1, therefore, orders two sections to extend to five paces and to advance against their hill, and the platoon commander follows with the other two sections also extended at 300 paces distance.

No. 2 platoon extends one section as firing line, sends one section out to the left echeloned in rear of No. 1, and two sections follow in support under the platoon commander. He will probably be able to indicate to the section on the left the position they should make for in order to carry out their mission of protecting the flank.

Scouts.—We have not yet mentioned the company scouts. These useful creatures should receive their instructions direct from the company commander.

It is suggested that he would send out two pairs of scouts in front of Nos. 1 and 2 platoons and two pairs out on the important flank on the left of No. 2.

Each party must be given a definite job and told where to send their reports.

Action of Scouts.—Infantry scouts cannot be used like cavalry. If sent too far in front they will only get scuppered, and their fate may never even be known. In this sort of attack, 300 or 400 yards is probably quite sufficient distance for scouts to move in front of the firing line. They must not mask the fire of the firing line and, when checked by the enemy, should either move out to a flank or lie down and wait till their own firing line comes up and join it. Their turn as scouts will come again later on when the enemy clear off and the advance is resumed.

VI.—GENERAL REMARKS ON TACTICAL METHODS.

We need not follow this attack any further in detail. Enough has been described to show the general principles under which a company of infantry of the new organization may be launched into

battle and controlled and commanded by its captain during the initial stages.

Importance of Initial Orders.—This is the important part of the fight. If the troops are *started off* under a clear, definite plan, which they all understand, the rest is comparatively simple.

Control in Battle and Position of Officer Commanding.—The control exercised by each commander, whether of the battalion, the company or the platoon, depends first of all on the instructions he issues at the start, and, secondly, on the use he makes of his reserves, with which he must remain himself, after the battle has really begun, during the course of the action.

In the final stage of all, when the fight becomes hot and the enemy's resistance is prolonged, the reserves will all be used up in the effort to carry out the orders received. It is *then* that the commander of the battalion or company or platoon must go forward himself, with his last reserve, and do what he can in the firing line, for there is nothing left for him to do in the rear. It is then that a commander must rely for the assistance which, in a well-trained army, he knows he can count upon from his superiors, if they are in a position to give it.

Unsuitability of Eight-Company Organization.—It would be of interest to reflect for one moment on the arrangements which could be made for the attack on Plain Farm, supposing this task were allotted to two companies of an eight-company battalion.

It is indeed doubtful whether any *two* commanders could hope, however cordial their co-operation, to carry out this job in such a practical and satisfactory manner as it can be carried out by one man with a suitably organized force to his hand.

Officer Commanding Company keeps his Company-Organization Intact.—You will notice in the methods adopted by these two company commanders that they have only dealt with their platoon commanders, thus carrying out the important principle mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, namely, that officers should command units as long as they can, and not men. It is a common experience to see company commanders violating this principle by taking sections away from their platoons and sending them off on separate jobs. If this is done, the company commander very soon finds himself commanding, or trying to command, eight or more units instead of four, many of these units being without an officer. His difficulties are at once doubled, and he has actually, by disregarding his organization, diminished very considerably the fighting value of his little force. A platoon officer, with four sections, is a power in the fight. Take away two, and his platoon as a fighting unit is less than half its former value, while the two you have taken away had far better be attached to another platoon than left to themselves. For one thing, who is to command them?

All company officers should realize the vital importance of retaining their organization as long as ever they can, and not splitting up commands and interfering with their subordinates, except in urgent cases of dire necessity.

The Rest of the Battle.—Time does not permit us to follow the fortunes of our battalion all through up to the final assault and capture of the distant ridge. It would have been interesting to discuss the further progress of the battle and to have shown how B and D Companies drove back the enemy's advanced troops and occupied Telegraph Hill—how C Company held on to Plain Farm and drove off an attack by dismounted cavalry—how A Company came up and occupied Plain Wood—how B and D silenced the enemy's fire and rushed forward down the slopes of Telegraph Hill, only to be met by a counter-attack which forced them back with heavy loss to their old position—how the colonel brought up A Company (heavily loaded with ammunition for the companies in front) to behind the hill—how he planned for B Company on the left to provide covering fire while A Company reinforced D, and both companies rushed into the dead ground below the enemy's position—how it was arranged for no less than six batteries of artillery to shell the trenches during the advance—how A and D climbed the hill under this fire and finally drove out the enemy with the bayonet.

Many Problems to Consider Afresh.—In every phase of such an attack there is some lesson to learn and something to be gained by considering which is the best of the many ways of doing a thing. Even then we would not have nearly exhausted all the problems which confront a battalion in war. There is the defence, action of a rear guard, outposts, advanced guards, rear guards, wood fighting, night attacks, and so on. There is not one of these things which must not be studied from a new point of view when your fighting machine is re-organized into four companies with four platoons. The new organization demands new methods.

VII.—ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING.

Other Aspects of the New Organization.—This paper has been entirely confined to the fighting aspect because that is the most important. Of administration and training, very little can be said in the space at my disposal.

Administration.—As regards administration, the most important effect of the change is that for the first time in his life a subaltern has now got a definite command of his own in which he can take an interest, and for which he can be made entirely responsible without being saddled with work which is not his at all. This was never possible before. The new organization provides every leader with a second in command, who carries on his job whenever he is away. The platoon officer has a sergeant as second in command, the company commander has a second captain. It will, therefore, never be necessary to make a platoon officer command the company or take over a platoon that is not his own. This fact has already, in the author's experience, been of the greatest benefit to both officers and men, and should be remembered by those officers who dislike the idea of being junior captains. Another answer that could be given to them is that it is better to assist in a really good show than be boss of an indifferent show of one's own.

Four Units in place of Eight.—From the point of view of the colonel, the adjutant, and the quartermaster, it need hardly be said that four

units have proved naturally very much easier to deal with than eight. There are only four people to whom orders are issued, there are only four sets of company books and returns, and so forth. These things speak for themselves.

Delegation of Responsibility.—Most important of all, perhaps, the new system makes it possible for the commanding officer to delegate real responsibility to his company commanders. Territorial battalions may not be as badly situated, but in the Regular Army it seldom occurs that more than half the majors and captains of a battalion are available for duty with it. So with eight companies, the Commanding Officer found half his company commanders without the necessary seniority and experience, and the result was that he had to interfere more than he liked, and to maintain a highly centralized system which was certainly prejudicial to efficiency, as well as bad training for everyone. As for the subaltern, he had no responsibility at all. As a platoon commander, on the other hand, he can now be made entirely responsible by his captain for everything that concerns the training, clothing, and equipment, and general well-being of his own platoon, in which he can take a pride and interest.

The company commander should consult the platoon commanders with reference to every matter that occurs in the platoon.

Platoon Organization.—There is one small matter regarding the interior organization of a company which may be referred to here. In peace time, each company has a certain number of men belonging to it who do not fight in the ranks, but really belong to battalion headquarters, namely, the band, machine gun section, signallers, transport drivers, and a few odds and ends, such as grooms and servants.

In some companies one finds all these people forming a supernumerary platoon in each company. In others, they are all attached to one of the four platoons. In both these methods they become a nuisance. In the first, they have no one to look after them except the officer commanding the company himself or his junior captain, who have other work to do. In the second method, they are an unfair burden on one of the platoon commanders. Another method is to split them all up among all the sections, which is bad, because it makes the corporal who commands a section responsible for men he never sees. It is suggested that the best way is to form in each platoon a fifth or supernumerary section of these headquarter men. The company will then be organised as follows:—

Company headquarters, major and junior captain, company sergeant major, company quartermaster sergeant.

No. I. Platoon:—

Headquarters: Lieutenant, sergeant.

No. 1 Section.

No. 4 Section.

No. 2 Section.

No. 5 Section (Supernumeraries).

No. 3 Section.


No. II. Platoon:—Ditto.

No. IV. Platoon:—Ditto.


No. III. Platoon:—Ditto.



SKETCH No. 1.



SKETCH No. 2.





VIII.—CONCLUSION.

Conditions in Territorial Force.—It is possible that many officers have the impression that the conditions obtaining in the Territorial Force are scarcely realized or we would not so lightly advocate a change which will be to them in the shape of a revolution. They may rest assured that these conditions are well understood.

It is realized what a company in a Territorial Force battalion is—how it is kept going by its captain in the teeth of great difficulties—what the captain will feel if his company is taken from him and the results of all his efforts passed to another officer who will not know his men. It is realized that, in many country battalions, companies are scattered over a very wide area, and that there are many objections to grouping into one company 200 or 250 men.

Answer to Objections.—To these objections there is but one answer, which the majority of officers who have the interests of their regiment at heart will admit to be conclusive.

The Territorial Force is an army, and an army exists only for one purpose, and that is for war. If it is necessary to change the organization for the sake of fighting efficiency, that change must be made, whatever the difficulties that lie in the way. These difficulties must be faced and must be overcome, and personal matters must be put on one side in order to do it.

THE TACTICS OF PENETRATION: A COUNTERBLAST TO GERMAN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY.¹

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(With 15 Diagrams).

I.—THE POWER OF MODERN WEAPONS.

"COLUMNS," writes Napier, "are the soul of military operations, in them is the victory, and in them is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front." In other words, to deploy at the right time and the right place, is the true foundation of the fight, constituting as it does the grand tactics of the battle, that part of the art of war which links strategy to fighting tactics, the movement of men's legs with the movement of their arms.

Take, for example, the tactics of Frederick the Great.

In his day a General brought his army from column of route into line of battle, not after gaining information of his enemy's dispositions, but before gaining it. To change this order, once it had been assumed, was both a lengthy and a difficult operation. Frederick saw, that if he could manœuvre so rapidly as to be able to form, or to re-form, his order of battle, after gaining exact information of his opponent's whereabouts, the advantage would always be his; and tactics remaining as they were, he must win, in fact, he could not well do otherwise, even if hopelessly outnumbered. At Leuthen (1757) with a demoralized army of 33,000 men, he met, outmanœuvred and routed 90,000 Austrians flushed with success.

Frederick's greatness lay in the fact that he gauged to a fuller extent than his opponents the power of the weapons of his day; further, that he discovered the weak point in their deployment, their grand tactics, before they could discover the weak point in his. His system being novel, was not understood, to it, therefore, was added the power of surprise.

Frederick's three-deep line gave way before the Revolutionary skirmishing line and column, which, in its turn, was vanquished by the two-deep line of the British Army, a formation first systematically practised by Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe.

¹ This paper was written as a lecture in April last, and though, eventually, the present war, will, no doubt, cause me to modify many of the opinions expressed in it, up to the present date (September 23rd, 1914) it has rather strengthened than weakened them.

Frederick relied, during his earlier wars, on volume of musket-fire to instil terror, followed by repeated charges with the bayonet; at a later date on massed artillery-fire, especially horse artillery and howitzer-fire, to cover his infantry assault. The chief defects in his system were, that his fire was most inaccurate and his field guns somewhat unwieldy; in that of his opponents, that their formations were prearranged, stereotyped and immobile.

Napoleon relied on: (1) the accurate fire of skirmishers to produce sufficient disorganization in the enemy's ranks to allow of his columns charging home; (2) concentration of artillery-fire, case shot fire at effective ranges for the same purpose. The chief defects in his first system were want of volume of fire and loss of control; in his second, difficulty in obtaining suitable ground to develop his artillery-fire. The chief defects in the tactics of his opponents were: want of accuracy of fire, insufficient use of ground, want of mobility, and again stereotyped formations.

Wellington relied on volume and a moderate accuracy of fire, as well as on suitability of ground, his fire being followed by the bayonet. Wellington's tactics destroyed all other systems; probably his was the soundest method ever employed by a General whose weapons were the muzzle-loading flint-lock and the smooth-bore cannon.

From the history of this period may be deduced four tactical facts:—

(1) That when two hostile forces of similar armament meet, that side which can first gain superiority of fire will usually prove victorious, irrespective of this superiority being gained by musket or cannon. (Leuthen, 1757; Wagram, 1809.)

(2) That when a commander seeks to gain superiority of fire, chiefly by cannon, his grand tactics will usually tend towards penetration, and his formation will be that of the column. (Napoleon.)

(3) That when a commander seeks to gain superiority of fire by the musket (or rifle) his grand tactics will usually tend towards envelopment, and his formation will be that of the line. (Frederick during his earlier wars—later on von Moltke.)

(4) That when two commanders seek to gain fire superiority by either means, the commander who surprises the other by using cannon or musket unexpectedly against some vital point will generally defeat the other. (Kolin, 1757; Austerlitz, 1805.)

These facts lead us to the following theory:—

That the grand tactics of an army will chiefly depend on the value its commander sets on any particular weapon (as well as the close co-operation of all available weapons and means towards the desired end); and that the commander who first grasps the true trend of any new, or improved, weapon, will be in a position to surprise an adversary who has not. (Mortgarten, 1315; Cressy, 1346.)

To-day we have, besides the magazine-rifle, the characteristics of which are understood, two, comparatively speaking, new weapons: the

quick-firing field gun, and the machine gun. Realizing this, we can predict with absolute certainty, that the general who makes the truest use of these weapons, that is, so deploys his men that their fullest power is attained, will win, unless he is hopelessly outnumbered. If this general further devise a system of deployment which will not only accentuate the power of these weapons, but also the defects in his opponent's formation, he will win irrespective of numbers, as surely as 1,400 Swiss beat 15,000 Austrians at Mortgarten, and as surely as 90,000 Austrians were beaten by 33,000 Prussians at Leuthen. This is a certainty.

From 1840 to the close of the nineteenth century, improvements steadily forced the rifle to the fore. A similar progress did not take place in the manufacture of cannon, breech loading guns not being finally adopted by the British Army until 1886. By the beginning of the present century we find the rifle master of all it surveyed; machine-guns were being still used experimentally, trajectories were slightly more curved than to-day, indirect laying was only exceptionally employed; but of all the changes introduced since the Russo-Japanese War, the general adoption of quick-firing artillery by civilized armies is out and out the greatest. This gun, if correctly employed, will, I feel, revolutionize the present theory of war by substituting as the leading grand tactical principle penetration for that of envelopment. And why? Because the quick-firing field gun is now the master missile throwing weapon, and for the following reasons.

Formerly to breach an enemy's line by artillery fire, it was usually necessary to do one of two things:

- (1) To hold the enemy by rifle and gun-fire, and then, when the decisive point was discovered, to withdraw guns from positions, which often could ill spare them, and to move them towards the decisive point, which might be far distant.

- (2) To hold back a great artillery reserve for this decisive operation, and to risk it arriving at the decisive point in time.

To-day, on account of the rapidity of fire of the modern field gun, there will be no necessity either to hold back guns in reserve, or to withdraw them from their positions; for, all that will be necessary will be to mass ammunition opposite a definite point, or a topographically weak point, or a point which has become, or is likely to become, a decisive point, so that the guns commanding this point, few or many in number, may pour a continuous and terrific deluge of shells on this point, and so enable the decisive attack to proceed against it. Admitting that this is feasible, then the problem resolves itself into one of supplying these breaching batteries with sufficient ammunition; this problem should not be a difficult one to solve now that motor transport is in general use.

If I am right in this deduction, then I am right in adding: that that side which can first throw its adversary on the defensive, and, by so doing, can select at will the decisive point of attack—or which can, through a careful study of the ground, foresee this decisive point, or

any moderately weak point—has all to gain by doing so. The defence cannot gauge, or will have the greatest difficulty in gauging, even by means of aerial reconnaissance, the point against which the decisive attack is going to be launched, if the assailants' preparatory attack be violently offensive. All it can do is to attempt to take the attack, or assault, in flank, just as the 52nd Regiment took the Old Guard of Napoleon in flank at the close of the Battle of Waterloo, or as Colonel Daubeney, in his astonishing charge at Inkerman, cut the great Russian trunk column in two as it neared the Home Ridge.

I will now turn to the dangers of this proposal.

The vital point in any column is its flank, or flanks, and the decisive attack to-day is as much a column formation as it ever was. The difference being that now the ranks are separated by considerable distances, whilst formerly they were close together. How can these vital points be guarded against the terrible converging fire which shattered Napoleon's columns at Waterloo; from the disastrous frontal fire which all but annihilated Augereau's assaulting column at Eylau; and from such counter attacks as Wellington constantly practised throughout the Peninsular War?

The answer to the first is by an offensive holding or preparatory attack heavily supported by artillery, and by a choice of the decisive point which will be detrimental to a hostile converging fire. To withdraw guns from the preparatory attack, in order to aid the decisive attack, may prove more disastrous than beneficial, should the enemy's guns, once free, be enabled to bring an enfilade, or oblique fire, to bear on the assaulting column. This withdrawal, we have seen, is now unnecessary.

The answer to the second is by volume and accuracy of fire. To the third, either by protecting the flanks of the decisive attack by lines of riflemen echeloned back, or by the use of machine guns. The first process is costly, as it withdraws men from the preparatory or decisive attacks, the second brings us to our second new weapon.

The machine gun is a nerveless weapon. Its fire is consequently more accurate than that of the rifle. Its volume of fire is enormous, and is entirely under the control of one man, consequently it can be diverged to right or to left at will, whilst rifle fire from men in action can only, as is well known, be directed to their front.

There is as much difference between machine gun and infantry-fire to-day as there was between light infantry and heavy infantry-fire a hundred years ago. So great is this difference that we might almost say that the light infantry of the future will be evolved from the machine gunners of the present. That is, that the assaulting column of the future will be flanked by these terror-spreading weapons, and that these new light infantrymen, like the old, will not only precede the assaulting column by working up close to the line of the holding attack, but will flank it on both sides, producing a somewhat similar effect on the hostile line as grape, canister and case shot did during the first 50 years of the last century. (See diagrams 1 and 2.)

II.—THE GERMAN GRAND TACTICS.

I will now turn to my second proposition: the determination of the weak point in the grand tactics of our opponent, namely, Germany. Once we have done this we can fit weapons to tactics and shape our deployment accordingly.

Major de Pardieu in his "A Critical Study of German Tactics," which is based on the German Regulations and Army Manœuvres, arrives at the conclusion that the German theory of battle is founded on four elementary principles:

- "(1) Prudence of the advanced guard;
- (2) Inutility of a general reserve;
- (3) Inviolability of the front;
- (4) Decisive attack by envelopment."

Let us briefly examine these principles, especially 3 and 4.

From the days of Frederick the Great to the present, German tactics have always tended towards precision of movement. Precision requires simplicity, especially in a slow-thinking race, and if to simplicity may be added prearrangement, under certain circumstances may be forged a weapon as formidable as the Macedonian phalanx.

The leading doctrine of German fighting tactics is not, as is sometimes supposed, the offence *à outrance*, but the immediate and unhesitating attack when superiority in numbers has once been gained.

There are two main defects in this doctrine which must be apparent to all:—

(1) Superiority of numbers is not an essential to success. (Marathon, B.C. 490; Lule Burgas, 1912.)

(2) Superiority of numbers is most difficult to gauge. (M'Clellan's calculations of Lee's strength in 1862; and Kuropatkin's of Oyama's in 1904.)

This craving for superiority of numbers logically leads German tacticians to dislike the general advanced guard, and to trust to their cavalry for information; further, to encourage prudence in their tactical advanced guards until the units in rear are deployed.

In the organization of this prearranged battle we find, properly speaking, no general reserve, and for the very simple reason that a general reserve is incompatible with a preconceived plan of battle. The Greek phalanx had no general reserve, it was its own reserve, so now is the German Army. The phalanx was destroyed by the Roman legion, an army which held its veterans in reserve, the élite of the élite—*The Triarii*. Napoleon modelled his army on the Roman system; can it be said that his Imperial Guard was a useless adjunct to his organization?

The principles of war do not change, and as Count von Waldersee, a German, has justly remarked: "He who possesses the strongest reserves at the decisive moment nails victory to his standard."

Where then is the decisive point? We answer it may be anywhere. No, replies the German, it is where I wish it to be—one or both

flanks. What is his authority for saying so? Superiority of numbers and the inviolability of the modern battle front. The Greeks thought the battle front of their phalanx inviolable, the Battle of Pydna (B.C. 168) proved that it was not so, for it destroyed the phalanx for 1,500 years. Duke Leopold at Sempach (1386) imagined his hedgehog of spearmen utterly impenetrable: one man, the heroic Arnold von Winkelried, broke it!

He who in war believes in the inviolability of anything is a fool heaping up disaster with both his hands: this is the dictum of history. I think we are here nearing the same point Frederick neared, when he viewed the Austrian line at Leuthen.

What has originated this idea of the inviolability of the front? The answer is—the preponderance of the musket and rifle over the cannon, which had been steadily growing from the days of Wellington to those of the Russo-Japanese War. During this period the Germans were undoubtedly right to trust to envelopment, and Sadowa, the victories of 1870, and the recent Japanese successes in Manchuria, prove that they have been right. Yet all these victories do not prove that their system is infallible any more than the victories of Cressy (1346), Neville's Cross (1346), Poitiers (1356), Halidon Hill (1383), Homildon Field (1402) and Agincourt (1415) proved that the British archers were invincible, for three small culverins at Formigny (1450) removed them from the realms of war.

The logical sequence from inviolability of front is violability of flank; this is as true to-day as ever. The flank, whether it be of an individual or an army, is undoubtedly a vulnerable point. To meet a flank attack a man pivots on his feet, an army on its centre or on one of its flanks. If its front is held it cannot pivot on either, and to protect itself it must extend its front towards one or both of the threatened flanks; this is what Miltiades did at Marathon, and though he won, he was very nearly cut in half by the army of Darius Hytaspes.

There are two main systems of enveloping an antagonist:—

- (1) By massing an army in front of him and then by feeling round his flanks.
- (2) By converging two or more armies upon him.

The difficulty of the first is the placing of the reserve. If placed in the centre, it may, at the critical moment, be found to be too far from either flank. If placed on the left it may be eventually required on the right. This system was attempted by Kutusoff at Austerlitz (1805) and by Marmont at Salamanca (1812) with disastrous results. It, however, has frequently succeeded. Napoleon attempted it at Ligny (1815), and had d'Erlon's column not been turned back, it is not too much to say that Waterloo would never have been fought.

Envelopment without separation of force requires skill and skilful manœuvring. The Germans will have none of these, if, in place, they can gain simplicity by converging masses from a prearranged circumference on a prearranged centre. Their entire movement rests on one of the two following suppositions:—

(1) Either the enemy will not move, that is, will passively accept the situation as Benedek did at Sadowa.

(2) Or, as fronts are inviolable, that army which first strikes, or is struck by the enemy, will be able to hold him until the other envelops his flank, as Wellington and Blücher held and enveloped Napoleon at Waterloo.

The first means either reckoning without your host, as Wurmser and Alvinzi did in Italy in 1796-97, or consummate generalship, a summing up to a nicety of the opposing commander's character, as, I believe, Moltke did Benedek's at Sadowa, and Oyama did Kuropatkin's at Liao-Yang.

The second—consummate good luck. That is, uninterference with prearranged timing. At Kolin the whole of Frederick's arrangements were upset by a few Croatian sharpshooters; at Marengo it was a matter of minutes whether Desaix's column would arrive in time; at Lule Burgas the 3rd Bulgarian Army had to fight alone unsupported by the 1st—how many armies have not stuck in the mud because of a shower of rain; how many have not lost their way because of a mist or a fog?

Time in war is everything; nevertheless he who trusts in time alone is trusting himself and his army to a cobweb. Damocles at least had his eyes open when he ascended the throne of Dionysius. A sword suspended by a horse hair cured him of his folly. If the Germans do not see the horse hair, perhaps because of its fineness, well their enemies alone are to be congratulated.

III.—DEPLOYMENT BASED ON I. AND II.

Having arrived thus far, let us now fit our means to our end, as Frederick did, and from this union devise a form of deployment which will accentuate the power of our weapons and the defects in our enemy's formations.

We have seen, at least I have attempted to show you, that to-day the cannon, being the master weapon, has rendered penetration not only a possible but a highly probable operation. Further, that this penetration is rendered still more feasible by the proper use of machine-guns at effective ranges, the fire of these guns replacing the hail and case shot fire of a hundred years ago.

Again we have seen that the defects in the German system are directly traceable to a faulty appreciation of the power of modern weapons. The superiority of the cannon is not fully realized, deployments are still based on rifle-fire. Consequently we find that the Germans favour envelopment from divergent bases, so that they may destroy their enemy by a concentric arc of fire. Their system favours neither assault nor pursuit (cf. the campaigns of 1866, 1870, and 1904-5); it violates the leading principles of war; it is a half-measure postulated to overcome the enormous difficulty of moving forward a firing line of three, four or five hundred thousand slow-thinking riflemen. I cannot conceive why we should copy or emulate it; for, he who in war

merely copies is irrevocably damned (*e.g.*, King John at Poitiers, 1356; Leopold the Proud at Sempach, 1386; Soubise at Rosbach, 1757).

If we wish to dislocate the body of a serpent, it matters very little whether we sever his head or his tail, or simply cut him in half; for any one of these acts will result in his total disorganization. So with an army using linear tactics; that is, one line or two or more converging lines; if any part be destroyed, history shows us that all correlative parts are, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, at our mercy, if we follow up disorganization by striking and striking again.

Now the leading principle of penetration is mass, the principle by which Bonaparte won victory after victory in Italy; it is as true to-day as ever, and especially suitable for a small army like our own, which must be prepared to overcome superiority of numbers deployed by superiority of numbers deployable. I, therefore, do not think that we can afford to violate the leading principles of war:—"Strike in Mass," and "Strike Together." I do not think we need fear carrying out frontal attacks; Skobelev did so at Plevna against a determined foe, 450 Boers did so at Spionkop against 3,000 British soldiers; both were successful. Further, I think that we should not forget that the two great modern inventions—flight and motor-traction—have tended to strengthen an army acting on interior lines, which operation so often lends itself as the strategical prelude to a tactical penetration.

If the armies be separated as in Diagram 3, and if by means of their aeroplanes the commanders of both sides discover these distances, the advantage of this knowledge is manifestly on the side of A, if A is acting on interior lines against B and C, because this aerial reconnaissance gives A liberty of action, whilst it only gives B and C information, for their action is already compromised by a prearranged plan. If, however, the distances were 50 miles each way, as in Diagram 4, the advantage would be equally distributed, unless an obstacle, such as a river, runs between B and the line joining A and C, in which case the advantage would still be in favour of A.

If A attacks C, and meanwhile B operates against A's left flank or against A's communications with D (see diagram 3), A, by means of motor-transport can either open a new line, say with E, or, by diverging from the main line, keep open his communications with D by way of F.

Let us now suppose that A's plan is to crush C before B and C can unite. A's object will then be:

(1) To discover C's battle-front (2) To pin C down to it (3) To select a point along it and strike it in mass.

The last two acts may appear to suggest a dual deployment, namely, a preparatory attack G followed by a decisive attack H (see diagram 5). This duality need not, however, exist; for remembering the power of our artillery along any part of G, if sufficiently supplied with ammunition, we need no longer keep a separate force H, somewhere behind G, in order to initiate a decisive attack at some fleeting moment. All we need do is so to arrange our units that those of the decisive attack

have, as compared to those of the holding, a depth proportionally greater than their frontage.

The question now arises, how are we going to restrict the frontages of some divisions and extend those of others? The answer to this question is by a converging movement from a base the lateral breadth of which is greater than the eventual battle front. Thus, if the battle front of a division is from one and a half to two and a half miles in extent, the interval between divisions on the line of march, at the moment the advanced guards become engaged, might be from two and a half to three and a half miles, the depth and breadth of the whole formation being such that it may become engaged within six or eight hours of the advanced guards.

Deployment is therefore intimately connected with march formation, which should be sufficiently elastic to admit of expansion or contraction up to the actual moment of engagement. Further, when at a distance from the enemy, and particularly so when operating on interior lines, march formations should be such as will admit of a complete change of direction in the shortest possible time.

To illustrate what I mean I will first of all take the simple case of an army A (see diagram 6) marching towards an enemy C.

Now, whether A intends to envelop or penetrate C is a matter of indifference, for there can be but one march formation which will permit him doing so, so that all his units strike the enemy together. This formation is that of a line of columns parallel to the enemy's front. It is perfectly simple, and A can either converge on or diverge from his central line of advance as his plan of action matures.

Suppose, now, a second hostile force, B, is introduced, and that C by closing inwards or falling back renders a change of direction imperative; is this deployment in line of columns applicable? It certainly is not; for, to change direction towards B, A must order a gigantic wheel to the right or left.

Is there now any other formation which would enable A to march against C so that all A's columns could, within a few hours, attack C, or in a shorter time still change direction towards B? Yes, there is, in fact there are two: (1) the lozenge formation so frequently employed by Napoleon; (2) the echeloned line of columns formation, employed by various commanders throughout history (*e.g.*, the Mediæval Swiss, Gustavus Adolphus) and elaborated by Captain Alléhaut in his "*Essai sur la Bataille.*"

The first—the lozenge formation, is more suited to a country in which roads are few and bad, or in which there are many defiles and natural obstacles. It is suitable when a general advanced guard has to be formed, for the leading division can, with ease, join the cavalry (see diagram 7). Its defect is its depth, which scarcely permits of a lozenge of six divisions coming into action on the same day; consequently, in an encounter battle, its divisions are liable to come into action piecemeal, a very serious defect. Further, if I am right in supposing that modern artillery has reduced the necessity of a separate manœuvring mass, at the actual point of decision, the sixth division

would now be badly placed for a movement against C. If a change of front is made against B the 5th Division would be equally badly situated. If the 6th is moved up in line with the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th, the old linear series of columns is reconstructed, and this we wish to avoid.

The formation of the echeloned line of columns overcomes many of these difficulties (see diagram 8), for it not only permits of a rapid engagement of C with all six divisions, but of a rapid change of direction towards B if necessity arises. Thus, if the marching front of six divisions is 14 to 18 miles, that is about two and a half to three and a half miles between divisions, and the depth echeloned back from the head of the leading division to the head of the rearmost be from 12 to 15 miles, then if a change of direction from C to B is contemplated, this change can immediately be made by merely wheeling the head of each division to the left. The 1st Division, according to Captain Alléhaut, should be slightly in advance of the 2nd in order to allow of it uniting with the cavalry division and forming a general advanced guard to cover the change of front.

If, however, such a change of front is impossible, on account of the closing in of B and C, A may, if he still thinks fit, carry out his attack, whilst holding back B with his cavalry, supported by say the 1st and 2nd Divisions; or engage C with the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th, allow B to commence enveloping this attack, and then attack in mass B's right flank, in other words, envelop the enveloper (see diagram 9).

If, again, B and C unite prior to encounter, A would do better, if time permit of it, to form a triangular lozenge somewhat similar to Marshal Bugeaud's triangle at Isly (1844), against the now converging semi-circular line; and, either hold back its wings as they commence to clinch and penetrate its centre, or, to hold back its centre and destroy its wings by taking them in enfilade (see diagram 10).

Supposing, now, that A detaches one cavalry and one infantry division to operate against B whilst A himself attacks C, let us now examine what factors, outside the march formations, will affect his deployment.

Directly a commander knows where his enemy is and when he will meet him, he can delay no longer, his plan of action must be formulated, and zones of attack must be allotted, the frontage of these zones depending on the intensity of the fighting which will have to take place in each.

Where is the decisive blow to be struck? This is the keystone to every deployment. If this question cannot be settled before severe fighting takes place, zones of approximately equal size must be allotted to a certain number of units, whilst other units are kept back to reinforce any such zone wherein a decisive advantage is being gained. This will mean that the whole force will not strike together, a separation will take place between the holding and the decisive attacks, which is undesirable.

Can this defect be obviated? Certainly, if we bear in mind the breaching power of modern artillery. But, it may be argued, what is

the use of breaching an enemy's front or flank, if reserves are not held back to secure the breach when once it has been made? Further, if it is not intended to hold back a definite force for fear that it will arrive too late, how is it intended to take advantage of our superior artillery fire? These questions have already been answered, however. I will answer them again: by apportioning zones of action to each unit, the frontages of which are in proportion to their tasks. Thus, say our five divisions attack C, the frontages of the 2nd and 3rd might be one and a half miles each, those of the 4th and 5th a mile or half a mile each, and that of the 6th three miles (see diagram 11). The question now arises, how, except when the battle is far advanced and when no change in dispositions can be made, is it possible to discover where the decisive point will lie.

If the rifle were still the master weapon, this question would indeed be a difficult one to answer, but, as my contention is that it is not, all that is necessary is, directly the advanced guards have become engaged, to discover by reconnaissance, especially aerial, which section of the battlefield is least advantageous to the enemy's guns and most advantageous to our own, and then to converge our striking force against this point.

Thus, suppose, in diagram 12, D E offers this advantage of ground, then the 4th and 5th Divisions might be directed against D E, whilst the 2nd and 3rd held F D, and the 6th E G. When deployed the effect would be that of depth opposite the decisive point (see diagram 13). This point being, not where the enemy is in least strength, but where A may develop the full power of all his weapons combined and simultaneously. It will also be seen that such a deployment as this not only automatically concentrates infantry against the decisive point but artillery as well; there is, therefore, no necessity to hold back guns or to withdraw them from the holding attack.

If such a point be found, suppose, near the enemy's left flank, well and good, the only difference is that F D E will be held by three divisions whilst two deliver the decisive blow against E G.

If no such a point is discoverable, and time and numbers permit of it, an artificially weak point may be created by causing C to weaken one of his flanks, for example the right, by a threatening envelopment by means of the 2nd Division, whilst the 3rd and 4th are converged against the weakened section F D (see diagram 14).

In all these formations it is not necessarily presupposed that each division will march on to the battlefield as a single column. If roads permit of it there is no reason why each brigade should not have a separate road allotted to it. In 1912 Demitrieff, who was in command of the Third Bulgarian Army in Thrace, employed a triple column formation for each of his divisions (see diagram 15). The general security of his army depending not on detachments or on general advanced guards "but rather upon *ability to attack*" in bulk and at the shortest possible notice.

Twenty months prior to Demitrieff's advance, the principles upon which much of the Bulgarian tactics appear to have been based were

DIAGRAM 1.





DIAGRAM 2.



DIAGRAM




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



DIAGRAM 6.



AM 4.



DIAGRAM 8.






DIAGRAM 12.



5.





DIAGRAM 13.



C

G

DIAGRAM 9.





DIAGRAM 14.






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



DIAGRAM 7.





A





DIAGRAM 10.



A

DIAGRAM 15.





DIAGRAM 11.



clearly dealt with by Colonel de Grandmaison in his "Deux Conférences." Colonel de Grandmaison writes: "In reality—and it would be easy to show that it has always been so—the safety of a force in the attack is based on this act: a man who one holds by the throat and who is occupied in defending himself cannot attack you in flank or in rear. The value of this method depends on the rapidity with which you spring at his throat and on the strength of your grip."

In other words, strike in mass and strike all together.

How from this point our columns further deploy does not concern us here, for such deployments are purely matters of fighting tactics.

I will, therefore, conclude this article by saying:—

I have no doctrine to preach, for I believe in none. Every concrete case demands its own particular solution, and for this solution all that we require is skill and knowledge, skill in the use of our weapons, knowledge of our enemy's formations.

A physician who is slave to a doctrine, as was the famous Doctor Sangrado in "Gil Blas," ends by killing his patients; a General who is under the spell of some such shibboleth as—the oblique-order, envelopment, penetration or the offensive à outrance ends by destroying his army. There is no difference. If there is a doctrine at all then it is common sense, that is, action adapted to circumstances.

I do not lay down that I am right in basing my proposed deployment for penetration principally on the power of quick-firing artillery; but all I can say is this: that a careful study of past and present history has led me to the following conclusions:—

(1) That weapons when correctly handled seldom fail to gain victory.

(2) That armies are more often ruined by dogmas springing from their former successes than by the skill of their opponents.

If these be so, then, if this article prove of sufficient worth to stimulate thought on this important subject—"How may our small Expeditionary Force be deployed to gain decisive victory over a numerically superior German army," I shall consider that I have been justified in writing it from this particular standpoint:—"Know your weapons. Understand your enemy."

A JOURNAL OF THE BHURTPORE CAMPAIGN OF 1805.

By CORNET GEORGE MCCALL, 27th Light Dragoons.

From a MS. in the Royal United Service Institution.

JANUARY 1ST, 1805.—The Army marched this Morning at 7 o'clock in two Columns, the Park and Baggage etc. moving in the Centre. No enemy seen; cultivation in abundance and a fine sporting Country. Encampment N.N.E. and S.S.West. Marched 8 or 9 miles. Course S.S.West. Water plenty.

2ND.—Marched at the same hour and in the same Order as yesterday; the March very tedious; not arriving at our Ground till one o'clock. 4 or 5 miles from this Ground, passed the Town and Fort of Comeer, bearing West of the Line of March 3 or 4 miles. Encampment N.N.E. and S.S.W. March 6 miles. Course S.S.West. Bhurtpore distant 2,500 Yards from the Front of the Infantry Line; bearing E.N.E.

4TH.—In the Evening, a party under the Command of the Brigadier General of the day (Lieut-Col. Maitland H.M. 75th Regt.) took possession of a Tope¹ without the least opposition, in front of the Encampment, distant nearly 2 miles.

5TH.—At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 p.m. a party for the Trenches, and the working party with fascines, Gabions, etc., left Camp; and the latter party, consisting of 80 men from H.M. 27th and 29th Light Dragoons, erected a Battery for 6 18's about 900² Yards from the point of Attack without any Cover and they had no sooner commenced upon their Work than the Enemy set fire to several Combustibles, on the plain, between the walls of the Town and our Battery which fortunately was of great Advantage to the Party as the Moon had been down some time. The enemy made not the least attempt to disturb the working Party during the time, for, had they known our party was without any protection, and also the distance they were from the Trenches, in the Tope, they might have dashed down and cut off the whole party as well as have destroyed the fascines, Gabions, etc., there being no Trench or covert way for a body of Infantry nearer than 500 Yards of the place fixed upon by the Engineer for the Battery. All but laying the Platforms and drawing in the Guns, was completed during the Night. The Ground very hard.

¹ Wood or large grove.

² The battery was to have been erected at 360 or 400 Yds., but from the darkness of the night or hurry or some other reason the Engineers made a *Mistake*.

6TH.—About 7 a.m. a firing commenced which led most to suppose that our Battery had opened, but it proved to be from the Fort, which by this time had discovered what we had been doing during the preceding Night. In the Evening a working Party from the 8th Light Dragoons went down and completed the Battery; the Guns laid and everything ready by 6 o'clock the 7th Inst.

7TH, 8TH, 9TH, 10TH.—The Battery opened on the 7th and by sunset the Breach was supposed to be practicable; however, as parties did not agree respecting the practicability of it, it was necessary to continue battering another day; in the Evening, a working party of 80 men (Dragoons) went down with this Party for the Trenches; by 12 o'clock a Battery for 8 Mortars of 8 Inches and 2 of 5½ Inches was erected. The two latter commenced playing by 10 o'clock and one 8 Inch by one o'clock and with such Nicety that the Hircarrah,¹ who left the Town about 12, brought word into the Battery that our Shells had killed and wounded several people. The Battery was to have been attacked during the night by the horse of Holkar and Meer Khan, a council of War having been held in their Camp for that purpose during the day, but, an hircarrah brought word towards the Morn² that the two Chiefs did not agree with regard to the mode of Attack and therefore the matter dropped; it is more probable they did not wish to taste our Grape, as we were prepared to receive them and of which they might have received information!

The Morn of the 8th discovered the Breach to have been repaired during the night, notwithstanding our fire from the Battery every ½ hour.

At 4 p.m. of the 9th the Breach was reported practicable and about 7 the Storming Party marched off in three Columns, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Maitland, and about 5 minutes before 8 p.m. a most tremendous fire of Cannon and small Arms commenced which did not cease till near 12 o'clock. A small party under Major Hawkes marched off to the Right of the Battery to attack a small one of 3 or 4 Guns and a body of the Enemy in the Trenches, in which he succeeded; the Guns were spiked and the Enemy bayoneted. The Right and Centre Columns advanced towards the Breach, but on arriving at the Ditch of the Town, they found a Canal or passage had been cut from the Lake on the Left, to the Ditch on the Right, which though not very broad, was 12 feet deep. This unforeseen event delayed the Party for ½ an hour, for the purpose of procuring ladders to throw across it, which being done the Columns moved on and reaching the opposite side found a deep Pit out of which the besieged had taken earth to repair the Breach; moving round this they at length reached the place, and marched up, but

¹ Spies, who assume the dress etc. of beggars, pedlars, servants to wait at Table.

² I had the honour of being in the Battery (for the 1st time) and commanded the Party.

could not proceed far owing to its having been stockaded¹ and after Many Efforts to succeed our party was obliged to return with the Loss of Many killed and wounded. The breach was enfiladed by 3 Guns on the Right Bastion, but notwithstanding the heavy fire of Grape,² etc. H.M. 75th Regt. attempted the breach 4 different Times, and the last time their Gallant Commander, Lieut.-Colonel Maitland with the Brigade Major of the Day of Infantry, Captain Wallace, both of whom had no sooner reached the summit than they were knocked back into the Ditch by the spears and killed. H.M. 22nd Flankers and a part of 2nd Battalion 12th came off with no better success, and every one having used his best endeavours to storm without any success, returned to their Lines by one o'clock a.m.

Our Loss was as follows :—5 Officers killed ; 6 badly wounded and 11 wounded slightly ; 44 privates killed and 280 wounded, many of the latter were able to do Duty on the 23rd Inst.

10TH, 11TH AND 12TH.—The Engineers busy in drawing Plans for new Batteries and their Establishment employed in making fascines, gabions, etc. A Battery of 3 12's erected during the Night of the 11th and 12th and the Embrasures of the old Battery inclined to the Right.

13TH.—At evening the working Party from the Dragoons went down to make the new Battery for 2 24's and 4 18's to the Right of the Old Battery and in a Line with the Mortar one, joining each other.

15TH.—At 7 a.m. the 3 Batteries opened and kept playing for many hours ; the fire was so hot that our *friends* on the outside of the Town were obliged to draw off their Guns. The Defences of the Left Bastion and Curtain were completely knocked off.

17TH.—This Morn discovered to us the Breach to be the same as the Old one but on further breaching the Piles gave way and a hole made through the work. Our Shells from the 7th to the 16th Inst. did much Mischief. The eldest son of the Rajah (Runder Sing) lost his Arm by a Shell ; the uncle was killed in the day time by a shot from the old Battery,³ while he was looking at the

¹ Instead of having been stockaded as was then supposed, it has proved by the new breach, that when the Wall was building large Piles were driven into the Ground and then covered with Earth about 10 or 14 feet thick.

² They not only fired Grape, but pice (brass coins) as several were taken out of the Men's Jackets and dresses—how hard they must have been pushed for ammunition. I actually saw *the coin*, which the Sepais had taken out of their dress when I visited Aylmer, who was lightly touched with a spent ball.

³ Capt. Nelly of Artillery, (who commanded in the Batteries that day) I heard say “that seeing a large Party looking over the Parapet into the Ditch, he allowed them to do so for some time, when at length he observed with a Glass a Person better dressed than the others, with a large Umbrella over him, descend a little way down the Breach ;” thinking him a person of rank, he laid one of his Guns for him, saying at the same time to the Men belonging to the Gun “we will shew this *curious* fine Man how well we can hit a Mark” and ordering them to fire, his words proved true, for the Shot struck him in the body and killed him, and by the account the Hicarrah brought, it turned out to be the Uncle.

bodies of our Men laying on the Old Breach. In the afternoon a party came over from the Enemy and also 15 of our own Sepais, who were taken in their Retreat from Rampoorra (1804) and now had made their escape. Meer Khan, Holkar's head Chief, joined his Master with 800 horse during the day.

18TH.—In the Evening, Major-General Smith, with 3 Battalions came into Camp having left Agra only the night before, a distance of 40 miles. The casualties in the Batteries to this day were 1 Artillery Officer killed and 4 Men killed and wounded.

20TH.—The Breach was reported practicable; however during the Night the Garrison attempted to stockade it, but on the following Morn, a few shots from our Batteries destroyed what they had repaired during the Night before. Three Troopers in the Afternoon, whilst on Duty, rode off (under pretence of deserting) and arriving at the part of the Ditch, opposite the New Breach, asked for Admittance; on being told to go round two of them fell from their horses to give the other more time for observation; the other Trooper keeping up a Conversation with the Enemy till they could remount their horses, and the Sepais in the Trench on the Right of the Battery kept up a heavy fire with blank Cartridges to make the appearance of Desertion in reality. The Troopers having made their observations respecting the Breach, the Depth of Water in and width of the Ditch, moved off as if they were going to the Gate, but turned suddenly off to the Right, and galloped direct to Head Quarters and informed the General of what they had seen, for which they received 1,500 Rupees (£188) between them and promoted also to the Rank above that which they then held (on the following day).

21ST.—About 3 a.m. of the 21st Inst. the Storming party marched down to the Trenches in the Tope and there remained till a few Minutes before 3 p.m. where the party, which was composed as follows:—The Flank Companies of H.M. 22nd Regt.; H.M. 75th Regt.; 300 76th Regt.; 60 for carrying Fascines 76th Regt.; H. Company's 1st European Regt.; 2nd Bn. of 15th Native Regt. marched down to the Breach under Cover of the fire from the Batteries and Trenches; on the Column arriving on the Edge of the Ditch they found it had been widened during the Night. Lieut. Morris of the 1st E. Regt. (an expert swimmer) with 7 or 9 men leapt into the Ditch and swam across, but on trying the scaling Ladders to make a Bridge they found them to be 12 or 14 feet too short; notwithstanding this the few with Lieut. Morris ascended the Breach; the latter had nearly gained the top of it when one of the Enemy fired at him and wounded him in the Leg, which brought him down, who with much presence of mind rolled himself down the Breach into the Ditch and swam back again and was taken out by the Party. Finding every attempt to gain the opposite side fruitless the party returned to their Lines with the Loss of 3 Officers killed and 15 wounded, 560 privates killed and wounded of Europeans and Natives.

The Cavalry mounted at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 2 and marched out to the Right of the Infantry Line, as a Cover to the Storming Party, but had not proceeded far in front in our Picquets, when we observed the Enemy's horse to be forming into Line. The Commander in Chief who was with us, ordered the 2 Brigades to form separate Lines and the Gallopers of H.M. 27th Light Dragoons (supported by a Troop of the same Regt. and one from a Regt. of N.C.) to advance about 300 Yards to the front, which was accordingly done. Lieut. Wallis who commanded the Gallopers on finding himself near enough to open on the Enemy commenced a brisk fire; the Line halted and the Horse Artillery which was on our Right moved out and played upon a large Body of horse in front of the 1st Brigade.¹ The enemy threw a few rockets but without any Effect, and our fire at last became so hot that they withdrew to a considerable distance, having lost many Men and Horses. His Excellency being informed of the failure of the Attack, ordered the Cavalry to retire in 2 Lines. We had not marched far when some few of the Enemy came very near to us; the Gallopers being ready and the Lines fronted they were received rather warmly and so unexpectedly by our Guns that they retreated in a hurry and permitted us to proceed to Camp without farther molestation.

22ND.—A Detachment left Camp at 5 o'Clock to bring in Grain from Muttra.

23RD.—About 6 o'clock a.m. a heavy firing was heard in the direction the above detachment was to return, and it being known the Enemy had moved round the range of Hills the preceding day to intercept them, H.M. 27th and one of N. Cavalry were sent out at 8 o'clock to support the Party and bring in the Grain; about 10 we arrived at the Scene of Action. The Detachment seeing us advancing made a second Charge on the foe and forced them to forsake their Guns, having been previously charged twice by a superior force of Infantry and a very large body of Meer Khan's Horse. The Circumstance being reported to Colonel Need (who commanded the Party) the Cavalry formed Squadrons and immediately pursued the Enemy, who were so greatly panic struck and no time allowed them to recover from it, that their horse fled instantly and the Infantry followed their example; the Gallopers gave them a few rounds and we then charged them. The Right Squadron of H.M. 27th Lt. Dragoons under the command of Captain Mylne, received orders to pursue a large Party of Infantry, which they soon came up with and charged, took their Colours and cut them up. The remainder of the Regiment with the N. Cavalry were not less successful and I should be guilty of great injustice as well as shew much partiality towards the Europeans Corps, were I to permit an opportunity like the present to pass by without remarking the Gallantry and Bravery which was shewn on this occasion by every Non-Commissioned officer, Sepais and Trooper of the 1st

¹ The 2 Brigades now had formed one Line.

N. Cavalry and 2nd Bn. 15th N. Regiment; too much praise cannot be bestowed on Capt. G. Welsh who commanded this small Detachment (which at the utmost was only 1,000 men) for his judgement and Gallantry. This little body at the commencement of the Attack were detached in Companies and Troops to a great distance, for the Protection of 10,000 Bullocks laden with Grain for the Grand Army. Captain W. seeing his situation and that the Enemy had guns, advanced to get Possession of a Village with a small Redoubt adjoining it for the purpose of securing his Convoy, but on his arrival there he found a large party of the Enemy's Infantry occupying the place; however they were soon driven out by a few Sepais; the greater part of the Cattle was secured and the remainder brought under the Walls of the Redoubt and Village, the places being too small to contain the whole number. The Enemy's horse and Infantry moved down to attack the Detachment. The Allegoles¹ charged our Infantry twice. One of the Gallopers of the N. Cavalry was rendered useless by its breaking down and of course was obliged to be left on the plain. In this situation was the Detachment for 3 hours and on the brink of being cut to pieces when we arrived and saved not only our brave men but the Grain (having only one day's supply more in Camp). The Sepais as soon as they saw us near them, cried out "here comes General Lake and his Cavalry" and rushed out of the Village and Ghurri and charged the Guns of the foe, which was just accomplished as we had formed Squadrons, and had received orders to Charge (the foe having previously saluted us with 2 rounds of Shot one of which had nearly killed the Officer of our Flanking Party); the three Regiments of Cavalry completed the destruction of the Enemy. Our Loss in the Whole was 8 Sepais killed and 36 wounded and a few Troopers wounded slightly and one Officer wounded, while in the Village the Enemy's loss could not have been less than 1,000 and these chiefly Infantry and their 4 Guns taken. Our Strength consisted of the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regt. 600 strong commanded by Lieut. Garner; 2 Regts. of N.C. and one of Dragoons, making in the whole 1,600. The Enemy had 2,000 Infantry and 4 or 5,000 horse, 1,300 of the latter fled towards Muttra at the commencement of the Action.

24TH.—The Engineer Department employed in making Fascines and Boats of Wicker work covered with hides.

25TH.—A Detachment consisting of 2 Battns. of N. Infantry and 29th L. Dragoons and 2 Regts. of N. Cavalry left Camp for Agra.

29TH.—The remainder of the Cavalry in Camp, Horse Artillery and 75th Regt. and Battalion of Sepais marched at 7 o'clock without Baggage with the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of meeting Lieut.-Colonel Don's Detachment (with 40,000 Binjarries with Grain and a large supply of Artillery Stores, etc.) as well as preventing the Supplies from being cut off; intelligence having been received on the 28th Inst. that 7 Battalions and 12 Guns and the

¹ Men carrying Musquets with Bayonets.

Horse under the following Chiefs:—Meer Khan, Runder Sing (the Rajah's eldest son), Bapho Scindia and 2 other Chiefs, had marched to intercept the Convoy and had encamped at or near to a Village where the Roads to Agra, Muttra and Bhurtpore join each other. About 2 p.m. we arrived at the above said Village, saw no Infantry of the Enemy's but a numerous body of Horse (a greater force than had been seen during the Campaign) awaiting the arrival of the Detachment; a few shots were fired at them on which they withdrew to a distance in small Bodies. We halted here till 4 o'clock (and partook of a little meat, etc. in the interim) about which hour the Dust occasioned by the Detachment was discovered at a short distance off. H.M. 27th L. Dragoons were ordered to go out and meet them and on the Convoy coming within a Mile of the Village, the horse came down in great numbers, so much so that the Ground could not be marked out till many shots had been fired at them from the Galloppers and Infantry Guns. At length they moved off to a considerable distance and we encamped by 7 o'clock with everything safe. The Party which marched from Camp in the Morn had a cold berth of it, having neither Tents, Bedding and some no food¹ etc.

30TH.—Marched at 7 o'clock in the following Order:—Right Column consisting of 29th Drgs. 2 Regts. of N. Cavalry and 1 Battn. of Sepais; the 27th Drgs. forming the Advd. Guard to this Column. Left Column consisting of 8th L. Drgs. 1 Regt. N.C., H.M. 75th Regt. and one Battn of N. Infantry. Advd. Guard, a Regt. of N. Cavalry, Rear Guard one Regt. of N.C. and one Battn. The treasure under a Party of recovered Europeans and a Jemidar and 12. Baggage and Convoy in the Centre, following the Treasure. The foes threw several Rockets but of no consequence. They then hovered about the Rear, wounding a few Sepais with their Matchlocks, but on a galling fire opening on them from the Left Column and Rear which killed not a few, they left us altogether, having marched 7 miles with us without taking a single particle of our Convoy. By 11 o'clock p.m. the whole arrived in Camp safe.

FEBRUARY 1ST TO 5TH.—Busy making Fascines, Pontoons, etc. etc. On the evening of the 5th the old Trenches were reduced to 50 Europeans and half the usual number of Sepais, and a party of 150 Europeans with one Battn. and its Guns marched off at 6 o'clock to break Ground at another part of the Fort.

6TH.—The Army shifted Ground at 10 o'clock about a mile from the above place, and a mile nearer to the Fort, so that the Left of the Infantry Line occupies the spot where one of our Picquets was within Cannon Shot. The Centre of the Line, the road to the Futtipour or Agra Gate by which means the communication with the Fort was cut off. Our position was strong with Villages on heights for Outposts. The Garrison

¹ The Privates had nothing but the remains of their yesterday's dinner from 6 o'clock of the 29th Inst. to 11 p.m. of the 30th.

deceived with regard to our next Attack. The new Trenches were ready and a Party sent down and by the 7th Inst. a Battery for 2 12's was erected at 400 Yards distant from the Gateway to destroy the Defences. The old Batteries remain *in statu quo*.

TRIP INTO ROHILLCUND UNDER MAJOR-GENERAL SMITH.

FEBRUARY 8TH.—The Horse Artillery and the whole of the Cavalry with the exception of the 2nd & 4th Regts. left Camp at 10 o'clock under the command of Major-General Smith and after a March of 16 miles encamped at Sunset near the Village of Swiney, distant from Matura 8 or 9 miles. Course N.E. Cultivation pretty general and water plenty.

9TH.—At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 o'clock marched in a N.N.E. course for about 8 or 9 miles when we arrived at Muttra, and crossed the Jumna over the Bridge of Boats, then steering an E. by N. Course for 2 or 3 miles encamped at a Ruinous Ghurri situated on an eminence and commanding a prospect of the River, town of Muttra and the country round Mersaun (a Fort belonging to Begwant Sing). Course N.N.E. and E. by N. March 10 or 11 miles; water plenty, but forage very scarce. Meer Khan, it is said, crossed the Jumna with 4 or 5,000 horse, such as they are, but more properly termed riff raffs, on the 7th Inst. in the afternoon at a place called Furrah 10 or 12 miles below Muttra; he is now reported by the Hircarrahs to be going to Hattrass, 24 miles from this.

10TH.—At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 6 left Gausnah, marching left in Front for 11 miles, when we reached Jora, where we halted for some time to refresh both Men and horses; here we learnt that Meer Khan and his party reposed during the last Night, under the Trees in and about the Village and that he had taken a N. East direction hence, instead of going to Hattrass as was yesterday reported. The Fort of Mersaun fired at his horse as they passed by it. Leaving Jora we took a N.E. course for 7 miles when we encamped amidst cultivation and plenty of water. The march lay thro' a very fine cultivated country. Course E. by N. & N. East. March 18 miles.

N.B.—The Firing at Bhurtpore heard very distinctly.

11TH.—Marched at 6 and arrived at Coël by 3 p.m. under the Walls of which fort we encamped. The Battn. under Lt.-Colonel Grueber joined us here. Course North. March 25 miles.

12TH.—The Cavalry marched at 2 o'clock a.m. intelligence having been received that the Enemy were encamped on the Banks of the Calli Nudda near Kumoonah, distant 20 miles from Coël; however on our arrival on the Spot occupied by them the Villagers informed us they had left it at 3, therefore finding it fruitless to pursue them we halted in Groves till the Infantry & Baggage should arrive and which unfortunately took a wrong course for four miles

and we were obliged to go after them, encamping at Sunset within 2 miles of Kumoonah. The Infantry left Coël at 6 o'clock. Course nearly North. March 20 miles. Long Grass; cultivation and Water plenty. Capt. Skinner with 500 of his horse was ordered to proceed 4 or 5 Coss in pursuit of the Enemy's rear and to cut them up; he had not gone more than 2 miles when his Party met some Allegoles, belonging to the Doondirh Cawn; the horse played away at them, the rebels cried out they were friends to Meer Khan, but on Capt. Skinner riding up to the head of his men, the Allegoles discovered their mistake and commenced firing; however this was soon stopped, as Capt. S. gave them 3 or 4 rounds of Grape from his Galloppers, upon which the Enemy threw down their Arms and ran off to a small Ghurri in which was a 4 pounder which opened upon the horse who were pursuing the fugitives, but did not prevent their Cattle, Baggage etc. etc. from being carried off from under the Walls of the Redoubt. Capt. S. loss was 3 killed and 4 or 5 wounded; the foe from 160 to 170 killed.

13TH.—Marched at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 in a North Direction leaving Anopsheer on the Right 6 miles; having been informed on the March that our friends had gone to Paena, the Cavalry repaired thither and the Infantry to Anopshur; on their leaving a village¹ fired on them, killing a Sepais and wounding an officer² and 4 Sepais. Colonel G. brought a 6 pounder to the Gate, blew it open, killed every man in the place, set it on fire and then continued his route. March 20 miles. Course North. Open country; little cultivation and little water.

14TH.—Marched at 5 o'clock and arrived at our Ground about 2. The Enemy attempted to cross the Ganges but it was not fordable, and therefore continued his course to the Northward. The Country thro' which we marched rather barren and the last 6 miles sandy soil and ravines. Encamped at Khanpour on the Banks of the River. March 24 miles. Course nearly North. Forage scarce.

15TH.—Marched at the usual hour, left in Front, about 9 miles; arrived at Ghurmatisher, the Nawaub of which place came out and saluted us. 9 miles farther arrived at a small hamlet, part of which had been burnt by the Enemy who passed thro' it about 12 o'clock yesterday; marched for a mile more across the Sands and arrived at the spot where the Enemy forded the River about breast high of our horses; the whole of the Cavalry, Baggage, etc. crossed without any loss or accident in the course of 2 hours and encamped at Coommoodenah Ghaut by 2 o'clock. The River Ganges on our Right. March 20 miles; cultivation pretty well.

16TH.—Halted.

17TH.—Marched at one a.m. and by 9 arrived at the Large Town of Amroah; the Country after the first 2 miles is a fine Champaign

¹ Belonging to Doondirh Khan.

² Died the day following.

and well cultivated. The Detachment marched thro' the town which is very populous and walled round with burnt bricks and has 4 or 5 Gates to it. The Inhabitants are Patans, very good looking people, well dressed and every one bearing Arms. They did not appear diffident on our Approach; rather on the contrary, for they sold us what we wanted and answered our interrogatories, were not insolent nor disrespectful. Meer Khan passed to the right of the town, but offered no violence; he only requested two Choudries (headmen of the Market who cheat like the devil) to be sent him, which was granted; it was reported here that he issued an Order that should any of his followers offer violence or plunder any Village etc. he shall be put to Death (should he be discovered in the fact). We have as yet no signs of devastation caused by him, thro' the country he has passed thro' nor any Complaint against him. Encamped on the Eastern side of the Town; course East by S. March 21 miles; Water plenty and good forage in abundance.

18TH.—Marched at 2 o'clock a.m. and by 8 crossed the Ramgonga River having passed thro' the town of Meradabad which has nothing remarkable in it to boast of, except that of a Collector and Judge. Meer Khan burnt the Sebundy Lines and a Cottage (Bungalow); he did attempt burning Mr. Leicester's house but was prevented by two obstacles; the first Mr. L. having thrown up a Work with 4 Bastions (round his house) with a deep ditch without, upon Holkar's arrival in the Dooab (Nov. 1804) and 2nd was 3 4 pounders and a few Swivels planted on the Ramparts and top of his house (which is 2 stories high) so as to bear upon any part; it was also Garrisoned by the Sebundy Corps (Militia); the foe attempted to escalate the Fort about Midnight but were obliged to go off hearing we were close upon him and the place being able to hold out a few hours longer; about 60 of his followers fell victims to the place from the fire of Cannon and small Arms. Two companies of the Sebundies deserted when the enemy went and fired upon the Sepais. From what the Inhabitants say and from the extent of Ground their Encampment took up it does not appear his force can be more than 3 or 4,000 Cavalry, if they can be called so. The Villagers and travellers say that some are mounted on Bullocks, some on Asses and but very few on horses and most without Arms. The Country very well cultivated, water good and plenty. March 18 miles to Meradabad and 3 miles more to the Encampment=21 miles. Course E.S.E.

FEBRUARY 19TH.—Marched at the usual hour and after having proceeded 6 or 7 miles North were obliged to halt for about two hours, as part of the Baggage had taken a contrary direction to that which we were going, and it was not till we had mounted that an Hircarrah brought word the Enemy had gone towards Cossipour (a rich mercantile town on the Skirts of the Hemaon Mountains) and the greater of our Baggage had gone with the

Guard to the Southward, according to the Orders of the preceding day. At 7 we again moved on and marched over a fine well cultivated Country for 7 or 8 miles more, when we encamped in the Midst of Forage and Water. No signs of the foe's depredation. The Villagers informed us he had passed this way and had gone towards Cossipour. March 17 miles. Course N. and N.E. Ramnaghur 15 miles from Cossipour.

20TH.—This day's march was a short one, and we did not leave the above village till $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 (for about the usual hour of Marching orders arrived to countermand it). However we moved in a contrary direction to yesterday's and encamped by one o'clock near Rampour. Soon as we left the last Ground we crossed a small river which runs into the Ramgonga and recrossed it near Rampour. The Country through which we marched was much cultivated and cattle grazing in abundance; in short, Rohilcund may be said to be a fine, open cultivated country and its soil very rich and superior to any Part of the Dooab. From the last 2 Marches it appears that the Country is one entire plain; from North to the East it is bound by the Mountains and Hills which to-day were seen pretty clearly and Snow on the Top of the former. The Villages are neat, airy and populous and in general built near Groves of Mangoe. March 12 miles. Course South.

21ST.—Left Rampour at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5; went round the Town, then took a North and afterwards an Eastern course, then S.E. and South. The Country in a very high State of cultivation and much Water. Crossed several Nullahs and a River, and encamped after a March of 20 miles on the Banks of the River, distant from Rampour 9 or 10 miles. No signs of the Enemy having been in the Neighbourhood.

Rampour is a very extensive town; its principle defence appears to be in a Cane Hedge about 30 feet thick which is said to surround the Town entirely. The avenues leading to the town are so narrow and low that they may be easily defended by 2 or 3 persons and from what I could observe it has more the appearance of a Labyrinth than anything else. There is one Gate but the Approach to it is thro' narrow Ravines and broken ground. The only things worthy of notice in the Town are the 3 Palaces, one in which the Prince's Grandmother resides; the 2 others are occupied by the Uncle, Prince and family. The town is full of *Armed Men* who seem disaffected towards the Government. The Regent (Uncle) came and visited the Major-General, attended by a large suite, in the name of the Prince, who is a lad of about 16 or 17 years of Age, tending his Services in whatever we wanted and appears much attached to our Side. We were supplied with wood and Grain. Rampour is celebrated for having the fairest women and Men in all India; they are nearly as fair as Europeans.

22ND.—Marched at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5. Left in front and at 12 reached Sheerghur where we encamped. We are to halt here till we get

further information respecting the Enemy's movements, who is reported to be at Booth or Boodipour a town on the Banks of a small River near the Hills (East from this 45 miles), and surrounded by broken and swampy Ground; there are several rivers between him and us. Our position is very good and central for marching to any principal town in the Province. Bareilli is 20 miles (in our rear) Southward and is the object of the Enemy to plunder. Rampour and Meradabad to the Westward. This day's march was very unpleasant owing to the winding of the River or Deep Nullah which we had to cross 3 times besides many broad and wet Ditches. The Country for the first 6 miles very much cultivated and the last 8 or 9 nothing but Jungle Grass; on the whole very bad for the Movements of an Army, particularly if much Artillery and Baggage. Course S.E. & E.S.East. March 15 miles in a strait course otherwise 20. Rain but not much.

FEBY. 23RD & 24TH.—Waiting for information, no intelligence for the last 12 hours; nearly 60 miles from the Enemy.

25TH.—Marched at 6 o'clock, right in front; after marching through a fine cultivated country arrived at Millick, a small village by 12 o'clock. Everything seemed to be in prosperity. Villages very neat and clean and built on rising Ground with a Grove in the rear, which had a pretty effect; the inhabitants appeared quite happy and instead of shunning us, came out to greet us offering our Troops water, milk, Poultry, etc. March 15 miles. Course W.N.West; water & forage plenty.

26TH.—Marched this Morn, left in Front, and by 12 encamped at Etwarunpour, 4 miles west of Rampour. The Nawaub rode out to meet the General and told him a *Lie* respecting our being in Possession of Bhurtpore on the 22nd Inst. He is a fine looking lad and has a mild countenance. March 16 miles. Course N.West; water plenty; the Country the same as yesterday. N.B. The Snow on the Mountains seen very clearly, distance upwards of 100 miles.

FEBY. 27TH.—Marched to Meradabad and recrossed the Ramgonga. Course W.N.West. March 18 miles.

28TH.—Left the above place at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5 and by 12 arrived near our Ground when we were informed some Pindarres¹ or Mahrattas were setting fire to and plundering the Villages. The General with 2 Troops and a Galloper from the 29th & 2 Troops of N. Cavalry went out to reconnoitre and after some time returned with 2 horsemen who were taken by some Men belonging to Capt. Skinner. The prisoners said they did not belong to Meer Khan; however, the villagers said that these men were left behind to burn, destroy and plunder while the Main body recrossed the Ganges. The Country pretty well cultivated and in this day's march oats were discovered, but in small quantities; an article

¹ Incendiaries.

scarcely heard of in this part of the Globe; it is much to be lamented that it is not more cultivated. Course N.N. West. March 19 or 20 miles.

- MARCH 1ST.—Left Canotghur or Seer Ghurri at 5 o'clock and after a tedious march over a bad and uncultivated country arrived at Bateilley, where the Enemy had been but a few hours, burning and plundering the whole way. The first 10 miles due West and the latter part nearly N. West. March 18 miles; encamped on the Banks of a small river, which empties itself into the Ramgonga below Meradabad.
- 2ND.—Marched at 5 o'clock and about 10 heard that the Enemy were only 4 coss off; left our Baggage under a strong Party in a Village and Square and about 12 came in Sight of them, and by 2 after a contest they left the Field. 150 Infantry marched against us and cut to pieces. Capt. Skinner's horse killed 40 of the Chief's bodyguard among whom was the Brother, and 3 Chiefs were also wounded. Our Loss very great; we did not pursue; Great display of Generalship!! I wish it were in my power to give a description of this slaughter, but must not for various reasons, and the less said the Better on the Subject. March 24 miles. Course E.N.E. Country jungle grass, intersected by Rivers, etc.
- 3RD.—Halted; encamped on the Banks of the Ramgonga.
- 4TH.—Marched at 5 and by 12 reached Sheer Ghur where we encamped on the 28th ult; march tedious over broken Ground, intersected by deep Ravines and Nullahs; little or no cultivation. Course South. March 19 miles.
- 5TH.—Marched by the Left at the usual hour and arrived at Meradabad by one o'clock. Course S.E. by S. March 19 miles.
- 6TH.—Marched by the Right at 5 o'clock for about 4 miles and encamped on the Banks of the Gunnan. Course W.S.W. Cultivation plenty; the wounded Officers and Men left at Meradabad.
- 7TH.—Marched by the left at 6 o'clock; by one encamped near Chundra, a large Village near the Banks of the Ramgonga. From the quantity of Rain which fell during the Night, the March was rendered pleasant till 11 when the Sun made it hot; it being in our faces and the Wind in our Backs. Cultivation plenty; no villages near; but the few huts on the Roadside were burnt by the Enemy and whom it appeared had committed Murder, as the part of the Body of a Child was lying on the Floor of one of the Huts and recently killed. Course S.E. March 15 miles.
- 8TH.—Marched at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 5, right in front; by one encamped on the Banks of the Ramgonga. Cultivation plenty; Course S.E. March 19 miles; Sephora, a small town.
- 9TH.—Marched (at the usual hour) thro' a fine, rich and well cultivated country and encamped after 7 hours' march on the Banks of a River. Capt. Skinner received a letter from his brother

Robert, on the Line of March, informing him that he had been shut up with his 400 men in a Serai or Caravansary for the last 3 days, and his horses were obliged to eat the old straw with which the different apartments had been thatched; and they themselves had eaten nothing for the last day and $\frac{1}{2}$; that Meer Khan had made three Attacks on the Place and had been as often repulsed; the Chief then sent him word he would spare his Life on condition he would deliver himself up; in answer to which the Young Skinner informed the Messenger (having previously addressed his Men, telling them that those who wished to go might do so, but for his part he would defend himself to the last) that he could not rely on the Chief's word and that he and his Men were able to hold out till General Smith should arrive, which would be in a few hours. Capt. S. had received intelligence of his Brother's confinement the day before by his own private Hircarrah and informed the General of it, requesting some relief might be sent him (we being but a day's March from the place), which was not granted; upon which he dispatched the said Hircarrah with a note to his brother saying we should be with him in a few hours and to give the Bearer a handsome Reward; the Man was desired to take this note to Meer Khan and to pretend he had ran away. The fellow did as he was desired and gave it to the Chief which had the desired effect, for as soon as he had perused it (which was about the time he had sent the Message to the younger Brother) he rewarded the Man with a few stripes and decamped. The Man recovered the Note and conveyed it to the Brother who rejoined us at Sercey the following Evening. Capt. Robert S. had been detached some days before to Coël, for grain, or to clear the Road from Anopsheer to Coël, which was infested by a small party of Horsemen (Pindarres or Robbers). Anopsheer was in the Direct road from Meradabad. The Chief got intelligence of it and waylaid him near this Serai, thither Capt. Robt. S. retreated; it was a short distance from Sumbul towards Anopsheer. March 20 miles. Course W.N.West.

10TH.—Marched by the right through a fine cultivated Country, tho' water not so abundant as at the other Encampment. By $\frac{1}{2}$ past one arrived at our Ground (Sercey, a large Village). The weather is getting rather too hot for Europeans to be so long exposed to the Sun's vertical rays; the cattle beginning to fail. Course, West, first 11 miles and the last 9 North. March 20 miles. Water only from Wells; the River 3 miles off. 11th.—Halted; Ferozepour 2 miles N.E. Sumbul 7 miles nearly West.

12TH.—At 11 p.m. of the 11th Inst. left Sercey and after a March of about 19 miles encamped on good Ground distant from Amroah 2 or 3 miles to the South. The March lay thro' a Jungle; cultivation little. Arrived at our Ground by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7. March to Amroah 22 miles. Course N.N.W.

13TH.—Halted. We were here joined by Lieut.-Colonel Burn's Detachment from whom we learnt the following Account. On the 10th Inst. Capt. Murray commanding the Irregular Horse (about 600

men) was ordered to cross the River Ganges and proceed to Meradabad for Money. Meer Khan having intimation of this Party being on their way to Amroah, left Sumbul and marched against it; fortunately for Capt. M. and his horse there was a Serai near at hand, when the Enemy were discovered at a short distance; into this walled place they retreated; the place was surrounded and a party of the Enemy's horse were dismounted to attack it. Two attacks were made, both of which failed and the only thing now left was to starve them out. This took place about 4 p.m., distant from Ghurmatisher 15 or 16 miles. Capt. M. seeing his Situation wrote to Lieut-Colonel B. who received the Letter about one a.m. of the 11th Inst. The Detachment, consisting of 2 Battalions and 300 Baraitch horse, marched immediately to his relief and arrived there by 7 o'clock. The Enemy hearing of Col. B.'s approach went off to Amroah whither the Detachment proceeded and a little before Sunset came up with his horse (Meer Khan's) who were encamped and cooking their food; the alarm being given and our Infantry by this time near the Spot, the foe made an *appearance* of Opposition and rode off, leaving their cooking Utensils to the Detachment. Here they encamped for the Night. The Enemy's Infantry and Baggage had taken another route to avoid us (the Cavalry) and arrived on the E. side of the town where they encamped, supposing the Horse seen by them on the S. Western side was Meer Khan's, not knowing what had taken place. They were allowed to remain quiet till towards day break when Col. B. was informed by a person from the Town that the Enemy were ignorant of his being there; accordingly he sent Capt. Murray and his horse to disturb them, but on the arrival of the latter it appeared the Enemy had been apprised of their mistake for they were loading and about to march. The opportunity was not to be lost. Capt. M. moved down and charged; the Infantry made a slight resistance and ran off; the Baggage was taken and the Infantry cut to pieces. In pursuing them the Horse came up with some of Meer Khan's Cavalry who had loitered in the Rear, a conflict ensued in which a Chief was killed and also one wounded near the Town belonging to the Enemy. The Baggage taken is as follows:—27 Camels, 150 Tatatoes or Ponies, 500 Bullocks laden with Grain, besides much money found concealed in the Clothes of the Slain and Wounded. The Women, who had been carried away from the different Villages were set at liberty. The loss of the foe is supposed to be not less than 300 killed and as many wounded; that of the Detachment one killed and one wounded. The 2 Surgeons with the above Party were busily employed in dressing the wounded foe from the 12th till the 14th Inst. The foe after this reception recrossed the Ganges. Lieut.-Colonel B. received orders to prevent the Enemy from recrossing from Hurdwar to Ghurmatisher on the W. side of the River, or getting into the Seih Country.

14TH.—The Cavalry marched at one a.m. and after a tedious march of 10½ hours encamped in loose sandy Soil, on the Banks of the

Ganges; the Infantry with the Stores from Meradabad to follow us. Forage scarce. Course W.N.W. 15 miles and West 7 miles. March 22. Cultivation little; chiefly jungle and coarse Ground.

15TH.—This Morning by 10 completed our recrossing nearly at the same place as where we crossed into Rohilcund. The water about a foot higher than it was on the 15th ult.; the baggage crossed by Regts. and Brigades commencing at 6 o'clock. The first Brigade as soon as their Baggage was over recrossed into the Duwaub; the 2nd Brigade then followed and their Baggage with them; encamped about a mile and $\frac{1}{2}$ from the Ghaut on the Banks of the Nullah.

16TH.—Left the above place at one a.m. and had proceeded but a short distance when we changed our Route to the Southward. By day-break about 10 miles from the last place passed on the western side Ghurmatisher (a walled town) and the high road, between which town and the last Ground crossed a Nullah which empties itself into the Ganges. The Country of a low and marshy soil, uncultivated and uninhabited. Hence proceeded at a slow pace for the next three hours till we arrived at Behauder Gunge, a fortified but small town and encamped by 8 o'clock on the N.E. side of it. The Country thro' which we marched from the above town to this place does not appear much better in cultivation and what little there was of it very poor, thin and impoverished. Left Pootghaut on our left about 6 miles. March 18 miles. Course first 10 miles South and the last 8 S. by West.

17TH.—Left Behauder Gunge at the usual hour and after marching thro' a fine champaign Country for 8 hours arrived at Janguirabad, where we encamped. The Country little cultivated and that very bad till within 3 miles of this place, when it is pretty General and good. There is a high road the whole way to Paenaghur and Anopsheer, distant 10 miles hence E. by N. Nothing remarkable seen during this day, till we arrived at Paenaghur 3 miles N. of this place and close to which we passed. It is a square Fort and pretty large, neat looking and rendered strong by its deep and wide dry Ditches, 30 feet deep and 20 broad, add to which a thick and strong Rennie¹ wall between the Ditch and Ramparts. The Gateway is the only place not well defended, but this will be completed in a short time, as the people were preparing everything necessary for its Defence and then no power without Guns can take it. Janguirabad is a large extensive high walled town; with regard to its interior I can say nothing as I did not go in; there are some Buildings in it which are of long standing. We were here informed the Enemy had gone to Pillouna and Kumoonah whither we shall march to-morrow. Water plenty but in Wells. Course S. and S. by East. March 24 miles.

18TH.—At the usual hour (right in front) continued our Route on the high road from Anopsheer or Janguirabad to this place, which we

¹ Faussebraye.

reached by 8 o'clock. Passed thro' the village of Shikerpour¹ about 8 or 9 miles from the last Encampment; the Country in general uncultivated and open, till within 3 miles of this Place (Pillouna, Kumoonah, Gorta, all being within a mile of each other) when it assumes a fine cultivated appearance, watered by the Caline River (on the left Banks of which the encampment now is). Vide 12th February. Capt. S. slaying Nareille² and Doondirh Khan's Infidels. March 19 miles. Course S. by West. Water and forage plenty.

This Fort was besieged by Lieut.-Colonel Grueber with 2 Battns. and its Guns and 2-18s after having made a practicable breach; the siege was raised on the 10th Feb. 1805 p.m. having been before it from the latter end of December 1804 till the 11th February when they joined us at Coël. The place is small and weak and defended by seven swivels; this place and Tourhipour, (the latter is now being attacked and has already cost us many Men) Nareille Khan's Fort, have broke out in rebellion twice since, although pardoned and their rent not demanded. The former is now reduced, its guns taken away and its ditch filled up.

19TH.—Marched at the usual hour, left in front, and by Sunrise arrived within 2 miles of Allyghur, when we halted for some time; $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 reached our Ground of Encampment. The March lay thro' a Jungle or wold and barren ground. Encamped to the S.W. of the Fort of Allyghur. March 18 miles to Coël and 16 to the Fort. Coël is 3 miles from the Fort. Course South. Water plenty. The enemy gone to the Jumna.

20TH.—Marched at the usual time, went 3 miles out of the Road before the mistake was discovered; by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 10 reached Zora or Joora, a large village (Vide Feb. 10th, 1805); encamped on the western side of it. The Country in high cultivation. Water plenty; the Cavalry were mounted from 1 a.m. till 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ a.m., during which time we marched not less than 30 miles. From Coël to Jora 26 miles. Course S. by West. The Cattle have been more injured by this day's march than by any during the Pursuit. The Nights and Morns extremely cold, a circumstance that has never been known in this Clime before at this Season of the Year (Hot Winds), and which generally commences about 10th of March and has been felt in the Southern part of the Dooab for the last 10 days. Without exaggerating I felt it so extremely cold for these 3 or 4 days past that I have been obliged to walk for some time to keep my feet warm.

21ST.—At one a.m. left Jora, and by 6 o'clock arrived on the Banks of the River and recrossed it over the Bridge of Boats, then taking a S.S.W. course for 6 miles arrived by 8 o'clock at the Village of Tirnah and there encamped. The Country the whole way barren and sandy and altho' the high road to Coël, Agra and

¹ The place for sporting.

² These two Zumindars or Landholders have joined each other and have caused no little trouble to us.

Futtighur from Mutura and Deig little or no water the whole way. March 20 miles. Course to Muttra W. & by S. The Enemy recrossed yesterday at Noon.

22ND.—Marched by the Right at 5 and by 8 arrived at the Village of ... and there encamped. Water in Wells plenty. Forage but not in superabundance. March 7 miles. Course S.S.West.

23RD.—Marched at 8 a.m.; by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4 contrived by some wonderful means or mechanical aid to clear the Encampment and by 8 rejoined the Grand Army, who were encamped on the N. side of the Fort, dist. 3 miles. Country cultivated and water plenty. Course S.S.W. March 7 miles.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST BHURTPORE.

From the 6th February to the time (23rd March) the Cavalry rejoined the Grand Army I can say but little respecting what happened at Bhurtpore; indeed it would be fruitless, as mine is from hearsay, and that little not perfectly detailed; the Affair being of so complicated a nature that every person dare not give his opinion openly and at the same time I may say that even those employed in the Attacks of the 20th and 21st February cannot give perfect Accounts of them; as it was, I will inform you as I heard the Affair and the less said the better. Everything went on in the Trenches and Batteries very well; a Breach was made by the 20th and the saps carried to within 50 Yards of the Counter-scarp of the Ditch; the Enemy attacked the Trenches and tough contest it was, just as our Troops were going to relieve each other (at daybreak), their aim was to get our Ladders; they were beaten back but our Loss great. At $\frac{1}{4}$ past 3 we attacked the place and failed; silence for once more. On the 21st another Assault was made; the Bombay Army attacked the Enemy's outposts and Guns and carried everything. The Bengal Army attacked the Bastion next to the Breach, were repulsed again and again; the Fort was crowded with people; in short, our Troops behaved with gallantry never to be surpassed, but not sufficiently numerous to attack the place on all sides. Therefore we will say it was owing to inferiority of Numbers that we did not succeed. Our Loss was immense. The Enemy's could not have been much less. 2,000 men killed and wounded and 64 Officers ditto. in the two attacks. For a detailed Account vide Gazette, March. Our Loss altogether before this place amounted to 3,000 Men killed and wounded and 103 Officers in the 4 Attacks.

29TH.—Nothing materially occurred since the Arrival of the Cavalry till this day, when the General and his Staff, 3 Battns. and its Guns, the Cavalry and Horse Artillery left Camp at 3 a.m. and just at Daybreak we arrived at the Enemy's Encampment. The Infantry marched to their Right; the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry formed Line and with their Guns went also to the Right. The 1st Brigade formed a second Line with the Horse Artillery. One Gallopper opened on the Enemy who by this time found themselves

nearly surprised, it now being daylight and the foe on the Move. Orders were given for the Right Troop of H.M. 24th (late 27th) Light Dragoons to charge, but finding the Enemy's Bazar or Market as well as their Horse scattering for miles around, the Centre Squadron received orders to pursue and cut up all who might fall in their way. The Honble. Lt.-Colonel Lake was with this Squadron who led us forward for many miles, until we were actually out of sight of the Party and about 5 or 6 miles from the Scene of Action. The Right and Centre Squadrons rejoined, each having been pursuing two different Parties. We halted and now finding ourselves so far from any assistance (should we have stood in need of any) it was judged most advisable to return slowly and collect the Enemy's Baggage and *Pistol*¹ those whom we had overran and slightly wounded. No Enemy was to be seen but at a great distance on our Right. The 25th (late 29th) Dragoons were employed in cutting up those whom we had overtaken, but had no time to spare being anxious to come up with those who had gone off at the commencement of the Surprise and we partly succeeded, for our Horses fairly overtook them in the Long Run. The 1st Brigade did also much execution amongst the foe; the Infantry were left a great way in our Rear; in short the Enemy were completely surprised; they lost their Baggage, Bazar, Horses and many Men. We took 60 Camels, 3 Elephants and much Grain and 160 horses, ponies, etc.

APRIL 2ND.—At 12 o'clock at Night Received Orders to turn out immediately. By one p.m. the Reserve (save the Flankers of H.M. 22nd), Cavalry and Horse Artillery marched off to give Holkar and Meer Khan an Alert, distance about 8 or 9 miles; by daybreak came up with them and instantly charged as they were on the Move for Jyepour. We pursued them for 9 or 10 miles, cutting them up the whole way; we succeeded better this time than the last, tho' they had no Bazar, having left it on the 29th ult. We destroyed many Horse and foot; we saw none on our return till within three miles of Camp when the Flankers came down upon a body of Infantry of about 150 who surrendered. The Cavalry discovered as they approached nearer the Fort a Body of about 4 or 500 Matchlockmen but these made their escape by being near the Jungle, which is within Shot of the town and into which they retreated on our Approach.

The Plan of Attack was as follows:—

H.M. 24th; 1st N.C.; Horse Artillery; H.M. 25th; & 3rd N.C. The 2nd Brigade; The Reserve on our Left. The Left Squadron under Capt. Philpot formed the Advanced Guard with our Gallopers. On our arrival at Holkar's late position our Right Squadron was ordered to Charge; the centre to remain with the Commander in Chief and also the Left Squadron or Advanced Guard. The Horse Artillery and all the Gallopers to remain with the Infantry. Thus the 24th pursued supported by the

¹ A General Order had been issued that no prisoner was to be made.

25th and 1st N.C. in Column of Regts; the 8th L. Dragoons charged Meer Khan's Party to the Right of us, supported by 2 Regts. of N.C. in Column, with the same success.

The Fort on our Return saluted us with two Rounds of 40 pounds or (20 Seers); although within reach they did us no Mischief.

8TH.—This day the Army shifted Ground; by 10 arrived at the S. Western side of the Fort; encamped just out of Shot distance in 3 lines. March about 7 miles. Ground good but water scarce. A satisfactory answer was received from the Fort to our Demand.

10TH.—The treaty which had been carrying on on the last Ground from the 30th ult. was finally settled yesternight and the Rajah's son expected in Camp. Our movement to this side may be said to have expedited the business as everything was ready for a fresh attack and would have been carried into execution had not the Fort acceded to our Terms. Holkar and his horse are now on the Eve of separating. 100 of them came into Camp on the 9th Inst. and out of 10 or 20,000 horse not 3 or 4,000 remain, so tired are they of our 2 last attacks. He has also lost the remainder of his Guns (4) and his Infantry nearly destroyed by Capt. Royal and 25 Companies.

11TH.—The third Son of the Bhurtpore Rajah came in this afternoon (as an hostage) about 5, and received by the General's son who went out to conduct him to Head Quarters, where 2 Tents were pitched for his accommodation. He was in a plain White Dress; about 25 years of age, and attended by a small suite.

12TH.—This Morning at 5 the Heavy Artillery and Ammunition for the same left Camp for Agra under escort of 3 Bengal Battalions and one from the Bombay Division, and 300 Irregular Horse from both.

18TH.—From the 12th till to-day nothing occurred to be inserted in the Journal. This morning G. Mercer Esq. attended by Capt. Wood of the Engineers and T. Metcalfe Esq. paid a visit to the Rajah and after the customary Ceremonies of embracing, etc. etc. were over the Treaty was finally ratified.

21ST.—The Army marched this Morn at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4, in the following order:— The Bengal Division (with the 1st Brigade of Cavalry leading) formed the Right Column; the Bombay Division, with the 2nd Brigade of Cavalry leading, formed the Left; the Baggage, etc. etc. in the Centre. No sign of an Enemy during the March; after going over the Scene of Action of the 2nd Inst. we encamped near the Village close to which the Allegoles were cut up and which completed the Attack of that Day. We arrived at our Ground about 9 o'clock. The Detachment which left our Camp on the 12th Inst. rejoined us a short time after our Arrival. Many of us could not forbear from remarking while marching over the Ground this Morn, the number of hairbreadth escapes we must have had while charging the Enemy, for at every 2 yards we met with large holes and how our horses avoided them was astonishing and had the animals made a wrong step, the

consequence might have been dreadful; the horse must have broken his Leg or Legs and his Rider most probably either his Neck or fractured his Arm. Thank God! only 2 met with the Accidents last named—Major Salkeld, Deputy Quartermaster General and his Deputy Assistant Capt. Covell, both of whom had their Collar bones fractured, but are now nearly recovered. March 7 or 8 miles. Water and forage plenty. Encampment Gossauneey.

22ND.—Marched at 5 in the same Order as yesterday; by 8 reached Futtipour¹ or Futtipour Sickery, where we encamped in two Lines. Course S. March 5 miles. Forage plenty but Water scarce.

23RD.—Marched in the same Order and at the same time as yesterday; by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 7 reached Rubass; encamped in two Lines. Water plenty being on the Banks of the Jompir River. The Hills which are infested by Mewattes (a set of Murderers and Robbers) run from N. to S. and E. to West; indeed the whole Country from Futtipour to Hindown (40 miles) is mountainous and infested by these sort of Men; it is to be hoped that they in some measure will be dispersed as their houses and Villages and towns on and under the Hills are burnt or destroyed as we pass by them. The town of Futtipour Sickery, which is built on a Rock and extends for 7 or 8 miles, is a Nest for them and it was here that the Detachment under Brigadier Monson in August 1804 were plundered of nearly all they had in their Retreat from the Benass River; it belongs to us and the General to shew an Example to the Country around ordered the Detachment on their return from Agrà to plunder the Place, which order was put in force on the 21st Inst. by the 14th Regt., who entered the Town and stripped it of everything and among other Articles, found the Muskets etc. which were taken from our Sepais in their Retreat from Holkar in 1804. March 5 miles. Course E.S.East.

24TH.—Marched at the usual hour and by 9 arrived at Numadeor Numeedah (a small Village built on a Rock) encamped in two Lines between the Hills which run N. and South, E & W. & W & S. and N. & East. March 8 miles. Course E.S.East. Water plenty.

25TH.—Our March which was in the same order as yesterday was over a good plain and after the 4 first miles we got clear of the Hills. Water and forage in abundance. March 8 miles. Course S.S.East. Kittery, a small pukka Brick town of some note.

26TH.—This Morn continued our March towards Dhoolpour and by $\frac{1}{2}$ past 8 arrived at Parbutty, where we encamped within 4 or 5 miles of Baree Dhoolpour, a town on the Chumbal. The first part of the March was over good Ground but within 2 miles of Camp we had to march over very broken ground, so much so that the Cavalry were obliged to go by single File till they reached the Nullah (at which they watered) when they were able to march by Divisions. Cultivation pretty general and the Country open, but rather a scarcity of Water in the Lines which is unfortunate

¹ The Town of Victory.

as the Hot Winds blow not a little. March 9 miles. Course E.S.E.

27TH.—Marched in the usual order and at the same hour as yesterday; by 8 reached Dhoolpour, encamping within a mile of the River Chumbul on a fine Plain. The Country till within a mile of this place has been much cultivated and the soil apparently good. March 9 miles. Course S.S.E. There is a Fort built on a Hill in which the Omeel or Collector resides; this belongs to the Company and is in the District of Agra and distant from it 40 miles.

29TH.—28th. Halted. On the 29th the Cavalry and Reserve marched at 5 from Dhoolpour and after going thro' Ravines for about 7 or 8 miles encamped by 10 on the Banks of the Chumbul, within the same distance of the Fort as we were from it on the N. side. The Road from Dhoolpour to the opposite side of the River has hitherto been reported to be nearly impassable for a Detachment or Grand Army, but this day's march has proved to the Contrary. The first part of the Route the Cavalry could pass by Divisions of 9 or 10 file; the middle part for about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles we marched by Subdivisions of 4 file and the latter part by Divisions again. The Road good in general. Course S.East. Encamped on the Bed of the River. Hills on all sides. The Detachment which we left on the last Ground (consisting of the Bengal & Bombay Divisions & Irregular Horse) is commanded by Major-General Jones.

30TH.—Marched at the usual hour, Right in Front, in 2 Columns. The Reserve going thro' the Left Ghaut or Pass, the Cavalry thro' the Right or upper one, and although the Passes were narrow they were nothing like what they have hitherto been represented. The Road was good and sufficiently wide for Subdivisions in the most narrow part. The Baggage was up in good time. By 8 we joined Colonel Martindale's encampment at Jettore situated 6 miles S.S.E. from the Chumbul or the last Ground. The Passes are about 3 miles in length and circuitous. A Nullah runs under Jettore (a small Village) and the Ground adjacent intersected by deep Ravines. March 6 miles. Course S.S.E. Water & Forage plenty. Colonel M's force is about 10,000 as follows:— 4,100 N. Infantry; the Governor-General's Body Guard and 2 Squadrons of 5 N.C. amounting in the whole to 500; Col. Sheppard's Infantry 3,100; Irregular Horse 2 or 300 and the Native force one or 1,900 Allegoles or Matchlock Men with Guns.

MAY 1ST.—Major-General Dowdesdell with the Left Wing of the Bengal Army and a proportion of the Park joined us this Morning.

From the 1st to the 10th Inst. the Army remained inactive at this place (Jettore). Scindia by this had retired from Sabulgur about 20 miles hence, to Kottah on the Banks of the Chumbul, distant from this 40 miles. Holkar with the remainder of his Horse lying near Rampoor, a fort which was taken from that

Chieftain in May 1804 by a Detachment under Lt.-Col. Don,¹ which marched from Narvae the last Encampment of the Grand Army while in Brigades, from which town we marched back to Quarters.

4TH & 5TH.—On the 4th & 5th Inst. the Buxhe² or Head Man to Holkar made his escape and came with his family over to us, being heartily weary of following such a Chief. He lost his two hands (he informed Lord Lake) in an attempt to cut off some of our Baggage during our Route from Mutra to Delhi; his horse was shot under him and at the same time a shot from the other Gallopper of the 1st N.C. under Cornet Stuart, disposed of his two hands.

The Rana of Gohud came in to pay his *Salam* or Compliment to the General, which was returned the next day. His Lordship was received by the usual salute (19 Guns). The Rana's Child, a boy of 4 or 5 years old was present at the time; the General while sitting in the State Chair took up the Child and placed him on his knee at which he appeared highly pleased, played with the Buttons on his Lordship's Coat and at length fell asleep. This Mark of attention was highly flattering to the Dad and his retinue, who looked upon this Condescension as a Proof of their being protected ever after by our Government.

During our Sejour on the N. & W. sides of Bhurtpore Capt. Royle with 25 Companies from 24th & 25th Regts. N.I. and the Irregular Horse under Col. Pohlman marched from Agra in March for the purpose of Dishing the last remains of Holkar's Infantry & Guns, encamped near Dhoolpour. On Capt. R's arrival at Baree, a town 6 miles from the above place to the N.West, he came up with Baphojee Scindia's horse with whom he engaged, mauled, and finally put them to flight. Hearing that the Infantry and Guns were at Adawlut Nugger, a small Ghurri a few miles farther, he advanced to attack them also and came up with them in the afternoon; they were ready to receive him, having the Redoubt in their Rear, their Front and Flanks covered and protected by deep Ravines and Nullahs. Capt. Royle seeing the Position attacked them instantly and after a heavy cannonade of $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour drove them from their Guns and routed them completely. Colonel Pohlman continued the pursuit for many miles and the 2 new raised Regts. (24th & 25th) collected the Spoils, which consisted of the whole of the Baggage, Camp Equipage, and 3 Guns with their Tumbrils, Carts, Arms etc. etc. Our loss was rather severe, but the Enemy were completely routed and lost everything. Holkar, who at the commencement of the War had 160 pieces of Cannon, 24 Battns. (10,000 Infantry) and 20 or 30,000 horse, has now left about 7,000 horse, foot and dragoons and 20 Guns; however this is from Native Accounts—whether he ever had 160 Guns or not I cannot say. We now learn

¹ Now D.Qr.Mr. General.

² Paymaster General and Commander of the Forces in the Native Service; the Highest Rank next to that of the Prince in whose service he may be.

from our Spies that his Men are deserting daily. His General Meer Khan is very anxious to come in and Holkar knows not what to do—without money, without men and in contempt with the Natives.

The Treaty with Reinjeit Sing, the Bhurtpore Rajah, is nearly to the following effect: that the Fortress of Deig shall remain in our hands with the Country belonging to it and the Accession of Territory given to him last year shall be taken from him and kept by us, and to pay into the Bargain 20 Lacs of Rupees; three lacs have been paid and the remainder to be paid by Installments, for a fulfillment of which his favourite Son was sent as an hostage. Vide April 10th.

20TH.—The Bundelcund Army under Lt.-Colonel Martindale with the exception of the Body Guard marched for Gwalior, which fortress they will reach by the 23rd Inst. The Bodyguard¹ marched for Gazhepour (a Cavalry Cantonment on the Eastern Bank of the Ganges, below Allahabad) by the route of Etayah or Etawah, a small fort on the Jumna, southward of Agra where Boats are ready to transport them.

21ST.—The Drafts and horses with the Officers left us this Morning for the same place, for the purpose of raising the 2 Regts. of N.C. (7th & 8th). 2 Battns. of Infantry marched under Lt.-Col. Bowyer for Gohud, the Rana of which Province has agreed to take 3 Battns. into his Pay.

26TH.—At length the long expected and wished for day arrived when we were to leave Jettore, and which took place this Morn at 4 a.m. when the Cavalry and Reserve marched back to the Chumbul and occupied the same Ground as that which was occupied by them going to Jettore.

The Europeans had their Tents pitched on the River side instead of in the usual Manner, that the Hot Winds might be less annoying to them. The Left Wing follows us to-morrow. March 6 miles. Course N.W. The 3 Battns. and Guns, the latter under Capt. Raban of the Artillery, and the whole under Lt.-Col. Bowyer, proceeded on the Route to Gohud, early this Morn the 2 Battns. having marched but a few miles from Camp on the 21st Inst. and there waited till the other, which was on its way from Capt. Royal's Detachment, should join them.

27TH.—At the usual hour continued our Route to Dhoolpour which we reached by 8 o'clock. Encamped in a Mangoe Tope. March 8 miles. Course N.W.

31ST.—Halted from the 27th till this Morn when we marched in 2 Columns at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4 and by 8 reached Muneah, a large town on the Road to Agra. The Country open. March 9 miles. Course N. Water etc. plenty.

JUNE 1ST.—Continued our Route this Morn at 4, marching in one Column, the Cavalry. About 7 miles from Muneah crossed a Nullah over which there is a large Bridge of many Arches and

¹ The Governor General's which joined the Bundelcund Army about the Months of October and November last, having left Calcutta in the Rains.

adjoining a large Building or place for Travellers, called Chouke Serai, which is in good repair. The Course of the Nullah¹ is now a great distance from the Bridge. 3 miles more arrived at Poora, a large town and in good repair. The Army formed separate encampments; one for Muttra and the other for Agra. His Lordship and Major-General Smith accompanied the former; Major-General Dowdesdell with the Park, Dragoons and Horse Artillery the latter. Water scarce; cultivation little. March 10 miles. Course North.

3RD.—2ND. Halted. On the following day left Poora; by 7 reached Cacooley a small town near to which we encamped. The Dragoons and Horse Artillery forming one Line and the Infantry, Park, etc. the other. The latter on the Agra Road, the former on the Secundra. Water plenty. Route good and cultivated. March 9 miles. Course N. and by N. & by E.

4TH.—Proceeded at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4 to Secundra, which we reached by 8; encamped on good Ground, plenty of Room and Water. The Infantry proceeded to Agra under Major-General Dowdesdell. March 12 miles. Course N. and by West. Brigades to cease as soon as they reach their respective quarters.

11TH.—The Cavalry marched into Quarters this Morning. The H. Artillery for want of Room were obliged to go to the Teagh at Agra.

The Men's quarters are much better than was at first expected they would have been; those for the 24th Dragoons appear the most airy and healthy. The Building is surrounded by a wall against the interior of which are the Stables, occupying 2 miles in extent. The Officers are to shift for themselves and the Company are so very poor that they will not remunerate an Officer for the expense of fitting up a ruinous Building to shelter him from the Wind and Rains, nor will they indemnify him for his Losses during the Campaigns for the 3 last years; and at present it appears we shall be bamboozled out of our Prize Money which we took at Deig, 4 months ago, as the Agents have made several applications for it and no positive answer given to them; and to keep the Soldier from being too rich or enable him to repair his Camp Equipage and have his Cattle in Order, they keep him in Arrears for 6 Months, and he to keep himself and Cattle alive must borrow at an exorbitant Interest, for the Natives have got the Whip Hand of us and will not trust (and it is impossible I assure you to live on Air); and thus it appears that increase of Territories causeth a decrease of Revenue and instead of J.Cy² having a Revenue of 10 or 20 lacs per Annum in addition to what he had last year, he is nearly beggared and it will be some Years before he can recover from his present difficulties, and had not the Lucknow Nawaub assisted him during this campaign from time to time with Lacs of Rupees, J.C. could not have taken the Field.

¹ River.

² E. India Company—commonly called John Company.

THE GREAT TRANSITION.

By MAJOR W. H. F. BASEVI.

"The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war."—(*Napoleon's Maxims.*)

"A wise choice of the place, and still more of the time, for the eventual assumption of the offensive demands very high qualities of skill and resolution in the commander."—(*Field Service Regulations.*)

THERE is a general consensus of opinion that a commander who adopts a defensive attitude at the beginning of a decisive battle puts himself in a very difficult position. Our regulations are strangely insistent on the point. Twice in the paragraph from which we have quoted and once again, later in the same chapter, they warn him of the trials he must face: Napoleon lends the weight of his authority in support; and history confirms the sentence of doctrine and personal experience.

With such weight of evidence behind it the fact must be admitted. Yet it is not self-evident. Had the task of the attacker been made the subject of special emphasis it would have seemed quite natural; but to assert that it is the defender whose position is the more embarrassing sounds very like a paradox.

The choice of time and place for putting his whole weight into the destruction of the enemy would appear, at first sight, to be far more difficult for the attacker. He is operating on strange ground: he has to move his troops under the eyes of an enemy motionless and concealed: he must tear aside the screen which surrounds his adversary before the disposition of even his advanced troops can be ascertained; and when this is done it is only by fighting that he can discover the enemy's main position and its flanks. Up to that point he is operating in a fog of perplexities and doubts.

The defender, on the other hand, knows not only the ground occupied by his own troops, but probably that over which the enemy must operate. He is therefore better able to guess at his opponent's movements. Moreover he has more time in which to make his dispositions, prepare stratagems, and organize a system of inter-communication.

Why then, with all these odds against him, is it easier for the attacker to fix the time and place for his decisive blow? Why should the defender's task alone demand such very high qualities of skill and resolution? Napoleon is silent: our regulations attempt no explanation; and history leaves us to draw our own conclusions from

recorded facts. Yet the answer to the riddle is of such importance that no clue should be neglected which may guide us to the answer.

One such clue, and one only, we find in our Field Service Regulations: a phrase of a dozen words buried in a long sentence. "Once battle is joined the liberty of manœuvre which the initiative has conferred on the assailant is limited to what he can do with his general reserve. The defender *should* be able to retain equal liberty of manœuvre, if he makes skilful dispositions, resists the temptation to subordinate his movements to those of the enemy, and strikes on the first favourable opportunity. It is in the difficulty of doing this that the chief objection to allowing the enemy to take the initiative lies."

Here we see that three conditions are essential to the free action of the defender. The first of these, namely, the need of skilful dispositions, we may put aside. For the purpose of this enquiry we may assume an equality of skill on the part of the commanders. If this is so the dispositions of the defender, who usually has more leisure in which to mature his plans, would presumably be the better, unless—and here we infringe on the vital question—unless he is subject to some special disturbing influence which clouds his judgment.

The last condition also we may leave out of consideration; for our regulations themselves are somewhat contradictory on the point. Here they say, "the *first* favourable opportunity": elsewhere, and in more detail, they lay down that "the most favourable moment is when the enemy has expended his reserves in endeavouring to storm the entrenchments, but it is by no means always advisable to wait for this."

There remains, then, the second: "if he resists the temptation to subordinate his movements to those of the enemy." This is the clue we seek. In this short phrase lies the crux of the whole matter. We are no longer concerned with skill and judgment, qualities which may be perfected by study and long experience, which also may be shared by each commander in equal measure; but we have now to deal with a problem in psychology: why, in given circumstances, is one commander more tempted than the other to subordinate his actions to those of his opponent?

In cases when the defender is considerably the weaker in *moral*, numbers, skill, organization, or training, the difficulties that beset him can easily be understood. But when the balance is approximately level some other factor must account for this strange phenomenon.

This other cause is not very far to seek. It lies in the fact that, as a rule, the commander takes upon his shoulders a double task when he adopts a defensive attitude with the intention of ultimately assuming the offensive. He undertakes the business of defence as well as the business of attack, and either of these duties alone is sufficient to tax the faculties of any man to the utmost.

Not only has he a double task to perform, but the mental attitude imposed by one is the opposite of that required for the other. In the one case he is concerned with warding off blows: in the other with delivering them. As a defender he must think of his defensive

position: it is the battle ground on which a part at least of the action will be decided, and it is a matter of high importance that his line should not be broken until he is ready to bring off his counterstroke. He must, therefore, be constantly informed of the progress of the action all along his front. These are matters pressing insistently on his attention, diverting and distracting his mind from the preparation of his forward movement. They involve other and equally disastrous consequences. When urgent appeals for help come from his hard pressed subordinates; when his line begins to waver; when important points are captured by the enemy before the time is ripe for his attack: then it becomes impossible for him to withstand the temptation to send a little, and again and again a little, of his striking force to help the defenders in their peril. Thus with a divided mind and a depleted reserve, is it strange that his counter attack so often fails?

How may a commander deliver himself from being obsessed by the anxieties of the defence? There is one way and one way only. It is that taken, deliberately or instinctively, by the great masters of war.

A man cannot concentrate his attention on two things at the same time. So a commander must decide whether, in the forthcoming battle, the defence or the attack is to be the major operation. He must devote himself entirely to that and hand over the other to a subordinate. If he is going to fight a delaying action the conduct of the defence holds the first place, and he must hold all the threads in his own hand. But if he proposes to destroy the enemy, if his line of defence is only ancillary to a greater purpose, then he must hand over the conduct of it to one or more of his subordinates.

Even this will not suffice alone. He must cast all thoughts of the defence from his mind, and this he can only do by separating himself from it physically. If there is one thing about the human mind more certain than anything else, it is that a man is more powerfully affected by events that are near than by those that are far off. The commander must therefore place himself as far as possible where he is free from the distractions of the defence so that he may concentrate his faculties upon the attack. His thoughts will then be centred upon the employment of his general reserve, which force he will no longer be tempted to regard as a reserve but as a distinct fighting unit with which he is about to deliver battle on his own account. The line of defence, in charge of another general, he will then be able to look upon in the same light as, in strategy, he would regard a fortress—something advantageous to himself and disadvantageous to the enemy. But the defence of it is another man's affair; and provided the other man holds out long enough, that is all he needs and all he asks.

A commander so placed is freed from many of the influences tempting him to subordinate his actions to those of the enemy. Spared the distraction of reports from all points of his defended line he can devote himself with singleness of purpose to the attack. To despairing calls for help, which in other circumstances are so difficult to

resist, he will turn a deaf ear. His attitude will be that of the Snark of whom we are told :—

“ At charity meetings he stands at the door
And collects—but never subscribes.”

Charity begins at home, and no general ever entered into a decisive action without an inward craving for at least a few more battalions. So, rather than give, he will snap up for his own needs any unconsidered trifle he can wrest from his protesting subordinates.

It was a knowledge of these truths, or at least an instinctive desire to isolate himself from the cares and anxieties of the defence, that induced Napoleon at Austerlitz to place himself away on the left where he could supervise his counter attack undisturbed. Had his position been more central he would have been concerned at the late arrival of some of his troops, anxious about his attenuated right flank, and perturbed by the early successes of the allies. How impossible would then have been that strange little talk with Soult just before the great attack was launched.

“ How long will your troops take to ascend the Pratzen plateau ? ”

“ Twenty minutes at the most.”

“ In that case let us wait for a quarter of an hour.”

Equally impossible would have been the concentration of mind and singleness of purpose with which he carried through the attack and the subsequent annihilation of the enemy.

Similarly at Salamanca Wellington placed himself on the top of the English Arapiles whence, except for the troops actually holding that advanced post, his nearest forces were a mile distant. Here, to some extent isolated from the distractions of the defence, he “ observed the enemy’s movements for some time with a stern contentment. Their left wing was entirely separated from the centre, the fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt.” Had he been in the centre of the line which extended westwards from the Arapiles village he must have been disturbed when “ Thomière’s division brought up their left shoulders as if to envelop Wellington’s position and embrace it with fire,” while Bonet’s troops “ carried the village of Arapiles and although soon driven from the greatest part of it again maintained a fierce struggle.”

In striking contrast with the methods of these two leaders is the action of General Kuropatkin who, in spite of habitually placing a large portion of his force in reserve, never succeeded in bringing off a decisive counter attack. Yet no one will deny his great ability; and the reason of his failure is made manifest in the following extract from Colonel Ross’s book on the Russo-Japanese War :—

“ Let us consider the vast task which he had set himself to accomplish. He was at this period, so far as we know, issuing orders direct to each army corps in his army, with the exception that General Zarnbaiev was in command of the IInd and IVth Corps in Liao-yang. He was also, apparently, issuing orders direct to each of his numerous flank detachments. He was also, as we know, communicating with

the Viceroy at Mukden, and with the Czar and Minister of War in Russia. He was attempting to fight a one-man battle seeking to manœuvre each body of troops himself, to keep himself acquainted with the detailed situation on every part of the battlefield, and, at the critical moment, to strike a crushing blow. When did he find time to eat and sleep? Let us leave him for the moment, merely recognizing that here must have been an overworked man with a vast weight of responsibility on his shoulders, a man mentally and physically fagged. Victory depends as much on the powers of endurance of the Commander-in-chief as on those of the rank and file. It depends, therefore, on his ability to husband his powers of endurance by delegating his authority to subordinates."

It is not strange that Kuropatkin failed: Napoleon himself would have staggered under such a burden. And he knew it, or at least he felt it, so he spared himself for the effort of attack by delegating the defence to others and isolating himself from its anxieties.

It is not suggested for a moment that the personal isolation of the commander and the delegation to subordinates of the onus of defence are sufficient in themselves to overcome the difficulty of transition from the defensive to the offensive. But this at least is true: they are methods which have been employed with success by great leaders when anxious to concentrate themselves upon the destruction of the enemy. And if such masters of war as Napoleon and Wellington found them necessary, lesser men cannot neglect them with impunity. Human nature has not changed; and the way that great commanders have won battles in the past is the way that they are won to-day.

"We tell these tales, which are strictest true,
Just by way of convincing you
How very little since things were made
Anything changes in anyone's trade."

A Hindu proverb tells us that "A temple mouse fears not the gods," but it is not without hesitation and some diffidence that a soldier may bring himself to criticize our Field Service Regulations. However, unlike the laws of the Medes and Persians, they can be altered—and they have been, when amendment was desirable. In this case it is not a question of the regulations being wrong, but inadequate. They lay great stress upon the difficulties that beset a commander who commences a decisive action by adopting a defensive form. But they do not explain the reason nor suggest a remedy, and it seems desirable that these deficiencies should be made good.


At present our regulations are somewhat averse from the defensive-offensive form of battle, though they do not prohibit its adoption. Nor, indeed, would it be of any avail if they did. It is a form of fighting bred in our bones, inherited from the days of the long bow, or even earlier. It comes as naturally to the British race as the crescent impi to the Zulu, the concealed stockade to the Burman, sniping and the ghazi charge to the wild Pathan, or the dense, thrusting advance by hordes to the modern German. The last of these is

clearly inherited from their ancestors, who issued from the same forests and swept over Italy, France, and Spain, bearing down all opposition by the ruthlessness of their advance and by the weight of overwhelming numbers which made them reckless of loss.

It is vain to resist the force of heredity, which, in spite of teaching, may gain the upper hand in time of stress and tension; and we must remember that for us the impulse to advance afterwards is as strong as the tendency to begin by awaiting the attack. It is only for the commander that special difficulties make the transition a matter requiring high qualities of skill and resolution. We have seen why this is so, and how the difficulties may, to some extent, be overcome. Surely these are matters worthy of recognition.

Finally, in order to avoid the effect that mere words have upon the mind, it would be well to use some other term than "general reserve." The word reserve has associations that are liable to mislead; also it is inappropriate. The moiety of a force withheld for the ultimate assumption of the offensive is no more a reserve than an army in the field is a reserve to the troops that garrison the fortresses.

The above proposals involve very slight changes in the regulations as they now stand, and perhaps these would suffice, though it is open to question whether the whole of the seventh chapter would not bear reconstruction with advantage. "But this," as Rudyard Kipling says, "is another story."



A STATEMENT OF EVENTS IN MANILA, MAY—OCTOBER, 1898.

By ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICH.

Translated, by permission, from the *Marine Rundschau*.

FROM June, 1897, I had been in command of our Cruiser Squadron on the Far Eastern station. The political tension between the United States and Spain, and the reports as to the preparations being made in the American ships lying at Hong Kong, led one to expect an attack upon Manila. When war was finally declared at the end of April, 1898, the German vessels "Irene" and "Cormoran" received orders to proceed to Manila for the protection of our nationals in the Philippines. These measures seemed to me to fully safeguard German interests, and the remaining ships of the Cruiser Squadron were stationed at other ports—the First Division at Kiao-Chao, and the Second Division told off to accompany a visit which Prince Henry was to pay the Emperor of China.

At this time we were expecting the transport which annually brought us the reliefs of all ranks and which took back to Germany men ready for their discharge. The ship also carried materials and stores of all kinds, on this occasion particularly numerous by reason of the completing of Tsingtao. I had arranged that all the ships of the squadron were to rendezvous at Tsingtao early in June so that the transport might the more quickly be discharged and filled up for the return voyage. This arrangement was changed when the "Irene" and "Cormoran" were despatched to Manila, and the transport "Darmstadt," then *en route*, was directed to proceed first to Manila, and, after transferring crews and stores to the two cruisers, to continue her journey to Tsingtao. My flagship, "Kaiser," was then in dock at Nagasaki, where the "Princess Wilhelm" was also being overhauled, when on June 3rd I received a cable from the Admiral in command, informing me that the Emperor directed that I myself should personally proceed to Manila. As the "Kaiser" could not be ready to sail for some days, I cabled to the "Kaiserin Augusta" to sail from Tsingtao to convey me to Manila.

The relief arrangements were completely upset. The transport "Darmstadt" would in a few days be reaching Manila, and would have continued her journey prior to my arrival there. There was no telegraphic communication.

After carefully considering the many matters relative to equipment, training and concentration of ships, I decided that when the "Kaiser" and "Princess Wilhelm" had completed repairs, they,

as well as the "Kaiserin Augusta," would carry out their reliefs off Manila. I reasoned more or less as follows: The "Darmstadt" could no longer be reached by cable and, with the south-west monsoon, could be at Manila on the 5th and at Tsingtao on June 13th. The "Kaiser" must follow to Manila as fast as possible, because only my flag-lieutenant was on the "Kaiserin Augusta," the whole of the rest of my staff being left on the "Kaiser." It was very doubtful whether both ships could reach Tsingtao in time to intercept the "Darmstadt." Besides, under her contract, the "Darmstadt" had only a limited period of time to discharge and load, so that any sailing to and fro must be avoided and days spent in harbour must be employed to the utmost. Speedy embarkation must also be arranged on account of the men for discharge, among whom there were many sick. As at that time there was, from one cause or another, an interruption of telegraphic communication with Manila, it seemed safest to arrange for the reliefs in Tsingtao of those ships only then already lying there—the "Deutschland," "Gefion," and "Arcona"—to allow all the others to carry out their reliefs in Manila, and if necessary to detain the "Darmstadt" there.

It was consequently the absence of good telegraphic and postal communication, as well as the administrative reasons, which necessitated the bringing to Manila of the three extra ships. Expecting that Manila would be quickly conquered, I was in hopes that very shortly after the completion of the reliefs, I would be able to leave in the "Princess Wilhelm" or "Cormoran" for northern ports, to carry on with the establishment of the new possessions. I was under the impression that my presence at Manila had only been required by reason of a cry for aid from the Germans in Manila consequent upon an insurrection by the insurgents or a possible bombardment.

On the "Kaiserin Augusta," on June 12th, I arrived off Corregidor, the island lying at the mouth of Manila Bay. I found no sign of any blockade; the entrance, so far as we could determine, was not guarded by any ships. Off Cavite, about 25 miles from the entrance, the American ships lay at anchor; about three miles from them, off Manila, were the "Irene" and "Cormoran," a number of foreign men-of-war and some merchant vessels. On my approach the usual signals were exchanged between the "Olympia," Admiral Dewey's flagship, and the "Kaiserin Augusta" bearing my flag, and then, an American officer having come on board to pay the usual compliments, I anchored not far from the "Irene." Nothing whatever was mentioned as to any declaration of a blockade.

On shore the Spanish flag waved over the walled town, and only the fact that business was at a standstill, the absence of any traffic in the harbour, and the emptiness of streets and squares proclaimed anything unusual. Admiral Dewey came over from Cavite in the gunboat "Petrel" to pay me a visit, and I returned it shortly afterwards. From all appearances, from the report of the commander of the "Irene," Captain Obenheimer, and the statements of the German Consul, Dr. Kreiger, the political situation seemed rather complicated.

The town of Manila, with portions of the immediate environs, were in the hands of the Spanish troops, of whom small and larger detachments, on various parts of the coast and in the interior, were surrounded by the insurgents without any communication with the capital.

The ships of the United States, under Admiral Dewey, commanded the Bay of Manila. The insurgents under the dictator Aguinaldo, who had been shipped from Hong Kong to Manila on one of Admiral Dewey's vessels, encircled the town on every side, except from the sea, and were pressing slowly forward to the entrenched positions of the Spaniards. How far the insurgents, who were fighting elsewhere, obeyed Aguinaldo's orders depended upon their personal views and temper; there was no general organization over the whole island of Luzon.

Both Americans and insurgents warred with the Spaniards; they had, however, varying aims, and regarded one another with mistrust. According to Dewey there was nothing resembling an alliance between them.

Government and army in the Philippines were alike under the mighty influence of the priesthood. When one considers that in every house in the town and country followers of the insurgents were serving as servants of all kinds: that an uncontrolled intercourse was maintained between the Americans and the insurgents; that the wives and families of neutrals and Spaniards, who had fled from the town, lived on hired steamboats in the harbour; that the English Consul was also representing the Consul of the United States, then one can appreciate what opportunities existed for mutual passing of information, and what a rich soil for gossip, cross-purposes and suspicion was here to hand.

The blockade of Manila was announced on May 1st to the Governor-General of Manila by letter, which ran as follows:—

“ . . . A blockade of this port will be at once established. . .

By order of Commodore Dewey, U.S. Squadron.

O. E. WILLIAMS, U.S. Consul.”

The contents of this document were first communicated to the German Consul, at his request, by the Governor-General on May 10th. Neither to me nor to the German Consul, directly or indirectly, was any communication made of any declaration of blockade, or of the opening of the blockade, from the American side.

This announcement of a blockade varies in form and substance from that laid down by the laws of nations which deal with blockade. The limits of the blockaded territory were not defined; the time of its commencement; a period of truce for neutral ships to leave the harbour—none of these were given. Neither to the foreign consuls nor to the Government itself does any regulated notice appear to have been accorded. The announcement varies also greatly from the declaration of blockade made in regard to a certain portion of the Cuban coast by the Government of the United States to foreign governments on April 23rd, 1898.

There are many sufficient reasons for this ill-defined state of affairs on the side of the blockading fleet. The impulse to punish and to carry on, in that tropical climate and with very inadequate means, the very heavy duties of a blockade, all disappeared in the absence of any opposition. The free intercourse with neutrals, who went in and out of Manila undisturbed, and even with the consular officials living in the town, gave every opportunity to the blockaded party for hearing all events and opinions.

The Spaniards, like all besieged parties, exerted themselves to maintain the usual intercourse as far as possible, and avoided giving any provocation for tightening their bonds.

The neutrals, who recognized that the interference of Admiral Dewey had prevented, or at least greatly lessened, the danger of the town being stormed by the rebels, were grateful for Admiral Dewey's provisions for the safety of their belongings and for the removal of all burdens so far as the warlike situation permitted. The ready ear and the friendly reception which the Consuls met with from the Commander of the blockading fleet in regard to all reasonable requests, on behalf of those they represented, for the security of life and property, made the neutrals recognize that the situation was handled as well as the circumstances permitted. Any grievance, any insistence upon the strict letter of legal right, any disregard of the law of neutrals, could only result in inconvenient estrangement and tightening of disciplinary measures, which must re-act most heavily upon the defenceless portion of the community.

These considerations caused me to endeavour to avoid anything that could irritate the blockading party, so long, of course, as the honour of our flag was not menaced. In this sense all my orders to the ships under my command were issued, and they were duly complied with by captains and subordinate officers. Anything that has been spoken and written in contradiction of the above rests upon false conjectures, misunderstandings or calumny.

I had no political instructions. Only one utterance from the Foreign Office in regard to the question of the Philippines came to my knowledge. This stated that H.I.M. the Kaiser had altogether rejected any idea of the establishment of a German Protectorate over the Philippines. I gathered from this that some irresponsible allusion had provoked this expression of the Kaiser's determination, and in course of time was fully able to appreciate the correctness of the outlook which had given rise to it.

From my immediate superior, the Admiral in Command, I had only received one order of a military character, which was to maintain the strictest neutrality towards both sides.

Under these circumstances I hoped, when I came upon the scene in the blockaded harbour, to witness the close of the warlike operations and then to be able to steam away to healthier ports. How little this was to prove true appears from the chapter in the *Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy*, entitled "A Period of Anxiety." I had never previously imagined that my words and

actions could have been so falsely interpreted, as is there the case. In order to make myself clear to those readers who have not that book before them, I here give the passage word for word. Page 252: "At a dinner given me at the White House upon my return home, President McKinley mentioned the repeated statements in the Press about the friction in my relations with Vice-Admiral von Diederichs, in command of the German Asiatic Squadron. 'There is no record of it at all on the files,' he said. 'No, Mr. President,' I answered; 'as I was on the spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I looked after it myself, at a time when you had worries enough of your own. . . .'"

From the above I gather that Admiral Dewey made no report of his mistrust of the Germans, since the files in Washington contain no mention of it. This is to be regretted. My communication with Berlin was maintained as closely as possible. My words and actions which had any significance at all, are all on record. Had Dewey done the same the extraordinary lapses of memory noticeable in his chronicle would have been avoided; possibly also any statements emanating from Washington would have combated the wild statements which appeared in the Press.

Pages 254—5: "The 'Irene' had come from Nagasaki. Although she may not have heard the news of the victory before leaving Japan, she definitely had the information from an English steamer the morning of her arrival. Nevertheless, she steamed by the 'Olympia' without stopping and dropped anchor where she chose. . . . I regarded this as an oversight which was a breach of naval etiquette, of course, but not to be taken seriously unless I were inclined to insist on punctiliousness. It was only natural to reason that the Captain of the 'Irene' might not be familiar with the customs and the laws of blockades. I knew the German naval officers were very self-reliant, keen to take offence about their rights, and most ambitious to learn by observation, which I always liked to think explained their subsequent proceedings."

In Vol. VII. of the *Marine Rundschau* for 1902, p. 760, Captain-Lieutenant Pohl describes, from a note-book, the daily life of the "Irene" in Philippine waters from 1896 to 1899. He says: "On May 6th, 1898, the ship, bound from Nagasaki, arrived off the northern entrance of the Bay of Manila. As it was very probable that both entrances, if not actually closed by mines, had at least been made dangerous, the lighthouse, which was flying no national flag, was asked by signal whether the channel was clear, and on getting the reply—'very dangerous without a pilot'—one was asked for. No pilot was, however, available for the 'Irene,' which accordingly anchored in the neighbouring Bay of Mariveles, while an officer was sent to Manila in the steam pinnace to fetch a pilot. In this little Bay of Mariveles, the American cruisers 'Boston' and 'Concord' were lying cleared for action, and these, shortly after the 'Irene' had anchored, left Mariveles and steamed off to Manila with a few small cattle boats in tow. The 'Irene' made use of this opportunity—having learnt from an English steamer lying off Mariveles the result

of the battle of Cavite—to steam through the dreaded mine-field in the wake of the Americans. Just before reaching Cavite the German Consul arrived with a harbour pilot. The Consul informed the Captain that he had not received any information of the establishment of a blockade of Manila. Consequently the Captain of the 'Irene' abstained from asking permission to anchor in the harbour of Manila from the American Commodore, Dewey."

The regulation report of the "Irene's" Captain, Obenheimer, is to the same effect. As there was no sign of any blockade, there can be no question of any breach of naval etiquette. And when the question of want of familiarity with the laws of blockade comes to the front, such unfamiliarity cannot be laid on the shoulders of the German captain.

Pages 255—6: "The second German ship, the 'Cormoran,' came in at three in the morning. Naturally, at night, it was our business to be on the alert. When the lights were seen a steam launch was sent to board her. She gave no heed to the steam launch's hail. Even though a man-of-war flew a German flag, it was possible that she was Spanish, using the German flag as a ruse. According to the laws of blockade it was our right and duty to board and identify her. In order to get the attention of the 'Cormoran,' the 'Raleigh' fired a shot across her bows. Then she promptly came to. Her captain was surprised at our action, but our boarding officer explained the law, and also the risk that a man-of-war was running in coming into the harbour at night. We had no thought of being discourteous and no desire to rouse any ill feeling, and fully appreciated that our point of view had not occurred to the Captain of the 'Cormoran' when he ran straight in towards our squadron in the dark. The shot across the bow was not provocative, but simply a form of signal when other signals failed."

I hear the above for the first time from Admiral Dewey, for at that time I was at Nagasaki. The Commander of the "Cormoran" must have considered the circumstance too unimportant to report. I am not competent to give any opinion about the matter, the less that the evidence of the accused is wanting. The Commander knew that war was declared and that a meeting with ships cleared for action was to be expected. He also does not appear to have noticed any sign of a blockade, or he would not have run into the anchorage at Cavite, while in Admiral Dewey's account it is not mentioned that the American officer conveyed any notice of a blockade to the "Cormoran."

A guard ship employed on blockade duty, and especially in the front, has undoubtedly the responsibility of informing incoming ships of the existence of a blockade or of a state of war, and must advise them how far movements are permitted. For this purpose signals may be used by day. As no international system of night signalling has been introduced, intercourse can only be maintained by boats or by hailing. In order to call the attention of an approaching vessel, a call of some kind—steam whistle, syren, signal gun—would be

employed, when a searchlight cannot be used. It is contrary to custom to fire a gun at once. If Captain Brussatis showed signs of surprise, this must be put down to the shotted gun. The sentence "according to the laws of blockade it was our right and duty to board and identify her," I can only subscribe to under reservation, as will be later more clearly explained.

Pages 256—7: "On the 12th, Vice-Admiral von Diederichs arrived in his flagship, the 'Kaiserin Augusta.' This made three German cruisers in the harbour. I learned that another was expected. Already on the 6th a German transport, the 'Darmstadt,' bringing 1,400 men as relief crews for the German vessels, had appeared. Such a transfer, for which I readily gave permission, while it might have been unusual in a blockaded harbour, might at the same time be easily explained as a matter of convenience for the German squadron, which was absent from its regular base at Kiao-Chao. The "Darmstadt," however, with a force of men nearly equal to the total number of my own crews, remained at anchor for four weeks."

I have already fully explained the arrangement for the reliefs at the commencement of this reply. When the "Darmstadt" was directed to proceed to Manila with reliefs for the "Irene" and "Cormoran," no intention of any attack upon Manila by the American squadron had been given out; further, in case of necessity, anchorages where the reliefs might have been effected could easily be found outside any probable blockade limits, e.g., Mariveles, Subic, Iloilo.

Captain Obenheimer had notified Admiral Dewey of the expected arrival of the relief ship; the Admiral had readily given his sanction and also permission to use lighters which were then shut up in Manila. Admiral Dewey must have later adopted the views he now expresses. The unarmed "Darmstadt," crammed full of recruits and stores, could only be regarded as a source of weakness by reason of the protection she needed; she lay in Mariveles from June 6th to 9th, sailed then to Tsingtao, and anchored again at Mariveles from June 26th to the 30th: a total of eight days, not four weeks.

Page 257: "In the course of conversation I referred to the presence of the large German force and to the limited German interests in the Philippines (there was only one German commercial house in Manila) and this in a courteous manner, amounting to a polite inquiry, which I thought was warranted, particularly in view of the fact that six days had elapsed without the 'Darmstadt' transferring her men. To this the Vice-Admiral answered—"I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir!" from which I could only infer that I had expressed myself in a way that excited his displeasure."

I can only recall the conversation held at Admiral Dewey's visit to the "Kaiserin Augusta" from brief notes and from memory. The long time which has elapsed prevents any literal setting down. When I received the order to proceed to Manila, it was clear to me that my appearance before the threatened town might well arouse the suspicions of foreign nations, and I made up my mind to defeat them by candour and prudence. For instance, I made up my mind to explain to Dewey

and to the commanders of neutral vessels how the coming of other of our ships was occasioned, and that their withdrawal was intended as they filled up with reliefs and supplies. I gave these explanations myself verbally.

At the very first visit to Admiral Dewey an animated conversation arose, chiefly concerned with the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Then the American Admiral inquired whether Prince Henry was coming to Manila, and on my replying in the negative, he told me what a pleasant impression he had received on meeting his Royal Highness at Hong Kong. I then joined in and explained the reason of my arrival and of the coming of two more German ships. The expression, "I have come here by the orders of the Emperor," may have then been used, but only in the sense that only a direct order had brought me there, not a wish to add to the forces before Manila, and with the addition of the conjecture that the alarm created among the Germans threatened by the insurgents may possibly have aroused a wish in the highest quarters to obtain from me personally an impartial verdict as to the actual danger of the situation. The expression is used and is, indeed, customary among German officers, since the orders for the movements of the ships on foreign stations are authorized after being reported to His Majesty, and are accepted as Royal commands. I certainly did not use in their almost threatening sense the words, "I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir."

The statement is also made in error that there was only one German business firm in Manila. A list of the firms at that time known to me contains the following 11 names:—Heinszen & Co., Baer & Co., Enrique Spitz, Fröhlich & Kuttner, S. Siegert, Struckmann & Co., Fressel & Co., Tielsen Hermann & Co., Martin Buck & Co., German & Co., and Wusinowsky & Co. Then there were the nationals of several countries which had no representatives of their own in the Philippines and which were handed over to the care and protection of the German Consul—Austrians, Dutch, Italians, Portuguese and Swiss. In Iloilo and Cebu there were also a by no means inconsiderable number of German business houses or firms under the protection of the German flag. The statement that "there was only one German commercial house in Manila," shows either faulty information or forgetfulness.

I cannot call to mind that at this visit or on any other occasion Admiral Dewey made any reference to the number of German ships then present; this seems hardly likely since there were only three ships there, and the English had the same number lying off Manila and several gunboats off Iloilo. It is also an error of memory to say that the "Darmstadt" was there for six days without discharging her relief crews; she was never six consecutive days in Mariveles, and was not idle for a day, even for an hour. Is it possible that somebody maliciously reported these inaccuracies to Admiral Dewey?

Either at our first meeting or at my return visit, Admiral Dewey, on his own initiative, stated that the United States had no wish to retain possession of the Philippines. I looked upon this as merely

an expression of personal views, although it might well be a deliberate statement of what the world was then meant to believe. At any rate the Admiral had no absolute knowledge at that time of the intentions of his Government, for the reason that telegraphic communication was interrupted—still less could he foresee future developments. Very soon I was able to recognize his endeavours to safeguard the United States possession of Manila, an endeavour which was perfectly justified.

Our meetings were conducted in the easy and courteous manner as is usual when commanders of friendly nations visit one another. But I had an impression that I had not altogether been able to disperse an existing want of confidence. As a possible source of this feeling of mistrust were the circumstances, learnt by me a few days later, which Captain-Lieutenant Pohl has already related in the *Marine Rundschau* for 1902: "As the German squadron passed by Dewey's flag on the cruiser 'Olympia,' it was saluted, and as the last gun was fired the American National Anthem was played by the band. An unmusical Spanish pilot took this anthem for the Spanish Royal March, and told this story with exaggerations in Manila, where it, of course, got into the papers. The consequence was a sudden enthusiasm for everything German, not only in Manila, but in every other place in the Philippines which was still in Spanish hands. The commander received from the volunteers in Iloilo an extravagantly-worded telegram in which they thanked him for his 'sympathetic demonstration.' This telegram, of course, became known among the Americans, and made bad blood among those who did not know the real circumstances. Commodore Dewey laughed over it, for he had himself heard the anthem played. Without doubt this occurrence was the initial motive of Spanish sympathy for the Germans, fostered by the Spaniards themselves and by the foreign residents in the Philippines. . . . The reports which appeared in the Press that Prince Henry was coming with seven ships to the relief of Manila, that at the first shot fired against the town the 'Irene' and the 'Cormoran' were to sink Dewey's ships, and so on, proved the state of despondency in the town, but made it clear that others than Germans were instrumental in making such reports public. These, of course, all reached the Americans and sowed the seeds of a rapidly-growing antipathy among the men. On the 13th May several young officers of the ships rode out in mufti to the extreme outposts. The Governor-General was asked officially to permit the officers of the 'Irene,' for instructional purposes, to inspect the defensive positions of the Spaniards, and permission was accorded. Several well-known Spanish officers attached themselves to this expedition, which produced a fine crop of rumours. A Hong Kong paper announced that the insurgents, lying in ambush behind cover, could have picked off every single member of the party, but refrained from doing so out of consideration for the Germans. A Manila paper wrote that the commander had made a speech in which he stated that Germany intended to fight for Spain against the Americans. As a matter of fact the commander did not take part in the expedition and no speeches were made. The Spanish paper was not allowed to appear for some time owing to a complaint made by the commander of the

'Irene.' . . . On the 6th, the North German Lloyd steamer, 'Darmstadt,' came in with some 1,400 men to relieve the crews of the 'Irene' and the 'Cormoran.' Here, too, the Americans met the request of the commander to allow the steamer through the line of the blockade, in the most courteous manner. The Admiral offered the use of lighters for transport purposes and the better protected Bay of Cavite. It was impossible to prevent the entry of this steamer being made occasion for the publication of fresh rumours of 'landings by night,' 'attack on Cavite,' etc., etc."

English and American newspapers began to circulate suspicions of the German ships at Manila and also of Germany itself. As a reporter of the *New York Herald* and *China Mail*, J. L. Stickney, had quarters on the flagship, "Olympia," it is not difficult to detect the means whereby these suspicions were able to reach the ears of Admiral Dewey.

Biography, p. 258: "The 'Kaiser' came in after dark on June 12th. She paid no attention to the launch sent to board her. However, next morning she steamed over to Cavite and formally reported her arrival."

This remark may easily give a false idea of the attitude of the commander of the blockading squadron to the neutral war vessels. The belligerents, blockaders and blockaded, have the right, in an effective blockade, to stop all traffic within the blockade zone, and also to turn back war vessels, even by force. But, if a neutral warship is admitted within the zone, then the belligerents have no more authority over this ship than during peace; but an effective blockade can at any time be again established. Intercourse with neutrals must be conducted in the established international form, *i.e.*, by interchange of complimentary visits, either through commanders or their representatives. This was what was observed when in 1870 the U.S. corvette "Juniata," under Captain Luce, visited Wilhelmshaven, then declared under blockade by the French. There is no such thing as "reporting" the arrival of neutrals to the blockading party, nothing but an official visit, such as is required in peace. Thus the commander of the "Kaiser" paid a visit to Admiral Dewey exactly as he did to Captain Chichester on the British armoured cruiser "Immortalité." The ship itself makes no report of any kind except to its own superior authority—in this case the commander of the cruiser squadron. It reports itself by its appearance and through such information as may be given to the compliment-paying ship.

Biography, p. 262: "In the latter part of June and the early days of July the Germans, with the industry with which they aim to make their navy efficient, were keeping very busy. I saw that they did not mean to accept my interpretation of the laws of blockade. German officers frequently landed at Manila, where they were on the most cordial terms with the Spaniards, who paid them marked attention, and, the wish fathering the thought, the talk of the town was that the Germans would intervene in favour of Spain. It was well-known that Vice-Admiral von Diederichs had officially visited the Spanish captain-general in Manila, who had returned the call at night. No

other senior foreign naval officer had exchanged visits with the captain-general. Other Spanish officials called on the Germans and were saluted by the German vessels, these salutes being returned by the Spanish batteries on shore; but they did not call on the other senior officers present, so far as I know, and certainly were not saluted if they did. Our Foreign Consul in Manila, I know, had orders from his Government to report the actions of the Germans in cypher."

Nearly as many errors as sentences. No declaration of blockade, still less any exposition of such, was made by the Americans to the neutrals. As already stated above, no declaration of blockade was made, nor were the notices drawn out and made known to the Governor-General. So far as I am aware the German officers held but little intercourse with the Spanish officers—certainly no more than did the officers of other neutrals; I personally had two official interviews with the Governor-General. As intercourse with the shore was uninterrupted and the Spaniards were one of the belligerent parties, there was no reason whatever to avoid them. But great caution was impressed on those taking part to avoid any chance of misunderstanding. No complaints of misuse of this intercourse ever came to my ears.

The above quoted extract from the account by Captain-Lieutenant Pohl gives some examples, to which I could add many, as to how the wildest reports arose, or were published and were sent out broadcast. Thus, early in July, a report arose that provisions were supplied to the Spaniards from the "Kaiser." The source of this report proved to be slanderous, was traced by the German Consul to the English Consul (acting also in American interests), and its circulation was brought home to him at the club. I heard this from the mouth of Captain Chichester, who was present at the scene in the club, the existence of which was then unknown to me.

I paid an official visit to the Governor-General of Manila just as I did to Admiral Dewey. The Spanish flag waved over Manila and under its folds lived very many Germans and others under the protection of Germany. The Governor-General behaved towards these in an indulgent and friendly manner; but even had this not been the case, I should have regarded it as a breach of international etiquette had I, for any trifling reason, omitted to greet the leading representative in the place of one of the great European nations living in peace with the German Empire. That would have been to behave, not in a neutral but in a brutal manner. According to agreement General Augustin returned my visit the same day at the German Consulate.

Here also is Admiral Dewey forgetful, or he has been falsely informed. I was told that the French Admiral, Gigault de la Bedolière, also paid a visit to General Augustin. I do not know what other neutrals did. There was a rumour that the Japanese had sent an officer to the Governor-General's staff, but with the wild flood of rumours let loose this proves no more than the belief of the multitude that such action was not improbable.

During my presence at Manila I can recall no case of any Spanish visit of officials to any German warship; had any salutes been fired,

as Dewey states, any such visit could not possibly have been concealed from me. From the anxiety, to which General Augustin repeatedly gave expression before the German Consul, that the terrified population might be more excited were guns fired either from the port or from land, I looked upon it as settled that during the blockade no salute would be fired from the works. The Governor-General had also made it quite clear that all guns in the shore batteries were loaded, and that for this reason alone no salute would be returned. If the cypher-despatches of the Foreign Consul in Manila testify to the general mistrust in German intentions, this should not be accepted as a proof of its existence in view of the many incitements and calumnies already mentioned—in no case when this Consul was nearly connected with the author of this Press campaign.

Biography, pp. 262, 263: "Not only did the German officers frequently visit the Spanish troops, and outposts, thus familiarizing themselves with the environs of Manila, but a Prince Löwenstein was taken off the 'Kaiserin Augusta' by one of Aguinaldo's staff. This came to our knowledge through the fact that the Prince and his escort had to seek refuge on board an English man-of-war in a heavy sea. German men-of-war boats took soundings off Malabon and the mouth of the Pasig river, and German seamen were sent to occupy the lighthouse at the mouth of the Pasig for some days."

The officers took a professional interest, as did other neutral officers, in following the course of the operations between the Spaniards and the rebels. I was inclined to sanction the gratification of this wish, so long as no breach of neutrality was occasioned. No complaints on this matter reached me. A certain acquaintance with the *terrain* in which the operations were carried on was acquired by the officers, but in this case there was nothing improper, and no possible injury could thereby be done to anybody but the Spaniards.

I did at that time hear mention of a Prince Löwenstein, but I never saw him, and never heard nor inquired what he was doing in Manila. That the Prince intended to pay a visit to the "Kaiserin Augusta" I never knew till now. Considering the good relations then existing between the Americans, the rebels and the English ships, it might be possible to fathom the intentions of the Prince were Admiral Dewey to tell us all that he learnt from the English about this gentleman and his intercourse with Aguinaldo's suite.

I find the following entry in my diary of June 18th, 1898: "The obstructions of the Pasig river have been added to by the sinking of two more ships. Entrance is now very difficult, even for small boats, and dangerous in the dark. From a military point of view the obstructions are of small importance." It is conceivable from the above that boats from our ships may have taken soundings at the river's mouth in order to make certain of the new passage. This may very well be correct, for in the next few days the lighters had to be brought out which were required for the expected "Darmstadt," of course, with the approval of Admiral Dewey and of the Spaniards. The occupation of the lighthouse on the mole by a party may well have been

with the intention of signalling after dark to the lighters or with some boat communicating with the Consulate. Against this, however, the Spaniards would probably have protested, since they alone would have been disadvantaged by such a diminution of the value of their obstructions.

The mention of this harmless occurrence as a complaint against the Germans, arouses the suspicion that Admiral Dewey regarded himself as absolute ruler over land and sea. But there had been as yet no struggle for the frontiers of Spanish and American possessions. If Dewey wished to fight out the struggle with the Spaniards only, then he ought to have acquainted the neutrals with a clearly demarcated blockade limit and accepted all responsibility for such a declaration. From all neutrals who were present, and certainly from the Germans, every endeavour was made to avoid any international proposals and any inclination to make the blockade more strict. I am of opinion that only the disquiet caused by the excuses and insinuations of evil-disposed persons could have incited and provoked the suspicion of the American Admiral arising from the above subject.

Biography, p. 263: "These extracts from the 'Olympia's' log are illuminating as to the activities of the German ships which were continually cruising about the bay and running in and out.

"June 27th. 'Irene' returned from Mariveles. During first watch at night saw searchlight at entrance of bay. 'Kaiserin Augusta' got under way from Manila anchorage and stood down the bay.

"June 28th. 'Kaiser' came in.

"June 29th. 'Irene' got under way, steamed about the upper bay and returned. Later again left the harbour. 'Princess Wilhelm' came in and anchored. 'Cormoran' got under way and stood down to Mariveles.

"June 30th. 'Kaiserin Augusta' came in and anchored off Manila. 'Callao' was sent over to Manila to board her (?) 'Trinidad' with coal for German squadron arrived.

"July 1st. 'Cormoran' and 'Princess Wilhelm' came in.

"July 2nd. 'Cormoran' and German collier left.

"July 3rd. 'Kaiser' left harbour."

On June 30th the steamer "Darmstadt" brought reliefs and equipment for completing our ships. It was agreed with the American Admiral that the transfer of cargo, etc., should take place at the entrance to the Bay of Mariveles, 28 sea miles from Manila, and, meeting us in the politest manner, Admiral Dewey had not only placed this anchorage entirely at our disposal, but also permitted lighters to be drawn from the Pasig river as already mentioned. The discharging period agreed upon for the "Darmstadt" was nearly up; this fact, and the presence of the sick who had been put on board for the home voyage, demanded despatch in working. During the relief, and most inopportunistly, there arrived the "Trinidad," bringing coal from Germany for our ships. This necessitated new arrangements. In the roadstead of Manila were the steamers with our *protégées*, who, needing guard and support, made it necessary that two men-of-war

should be always anchored off Manila. In these circumstances a certain amount of communication between Mariveles and Manila was unavoidable. Admiral Dewey was informed of this, our ship commanders were warned to have all possible consideration for the state of blockade, and so far as we were able there was no undue delay, and no complaint whatever was raised, except that made to me by Lieutenant Brumby, and which will be mentioned more in detail later on. But at that time, and independently of this, there was a fairly lively ship traffic before Manila. I could only give it in full from the logs, which are not available, but in my diary I find the following notes about the movements of neutral shipping:—

"June 22nd. The English gunboat 'Bonaventure' arrived. 'Rattler' to sea.

"June 24th. The Japanese cruiser 'Akitsushima' arrived.

"June 25th. The English cruiser 'Iphigenia' arrived. The English gunboat 'Plover' arrived. The French battleship 'Bayard,' Rear-Admiral de la Bedollière, anchored in the roadstead.

"June 26th. The English gunboat 'Bonaventure' left the anchorage.

"June 27th. The Japanese cruiser 'Matsushima' put to sea."

From Admiral Dewey's notes one might almost draw the conclusion that he had eyes only for the movements of the German ships, although he was already acquainted with the reasons for them.

Biography, pp. 263, 264: "Finally, without my permission, they landed their men for drill at Mariveles harbour opposite Corregidore and Boca Chica at the entrance of the bay, and took possession of the quarantine station, while Admiral von Diederichs occupied a large house which had been the quarters of the Spanish officials. On July 5th I hoisted my flag on the 'M'Culloch' and steamed round the German ships anchored in Mariveles, without, however, communicating with the German Admiral, whence I trusted that he might understand that I did not view his proceedings with favour."

Mariveles, a small place with a safe harbour, had been used by the Spaniards as a quarantine station. When the typhoon season drew near, pressure was exerted in the German Colony to remove the women and children of Germans and those under German protection, then on small, uncomfortable, hired steamers, from Manila to Mariveles.

On June 18th the "Cormoran" was ordered to inspect the place as to its suitability for the purpose. Captain Brüssatis reported that on May 30th the rebels, *i.e.*, the natives of the place, had overcome or captured the Spanish garrison, and were now exercising dominion over it. The local magistrate had frequently suggested that the fugitives from Manila should be accommodated in the roomy quarantine quarters, saying the rebels would be responsible for their protection. At the time, however, it did not seem desirable, the political situation being what it was, to put Germans under the protection of the rebels; the suggested emigration remained consequently in abeyance.

The harbour of Mariveles was at different times used by English ships as an anchorage and for taking coal on board. The Americans had made no special claim on Mariveles, either by a declaration of blockade or by occupying the place, and according to Dewey's own account there was no alliance between the Americans and the rebels.

As to Admiral Dewey's complaint that we landed men "without his permission" for drill at Mariveles, I am not aware whether, by arrangement with the rebels on shore, one of the German ships permitted any recruits to drill during the coaling operations or not. Legally there was no reason why they should not, and at any rate no complaint was made.

My flagship, the "Kaiser," had to ship a very large quantity of coal from the steamer "Drachenfels," and the appliances on this ship made the work very slow, so that more than two days were necessary. Whoever has experienced coaling on a man-of-war will know that the fine coal dust, getting through every crevice and pore, into eyes and lungs, makes a stay on board a torment. In the sweltering tropical heat and in confined spaces with windows and doors fast shut the oppression becomes almost insupportable. How I was saved from this distress I related in the following letter to my wife:—"My cook, a Chinaman, Yo-a-kin, at once discovered a place on shore where we might breakfast while coaling was going on aboard the 'Kaiser.' This was a summer-house, roomy and airy, in a garden on the beach. My yellow *chef* had also annexed the quarantine kitchen, and when I landed the men in charge were so willing to please and helpful that I made up my mind, whenever opportunity occurred, to sleep on shore among the rebels. It appeared that the property of the State had been most carefully guarded. The quarters of the medical officer, and guest-rooms for people undergoing quarantine, were all in the best possible order, bed linen, soap, towels, ink, etc., were at once provided, and thus I passed two days and nights in the utmost quiet and comfort in the quarters of the chief medical officer of a former Spanish quarantine station. At breakfast and lunch I had the commanders of the other ships then engaged in coaling: once two Englishmen."

This is the occurrence which Admiral Dewey found so displeasing. I know nothing of his "steaming round," but near the "Kaiser" an English gun boat was one day anchored. Admiral Dewey expressly states that he did not communicate with me although he circled round our ships. I regret this, for I think that a closer approach might have given him a clearer and more favourable impression of what was taking place on shore, while my two days' rest in the room of a deserted quarantine station, under the care of a Chinese cook, would no longer have been regarded through the eyes of suspicion as the seizure of a quarantine station and the occupation of a large building belonging to the Spanish authorities!

Biography, p. 264: "On the 6th I was informed by the insurgents that the Germans had been interfering with their operations against the Spaniards in Subic Bay. This was of course contrary to my policy to allow the insurgents to weaken the Spaniards as far

as possible, and it was, besides, a breach of neutrality by a neutral Power. I despatched the 'Raleigh' and 'Concord' to Subic to inquire into the truth of this report. They found a force of Spanish troops entrenched on Isla Grande, and under siege by the insurgents. There was not a German subject in the place. When the German cruiser 'Irene' appeared her captain had visited the Spaniards and then informed the insurgents that they might not use a small steamer which was in their possession to assist in their operations against the Spaniards. However, when the 'Raleigh' and 'Concord' steamed into the harbour at daylight the 'Irene' promptly steamed out."

On July 5th I sent the 'Irene' to Subic Bay to make inquiries as to some German whom the Consul had missed, but particularly to find out all about the safety of the harbour in view of the approaching typhoon season. From the official reports, and from the account of Captain-Lieutenant Pohl, then navigating lieutenant of the "Irene," it is clear that there could be no question of anything like interference in the warlike operations, still less of any breach of neutrality. The "Irene" was already at the outlet of the bay when she sighted the American cruisers which had been sent to the assistance of the insurgents. Here, again, reports, or Admiral Dewey's memory, have played him false. Still his account might pass, from the American point of view, if in his last sentence he had substituted the word "already" for "promptly."

Biography, pp. 265—267: "Even before our flag was flying over Isla Grande, although we had not yet received the news, Americans at home were rejoicing over our naval victory at Santiago and Camara had been recalled to Spain. I was glad of an opportunity of stating my own position with perfect candour to Admiral von Diederichs, yet in a diplomatic fashion which could not be personally offensive to him, however positive he was in his views about the rights of neutrals in a blockaded port. Already there had been a correspondence between us in which, in keeping with the accepted authorities on international law, including the German, Perels, who had lectured at the Imperial Naval Academy at Kiel, I maintained my right of blockade in boarding all vessels, including men-of-war. Or, in my own words in one letter to Vice-Admiral von Diederichs: 'As a state of war exists between the United States and Spain, and as the entry into this blockaded port of the vessels of war of a neutral is permitted by the blockading squadron as a matter of international courtesy, such neutrals should necessarily satisfy the blockading vessels as to their identity. I distinctly disclaim any intention of exercising or claiming the *droit de visite* of neutral vessels of war. What I do claim is the right to communicate with all vessels entering this port now blockaded by the forces under my command. It could easily be possible that it was the duty of the picket vessel to notify incoming men-of-war that they could not enter the port—not on account of the blockade, but the intervention of my lines of attack.'"

"Vice-Admiral von Diederichs, in denial of the right, had notified us that he would submit the point to a conference of all the senior officers of the men-of-war in the harbour. But only one officer appeared,

Captain Chichester, of the British 'Immortalité.' He informed the German commander that I was acting entirely within my rights; that he had instructions from his Government to comply with even more rigorous restrictions than I had laid down; and, moreover, that as the senior British officer present he had passed the word that all British men-of-war upon entering the harbour should first report to me and fully satisfy any inquiries on my part before proceeding to the anchorage of the foreign fleet."

"However, Vice-Admiral von Diederichs was unconvinced. When, later, the 'Cormoran,' which was an old offender, was sighted coming up the bay, Flag-Lieutenant Brumby was sent to make sure that she stopped to report, in keeping with the custom of other men-of-war. When the 'Cormoran' saw the 'M'Culloch' approaching, she turned and steamed toward the northern part of the bay, compelling the 'M'Culloch' to follow. Brumby first hoisted the international signal, 'I wish to communicate.' No attention was paid to this by the 'Cormoran.' Then Brumby fired a shot across her bows, which had the desired effect.

"On the following day Vice-Admiral von Diederichs sent a capable, tactful young officer of his staff to me with a memorandum of grievances. When I had heard them through I made the most of the occasion by using him as a third person to state candidly and firmly my attitude in a verbal message, which he conveyed to his superior so successfully that Vice-Admiral von Diederichs was able to understand my point of view. There was no further interference with the blockade or breach of the etiquette which had been established by the common consent of the other foreign commanders."

In the latter portion of this Chapter 17, events are arbitrarily mixed up among a mass of distortions. For this reason any attempt to correct individual statements would only confuse matters the more. I think, therefore, it is only possible to give a clear account by putting down everything in chronological order as taken from notes, letters and official reports.

I would flatly contradict the Biography that any interchange of views on the question of the blockade had taken place between me and Admiral Dewey, until Lieutenant Brumby brought a formal complaint on July 8th. According to this, steam launches belonging to our ships had on two occasions committed breaches of the blockade orders; the reports sent in proved, however, that the circumstances were of small importance. But the manner in which they were taken up by the Americans and spoken of by Admiral Dewey evinced an unfriendly tone. Only a few days before I had been verbally informed that on June 27th an American guard boat had stopped the "Irene" on her return from Dagupan in an improper manner.

I had looked upon the affair as a mistake of no particular significance on the part of the American officer concerned, as the captain of the "Irene" made no mention of it and did not enter it in his log. But the matter, taken in conjunction with Admiral Dewey's complaint, now assumed a certain importance; there seemed to be

here an unfriendly intention. In order not to start a quarrel out of petty provocations, I made up my mind to have the matter cleared up. On July 10th my flag-lieutenant, Captain-Lieutenant Hintze, carried to Admiral Dewey my verbal explanation of the complaints. What now follows I take from the report of Captain-Lieutenant Hintze, the same whom Admiral Dewey in his book describes as a "capable, tactful young officer." (In order that my silence may not be misunderstood, I would expressly state that I have nothing but praise for the demeanour of Lieutenant Brumby).

"Admiral Dewey said he was very satisfied with this information and expressed his thanks. According to my instructions I then mentioned the occurrence in connection with the 'Irene' on June 27th. On her way from Dagupan, about two and a half sea miles outside Corregidor, this ship met the United States cruiser, 'Hugh M'Culloch.' The latter steamed up close and made the signal B.N.D. — 'I wish to communicate, close'; at the same time she lowered a boat with an officer. Accordingly the 'Irene' stopped and received the officer on board. When his queries as to the names of the ship and commander and port of departure had been replied to, the officer of the 'Irene,' who was conducting the conversation, asked, on behalf of the captain, if the 'M'Culloch' had anything really important to communicate. The officer of the 'M'Culloch' at first said 'No,' but then inquired whether the 'Irene' had seen the 'Baltimore,' as they were anxious about her. Admiral Dewey did not seem altogether satisfied with this action on the part of the ship and said, 'You see, the "M'Culloch" is not a man-of-war, she is but a revenue cutter, maybe the captain has made some mistake in signalling.'

"When I pointed out that the whole matter could have been inquired into by signal, since the 'Irene' had been off Manila since May 6th and everybody knew her, Admiral Dewey began at first to argue this point quietly—that is *he only spoke*. I was listening to him. There must be a clear understanding in this connection. The laws of blockade were as easy as A B C. He studied the instructions relating to them every day, for he did not intend to make any mistakes and knew well enough what he had to do. He had the right to board any ship, whether men-of-war or merchantmen, to make the inquiries necessary to establish identity. Then, suddenly, Admiral Dewey exclaimed angrily—'Why! I shall stop each vessel, whatever may be her colours! And if she does not stop, I shall fire at her, and that means war, do you know, Sir? etc., etc.' When the words 'if Germany wants war,' and so on were repeated, I took my departure.

"I received the impression from this trivial matter that the explosive material engendered for some time past in Admiral Dewey through mistrust, rumours, and Press reports, was on the point of going off!"

Captain Coghlan, one of Admiral Dewey's captains, later said, according to newspaper reports (see, for instance, the *Shanghai Daily Press*, of May 27th, 1899), that he overheard this conversation, and he testified that everything was said as was reported to me by Captain-Lieutenant Hintze. Admiral Dewey knew well enough that a declaration of war could not emanate either from him or from me. I put

down this behaviour towards a young officer, who was interviewing him as the representative of a foreign commander, as due to the burden of his responsibility as commander of the blockading squadron and the nervous strain. I now awaited the promised reply to my queries *re* the "Irene" case. On the morning of July 11th I received the following letter:—

"No. 526.M.

United States Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
Flagship 'Olympia,' Cavite, July 11th, 1898.

"My dear Admiral,

"Referring to the conversation held with your flag-lieutenant yesterday, I have investigated the matter of the communication of the 'M'Culloch' with the 'Irene' off the entrance to Manila on June 27th. On reference to the signal records of the 'M'Culloch' I find that the signal made by her on that occasion was international B.N.D. —'I wish to communicate with you.' My flag-lieutenant was on board of the 'M'Culloch' at the time, on the bridge, and states that neither he nor the captain were able to make out the colours of the 'Irene' until she was very near to, that she was standing nearly end on towards the 'M'Culloch,' and was not recognized by either of them until after she had passed and her name was read, as they thought the 'Irene' was at Mariveles. Further, he states that, although the 'M'Culloch' was lying to with a boat in the water, he thought the approaching vessel at the speed she was making did not intend to stop, and so he ordered the above mentioned signal to be made after she was abreast of the 'M'Culloch.' The boarding officer asked only the questions required by squadron regulations when boarding a man-of-war at any time, in peace or war, and also if the 'Irene' had seen anything of the 'Baltimore' to the northward. It is not only my right but my duty during this blockade to communicate with all vessels of whatever nationality, entering or wishing to enter this port; and I can see no good reason why any neutral man-of-war should object to such inquiries as are necessary to establish her identity. Her colours alone do not establish that identity, for it is a common *ruse* of war to hoist false colours.

"Very sincerely,

(Sd.) GEORGE DEWEY.

"Vice-Admiral von Diederichs,

"Flagship 'Kaiser.'"

As the stopping of the "Irene" was thus belatedly explained, I had no object in further pursuing the matter, though I might very well have raised a query as to the full object of the explanation. Dewey himself, in the "Autobiography," rather destroys the credibility of the explanation made at the time by the distorted account of the occurrence. For me it was mainly a matter of principle. Personally I had no objection to Dewey opening communications with approaching foreign vessels by means of summons, signal, or exchange of visits; but I held and still hold it unpermissible that the boarding officer should ask any questions other than those ordinarily put, *e.g.*, name and last port of ship, name of commander, while also giving information

about the blockade. The expression employed by Admiral Dewey—"such inquiries as are necessary to establish identity"—might, owing to the double meaning of the word "inquiry," viz., question or examination, easily mean more than appears above, especially considered in connection with the sentence—"to establish the identity."

I replied at once as follows, in German :—

"B. No. 4372.I.

Manila, July 11th, 1898.

"Herr Admiral,

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst., and to thank you for the accompanying explanation of the visit to the 'Irene' of an officer of the U.S.S. 'Hugh M'Culloch.' The concluding portion of your letter, wherein you claim the *droit de visite* in connection with men-of-war under neutral flags, does not seem to be in accordance with such principles of naval law as are known to me. As the question is an important one for all neutrals I have communicated on the subject with the senior officers of all the neutral men-of-war here represented, and will not fail to send a further communication to your Excellency as speedily as possible.

"I have the honour to be, etc.,

"VON DIEDERICHs,

"To His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Dewey,

"Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station."

At the same time I issued an order to the commanders of all ships under my orders off Manila, that they were to decline visits to "establish identity" when colours were visible, under all circumstances.

I sent an officer to the senior commanders of the neutral ships lying off Manila, and asked them for an expression of opinion on the matter contained in Admiral Dewey's letter of the 11th July. Rear-Admiral de la Bedolière expressed himself very decidedly on the subject to this officer—the identity of a ship of war was established by its Colours and its outward appearance, and any possible deception by hoisting false Colours made no alteration in the general principle involved. The commander of the Austro-Hungarian frigate, "Freundsberg," said that he shared my view, but that the question had only an academic interest for him as he was sailing for Yokohama next day. Captain Saito, commanding the Japanese cruiser, "Akitsushima," asked for time to consider the matter, and called next morning, the 12th July, on my flag lieutenant, when he gave his opinion as follows :—During the China-Japanese War the Japanese were in the habit of exchanging compliments with approaching foreign ships, and took the opportunity of informing them of any circumstances which had developed during the war. They did not, however, look upon this sending an officer on board as giving them any right of thereby establishing identity. He therefore considered that the outward appearance of ships of war and the flag they sailed under were sufficient for the purposes of the blockading ships, and that boarding to establish identity was not permissible. The fact that hostile ships might hoist neutral Colours did not make any difference; that was a matter which concerned the parties engaged in war. A complimentary visit he held to be allowable.

Captain Chichester, the senior British naval officer, and a close friend of Admiral Dewey, was not on board when my officer arrived. I received a note from him, which, with my reply, I give *verbatim*, in order to show the inaccuracy of Admiral Dewey's statement as to the calling together of a conference of neutrals.

Captain Chichester wrote :

"H.M.S. 'Immortalité.'

Manila, 11th July, 1898.

"Dear Admiral von Diederichs,

"I was on shore to-day when your officer called, but I hear from my commander that you wished to confer with the senior officers of the men-of-war present relative to a communication that you have received from Admiral Dewey regarding blockading operations. I can only say that I am ready to come on board your ship for the above-mentioned purpose at any time you propose as being convenient to yourself.

"Yours sincerely,

"E. Chichester."

I replied :

"S.M.S. 'Kaiser.'

Manila, 12th July, 1898.

"My Dear Captain Chichester,

"Many thanks for your kind readiness to come and confer with me about a letter Admiral Dewey wrote to me regarding blockading operations. I remain to-day on board and shall be happy to see you at any time you choose, preferring the hours between 9 and 12 o'clock.

"Yours very truly,

"v. Diederichs."

Admiral Dewey's mistake may have arisen from the words "to confer"—words which perhaps Captain Chichester may also have employed to him. The last named called on me on the "Kaiser" at mid-day. He brought with him a confidential work dealing with blockade, and endeavoured to prove, by showing me several paragraphs, that Dewey's assertions were justified. In every instance I was able to prove that his book referred only to merchant ships. On being asked, he admitted the phrase "inquiries necessary to establish the identity" as implying "search for evidence." I then asked him the question what he would do were an officer of another nation to endeavour thus to act against him, and received the reply : "I would fire on him." He then admitted that a search was unpermissible, that only a polite questioning could be allowed, and that this could go no further than the officer questioned chose to allow, and he added : "If the officer does not take my word for it the worse for him."

About 1 p.m. I received another reply from Admiral Dewey :

"No. 530.M. United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station,
Flagship 'Olympia,' Cavite, July 12th, 1898.

"Sir,

"I am just in receipt of your communication of yesterday. I hasten to answer as you have apparently misinterpreted a portion of my letter

about the blockade. The expression employed by Admiral Dewey—"such inquiries as are necessary to establish identity"—might, owing to the double meaning of the word "inquiry," *viz.*, question or examination, easily mean more than appears above, especially considered in connection with the sentence—"to establish the identity."

I replied at once as follows, in German:—

"B. No. 4372.I.

Manila, July 11th, 1898.

"Herr Admiral,

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst., and to thank you for the accompanying explanation of the visit to the 'Irene' of an officer of the U.S.S. 'Hugh M'Culloch.' The concluding portion of your letter, wherein you claim the *droit de visite* in connection with men-of-war under neutral flags, does not seem to be in accordance with such principles of naval law as are known to me. As the question is an important one for all neutrals I have communicated on the subject with the senior officers of all the neutral men-of-war here represented, and will not fail to send a further communication to your Excellency as speedily as possible.

"I have the honour to be, etc.,

"VON DIEDERICH,

"To His Excellency Rear-Admiral G. Dewey,

"Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station."

At the same time I issued an order to the commanders of all ships under my orders off Manila, that they were to decline visits to "establish identity" when colours were visible, under all circumstances.

I sent an officer to the senior commanders of the neutral ships lying off Manila, and asked them for an expression of opinion on the matter contained in Admiral Dewey's letter of the 11th July. Rear-Admiral de la Bedolière expressed himself very decidedly on the subject to this officer—the identity of a ship of war was established by its Colours and its outward appearance, and any possible deception by hoisting false Colours made no alteration in the general principle involved. The commander of the Austro-Hungarian frigate, "Freundsberg," said that he shared my view, but that the question had only an academic interest for him as he was sailing for Yokohama next day. Captain Saito, commanding the Japanese cruiser, "Akitsushima," asked for time to consider the matter, and called next morning, the 12th July, on my flag lieutenant, when he gave his opinion as follows:—During the China-Japanese War the Japanese were in the habit of exchanging compliments with approaching foreign ships, and took the opportunity of informing them of any circumstances which had developed during the war. They did not, however, look upon this sending an officer on board as giving them any right of thereby establishing identity. He therefore considered that the outward appearance of ships of war and the flag they sailed under were sufficient for the purposes of the blockading ships, and that boarding to establish identity was not permissible. The fact that hostile ships might hoist neutral Colours did not make any difference; that was a matter which concerned the parties engaged in war. A complimentary visit he held to be allowable.

Captain Chichester, the senior British naval officer, and a close friend of Admiral Dewey, was not on board when my officer arrived. I received a note from him, which, with my reply, I give *verbatim*, in order to show the inaccuracy of Admiral Dewey's statement as to the calling together of a conference of neutrals.

Captain Chichester wrote:

"H.M.S. 'Immortalité.'"

Manila, 11th July, 1898.

"Dear Admiral von Diederichs,

"I was on shore to-day when your officer called, but I hear from my commander that you wished to confer with the senior officers of the men-of-war present relative to a communication that you have received from Admiral Dewey regarding blockading operations. I can only say that I am ready to come on board your ship for the above-mentioned purpose at any time you propose as being convenient to yourself.

"Yours sincerely,

"E. Chichester."

I replied:

"S.M.S. 'Kaiser.'"

Manila, 12th July, 1898.

"My Dear Captain Chichester,

"Many thanks for your kind readiness to come and confer with me about a letter Admiral Dewey wrote to me regarding blockading operations. I remain to-day on board and shall be happy to see you at any time you choose, preferring the hours between 9 and 12 o'clock.

"Yours very truly,

"v. Diederichs."

Admiral Dewey's mistake may have arisen from the words "to confer"—words which perhaps Captain Chichester may also have employed to him. The last named called on me on the "Kaiser" at mid-day. He brought with him a confidential work dealing with blockade, and endeavoured to prove, by showing me several paragraphs, that Dewey's assertions were justified. In every instance I was able to prove that his book referred only to merchant ships. On being asked, he admitted the phrase "inquiries necessary to establish the identity" as implying "search for evidence." I then asked him the question what he would do were an officer of another nation to endeavour thus to act against him, and received the reply: "I would fire on him." He then admitted that a search was unpermissible, that only a polite questioning could be allowed, and that this could go no further than the officer questioned chose to allow, and he added: "If the officer does not take my word for it the worse for him."

About 1 p.m. I received another reply from Admiral Dewey:

"No. 530.M. United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station,
Flagship 'Olympia,' Cavite, July 12th, 1898.

"Sir,

"I am just in receipt of your communication of yesterday. I hasten to answer as you have apparently misinterpreted a portion of my letter

of July 11th. I distinctly disclaim any intention of exercising or claiming the *droit de visite* of neutral vessels of war. What I do claim is the right to communicate with all vessels entering this port, now blockaded by the forces under my command. I must inform such vessels that a blockade exists; it could easily be possible that it was the duty of the picket vessels to notify incoming men-of-war that they could not enter the port, not on account of the blockade, but the intervention of my lines of attack. As a state of war exists between the United States and Spain, and as the entry into this blockaded port of the vessels of war of a neutral is permitted by the blockading squadron as a matter of international courtesy, such neutrals should necessarily satisfy the blockading vessels as to their identity. And I can see no good reason why such neutrals should object to such inquiries as are necessary to establish their identity, whether these be made by signal, by hailing, or by the more usual method between men-of-war, visiting, or by other methods usual and common.

"As you referred a portion of my last letter to the senior officers of the men-of-war now in the port of Manila, will you kindly transmit this letter as well.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Very respectfully,

"George Dewey,

"Rear-Admiral U.S. Navy.

"H. E. Rear-Admiral von Diederichs."

This letter corresponds to that quoted in the autobiography, but there the sense is slightly altered by transposition and omissions. The wording, "such inquiries as are necessary to establish her identity" was here again employed, which I could the less agree to since Captain Chichester had admitted the possibility of a meaning which I could not countenance.

My flag-lieutenant was sent round with this communication to the senior officers of neutral ships. He reported that Rear-Admiral de la Bedolière, without relinquishing his original standpoint, was more reserved than on the previous day, and expressed himself as confident that Admiral Dewey meant to suggest nothing more than the putting of civil queries. Captains Chichester and Saito expressed themselves as they had done before, the former again mentioning the possibility of a double interpretation of the sentence in question.

I replied in writing to Admiral Dewey as follows:—

"B. No. 4383 I. S.M.S. 'Kaiser,' Manila, 12th July, 1898.

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 12th inst.

"I gather from it that you do reject any intention of claiming the *droit de visite* of neutral men of war. With pleasure I state that I am in full agreement with your Excellency as to your right to communicate with neutral ships entering the harbour of Manila by signal, hail, or by exchange of visits.

"What I combatted and must combat was that any recognized law of nations permitted officers to be sent on board neutral men-of-war in order to establish their identity by means of inquiries or examination. According to my view the identity of a ship of war is sufficiently differentiated from that of merchantmen by perfectly recognizable outward appearance, while their neutrality is established by means of their flags. The principle cannot be altered by the fact that hostile ships have been known to hoist the flags of neutrals.

"I have not failed to bring your Excellency's letter of the 12th inst. to the notice of the senior officers of the ships of the neutral Powers represented on this station.

"I have the honour to be, etc.,

"v. Diederichs,

"Vice-Admiral and Commander of the Cruiser Squadron."

The exchange of correspondence now closed.

At this time the "Cormoran" was expected back from a cruise to the southern islands of Iloilo, Cebu and others, and in order to avoid any rencontre between her and an American ship, I sent the "Kaiserin Augusta" to the harbour mouth with orders to meet the "Cormoran," to advise her of the situation, and to conduct her to an anchorage.

The "Kaiserin Augusta" succeeded in establishing signal communication with the "Cormoran" after cruising about the mouth of the harbour half the night of the 12th and 13th, signalling to the south with her searchlights, and directed the "Cormoran" to proceed to Mariveles to coal. Thence both ships returned on July 14th to the harbour of Manila. Despite the long-continued and widely-seen searchlight signalling and the entrance by daylight into the harbour, the blockading ships made no attempts to obtain information as to names and ports. This circumstance will save me from any suspicion of having swerved by even a hair's breadth from the standpoint I had adopted by reason of Admiral Dewey's demands.

Later, a letter from a petty officer of the "Kaiserin Augusta" appeared in the German papers; the author wrote rather in the style of a hero of the Homeric age than of the twentieth century, and declared that the ships returned "cleared for action." This was due to no order from me.

My account of the occurrences which took place gives a very different picture than do the two last pages in Chapter 17 of Dewey's autobiography. I base my account on the notes taken down at the time as the events passed, and on the original correspondence now available for reference; from these documents I must believe that Admiral Dewey's memory has here played him false.

In order to emphasize the chief of the errors to be found on the three last pages of Chapter 17, I would here repeat:—

Prior to 10th July there was no exchange of letters or opinion on questions connected with the "rights of nations." What is mentioned by Admiral Dewey in his Appendix F has absolutely nothing to do with the question raised by me.

I never contemplated the holding of a conference by the senior officers of neutral ships, and never mentioned such a thing.

What Captain Chichester is stated to have said is so entirely opposed to the terms in which he expressed himself to me and to my flag-lieutenant, that in justice to the British officer I must take it that here again Admiral Dewey is completely mistaken.

"The "Cormoran" was never stopped by the "McCulloch"; it has been confused with the "Irene." The commander of the "Irene" and Captain-Lieutenant Pohl, the navigating officer, both reported officially that no shot was fired; further, the course of the "Irene" was not changed. Admiral Dewey's story is insulting to German officers, and must be strenuously denied. In his account Admiral Dewey gave an apparent statement of the action meditated against the "Irene." I could hardly desire a better justification of my behaviour.

Not "on the following day," but ten days later I brought the "Irene"—"McCulloch" incident to notice in consequence of the complaints made against our ships—as above mentioned. An "interference with the blockade" or "breach of etiquette" has not in any case been proved against the German ships, and, indeed, no other complaint of any kind has been raised except those above mentioned and contradicted by me.

This statement should suffice to throw doubts on the historical accuracy of the account in the autobiography.

The relations with Admiral Dewey soon took on a more friendly complexion. The Admiral sent me a present of some mutton from a transport bringing frozen meat for the American forces, and owing to the want of fresh meat experienced during the blockade this change was very welcome. I made a return with a live calf which I had received from Hong Kong. Thus a dead sheep and a live calf formed something of the nature of a sacrifice on the altar of friendship!

It is inexplicable to me how, at the end of Chapter 17, Admiral Dewey can speak of an etiquette, "which had been established by the common consent of the other foreign commanders." In the first place I know nothing whatever of such a consent, although I maintained the friendliest relations with the senior officers present at Manila, and on several occasions discussed many not generally known matters with Admiral de la Bedolière; but then I ask—what right does Admiral Dewey adjudge to the few neutrals present for the absolute decision of international questions of etiquette? Does not this evince a wholly incorrect appreciation of the meaning of international arrangements?

At that time an understanding had been come to between the Governments of Berlin and Washington, which was communicated to me by cable as follows:—"For the future, and as a rule, prior to the arrival of German ships of war before blockaded ports, the names of such ships should be communicated to the commander of the blockading squadron, when all that will be required will be for these to exchange signals with the commander of the blockading squadron or his representative." There is here nothing about "inquiries necessary to establish the identity," although it would be just as easy for enemy

ships to deceive by signals as by hoisting false Colours. Finally, there was never any "effective" blockade of Manila.

Captain Chichester represented to me that Admiral Dewey had been made suspicious by foreign influences, such as the gossip in Manila; but the more or less unfriendly rumours ashore could not, so far as I can see, account for a scene such as is described by Captain-Lieutenant Hintze, and which is quite exceptional in the official intercourse of representatives of nations of modern culture. I have frequently asked myself the question—how could such hateful misunderstanding arise between the apparently well-meaning *Admiral Dewey*, who was always thoughtful how to diminish the hardships of the blockade for those who were innocently suffering from them, and *one* who was genuinely anxious to comply with every wish of the blockade commander, up to the point where it touched the honour of the flag? I can only perceive the following reasons:—

A misdirected public opinion in Manila had expressed a wholly unjustified hope of German assistance, and thus a mistrust of Germany's intentions was aroused. Many newspapers, especially those published in English on the East Asiatic coast, spread abroad all rumours having a mistrustful reference to Germany.

Admiral Dewey—with numerically weak forces, his communication difficult with the Mother Country—had not merely to keep down an overthrown enemy, but to thrust back the rebels thronging against it, without drawing them upon himself. Under the pressure of these heavy responsibilities mistrust appears to have grown into real suspicion when, by a series of unlucky coincidences, a number of German ships assembled off Manila under an officer who, at the time, was actually senior to him. That unintentional or wicked rumours stirred up suspicion seems to me to be proved by what later appeared in the Press in regard to the utterances of Messrs. Coghlan, Stickney and others; the first named of these actually stated that he possessed a plan, worked out in the smallest detail for the complete destruction of the German ships!

Much of this sort of thing I detected very soon after I reached Manila, some I only suspected, and when this was completed by the nervous outburst of Admiral Dewey against my flag-lieutenant, I could not help feeling something of pity for a man so sorely tried in a position of heavy anxiety. I was the more rejoiced when I saw later that Admiral Dewey regarded these misunderstandings in the same light that I did. The first proof of this was the reply I received to my congratulations on his promotion; this ran as follows:—

"No. 218. M. United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station,
Flagship 'Olympia,'

"Manila, P.I., 16th April, 1899.

"Dear Admiral von Diederichs,

"I wish to thank you most heartily for your cordial letter of congratulations upon my promotion. It is a great pleasure to me to

feel that my advancement is a source of satisfaction to you, and I rejoice that our differences have been of newspaper manufacture.

" Hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you again before leaving the station, I am,

"Very sincerely,

"(Sd.) George Dewey,

"Admiral U.S. Navy,

"Comding. U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station."

The two other proofs are authentic reports of utterances made by Admiral Dewey to the German Consuls at their official visits at Manila and Hong Kong.

Consul Dr. Krüger wrote from Manila on May 19th, 1899: "Admiral Dewey was visibly pleased and said that he was greatly drawn to Germany, and that it had been a pleasure to him to have experienced so much sympathy from all Germans present, both by land and water. For he could state that so far as he was concerned, any stiffness between him and Admiral von Diederichs had been fomented in the Press, but that actually there had been nowhere any sign of such a thing. . ."

Consul Rieloff wrote from Hong Kong on May 30th, 1899: "In the course of conversation Admiral Dewey said in the presence of several English and American visitors, that he took the opportunity of assuring me that the reports of the so-called differences of opinion between Vice-Admiral von Diederichs and himself merely originated in stupid newspaper gossip."

According to all appearances Admiral Dewey has since gone back to his former views. It may now be left to the reader to form his own opinion as to any justification for the same.



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. R. R. GILLESPIE, K.C.B.

By CAPTAIN W. H. WILKIN, The Sherwood Foresters, Notts and Derbyshire Regiment.

HUGH ROBERT ROLLO GILLESPIE was born at Comber, Co. Down, on January 21st, 1766. His grandfather, Hugh Gillespie, who married the daughter of the third Lord Rollo, left Scotland after the troubles in 1715 and settled in Ireland. Hugh Gillespie had a son, Robert. Robert was thrice married, but he had only one child—Hugh Robert Rollo, the son of his third wife. A few years after Rollo's birth his parents left Ireland and settled at Bath. The boy was sent to a school called Norland House at Kensington. He afterwards went to a tutor at Exning, near Newmarket, to prepare for Emanuel College, Cambridge.

Rollo Gillespie was destined for the bar, but he wished to be a soldier, and in April, 1783, he was gazetted cornet in the 3rd Irish Horse (now the 6th Dragoon Guards—the Carabineers).

In 1786 young Gillespie was at Clogher with the regiment, and on November 24th he secretly married Annabella, the fourth daughter of Thomas Taylor, of Taylor's Grange, Co. Dublin. In the following year he accompanied the regiment to Athy, Co. Kildare.

At Athy a violent quarrel took place in Gillespie's house between a brother-officer of his named Mackenzie and a gentleman of the neighbourhood—Mr. Barrington. They met next morning, but after the exchange of two shots the dispute was settled. A quarrel then broke out between Barrington and Gillespie, who had been Mackenzie's second. Barrington used most insulting language, and Gillespie challenged him to fight across a handkerchief. The two men fired together. Gillespie killed his man, and he himself had a marvellous escape, for his opponent's bullet was deflected by a button, and he got off with a slight wound. Gillespie was hurried from the ground, but he surrendered and stood his trial at Maryborough at the Summer Assizes in 1788. The jury brought in a verdict of "Justifiable Homicide."

Robert Gillespie was very anxious that his son should retire and settle down on his estate, but in 1791 the old gentleman died. Rollo Gillespie was promoted lieutenant into the 20th (Jamaica) Light Dragoons on July 25th, 1792. He left his wife at Farm Hill, near Belfast, and sailed for the West Indies in the following winter. The ship called at Madeira, and while she was there a storm came on. Gillespie and several other passengers managed to get ashore in a boat at considerable risk, but the ship was driven from the roads, and it was three weeks before she managed to beat her way back and refit. Gillespie reached Jamaica in safety, but at once contracted yellow fever and very nearly died.

In the summer of 1793 it was decided to despatch an expedition to St. Domingo. The 20th Light Dragoons remained in Jamaica, but Lieutenant Gillespie volunteered for service with the infantry and accompanied the force which occupied Jeremie on September 20th, and Mole St. Nicholas two days later.

He was promoted captain in January, 1794, and took part in the capture of Fort Tiburon on February 3rd. In the month of May Captain Gillespie and Captain Rowley of the navy swam ashore with a flag of truce to demand the surrender of Port-au-Prince. Gillespie distinguished himself greatly at the capture of Fort Bizutton on May 31st, and also in the storming of Fort de L'Hopital, where he received several wounds.

There was a lull in the operations, and Gillespie, who had suffered much from the climate as well as from his wounds, returned home on leave. His ship was wrecked in the Channel, and he lost all his luggage, but he reached London in October. He was joined by his wife, and they returned together to Ireland, and afterwards travelled about in Scotland and England.

At the end of 1795 Captain Gillespie sailed as brigade-major with Major-General Wilford, his old commanding officer in the Carabineers. The ships were detained for a long time at Cork by bad weather. Captain Gillespie went to the theatre one evening, and on this occasion some members of the audience behaved in a very disloyal manner. Gillespie removed the hat of a man who refused to uncover when the National Anthem was played, and in the scuffle which ensued he broke the offender's nose. A warrant was issued, but Gillespie could not run the risk of being left behind, so, after staying a few days with a gentleman of the neighbourhood, he returned to his ship disguised as a woman. When the vessel was searched he had a child in his arms to render his disguise more complete, and he was not discovered.

After the capture of St. Lucia, Major-General Wilford was sent to St. Domingo. Gillespie was promoted major on Christmas Day, 1796, and he distinguished himself when Simcoe defeated Toussaint before Port-au-Prince in the following year. A few months later Gillespie was appointed D.A.G. in St. Domingo.

In 1798 a party of ruffians entered Gillespie's house. The major rushed downstairs and found his servant lying mortally wounded. He was immediately attacked by eight men, but he defended himself to such good purpose that he killed six of his assailants, whereupon the remaining two fled.

This remarkable exploit created a great sensation. Some years later when Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie was presented at a levée the King cried out "Eh, eh! what, what! Is this the little man that killed the brigands?"

When St. Domingo was evacuated, Major Gillespie returned to Jamaica and assumed command of his regiment. In December, 1797, the Jamaica House of Assembly petitioned that the 20th Light Dragoons might have a second lieutenant-colonel, and that Gillespie might be promoted. As a matter of fact, he had been gazetted lieutenant-colonel on November 21st.

At the close of the year 1801 orders were received for the regiment to return to England, and on December 7th the House of Assembly voted a hundred guineas to Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie for the purchase of a sword of honour. The regiment landed at Portsmouth in the autumn of 1802 three hundred strong and in good health.

An officer named Major Allen Cameron, who joined the 20th Light Dragoons in Jamaica in August, 1800, had only spent nine months in the island, and was doing duty for less than three months with the regiment, accused Gillespie of signing false returns and claiming allowances to which officers and men were not entitled. In June, 1804, a General court martial was ordered to assemble at Colchester, and Major-General John Hope was appointed President. The Court sat from June 27th till July 17th, when Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie was found not guilty and honourably acquitted. His accuser, Major Cameron, was removed from the army.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie had got into financial difficulties, and in May, 1805, he exchanged into the 19th Light Dragoons, who were in India. Gillespie decided to travel out overland. He left England in June. At Hamburg he was warned by Napper Tandy that he was in danger from French spies. He travelled via Berlin, Dresden and Vienna. Near Lemberg, in Galicia, he met the Austrian and Russian Armies on the march, and an exalted personage coolly appropriated a beautiful gun which he was taking with him.

Gillespie passed safely through Servia, but he had some trouble in the Black Sea. The skipper had agreed to take him to Constantinople, but he tried to make for a port on the coast of Asia, and only desisted when Gillespie covered him with a gun.

Gillespie stayed for a time at Constantinople. A French officer invited him to dinner. Gillespie politely declined the invitation, but the Frenchman was offended and announced that he would be glad to kill an Englishman. The colonel at once called upon him and said: "As it is your wish to kill an Englishman, I am come to give you that satisfaction by trying your skill upon me." They fought with swords, and Gillespie wounded and disarmed his opponent.

From Constantinople he proceeded to Greece, and thence by Aleppo and across the desert to Baghdad. He was in some danger of being robbed by the Arabs, but he acquired a great reputation as a doctor by giving the sheikh a violent aperient. He embarked at Bussorah and made his way to Bombay and thence to Madras, which he reached at the beginning of 1806. He assumed the command of his regiment at Arcot.

Gillespie had arranged to dine with Colonel Fancourt of the 69th Regiment at Vellore on July 9th, but luckily he was prevented from going there by the arrival of important letters. The Vellore Mutiny broke out at 2 a.m. on the 10th, and 400 men of the 69th Foot were attacked by the native regiments. Gillespie heard of the outbreak at 6 a.m., for Arcot is only 14 miles from Vellore. He galloped over at once with a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons, and left orders for the remainder of the regiment to follow with the guns. Gillespie

pushed on ahead of his men, and when he reached Vellore the British soldiers were very hard pressed, but the Guard under Sergeant Brodie were still holding their own above the gateway. The 69th had known Gillespie in the West Indies, and Sergeant Brodie cried out "If Colonel Gillespie be alive, he is now at the head of the 19th Dragoons, and God Almighty has sent him from the West Indies to save our lives in the East."

The men of the 69th lowered a rope and pulled Gillespie up. The colonel immediately put himself at their head and charged the mutineers. On the arrival of the 19th Light Dragoons the rising was suppressed—600 of the mutineers were killed on the spot and most of the remainder were captured.

Gillespie got off with a contusion on the arm.

Soon after this he was sent to Wallajabad to put down symptoms of unrest. He received the thanks of the Government for his services, and a grant of £2,500. He was also made an Inspector of Cavalry, but not long afterwards he was deprived of this appointment.

In 1807 the 19th Light Dragoons was ordered home, so in April Gillespie exchanged into the 8th Royal Irish Light Dragoons.

Our relations with Ranjit Singh became very strained, and Gillespie was given command of the cavalry and horse artillery between the Jumna and the Sutlej. War was averted, and on the break up of the camp at Ludhiana Gillespie went off to Hurdwar with several friends on a tiger shoot.

In January, 1809, he exchanged to the 25th Light Dragoons, and at the end of the year he was in command of the troops at Bangalore. While there he speared a tiger on the race-course. Colonel Skinner and Sir James Outram are also said to have speared tigers, but it is certain that the feat has very seldom been accomplished, and Gillespie sent home the Arab he was riding on that occasion as a present to the Duke of York.

At the end of the year 1810 an expedition to Java was decided upon, and on April 18th, 1811, the 1st Division sailed from Madras under Colonel Gillespie. By June 1st the whole force was concentrated at Malacca under Sir Samuel Auchmuty, who reorganized it in three divisions, called the advance, the line and the reserve. Colonel Gillespie was placed in command of the advance.

On August 4th the fleet arrived at Chilingching, about 12 miles from Batavia. The advance was at once landed and Gillespie seized the bridge over the canal beyond the village. Two days later the advance moved forward half way to Batavia, and Gillespie reconnoitred to within two miles of the place.

Batavia was occupied on August 8th. On the 10th Gillespie advanced to Weltevreden. Just before he started a Frenchman attempted to poison him with some drugged coffee. The plot failed; and Gillespie had the remainder of the coffee poured down the miscreant's throat. Weltevreden was unoccupied, but the enemy was in position a mile beyond it. Gillespie at once attacked, drove the enemy from their position, captured their four guns, and pursued them till

they took shelter in the lines of Cornelis. The British casualties in this affair were only 91 killed and wounded. Those of the enemy were three times as numerous. Sir Samuel Auchmuty publicly thanked Colonel Gillespie for his conduct on this occasion.

The lines of Cornelis were over four miles in circumference and were held by a strong force of the enemy, so Auchmuty decided to undertake regular siege operations. The construction of batteries was begun on August 20th, fire was opened on the 24th, and by the evening of the 25th the guns of the defenders were silenced. The climate was beginning to tell on the health of the British troops, so Auchmuty decided on an immediate assault, and he selected the east face of the lines for the principal attack. A stream called the Slokan ran along this side of the lines. It was crossed by a bridge which was covered by two redoubts in the rear and one on the far side of the river. This attack was entrusted to a column commanded by Colonel Gillespie, who was supported by Colonel Gibbs.

Gillespie moved off soon after midnight on the early morning of the 26th. Shortly before dawn the column had arrived quite close to the redoubt in front of the bridge, when Gillespie was informed that the supports under Colonel Gibbs had lost touch and were not up. Delay at this juncture might have proved fatal, so Gillespie decided to push on, and trust to Colonel Gibbs hastening to the sound of the firing. A picquet of the enemy was overwhelmed, and the redoubt was carried with a rush at the point of the bayonet. Gillespie pressed on at once, and seized the bridge over the Slokan in spite of the fire of four horse artillery guns and the two redoubts in rear.

As soon as he had secured the bridge Gillespie attacked and captured one of the redoubts behind it. Just at this juncture Colonel Gibbs arrived with the supports, and by Gillespie's orders he captured the other redoubt. Gillespie himself took part in the assault, and with his own hand captured Brigadier-General Jauffret.

Gillespie soon pushed on into the heart of the enemy's position and delivered an attack upon their reserves. Meanwhile the other attacking columns had also proved successful, and the enemy abandoned their works and retreated to the South.

Colonel Gillespie was suffering from fever when his column moved off at midnight; he had been obliged to walk all night, he had taken part in the storming of three redoubts, he had received a severe contusion in the attack on the enemy's reserves, and he had fainted at the close of the attack. His energy was amazing. No sooner did the small body of cavalry come up than he mounted a horse which was cut loose from one of the enemy's guns, placed himself at the head of the cavalry, and pursued the enemy for eight miles. During the day he killed one colonel, and captured with his own hand two generals and one colonel. In Fortescue's "History of the British Army" there occurs this sentence: "It may well be doubted whether, in the whole story of the army, any man has ever distinguished himself so signally in any one engagement as did Rollo Gillespie at the Lines of Cornelis."

In his despatch Auchmuty wrote as follows: "I must not omit noticing to your lordship the very particular merit of Colonel Gillespie,

to whose assistance, in planning the principal attack, and to whose gallantry, energy and judgment in executing it, the success is greatly to be attributed."

On the surrender of Java, Lord Minto, the Governor-General, and Sir Samuel Auchmuty returned to India, leaving Mr. Raffles as Governor and Colonel Gillespie in command of the troops.

Disturbances soon arose in Sumatra. After nightfall on April 25th, 1812, Gillespie walked into the town of Palimbang with six officers and seventeen Grenadiers, and imposed his will on the natives. He installed a new Sultan, and left Palimbang on May 17th. Three days later he took possession of the Island of Banca. He returned to Batavia on June 1st, and a few days later he went to Samarang to suppress a rising in Java. On the 20th he stormed the fortress of Dyo-dyo-carta and crushed the rebellion. On this occasion the British casualties were 100 killed and wounded, and Gillespie was severely wounded in the arm.

Gillespie had been promoted Major-General on January 1st, 1812, but his position was not a pleasant one, for there was much friction between him and Mr. Raffles. The Governor not only interfered in military plans, but would not sanction measures which Gillespie considered essential for the health and comfort of the troops, so in October the General threw up his command and returned to India. He landed at Calcutta, and went up the Ganges to assume command of the Meerut Division.

In the year 1814 war with the Ghurkas became inevitable, and the Governor-General—Lord Moira—decided to invade their territory from four points. Two columns were to march on Katmandu, while two other columns under Colonel Ochterlony and Major-General Gillespie were to enter the Dera Dun valley and subdue the district of Almora.

On October 15th Gillespie wrote to a friend: "Lord Moira has left in a great measure the movements from my side to myself. I am inclined to think that he will find the present undertaking more arduous and difficult than he imagines, as the country in itself is so difficult of access: every yard is a post, and the Goorkhalees are a very warlike, active people. I shall have to move in several columns, and my force is so small that I fear disaster."

Gillespie entered the Dera Dun valley on October 25th, and three days later he wrote as follows from before the front of Kalanga: "Here I am, with as stiff and strong a position as ever I saw, garrisoned by men who are fighting *pro aris et focis* in my front, and who have decidedly formed the resolution to dispute the fort as long as a man is alive.

"The fort starts on the summit of an almost inaccessible mountain, and covered with an impenetrable jungle; the only approaches commanded, and stiffly stockaded. It will be a tough job to take it; but by the 1st proximo I think I shall have it, *sub auspice Deo*."

On the 29th the General issued detailed instructions for the assault. Among other points he directed officers to tell their men to keep the

Ghurkas at the point of the bayonet owing to their skill with the kukri. The instructions ended with the following paragraph, which is of particular interest in view of what actually happened :—

“When several columns move to given points, officers commanding columns will bear in mind the utility and necessity of timing their march so as to render the attack simultaneous. The effects of several columns moving at once on an object is on most occasions decisive.”

The General decided to attack the fort on the morning of October 31st on three sides. Guns were placed in the batteries on the flat hill to the south of the fort and fire was opened at dawn. It was arranged that five guns should be fired as a signal exactly two hours before the assault was delivered, so as to ensure the three attacks being simultaneous. The signal was fired at 7 a.m.

Before 9 a.m. a party of the enemy made a sortie and attacked the right flank of the main column to the south of the fort. The attack was repulsed, and Gillespie ordered the column to advance at once in the hope of entering the fort on the heels of the retreating enemy. A dismounted party of 100 men of the 8th Royal Irish Light Dragoons led the advance, and forced their way through a stockade which surrounded the village, but they were checked by the walls of the fort. Meanwhile the other columns had not heard the signal, so they did not advance to the attack.

On the supports coming up three companies of the 53rd Foot delivered two attacks, but they were repulsed on both occasions. Major-General Gillespie now entered the stockade, and placed himself at the head of the troops for a supreme effort. The troops advanced again to the attack shortly before noon, but the General was killed within a few yards of the wall, while leading on his men. The attack failed, and the officer who succeeded to the command at once ordered a retreat. The General's body was placed in spirits and taken down to Meerut, where it was buried.

Gillespie's fall before Kalanga ended a career distinguished by a series of remarkable exploits, which recall those of heroes of romance. In the West Indies as in the East his gallantry and skill at arms had enabled him to accomplish the most wonderful achievements. His zeal and energy were as unbounded as his courage. He was a strict disciplinarian, but he was always attentive to the wants of his men, so that the soldiers not only admired his gallantry, but liked him as a commanding officer.

Gillespie did nearly all the hard work during the campaign in Java. At Kalanga his plans for a simultaneous attack came to naught; but, when he had no more reserves to throw into the fight, he cannot be blamed for following the example set by Cromwell at Drogheda and Napoleon at the Bridge of Lodi, and for endeavouring to inspire his men by his personal example, and thus turn defeat into victory.

News travelled slowly a hundred years ago, and on January 1st, 1815, Major-General Gillespie was gazetted a K.C.B. A memorial to

the General was executed by Chantrey and placed in St. Paul's Cathedral, and in 1845 the Freemasons set up a fine statue to him in the centre of the Square at Comber.

HUGH ROBERT ROLLO GILLESPIE.

Cornet	3rd Rgt. of Horse (Carabiniers)	28th April, 1783.
Lieutenant	20th (Jamaica) Rgt. of Lt. Dragoons	25th July, 1792.
Captain	" " " " "	2nd Jan., 1794.
Major	" " " " "	25th Dec., 1796.
Lieut.-Colonel	" " " " "	21st Nov., 1799.
" "	19th Light Dragoons	7th March, 1805.
" "	8th " "	16th April, 1807.
" "	25th " "	5th Jan., 1809.
Colonel		25th Oct., 1809.
Major-General		1st Jan., 1812.
Killed		31st Oct. 1814.
Gazetted K.C.B.		1st Jan., 1815.



THE USE OF SUBMARINE MINES AS AFFECTED BY THE VIIIth HAGUE CONVENTION.

Translated from the *Revista Marittima* of February, 1914.

By LIEUTENANT PIERS K. KEKEWICH, Royal Navy.

Paymaster-in-Chief, G. Larghezza, wrote the paper which follows with a view to explaining the attitude of International Law with respect to the use of mines. The work of the viiith Hague Convention did not result in more than a drawing up of the various headings on which discussion would take place at the next Conference; this is to be deeply deplored, and the paper gives the more exact of laws drawn up by the International Law Society, and further proposes some articles of a still more definite nature. But the main interest of the paper does not lie in its legal aspect, but rather in the clear way it states the various factors which have to be considered by a Government before issuing orders for mine laying to be carried out, when deciding on the areas to be mined, and when choosing the type of mine to be used, when in fact considering how far the exigencies of war may be modified for the benefit of neutrals and commerce in general.

THE use of mines in naval warfare has become a general practice since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Before that mines were used for the defence of coast and ports; the first nation to do this being the Americans of the Northern states in the war of Secession. The Japanese were the first to make use of them in the open sea, and Russians did not wait long before following their example; both felt the dire results.

There are several varieties of mines: electrical observation mines and automatic contact mines. The first are exploded by means of an electric current worked from the shore or a stationary ship. The Hague Convention did not deal with those since they are subject to control, and, even if they parted their moorings and drifted about they would not explode if struck by a ship. Automatic contact mines are so called because they explode on contact with another solid body. They may be divided into three classes: unmoored mines, moored mines, and moving mines (torpedoes).

Unmoored mines are the most dangerous to maritime commerce, for drifting about at the mercy of tides and currents they have a large radius of action, and will be exploded by the first ship that strikes

them. Moored mines have a more limited field of action, as they only present a danger to ships traversing the area in which the mines are moored with suitable anchors. Moving mines (torpedoes) are launched by a special apparatus, exploding on contact, and should they fail to strike, becoming harmless in a very short period by sinking.

Science has made great steps in the construction of these machines, and while their effect is enormous, their cost is quite small.

Their use involves great danger. During the Russo-Japanese War one battleship of each belligerent, the "Petropawlovsk"¹ on 13th April, 1904, outside Port Arthur, and the "Hatsuse" on the 15th of the following month at a distance of ten miles from that Port, struck drifting mines and were destroyed. The actual Russian mine-layer herself, "Yenissei," after having laid 389, was destroyed by the 390th.¹

The great dangers to which international maritime commerce was subjected after the war of 1904 gave all the Powers seriously to think, more especially Great Britain and Japan, who had extensive trade in the Far East. The question could not pass unnoticed at the second Hague Conference of 1907, before which China violently protested at the immense amount of damage caused to her goods and subjects by the floating mines dropped by the Russians and Japanese during their struggle. The Chinese pointed out that though it was three years since the mines were dropped, they were still obliged to provide their coastguards and coasting vessels with means of collecting and destroying the floating mines which threatened not only the high seas but also territorial waters. They further stated that though taking every precaution, a great number of small craft had been destroyed with all their crews, to the horror of the eastern world, and that 500 or 600 Chinese, while carrying out their peaceful occupations, had met a violent death caused by these dangerous machines.²

The burden of drawing up a code to regulate the use of automatic contact mines, which would take due account of not only the principles of humanity and freedom of the sea, but also the interests of the various states, was laid on a Sub-committee composed of jurists and technical men. But from the very first days it became evident that no practical solution could be arrived at, as each delegate sought to obtain that solution which would be most favourable to his own country.

The British delegate proposed that the use of floating automatic contact mines should be absolutely prohibited, and that the laying of moored mines should be subject to the condition that they become harmless if they break adrift; but the other delegates, supporting the motion of Italy, were not of the same opinion.

They considered it advisable not to renounce "a method of warfare which possessed the double advantage of being cheap, and presenting a possible means of escape to a vessel pursued by a stronger force."³

¹ Lawrence, "War and Neutrality in the Far East," pp. 100—101.

² Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, troisieme Commission, annex 15, T. III., p. 663.

³ Deuxieme Conference cit., T. III., p. 518.

The speech of the principal British delegate, Sir Ernest Satow, did not succeed in modifying their views; he pointed out, in the interests of humanity and the freedom of the sea, the grave danger that unmoored mines presented to maritime commerce, and the probabilities of reprisals for damage to neutral trade resulting in war. The delegates of the various nations did not allow themselves to be persuaded, and the German delegate, Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, took upon himself to answer his colleague: "A belligerent," he said, "who lays mines on the high seas assumes the entire responsibility towards neutral powers and peaceful traffic. On that point we are all agreed. No one would have recourse to such an expedient without pressing military necessity. Now military necessity is not the only subject dealt with by international law. There are other factors. Conscience, sound judgment, and the feelings of duty imposed by principles of humanity will be the primary considerations of naval officers, and will give a sure guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I say it proudly, will always be guided by the unwritten laws of humanity and civilization. I have no need to say that I thoroughly realize the importance of codifying the conditions of warfare; but such code must be studiously kept clear of all laws which it may be impossible to observe through stress of circumstances. It is of the greatest importance that the international maritime law, which we would create, should only contain those clauses which it may be possible to observe even in exceptional cases: otherwise international law will be brought into disrepute and its authority will vanish. As for considerations of humanity, I cannot admit that any Government or country is, in this respect, superior to that which I have the honour to represent."¹

The words show the keenness with which the two great naval Powers of Europe, Great Britain and Germany, sought to win the opinion of the Conference to their own point of view. Each of them gave reasons of the first importance, but unfortunately no settlement could be arrived at as neither had any concessions to make, one defending the rights of neutrals, the other defending the rights of belligerents. In other words, stripped of all sentiment, the two views represented the divergent interests with which each nation was particularly concerned.

Great Britain, who in the past has violated the rights of neutrals² and destroyed the commerce of so many peoples, did not wish to recognize any legislation but her own; and now took the initiative³ in uniting the nations in congress with an agreement, which provided for the opposite point of view. For what reasons did Great Britain assume this opposite point of view in questions of maritime law?

Without doubt the answer is found in her new situation among the other nations.

¹ Actes et documents de la deuxième Conference de la Paix, T. 1, p. 282.

² Hautefeuille, Les droits et les devoirs des nations neutres, T. 1, p. 264.

³ Vide letter of Sir E. Grey to His Majesty's representatives at Rome, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, Tokio, Vienna and Washington. Foreign Office, February 27th, 1908.

The British themselves do not hide the fact that they are acting to safeguard their interests. Since about the middle of the nineteenth century, they have had the monopoly of maritime trade and the domination of the sea. To-day in Europe, America and the Far East, there are states which are entering into keen competition with them, and with whom it is as well they should come to an agreement. To-day Great Britain is still the strongest naval power, but there are other considerations, and she cannot look with indifference on the chances of a war, nor indulge in one whenever she finds any state opposed to her. "Our country," says Lord Loreburn,¹ "lives on imports and exports, and if these are interrupted the population will be starved. It is vital to us that our communications be free in time of war, and all our concessions should be made with that object; but can we be sure of always succeeding? It is to our interest to abolish the right of capture and uphold the freedom of commercial navigation so stubbornly refused by us for many centuries."

In these words of wise and prudent advice we find the reasons why Great Britain wishes to eliminate from naval warfare all that may threaten or endanger her naval power and maritime commerce if she found herself placed as belligerent or neutral. The other states, however, were not of the same opinion, and at the second Hague Conference, of 1907, the proposals of Great Britain relative to the reduction of armaments, the restriction of the rights of neutrals (xiiiith Convention), and the prohibition of the use of automatic contact mines were rejected. As regards this last item, the interests of Great Britain were, and are, totally different to those of the other Powers, and any agreement could only have tended to favour those interests.

Without doubt mines do institute a danger alike to peaceful traffic and belligerent ships. All deplored the accidents to peaceful traffic for reasons of humanity and justice, as the British delegate stated, and they did not wish similar accidents to re-occur. But the matter should not be examined solely from this point of view, which, however important, is not the only one; we must study it with due regard to the interests of belligerents. What were these interests at the time when the viiiith Hague Convention was drawn up? On one side Great Britain, possessing a very powerful fleet, and considering herself absolute mistress in all parts of the sea, could not approve of the use of a weapon which might easily cause the destruction of several of her ships; the great European Powers and Japan, on the other hand, did not wish to forbid its use since it offered an excellent defence against a stronger Power. Great Britain, with her proposals for reduction of armaments and abolition of mines, sought to maintain her present superiority which was threatened by the ever-growing forces of other States, who, in their turn, opposed the idea with the intention of having means of defence at hand and being able to exercise, politically and economically, a degree of control over those waters whose freedom is essential to their existence and development. The Italian technical delegate, Commander Castigila, when speaking on the British proposal

¹ "Capture at Sea." Vide review in the R.M. of December, 1913.

to abolish automatic contact mines on the high seas before the Subcommittee assembled on June 27th, 1907, said :—

"How can a Government renounce so efficient a means of securing the safety of its ships? By denying itself this means, surely a Government is laying itself open to certain losses of ships and men at the hands of a stronger enemy. Is not a Government in so doing throwing away the supreme rights of defence of its country?"¹ Such objections, set forth with clearness and sincerity, won the wavering delegates to the view of Italy, founded, as they were, on the recognition of the right of a belligerent to make use of automatic contact mines against an enemy on the high seas. Such were the general principles, the acceptance of which was, without doubt, a victory for the Continental Powers.

Notwithstanding this, it was suggested that some concessions might be made to the peaceful traffic of neutrals whose part Great Britain had taken at the Conference. These concessions were of two natures, legislative and technical. The basis of the first was the agreement to forbid the use of mines with the sole intention of destroying commerce, and the obligation on a belligerent to point out to neutrals mined areas; the second consisted in stipulating that the mines should be so constructed as to become harmless after a very short time, and that those already existing should be reconstructed to conform with this.

These two restrictions were held to guarantee the right of neutrals in maritime war, and to some extent counterbalance the immense freedom allowed to belligerents. Though theoretically exact, the laws were unfortunately not well worded, and their underlying principles pleased neither those who wished unlimited use of mines nor those who wished to restrict the use of special circumstances.

"The viiiith Convention of October 13th, 1907," writes Dupuis, "forbids, but only in theory, the fundamental principle of using contact mines which do not become harmless after a certain period; it forbids the practice of laying of mines outside the enemy's ports or off their coasts with the sole object of establishing a blockade; it gives certain restrictions to limit the danger run by peaceful navigation; it authorizes neutral states to remove the mines from their own coasts; it allowed belligerents, under certain conditions, to lay mines, not only in their own territorial waters, but on the high seas; but though thus restricting the use of mines so as to minimise all danger, the right remains to use the mines so condemned for an indefinite period, thus doing away with the restrictions as to conditions, and the obligations imposed since the contracting powers do not possess a perfected mine, and as they contented themselves with merely imposing the obligation to have their mines altered as soon as possible."²

The contradictions reflected the conflicting interests of the various Powers, who, for reasons of these divergent interests, did not seek

¹ *Premiere seance de la troisieme Commission, T. III., p. 518, op. Cit.*

² *Ch. Dupuis, Le droit de la guerre maritime d'apres les Conferences de la Hague et de Londres, pp. 533, n. 335.*

or wish for a common ground for agreement, as some thought they did. The laws established by the viiith Convention of the Second Peace Conference require large revision and codification. Charles Dupuis writes: "It is much less a code of laws than a ground for future action. Its authors were guided by the highest principles, and they have formally expressed these principles both in the preamble of the Convention and in statements dealing with the duration of the Convention."¹

The short period of seven years, during which the convention was to hold good, indicates the feeling of necessity to return to the discussion as soon as possible. And the proof of it is given by the fact that the obligation assumed by the Powers (Article 12) to re-open the question six months previous to the termination of this period (Article 11), if it had not already been re-opened by the Third Peace Conference, was carried unanimously.

The inherent error which deprived the Convention of any value was the including of restrictions which, as we have already said, could not be practically acted on.

This circumstance did not escape the technical experts, many of whom did not wish to accept the obligations laid on them by several of the conditions of the Conference, principal amongst which were those relating to the perfecting of the mines, a detail which, if even existent in the field of theory, had not yet taken definite shape; and the numerous reservations made by the Powers, particularly the European Powers, were founded on this objection.²

These reservations were fully justified, and time has vindicated the Powers which made them. A cursory examination of the separate articles of the Convention is sufficient to convince one that the laws contained therein lacked a solid basis, for they took no count of the special circumstances in which a belligerent might be placed, nor of the technical difficulties of making a mine to conform with the prescribed conditions.

Article 1 laid down that unmoored automatic contact mines should not be used unless they were constructed so as to become harmless an hour at most after they had been dropped or after control over them had been lost. It is permissible to make certain reservations as to the technical possibilities and the opportunities of exercising a serious control. "This disposition," writes Lawrence,³ "presents a double danger. Moored mines can be, in certain cases, dangerous to peaceful

¹ Ch. Dupuis, *Le droit de la guerre maritime d'après les Conférences de la Hague et de Londres*. Paris, 1912, p. 552.

² First Germany, Russia and Turkey did not accept the wording of the 1st Article on account of the impossibility to construct contact mines which would conform to the required conditions; 2nd, Germany and France would not accept Article 2 on account of its indefiniteness; 3rd, Turkey did not want to include Article 3 as she did not wish to assume responsibilities it was impossible to foresee; 4th, England and Spain made full reservation on all the Articles except Article 12, in which the Powers engaged to study the question afresh.

³ *The International Problem and the Hague Conferences*, pp. 166-7.

traffic. Even if they can be constructed so as to be harmless a certain period after immersion, it is difficult to arrange that they shall become harmless at a given moment after parting their moorings.

Everything depends on the way the phrase "to lose control" is interpreted. Dupuis writes: "When we realize that a score of mines attached to a hawser may be towed by a destroyer or other small vessel, one can see how elastic this phrase may become. A vessel several miles distant on the horizon can neither warn a neutral ship or prevent the mines at the end of the cable from striking her, and yet one could affirm that these mines were under control of the vessel which was towing them since they are attached to her, and, under favourable circumstances, she can change their position."¹

In the same article it is forbidden to use automatic contact mines which do not become harmless when they break adrift. This detail can be arranged for, and it is known that several naval Powers already possess automatic contact mines fulfilling this condition.

Such a provision is the only one which would be of any protection to peaceful navigation, and should be included in the Convention if it were not to be annulled by reservations in the various other articles.² The Japanese delegate, Mr. Tsudzuki, stated at the Hague that the mines used in the Russo-Japanese War by his country were all moored mines, but that the force of the waves, winds, hurricanes and typhoons, had broken them adrift, thus causing the numerous accidents which had produced such a sad impression on the public mind.

We can rely on this statement, nor is there any reason to doubt that the mines used by the Japanese in 1904 were moored mines. It is not possible to say whether the mines which caused the damage were Russian or Japanese, they might have been some of those which broke adrift;³ it is certain that if they were not constructed according to the specifications of the Convention they were just as dangerous as the others.

Though all the States agreed as to establishing that moored mines should be constructed so as to become harmless on breaking adrift, they could not agree as to the waters in which the mines could be used. The Convention did not issue a report despite the fact that the discussions were long and interesting.

England proposed to limit the use of mines to territorial waters and to special cases, as for instance before a fortified port, limiting the distance to ten miles from the shore, and the Convention expressed the desire to forbid the laying of mines in the waters of the enemy, considering the weapon to be one of defence, not offence. These and

¹ Ch. Dupuis, *op. Cit.*, p. 560.

² When drawing up the Convention again, such dispositions will be retained untouched and observed without restriction since they fulfil a high duty to humanity and do not injure the rights of belligerents.

³ At the fifth sitting of the Sub-commission appointed to draw up the Convention, the Japanese delegate, while making the statement as to the use of moored mines only by his country, stated that he was convinced that Russia had also done the same. The Russian delegate did not confirm this statement.

other proposals which intended limiting moored mines to certain areas were rejected; thus a belligerent can make use of mines anywhere, as much in territorial waters as on the high seas. It is true that moored mines cannot be used in waters of great depth; nevertheless their restricted field of action is sufficiently wide and, as Sir E. Satow said, they can be used in the greater parts of the Baltic, North Sea, the Channel, on the Mediterranean coasts, not to mention the Straits of Malacca, the East Indian waters, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Yellow Sea and many others.¹ It is remarkable that while maintaining silence on the essential point, the Convention provided Article 3, giving all precautions necessary for the safety of peaceful traffic after the mines are placed. This clause can have no more value than an expression of goodwill towards neutral commerce. The ultimate aim of a belligerent is to annihilate his enemy, and this purpose must guide him in all his actions, irrespective of the inconvenience and danger he may cause to peaceful traffic, though he will seek to avoid causing such as far as compatible with his strategy. War has its own imperious demands; belligerents find themselves during its various operations in a state of great nervous tension and it is impossible on account of the danger and anxiety caused by the placing of mines to consider all the precautions. Mine laying in itself is an operation fraught with danger, and the mine layer is open to attacks from his enemy in the same way as other ships, and cannot even take the usual precautions for the safety of those carrying out the operation.

But, admitting that precautions are possible, in what do they consist? And allowing such a precaution is mechanically practical, after how long should a mine become harmless? The Convention says "a limited time."

Such a phrase is very elastic, it has a relative value and can have any interpretation put on it which suits the convenience of the Power which placed the mine. Besides this, according to the Convention, belligerents are only under the obligation that their mines become harmless after a certain time, *within the measure of possibility*; this clause annuls all precautions, and was given birth to by the uncertainty of making such a mine, thus affording a very uncertain guarantee to peaceful traffic.

Nor is the obligation imposed on belligerents to inform neutral states of the presence of mines in certain areas of much greater value. In order that the warning may be of use it must be given beforehand, which is precluded since the obligation only holds *when military exigencies permit*. Warning to navigation, which should be made through the diplomatic channels, is impossible, and can only be given after accidents have happened.

Besides this such warning has but a limited value, for it is possible that some mines, States having been authorized to use the old model for an indefinite period, will break adrift, carrying danger and death outside the mined area.

¹ Conference Internationale de la Paix, T. III., p. 380.

The wording of Article 2 is not much happier; it prohibits the laying of automatic contact mines before the coasts and ports of an enemy with the sole design of interrupting his peaceful traffic. This clause contains a factor which, as the German delegate stated, is not met with in any of the other Conventions, and which would give rise to considerable difficulties in its application; the belligerent is the only person in a position to judge the purpose with which he laid mines off an enemy's port. Maybe the authors of Article 2 wished to preclude the possibility of a blockade by mines only. It would be a most effective and cheap blockade, but no one would ever dream of making use of it, still less since the violent and constant strife on the subject of blockades was settled in the Declaration of Paris of April 16th, 1856. Maybe they wished to prohibit the mining of commercial ports when these were not naval bases. This would seem the most logical conclusion, but we are bound to remark that this is one of the fundamental principles to be observed with reference to neutrals and belligerent ports with the only restrictions imposed by blockade and the measures against contraband.

Besides this, belligerents must consider carefully before they dislocate neutral commerce without good reason. It is assumed that they will close, by means of mines, one or two commercial ports which could be used as bases of operations or supplies, but in this case they would be making use of a lawful method of war against their enemy and not against commerce, with which latter no one nowadays can be permitted to interfere.

Applying the letter of the article, its unfortunate phraseology gives an opportunity to avoid the Declaration of Paris and London, since a belligerent, in mining a commercial port of the enemy, can always state he had strategical reasons, which are easy to invent, and that he had no designs on peaceful traffic.

If this was allowed the fictitious blockade of unhappy memory would be revived. Fortunately the Declaration of London of 1909 is so exact in its definition of real and effective blockade as presented by the Convention of Paris of April 16th, 1856, that all doubt is eliminated.

The authors of the Convention seem to have been above all intent on laying down laws which would favour both sides. Thus, after an article conceding a definite point of a belligerent, an article will follow making restrictions in favour of a neutral with reference to the same point, and making a fresh concession to him. This theory of equilibrium and compensation also pervaded the Second Hague Conference. An example of this is Article 4, which gives neutrals the same rights as belligerents as regards mines.

To-day it is recognized that neutrals have a right to take any steps they may consider necessary to defend their neutrality against possible violation, or their territory against threatened invasion.

Mines are the best way of preserving neutrality of any portion of the sea, and thus their use is justified. But up to what distance from their coast should neutrals lay them, and what description of

mines may they use? By Article 4 any neutral Power which lays automatic contact mines must observe the same regulations and take the same precautions as a belligerent.

This article does not answer those questions, and we must turn to the general principles of maritime law for a solution: that is, a neutral may only lay mines within three miles of his coasts or in his own territorial waters.

Article 5, which imposes the obligation on belligerents of weighing the mines they have laid, is incontestable.

Such a clause should be included whenever the new Convention is drawn up. The same regulation laid down with reference to automatic contact mines that every State, on being shown the position of such mines by the State who laid them, should weigh those in her own waters.

The article which has been most severely criticised is Article 6, which, in its own words annuls the very benefits which, after long and laborious discussion, were conceded to neutrals, with reference to the construction of mines. "The Powers who have not yet mines at their disposal which fulfil the requirements of the Convention, and who are thus unable to conform with the obligations laid on them by Articles 1 and 3, are to transform those mines they already possess so as to carry out these obligations as soon as possible." This article is deserving of further explanation.

Great Britain wished for laws of the Convention to be put into force without delay. Russia stated that there did not seem to be a mine, nor did it seem possible to make one to conform with the requirements of the Convention, nor could she give up altogether the use of the mine which was at present in use. She asked that in any case a certain time might be given to the governments to put the new model into service. Japan suggested three years for this period, and Austria opposed it.

In Austria's memorial,¹ Vice-Admiral Hans observed that Austria-Hungary, not possessing mines which accorded with the Convention would have hers altered, but the possibility of this alteration was uncertain; indeed, not only theoretical but also practical difficulties might be encountered. Besides which, in order that the change in construction might not be detrimental to the offensive power of the mine, considerable experience would be required in its handling and construction. In the event of war, previous to the old material having been replaced, Austria-Hungary would find before her the choice of falling back on her old resources or infringing the laws of the Convention; two circumstances to be avoided.

The reasoning of the Austro-Hungarian delegate was so fair and just that no one dared refute it. Thus in approving of Article 6 the Powers were freed from all obligation as to the use of the improved mine, and authorized, without limit of time, to use those which they possessed previous to the Convention.

¹ Rapport de M. Streit. Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, T. III., p. 422.

To what avail then are all the discussions, the regulations and precautions in favour of neutrals under the viiith Convention. Have all the signatory states agreed to alter their mines?

The Hague Convention dealing with automatic contact mines, established some fundamental principles, but solved no problems. Perhaps with the good intentions of the Powers and by making mutual concessions from a common point of agreement, something more important might be arrived at. But from what point of agreement can they start?

Mines are an economical form of protection for the coasts of weak naval powers, and also are a useful weapon of defence in the hands of the strong.

M. Meurer, Member of the Institute of International Law, writes :— Mines are means of damaging a stronger Power which weaker Powers cannot lightly discard, and in some circumstances afford the only means by which a ship chased may protect herself. The interests of neutrals are sufficiently well looked after by the precautions which should be taken to ensure the safety of peaceful traffic.¹ To-day several British writers recognize that the mine is an arm which the greater part of the maritime powers cannot forswear. Carefully used it can render invaluable service at a very small cost. They are for the small states a reply to "Dreadnoughts." If it were possible to build a ship so well protected and of such speed that it could lay mines and fire torpedoes with a degree of safety, we should then have a real menace to the "Dreadnoughts," and possibly a reason for stopping their ever-increasing tonnage.

For such reasons the use of mines should be permitted. What is then required is to draw up a code to prevent their abuse, such code being founded on the practical and technical requirements of the question. If belligerents have the right to make use of such murderous weapons of offence and defence it must not be forgotten on the other hand that neutral and peaceful states cannot be made the unwilling victims of war. This is an outstanding principle of humanity. All States should, therefore, try and avoid the means of conflict between belligerents and neutrals, and, therefore, should endeavour to find a common basis on which a Convention suiting both sides of the question may be founded. We must remember that the complaints as to the damage caused by mines during and after the Russo-Japanese War were made by China, whose voice remained unheeded as she had not the strength behind her to lend weight to her arguments and as she was so far from the Western world. What would be the effect of the loss of a neutral merchant ship—British or German—in our waters?

By 31st December, 1912, the viiith Convention had been ratified by all the Powers except Russia. The ratifications were given with a certain amount of reserve on several Articles. Great Britain placed a reserve on the whole of the Convention, and it is to the point to record her declaration. "In affixing their signatures to the Convention

¹ *Annuaire de l'Institut* 1912, p. 333.

the British plenipotentiaries declare that His Britannic Majesty's Government do not on account of a simple prohibition of this or that act or procedure, deny themselves the right to contest the legitimacy of such act or procedure": which means that, notwithstanding the principles of the Convention Great Britain reserves to herself the right of intervention for and the safeguarding of her own interests.

The Institute of International Law after a lively criticism of the various laws prescribed by the Hague Convention, drew up a few months later (9th August, 1913), at the Session of Oxford, the following rules to be included in the Manual of Maritime Law:—¹

Article 20. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines on the high seas, whether moored or unmoored.

Article 21. Belligerents may lay mines in their own territorial waters or in those of the enemy.

But even in their own territorial waters it is forbidden to—

1st. To lay unmoored automatic contact mines unless they are so constructed as to become harmless at most one hour after the persons laying them have ceased to have control.

2nd. To lay moored automatic contact mines which do not immediately become harmless on breaking adrift.

Article 22. A belligerent may not lay mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy for the purpose of naval or military operations. It is forbidden to lay them with the object of establishing or maintaining a commercial blockade.

Article 23. Whenever moored or unmoored automatic contact mines are laid all precautions for the safety of peaceful traffic are to be taken.

Belligerents providing as far as possible that mines shall become harmless after a short time.

In cases where mines have ceased to be under control the belligerents will communicate the dangerous area as far as military necessities permit, by means of a Notice to Mariners forwarded through the diplomatic channel to the various governments.

Article 24. At the end of the war the late belligerents will do all they can to weigh, each in his own waters, the mines he has laid.

In the case of automatic contact mines which have been laid by one belligerent in the waters of another, such laying shall be notified to the other party by the State which has laid them, and each State will proceed in the shortest possible time to weigh the mines she may find in her own waters.

Belligerent States, on whom is incumbent the obligation of weighing mines after the war should, as early as possible, announce when such operation is completed.

This code, which, as a whole, differs considerably from that drawn up by the Institute in 1911 and 1912 at the Sessions of Madrid and

¹ Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, December, 1913, p. 681.

Christiania, contains laws which though less ambiguous and contradictory than those of the Hague Conferences, are not above criticism. Several of the illustrious members of the authorized Convention did not wish to approve of some of the rules: amongst these Article 20, dealing with the prohibition of laying unmoored automatic contact mines on the high seas, barely obtained a majority of votes in its favour.

Article 20 had its origin from the British proposal made at the Second Hague Conference which was rejected by the Powers in 1907 for reasons fully explained above. Is it to be thought that the Powers would accept to-day, when torpedoes and mines have reached so much greater a degree of perfection and are considered as important an arm as artillery, the clause they rejected but a few years previous?

The question in 1914 remains the same as the question of 1907.

But should a solution be so difficult to find? The attempt could do no harm, and the author of this paper, though approaching the task with great diffidence, wishes to lay before students of the legal and technical aspect a few principles which may serve as a starting point for a new Convention which will respect both rights of belligerents and neutrals.

Article 1.—*Unmoored automatic contact mines.* Belligerents may use this type both on the high seas and in territorial waters, provided such use is in the theatre of war and during actual or imminent action. The mines are to be constructed so that they become harmless at most six hours' after immersion in the sea.

Article 2.—*Moored automatic contact mines.* Belligerents may use this description of mine in their respective territorial waters so long as the mines are so constructed as to become harmless on breaking adrift. A belligerent may only lay these mines in the waters of his enemy before ports of shelter and bases of operations and supply within the meaning of Article 34 of the Declaration of London.

Neither these mines, or any other description of mines, may be used to establish a blockade.

Belligerents are under the obligation of informing neutral Powers and mariners the areas in their own waters and those of the enemy which have been mined.

Article 3.—*Electric observation mines.* Neutrals are forbidden to use automatic contact mines, moored or unmoored. They can only make use of electric observation mines for the defence of their neutrality, and those are to be confined to their territorial waters.

¹ The period of one hour laid down by the viiith Convention is insufficient. "If a naval force," says Admiral Siegel, "realizes it is chased and wishes to make use of unmoored mines to check the advance of the enemy, the period of one hour renders them as means of defence ineffective and useless, since the pursuer may, by means of his light cruisers or other arms, discover mines have been laid. In such a case all danger can be avoided by altering course and waiting an hour before passing the mined area." The period of six hours seems to be sufficient. The technical experts can increase or diminish it as required as this does not affect the principle involved.

With the exception of those which are subject to special convention, neither belligerents nor neutrals may lay automatic contact mines, moored or unmoored, in a strait which connects two areas of open sea, or the open sea with an enclosed area. Electric observation mines are the only description which can be used in such a case.

Article 4. Towns of a belligerent, whose ports and coasts are defended by mines cannot be considered undefended in the meaning of the viith Hague Convention dealing with bombardment by a naval force.

Article 5. The International Arbitration Court sitting at the Hague will be competent to assess the damages caused by a belligerent from not carrying out the clauses of the present Convention.¹

¹ The clauses would be supplemented by others of secondary importance relating to the exigencies of war and the requirements of maritime commerce. Nevertheless, though they fully comply with the various and diverse opinions expressed at the Hague, this cannot give them weight, and they must be discussed and modified. It is not the object of this paper to perform the difficult task of solving the problem, but of directing the attention of students and publicists to this grave question.

G. LAGHEZZA,

Paymaster-in-Chief, R.M.



LETTERS BY COLONEL CAILLAUD AND MAJOR CARNAC

WRITTEN TO COLONEL EYRE COOTE, THEN IN
MADRAS, DESCRIBING THE OPERATIONS IN BENGAL
IN 1760 AND 1761.

From Colonel (then Major) Caillaud, received on the 5th May, 1760:—

"The first opportunity after my arrival at Calcutta I had the honour of writing to you and informed you that I was shortly to join the Nabob with a detachment, in order to proceed towards Patna, which province the Shahzadah had again entered with a considerable force. When you were at Patna, Sir, the Shahzadah's father, Alum Geér, was on the throne of Delly. But the same hand that raised him to that dignity (Vizier Gawge Zadin Cawn)¹ thought proper to depose him about four months ago, and deprived him of his life and of his throne. He raised in his stead a daughter's child of his, and had him crowned Mogul by the name of Shah Jahan. The Shahzadah, on the news of his father's death, declares himself also king by the name of Allum Shah. One would think two competitors for a throne were enough to distract a kingdom, but fortune, as if pleased to increase the confusion of this unhappy empire, hath thought proper to raise there a third. A very short time after the election of Shah Jahan, Abdallah, at the head of the Patans, enters the Province of Delly, and gains a complete victory over the Mogul and his Vizier, drives them both out of the capital and causes his son to be crowned by the name of Adill Shah. However, if the news of yesterday be true, this revolution hath not been of long duration. Advices are come that the Vizier, with a fresh army of Morattoes, hath beat the Patans, retaken Delly, and rupees are again struck in the name of Shah Jahan. This, Sir, will give you an idea of the distracted state of this mighty empire, and I will now return to the affairs of these provinces, which I assure you have their share in the general confusion.

"I began my march with the young Nabob from Muxadabad about the middle of January. Ramnarain, the Suba of Patna, whom you will know, according to his old Gentoo custom, suffered the Prince by his delay to be joined by a number of rajahs in the province, and gave him also an opportunity of tampering with his own people, who were ill-paid and consequently ill-affected. Both their armies lay for a long time near each other, but as we were then marching up with all

¹ Ghazi-u-din.

expedition I recommended to Ramnarain, since he had so long put off fighting with the Prince, not to risque an engagement, but wait for our arrival. The Rajah, however, as if resolved to act diametrically opposite to all advice, when we were within ten days' march of him offers the Prince battle, fought him, and, by the treachery of part of his army and the want of courage in most, was totally routed. Fortunately for him a battalion of Seapoys, which was left with him last year, brought him off though much wounded. The battle was fought near Bicuntpoor, about 15 coss from Patna, at which place he arrived safe about 9 o'clock the same night. The Prince, after his victory, marched immediately to that city, but what through fear of our Seapoys and Ramnarain's negotiations, the time protracted until, by forced marches, I got so near the Prince that he was obliged to leave the city and think of meeting us.

"I am ashamed after your successes¹ to mention ours, for though we gained a complete victory we continued to make so bad a use of it by our delays that we have given time to the Prince to recover the blow, who is likely now to give us as much trouble as ever. I arrived about the 19th ultimo at Colladera. A nulla divided the two armies, then about four coss from each other, and thus I remained until the 22nd, for I could make no motion without the Nabob's astrologers consenting to it. That day they gave us leave at last, and we made a motion and crossed the nuller (sic). This brought us within three miles of each other. I did not intend attacking him that day, but the next morning early. However, we had no sooner passed the nuller but the Prince struck his tents and marched to attack us. We knew for certain that they intended to make a push at the young Nabob, I therefore had desired him to take post in my rear, and that when we had broke the enemy's line, which I was pretty certain we should do, I would open for him and his horse to pursue the blow. This he promised to do, but when the army formed, instead of coming into my rear he took his post on my right. By this time the enemy's horse advanced so fast that a motion of my whole body became dangerous; for besides this party which was coming down on the Nabob, there was another large body on my left. The party on the Nabob attacked with the greatest intrepidity, and he for some time stood the shock pretty well, but being wounded and turning his elephant—which in plain English is running away—the whole army in an instant were following his example. Luckily for him, however, I brought up the battalion of Seapoys which was on our right, with which I flanked that body of horse which made the attack. The first fire threw them into confusion, and that repeated fairly set them a running. The Nabob's Duan, Rajah Bullap, who was in the rear and not yet seized with the panick, came up to support his master and pursued the run-aways, and thus ended the battle of Seerpore, with the loss of about 500 killed and wounded on both sides, and 19 pieces of cannon, etc., which we took in the field. The pursuit would have been much more close and effectual could the Nabob have joined in it, but this could not be on

¹ In allusion to Coote's victories at Wandewash and Arcot, etc.

account of two scratches which he had received from arrows, and which he was then pleased to think were very dreadful wounds.

"The Prince retreated that night to Bahaar. In vain were all my solicitations with the Nabob (since he could not follow them himself) to give me a body of horse joined with my own detachment to have marched after him. But this his pride would not permit, being jealous of my getting more reputation than himself. Joined to this, the natural eastern indolence made him think that he had done enough, and that it was impossible the Prince could ever make head again; and so we set out for the dancing girls of Patna. However, to my great satisfaction, this scheme of pleasure and idleness was soon overset. The Prince collected together his scattered army again, and gave out his intention of once more trying his fortune in the field against us. This persuaded the Nabob to move, and another march we expected would have brought on a second engagement, but in this we were deceived. The Prince, instead of meeting us, made a forced march of near 30 miles in one day eastward of Bahaar. By this he got into the road which leads through the hills into the Province of Bengal. We are following of him as fast as we can. He, however, greatly out-marches us, having neither cannon or baggage. The old Nabob is ready to receive him at the head of a numerous army in which, by the by, I believe the Prince has many friends, who would soon declare themselves were it not for the detachment of our troops under Captain Spear. This last push of the Prince, however, is a bold and judicious one, but must end, I think, in his ruin. I own I pity his fortune and could wish our arms were employed against anybody else."

From the same, dated Muxadavad, the 5th September, 1760 :—

"To endeavour as nearly as in my power to gratify your request of being acquainted with the progress of our operations in Bengal, intimated to me in your favour of the 9th July last, is the particular purpose of this my address to you. My last letter, I think, brought our army in pursuit of the Shahzadah beyond the mountains, which divide the Kingdom of Bengal to the southward from the suba-ship of Bahaar. He got the start of us several days' march (his forces consisting principally of horse), constant in his design to penetrate into the Province of Bengal. We continued to follow him into a country ever before deemed impassable to any army from the number of close woods and narrow passes, which often rendered our motions extremely difficult. The passage of one pass, in particular, detained the Prince so long that we arrived in the encampment which he had quitted but two days before. The regularity of our march having carried us through in a much shorter time. The interval, likewise, spent in this transaction, forwarded our advice to Muxadavad, and enabled the old Nabob to collect his army, sustained by 200 Europeans from Fort William, and to march out for the defence of his capital. The Prince advanced towards the city on the side of Burdawan about three days before us, and was there joined by a party of Marattas. Either from irresolution or from some dissension among his commanders, perhaps not finding his cause so warmly espoused in the province as he at first expected, or

from whatever motives, he certainly committed a capital error in hesitating to attack the old Nabob immediately and while the armies were divided. This delay at once completely ruined his design, so masterly concerted, and till then with so much steadiness pursued. By continued and forced marches we threw ourselves between him and the city, and a few days afterwards the two Nabobs formed a junction of their armies near to Cutivah. Our forces, thus united, advanced to constrain the Prince to retire from Burdawan. Five days after the enemy were descried encamped on the opposite bank of the Damoodah, a river which runs close to Burdawan. It being previously determined to engage them, the van of the English were preparing immediately to ford the river under cover of their cannon, but the Prince, observing this disposition, spared them the trouble of completing it, after half-an-hour's cannonading, by setting fire to his camp and retreating with precipitation. His expectation of entering the metropolis being for once entirely defeated, he was not disposed to hazard a battle to attempt it a second time, a risk much too considerable. Respecting the inequality of numbers, he preferred the more prudent alternative, and withdrew from the province by the same track over the mountains. After this it was naturally conjectured, and was realized in the sequel, that on his return to Bahaar he would make another push at Patna before we could replace those succours for its relief which had been withdrawn to reinforce our army. Attentive to this, a detachment of 200 choice Europeans, one battalion of Seapoys, and two field pieces were formed under the command of Captain Knox, with instructions to hasten to the defence of Patna with the utmost expedition. The remainder of our army, together with the Nabob's, being exceedingly harassed, and spent with the length and fatigue of their late expedition, were ordered to Muxadavad to quarters of refreshment. Captain Knox pursued his route to Patna, which he completed in 13 days (300 miles), having crossed the Ganges twice in that space. Some time before he arrived the Prince had invested the town. The two preceding days there had been made two general assaults. Parties of Mr. Law's people forced into the place, but were driven out again, chiefly by the timely assistance given by a few of our Seapoys with an officer, who had been left for the security of our factory. On the third night they were also preparing for an escalade on all sides, when Captain Knox with a flying party arrived in the evening. His presence so much animated the inhabitants and dispirited the besiegers, that though they persisted in their intent, they were, without great difficulty, repulsed. The remainder of Knox's detachment joined him soon after. He early in the morning treated them with a well-conducted and spirited sally, engaged with success against one of their principal commanders, and drove them entirely from their attacks, to which they never afterwards returned. The Prince, perceiving all his endeavours ineffectual, drew off his troops from before the place, and resumed his old station on the banks of the Soane, near to which he has continued ever since. This is the third time Patna has been thus critically preserved, within a few hours of being lost. While the fate of Patna was depending above, Candim Hossein Khan, a Rajah of Pyrneah, from an ancient and irreconcilable

animosity subsisting between the young Nabob and him, and from recent quarrels with the father, determined to divest himself of all allegiance to his master and attach himself to the Shahzadah, for which purpose he was then levying a large army and collecting a number of boats, with intention to cross the Ganges and join him. To prevent this junction was now our more immediate view. All the troops about Muxadavad were immediately ordered to re-assemble. In a few days they rendezvoused at Rajamaul, where we learnt that Candim Hossein Khan had begun his march. While we pushed up to Patna, Captain Knox, with the detachment he commanded there, crossed over the river and laid in wait to intercept him or in any manner to harass and distress his march. At Ponnarac the boats of the enemy, unable to proceed so fast as their army, fell into our hands. The Seapoys who attacked them met with very little resistance. They were all burnt, together with a large quantity of stores and ammunition. Notwithstanding this loss, Candim Hossein Khan advanced on until he approached near the place where Captain Knox lay with his party. Sensible that his joining the Prince depended entirely on his passing Knox, and knowing the least delay would bring us close in his rear, he resolved to dislodge Knox from his post. He attacked him and a very warm action ensued. Captain Knox with 200 Europeans, one battalion of Seapoys, five pieces of cannon and about 300 horse, maintained himself for six hours, opposed to an army of above 12,000 men with 30 pieces of cannon. He was totally surrounded near the whole time, but being possessed of an excellent post and making a skilful disposition, he at length compelled them to quit the field with the loss of eight pieces of cannon, three elephants, and between two and three hundred men killed on the spot. By this victory he was prevented any further progress towards the Prince. He was obliged to fly up into the country, and took the road to the Province of Butteach. Three days after this the young Nabob's and our army crossed the river and relieved Knox, who returned to his garrison at Patna.

"Candim Hossein Khan still retreating we set out after him. He was very much encumbered with heavy baggage, bearing away with him the accumulated treasure of many years' rapine. We soon came in sight of his rear. When he found us so near, he formed his army ready to engage. The same was done on our side and, pressing forward to attack, a mutual cannonading was begun. The enemy by frequent motions along their line, appeared inclinable to make a charge on us with their horse, but on our continuing to advance nearer, we found the whole was intended to amuse us in front, while they unloaded the treasure and other valuable effects in the rear, and conveyed it away upon elephants and camels. After drawing them from two or three villages on their left, they abandoned the field, the remainder of their cannon (22 pieces) all their empty hackries and some heavy baggage. The Nabob, during the whole time of this skirmish, kept with his whole army above a mile in our rear looking on, left our flanks entirely exposed; nor ever once offered to attack them, or even to pursue them when they had fled. By his inactivity they got off and the night favoured their escape. We, ourselves, after a few hours' refreshment,

hastened to pursue him. The road of his flight was scattered over for several miles with baggage, etc., they spoil and left behind. The pursuit was prosecuted for four days, and we had the greatest probability of coming up with him soon after, and were disappointed in our designs by a very singular and uncommon incident. The young Nabob, as he lay sleeping in his tent about midnight, was suddenly struck dead in the midst of a most violent storm by a flash of lightning. As I had the most timely information of his disease, I was fortunate enough to prevent that immediate succession of bad consequences I had at first expected from it. Far from thinking of any further pursuit of Candim Hossein Khan, I was now full sufficiently employed in keeping the Nabob's army together, who after the loss of their leader (as is commonly the case in this country), threatened immediate separation. With the assistance of some principal Jemmidars, more particularly attached to our interest, and with much pains and difficulty, I happily accomplished my aims. Had the troops dispersed the province must inevitably have fallen to the Shahzadah. At once, to keep them in the disposition I had brought them to, and to prevent any further accidents, I hurried back to Patna. The season, indeed, in a few days more would have compelled me to this step, the rains being set in some time before with excessive violence, and the waters rising to a great height over the country. Having conducted the two armies to Patna, the campaign was terminated by distributing them into winter quarters. The Shahzadah is still hovering about the Soane, and I hope the next campaign will be something more decisive with him. Advice of another battle between the Vizier and Abdallah is daily expected. The former (who is again in possession of Delly) is assisted by the Marattas and the Jautts. Sujah Dowlatt and the Ruellahs support Abdallah. The van of both armies are composed of an immense number of men. With us Cossim Ali Khan has succeeded to the titles and dignity of the late young Nabob, and has the command of the army. He is son-in-law to the old Nabob. We shall enter the field again very early, and I promise myself that by the end of another campaign everything on this side India will be adjusted agreeable to both the expectations of the Company and to our utmost wishes. . ."

From Major John Carnac, received on the 12th April, 1761:—

"By the recall of Colonel Caillaud, who left Patna the last day of December, 1760, the command of the army and the management of the affairs of this province devolved upon me.

"At the time of my receiving this charge the Shahzadah was in peaceable possession of considerable part of the province, and collecting its revenue within 15 coss of Patna. His followers were greatly increased by his having kept his ground so long, and from a kind of veneration which people of all castes here have for him as being the King's son. The Nabob's troops were almost outrageous on account of the immense arrears due to them. Colonel Caillaud had been necessitated to enter into engagements with them on the part of the Nabob, which the latter did not fulfil, and as the Colonel was gone, from whom, in consequence of his engagement, they

had some hopes of relief, they grew almost desperate. To appease this ferment was the first difficulty I had to encounter, and which I found the harder to surmount as there is no reasoning against hunger; and they had really so much justice on their side that I could not think of proceeding to extremities with them. I represented to them the necessity of removing from the neighbourhood of Patna by laying before them how little their circumstances would be improved by remaining there, yet might be repaired by the fortune of a battle; that by refusing to accompany me, they must inevitably forfeit all future claim to the Nabob, their master's favour, and consequently all the wages due to them. But this reasoning, though evidently calculated for their advantage, as much as the nature of the situation would admit, was ineffectual. Finding so little success in this way, and there being an almost absolute necessity of our moving towards the Shahzadah in order to stop his progress, I was determined to make a march, and was in hopes this step would draw them away also, but being under apprehensions for the city of Patna in case of their continuing behind me, I was obliged to leave for the protection of the city more Seapoys than I could well spare. The event fully justified my expectations, and this single motion effected what all my arguments and entreaties had solicited in vain, for their fears instantly catching the alarm, and dreading the approach of the enemy while the English troops were separated from them, they soon after struck their camp and followed us. To give them as little time as possible for recollection, I marched away the next morning, and continued my route till we arrived very near the enemy. Not that I placed any confidence in their support or reliance on their attachment; on the contrary, I had so much reason to doubt their fidelity, having a certainty that most, if not all, their Jemmatdars were in actual correspondence with the Shahzadah, as to be obliged to bestow as great a part of my attention on their motions as on those of the Prince.

"Such was my situation when the day long expected arrived that we were to meet the enemy, who appeared on the 15th January on the banks of the Suan, a river which runs about three coss west of Patna. Under cover of our cannon we immediately crossed in the face of and without any opposition from the enemy, who retired to the distant shelter of some banks and ditches, left a clear passage, and thus missed the fairest opportunity that could have offered to take us at a disadvantage and while our troops were divided by the water. Though I had at first determined to cross, yet my surmise that some treachery might be attempted by the Nabob's troops confirmed me in my resolution, for had the enemy attacked us in that situation as I expected, the intervention of the river would have secured my rear from any ill designs of those suspected allies. When the guns and ammunition had passed the river we formed and hastened to drive them from their intrenchment, which, on our approach, they instantly abandoned, and retreated to another, equally tenable with the former, had they been resolute to defend it. But this, too, they quitted as we advanced, and were also driven from a third before they made any stand, and drew up in some order upon the plain. We still kept moving forwards,

cannonading as we marched, and expected the moment when their horse would begin the charge, but a lucky ball from a twelve pounder killing the driver of the elephant on which the Shahzadah was mounted, the beast, deprived of his guide, turned about and conveyed his rider, and consequently the whole Rissalah with him, into the rear. As I perceived some accident had very much disconcerted them, I thought I could never have a more favourable moment, I therefore ordered the line to move up briskly, and the artillery being served with uncommon activity and success during that time, the enemy first began to recoil, and presently after turned their backs and fled in great disorder. While this was transacting, the Nabob's troops were busied in passing the river. The pursuit of the enemy continued about four miles and deprived them of part of their baggage. When at length coming near enough to observe the French troops (were) brought up and endeavoured to cover their rear, I determined at all events to make an effort at them, that their escape at least might be prevented with the rest. The guns were, therefore, dropped behind under the guard of a battalion of Seapoys, and with the Europeans and the remainder of the Seapoys I made a push at Mr. Law. The French played six pieces of artillery upon us as we advanced, but being levelled too high the balls fled over us. Our Europeans, much to their credit, marched up to and passed these guns with shouldered arms. The French battalion fell into disorder and broke before our musquetry could reach them. Not a shot was fired on our side, nor did we lose a single man. Mr. Law, with several of his officers and about fifty men were then taken and the remainder some time afterwards surrendered.

"By the fatigue of our people and the inactivity of the Nabob's troops, who, spite of all my pressing instances, absolutely refused to pursue, the affair was not so decisive as it might have been had these troops done their duty; and the Prince with his army retired in safety beyond Bahar. I allowed him, however, no further respite than was absolutely necessary for the relief of our own people, but followed him the morning immediately succeeding the battle. The Prince moved off with as much expedition as he could, and taking the high road by the Ganges side, marched upwards with intent, as I surmised, to proceed by Patna to the Soane. I therefore quitted his track, and by crossing the country turned him again to the southward, and persisting to press close upon him oftentimes found the fires of his camp still burning; so that in a very little time his army was reduced (retreating through a country they had before laid desolate) to the utmost distress for subsistence. In this extremity, being deprived of every resource, the Shahzadah now condescended to propose overtures of an accommodation, and to this purpose dispatched on the 29th January his Buxy, Fazizooly Chan, as his ambassador, to know what were the conditions he must submit to. As I was not sufficiently authorized to treat, and chose to wait for full powers from Fort William before I engaged in any direct negotiation, I took upon me no more than to insist, as a preliminary demand, on the immediate dismission of Komgar Chan, which, if the Prince chose to comply with and would afterwards retire to the Soane, I promised to follow him no further than Mohobolipoor,

where I would attend the Council's instructions; that Ramnarain would undertake to subsist him till their answer arrived, and with this reply I dismissed the ambassador. In the interim my marches were rather quickened than delayed, so that on the 2nd February we were within a few hours of surprising him in his camp. On our advancing so unexpectedly upon him, he sent back his ambassador requesting me to halt, but as I would by no means consent thereto he moved off very fast himself, nor stopped until he got near twelve coss. This precipitate march of ours had the proper effect in accelerating the Prince's compliance with the proposals I made to him by his ambassador, and obliged him to assent to all and even more than I had desired, for he not only dismissed Komgar Chan, but offered, whenever I would permit him, to repair to the English camp. Accordingly on the 6th February, after an interview at about a coss distance from our camp, he reposed so much confidence in me as to pay me a visit at my quarters, where I took occasion to make him sensible how incapable I was to act treacherously by him, and that he had nothing to dread on the part of the English, who had much respect for his person and the illustrious race he was descended from; and in the course of my conference he appeared so well satisfied of the sincerity of my professions, that he declared he had no other reason to alledge for wishing to return to his camp but to convince his people of the injustice of their suspicions regarding the safety of his person; after which he took his leave and went away. The next morning I sent a gentleman to him on my part, and all matters being adjusted between us that day, he confided in the assurances I gave him for the security of his life, honour and maintenance, and on the succeeding day his camp was united to ours. The allowance I agreed to pay him was one thousand rupees per day to be defrayed by the Nabob.

"Having so far accomplished my aim, my next care was to get the Prince as soon as I could to Patna, and in consequence of this I left a detachment of Europeans and Seapoys with all the Nabob's troops for the preservation of the country about Behar, and with the remainder began my march for the city, which I reached without anything material occurring in that interval. On the 14th February our troops encamped close to the west gate and (I) fixed the quarters of the Prince at Bockey-poor, three coss west of the town. From that time till the 20th I was in daily expectation of the Prince's taking up his residence in the city as he had promised, and which he was prevented from doing by his people, who, being unacquainted with our manners, and judging of us from the Indostan genius (?), concluded he would be cut off. Four or five days were spent in endeavouring to show them the injustice and absurdity of their fears and to remove them; but finding I did not succeed, and imagining they must be trifling with me, and that he had no intention to come into the city, I was at last reduced to the necessity of acquainting his Buxy that I thought his master's delays argued a diffidence in me that I had not merited, that I was resolved not to see the Prince again unless it was in Patna, and that till that day I would stop all his former allowances. This menace had the desired effect, for the same night he requested without further hesitation

that his principal eunuch might be admitted into the city to prepare the apartments for his reception, and the next day he made his publick entry, accompanied by about three hundred Mogul horse, besides his attendants. The utmost care was taken to prevent too many of his people from entering with him, and he immediately repaired to the Kella, where he has resided ever since.

"From the time of the Shahzadah's coming over to us, and particularly on our first visits to him in the city, he incessantly solicited our publick acknowledgment of him as King of Indostan by causing the Cootba to be read and Siccas to be coined in his name, a distinction which he affirmed would contribute more than any other circumstance to promote his cause; for the reputation of support from so powerful a nation as the English would give spirit to his partizans, fix the wavering, and engage many to take up arms in his favour. The scantiness of his allowance was another subject of discontent to him, and as both Mr. Macguire and myself considered it very inadequate to his wants and dignity, we ventured on our own authority to add 300 rupees per day. The Prince, to convince us of the reasonableness of his expectations, had on several occasions produced letters from Najeef Chan, Sujah Dowlah, and other principal men about the court, tending to show that Abdallah, who by his last victory over the Marrattas had made himself master of Delhi, was much in his interest and seemed disposed to place him on the throne. But our gentlemen below do not think it advisable to engage themselves absolutely in his cause till they have further assurances, and till he can make it evidently appear that he has himself such resources of friends and money as may in a manner insure to us success.

"Early in the month of March arrived from Beerboon, accompanied by a body of Europeans under the command of Major Yorke, the Nabob Cossim Aly Chan, and fixed his camp at Bycuntpoor, at which place I went out to meet him. From the moment he saw me he introduced the conversation by betraying the most shameful and unmanly fears of the Shahzadah, and not thinking himself sufficiently secure with the large force he brought up with him, he sent for both Ramnarain and Ragebullub with all the forces from Bahar, without advising me thereof. Those troops I had directed to remain in Komgar Chan's country with the detachment under the command of Captain Champion, but whom, upon their being withdrawn, as I did not think it reasonable our people should be left by themselves in a country they were entire strangers to, I recalled likewise; as the Nabob was already informed of this it gave him great displeasure, so much that he then mentioned in his publick Durbar, and on many occasions since has given to understand the implicit obedience he expected from me, but in that point I have as often taken care to undeceive him by acquainting him that while I am at the head of the army I will obey him no further than I think consistent with the good of the publick service and my own honour. However, at his repeated instances, I ordered Captain Champion to continue at Behar. During this visit I fully disclosed to the Nabob my sentiments concerning the Shahzadah, and my opinion on the expediency of his paying a visit as soon as

possible to that prince. I represented to him likewise the shame that must result to himself and the detriment to his affairs from so considerable a force lying inactive. That with respect to ourselves the expense of our army is so great that we were desirous a speedy end might be put to the troubles of the country. To this last he made no other reply than that we were bound by treaty to assist him with all our troops, whenever, and for whatever purpose he chose to demand them; that he might send them to Assam if he pleased, and that he had furnished us with these promises to defray the expense thereof. With respect to the Shahzadah he appeared little inclined to see him at all, and as little inclined to favour him. But as I thought it would have a good appearance and might hereafter be of service to the Nabob's affairs, if he preserved a good understanding with the Prince, I interested myself very much, and took uncommon pains to remove the many difficulties he had started to avoid this interview. But no argument could surmount the suggestions of his fear, and though I prevailed with him to grant part of my request, yet no persuasion could induce him to trust himself in the Kella; and instead of visiting the Prince he would only consent to give him a meeting in our factory. Agreeable to appointment on the 12th March they met. The highest distinctions were at this conference conferred by the Shahzadah on the Nabob, and he in return made the strongest professions of his attachment and allegiance, though I had soon very good reason to doubt of the sincerity of either party. The Nabob is now heartily wearied of his guest, and frequently proposes dismissing him with a sum of money; for as he is sensible of the little share of merit he can himself claim in bringing the Prince over to us, he is for that reason jealous that we may hereafter make use of him against himself. As for the Shahzadah, now he finds we are not so sanguine in his cause as he imagined we would be from the style of some letters he received prior to the battle, and as he has many reasons to be displeased with the Nabob for his suspicions, his neglect, and, above all, that he is so much stinted in point of money by him (for the Nabob will allow him no more than the 1,300 rupees per day, scarcely a competence), these reasons, added to the expectations he entertains from above, make him more and more solicitous to be dismissed likewise. This he asks me with uncommon earnestness, urging the detriment that will accrue to his affairs if we detain him any longer, and if the letters he daily shews are authentick, it is very material he should set out for Delhi immediately, as the least delay may be the most entire prejudice to his cause, and occasion Abdallah for want of him to set up some other person. The Nabob desires nothing more ardently than the Prince's departure, but I have hitherto evaded both their importunities on this point, desirous of the opinion of the gentlemen below in answer to what I have wrote on the subject, and which I shall wait for before I take any further measures. Should the Shahzadah ascend the throne of his ancestors, of which he seems now to have some prospect, and this without either the Nabob or us contributing anything thereto, we can neither of us have the least claim to favour from him hereafter. The friendship of a Mogul may be immaterial to us, but can never be so to the Nabob, were it only for

the sake of securing the Royal confirmation to the Sabadarree of these provinces. For, however we may take upon us to appoint Nabobs, it is certain, according to the principles and constitution of the Indostan Government, no man can have a legal right to be so but by appointment from the Mogul.

"Such has been the happy consequence of the victory of the 15th January, that the hitherto disaffected Zemindars are all disposed to make their submissions, and the Nabob expects to be able to settle thoroughly the business of this province without moving further. Komgar Chan indeed, owing to the Nabob's folly in withdrawing his forces, again attempted to make head and ventured from out of his hills. He recovered a small fort called Billara, and had invested the most considerable one in his country, by name Caosera. The Nabob would have been only rightly served if Komgar Chan had been suffered to recover his country, nor would I have interfered, but that it would have been a disgrace to the English troops to suffer such a fellow to be acting offensively in their neighbourhood. On this account only I ordered Captain Champion in pursuit of him and obliged him to retire to his hills again."



THE HOHENZOLLERNS.

WE are all so intent on watching lava-streams emitted by the German volcano that time is lacking for calm retrospection. Yet the roots of the present lie deeply embedded in the past, and future events will unfold themselves as the outcome of a chain of causation. Glancing backwards on the long vista of years, we may trace the origin of explosive forces which threaten our civilization, and perhaps discover means of grappling with them. Fifty years ago, Central Europe was peopled by a thrifty, peaceable and law-abiding race, whose bent lay towards philosophy and scientific research. They followed the immense industrial progress of this country at a respectful distance, capital for similar developments at home being non-existent. Great Britain's wealth and empire excited their admiration, not unmixed with envy; the thought of rivalling, and even supplanting her, was confined to a small military caste. Germany has undergone a complete transformation within one life time's span. Her people are now magnificently organized for aggressive warfare, and well provided with its sinews. Their racial pride is mitigated by no spark of saving humour, their morality and ideals differ radically from those of Christendom. Ruthless in pursuit of the chimera of world-empire, and burning with hatred for presumed rivals, the Germans of our day are suffering from an acute attack of megalomania. The empire of blood and iron built up by statesmen who epitomised the trend of their country's evolution is a replica of the predatory state which brought ruin on Hellenic culture. A unique and terrible characteristic of the war now raging is that it locks us in a death-struggle with forces which strongly resemble those of King Cetewayo and the Egyptian Mahdi. The European situation to-day is paralleled only by that of the year 451 of our era, when Attila's hordes were signally defeated by a confederation of Gothic tribes in the valley of the Marne. Meantime the people of this country were too completely absorbed in political strife, money getting and pleasure to observe the progress made by a huge fungoid growth which was eating into the German soul. The time has come for an attempt to reveal the hidden agencies at work to produce it, and place them in historical perspective.

Men in association render instinctive obedience to that law of Nature which impels the individual to improve his physical environment. The resulting movements of population have sometimes arisen from economic necessity, as in the case of our Aryan forbears, who were forced to invade Europe by the desiccation of their pasture-grounds in Central Asia. Others were due to lust of conquest felt by tribal chiefs, whose mantle has fallen on the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs. In others, again, a highly militant religion was the driving force. Islam's world-wide conquests within a century of its Founder's death

and the success of the early Crusades prove "God with us!" to be a battle-cry of unequalled force. Such cataclysmic movements as these belong to the earlier stages of society. In course of time the nomad horde, or confederation of clans, becomes stationary. Cultivation, and afterwards the production and exchange of commodities, replace hunting and cattle-breeding as the sources of economic life. The structure of society becomes increasingly complex, and assumes more definite shape. An association of tribes connected by kinship, real or assumed, settles down into a Nation, which presents many analogies with the multicellular organism of biology. Its bond is a tissue of custom, tradition, law, morality and convention. It possesses organs for nutrition and defence. Its growth is influenced by past phases in its long life-history, and, with considerable power of repairing lesions, it may be subjected to a destructive strain. Finally, the nation develops a Soul in which current ideals are reflected. From a psychological standpoint, the new forces are somewhat puerile; the morality of men in association being in an inverse ratio to their numbers. Vital nations are keenly sensitive of prestige, their gratitude for services rendered and respect for the plighted word cannot always be relied on. While appeals to the higher collective self stir them to heroism, they may be cowed into abject submission by a superior will, and sunk below the level of beasts of prey by stimulus applied to instincts which survive from the Tribal Era. Thus combativeness, prompts them to draw the sword in furtherance of selfish aims; insult or oppression stir them to unreasoning fury; laudable pride in ancestral exploits degenerates into gross over-valuation of their resources. For these reasons anarchy has always ruled in international relations. Attempts to supersede war by arbitration as a method for settling disputes invariably fail, because decisions of an international tribunal are devoid of "sanction"; in other words, no police force has yet been devised capable of coercing the worsted side. Ideas absorbed during the plastic stage leave an indelible impression on the adult; education is, therefore, the prime agency in moulding a nation's soul. This process was once regarded as a panacea for social ills—because men confounded mere instruction, which may or may not be sound, with the "bringing out" of all that is best in a child, and checking the growth of its anti-social instincts. A mighty river may be poisoned at its source. The Germans of our day exemplify a process well known in biology as "Reversion to an Archaic Type." Economic pressure, dynastic lust of conquest, militant religion, and unsound instruction have conspired to degrade the Spirit of the Race.

Their habitat displays every physical feature known in temperate regions. Its southern territory is fertile, and there are vast mineral deposits in Silesia, Westphalia and Rhineland. Its climate is continental, with extreme winter cold and an abundant rainfall. In prehistoric times Central Europe was clad with dense forests. Writing in the first century of our era, Tacitus lifts the veil that shrouded it to reveal the Germany of that day sparsely peopled by Teuton clans, who are now known to have been a later wave of the Aryan migration. They worshipped the Powers of Nature, whose nomenclature survives in

our weekdays. Their normal condition was inter-tribal warfare, which evolved an extremely virile human type. But male brutality was softened by their deep respect for women, perhaps a survival of the Matriarchate. Ancient Teutons gave unquestioning obedience to chosen leaders in war time, but never surrendered the right of self-government. The germs of chivalry and democracy existed in these barbarians of two millenniums ago. For five centuries they harassed Imperial Rome, and finally overwhelmed her, letting the breaths of their forests into the fetid atmosphere of decadence. But hordes of Hunnish invaders pressed in their rear: for 400 years Europe was a prey to anarchy.

A Superman born in the purple brought order from the general chaos. Charlemagne was a German prince, grandson of Charles Martel, King of the Franks, who checked the tide of Saracenic invasion at Tours in 732 A.D. To unsurpassed genius of war and affairs he added a magnetic personality which compelled obedience. By dint of conquest he extended his empire over France and the greater part of Central Europe. In 800 A.D. Charlemagne undertook a campaign in Italy, where the Papacy had established itself on the ruins of Rome. Leo III. saw an opportunity of fulfilling St. Augustine's vision of the *Civitas Dei*. He saluted the Teuton warrior as Charles Augustus, Emperor of the Romans. From that epoch dates the mirage of universal empire, which has lured many a French and German prince to ruin. Charlemagne ruled his vast realm wisely. He organized it in districts under Dukes, or war-leaders, Counts, and Barons; Margraves, or Lords of the Marches, safeguarded his frontier; and the efficiency of the vast machine was secured by rigorous inspection. Charlemagne fostered education and the arts; his long reign marks a splendid effort to give order and Christian culture to a distracted Continent. Like many great movements, it was premature. At his death the fabric fell to pieces, but the principles on which it rested survive at the present day. Charlemagne's heirs partitioned his unwieldy Empire amongst them. Thus France and Germany became separate realms; and nations began to crystallize, each with a dynasty and its nucleus. In ancient Germany chieftainship was elective, but the evils of disputed succession became so evident that the custom of primogeniture crept in. Under the weak successors of Charlemagne, every great office became hereditary, and dynastic rule began. It has great advantages over a democratic régime. A line of policy may be followed for centuries without the deflections which arise from the breath of popular will. Empires are amazingly stable, in spite of divergencies in the personal equation. Kingship affords a living symbol of the nation's greatness to millions who are incapable of grasping an abstract idea. But kings are fallible mortals like the rest of us; their inherited aims are generally selfish; the religious awe which environs the throne is often grossly abused by its occupant, who wastes his people's substance in ministering to self-indulgence and aggressive warfare for the benefit of his dynasty. From a biological point of view, the danger of exaggerating the influence of one unit cell cannot be gainsaid. Little men thrust in to great

places by the accident of birth have worked more lasting mischief than human whirlwinds, of which Napoleon presents the finished type. Under a virtuous despot, the people's capacity for self-government atrophies; a tyrant or a debauchee may warp the whole course of an empire's evolution.

During the 10th century Feudalism took root in Germany. Land became the source of honour and basis of national defence. Its possession conferred great privileges, but each carried a corresponding duty. Society assumed a pyramidal shape. At its apex stood the Emperor, elected by his great feudatories, who claimed to rule by Right Divine, as representing the Church's secular arm. Thenceforward from the dark background of mediæval history there loom gigantic figures of Suabian and Saxon dynasts, striving to grasp the will-o'-the-wisp of Cæsarism. Beneath them was a hierarchy of ruling princes, churchmen and free cities, the entire edifice resting on serfs, who were tied to the soil and liable to transfer with the clods they cultivated. The feudal nexus was more in harmony with the law of mutual help than the lawless competition which has supplanted it. But the system contained germs of anarchism, inasmuch as every vassal owed allegiance only to his immediate superior, and might be summoned to fight against the Emperor himself. Robber-knights abounded; but for the Church's precept and example serfdom would have become intolerable. As society grew more stable intervals of peace lengthened, and the flame of literature was kept alight in monasteries.

In the 11th century came one of those cataclysmic movements which shake the world at intervals of about five hundred years. Princes and their followers hastened eastwards, in view of ousting Saracens from the Holy Places of Palestine. A new spirit dawned on Europe with the Crusades. They brought the rude warriors of Germany into touch with a finer civilization than their own, stimulated the love of adventure and, by introducing unknown luxuries, they favoured the growth of foreign commerce. Cities grew in importance, and many of them cast off the feudal yoke. A confederation was formed, known as the Hansa, which brought precious wares from Asia by caravan and sea routes. As wealth increased Germany shed the slough of barbarism. Her people shared the 13th century Renaissance, which gave Europe its cathedrals and secular edifices not less stately, testifying at once to the power of faith and of the civic instinct. Ancient literature was eagerly studied through the medium of Arabic and ecclesiastical philosophy. Europe's newly awakened intellect found expression in a complex system of instruction, termed Scholasticism, which sharpened the logical faculties while it tended towards hair-splitting. Chivalry took root in the warrior caste. It idealized woman as the object of tender devotion, forbade mean advantages in battle, set up high conceptions of knightly honour, and inculcated pity for the helpless. Under the Empire's loosely-knit régime each nationality enjoyed scope to follow lines suggested by its genius. A common standard of faith and morals embraced all Europe in the "Comity of Christendom."

In the 15th century began another semi-millennial epoch, bringing all current beliefs into the melting-pot. A second Renaissance began in France and Italy, prompted by learned Byzantines whom the all-conquering Turks had evicted from Constantinople. They introduced Greek and Latin lore into the Universities; and its transcendental beauty soon banished the arid subtleties of Scholasticism. The invention of printing served to diffuse the new learning; commerce was revolutionized by the discovery of America and of the Cape route to India; while astronomers destroyed the "homicentric" conception of our Universe. In the sunny south this revival left a ferment of paganism behind it; far different was its effect on sober-minded Germany. There it took the form of a rebellion against Rome's spiritual authority. The Empire rang with doctrinal wranglings, and a religious Reformation began. Its propagandists were Luther and, long afterwards, Calvin, the inspirer and organizer of victory. They asserted the right of private judgment as to commonly accepted dogma, but illogically made a shibboleth of their own religious canons. Germany was split into hostile camps; and if Charles V. had adopted Protestantism, his subjects would have followed him. But he stood firm on ancient ways, and a counter Reformation, engineered by the Jesuits, enabled Rome to make headway against the schism. For Germany the Reformation spelt decadence. The revolution in trade routes transferred maritime supremacy from the Hansa to Italy and Western Europe. Commercialism sapped the feudal nexus, inciting the landholding class to exactions which stirred up a ferocious Peasants' War (1514-24).

At this epoch of unrest the Hohenzollerns emerged from comparative obscurity. In the 12th century they were Suabian robber-knights, owing allegiance to the House of Württemberg. In 1190, however, a Hohenzollern thrust his eagle's talons into the Imperial City of Nuremberg, becoming its hereditary protector or Burgrave. In 1417 Burgrave Albert, having amassed enormous wealth by exactions, was able to purchase the Mark or frontier province of Brandenburg from the Emperor Sigismund, who betrayed John Huss to the flames. Possession of this important fief gave electoral rank to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Their new domains were a sterile tract on the Baltic coast, bitterly cold in winter and deluged by autumnal rains, sparsely peopled by Wendish tribes of Slavonic descent, who worshipped Nature's Powers and lived by hunting. In the 14th century these heathen were forcibly converted by the Teutonic Knights, a militant Order dating back to the Crusades. Thus the Prussians of our day descend from savages who escaped the ennobling influence of chivalry, and stood outside the Comity of Christendom. Their racial character retains the impress of ancestral brutality. In 1521 Albert of Hohenzollern, the elected Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, embraced Reformation principles in order to convert his trust into the hereditary dukedom of East Prussia, which his successor held as a fief under the King of Poland.

In 1618 religious disputes between German princes culminated in civil war, which soon became a mad struggle for territory. For 30

years the Empire was ravaged by mercenary hordes. A generation grew up without religion or instruction, every art and craft disappeared, and half the population perished by battle or rapine. But the worst results of that fratricidal struggle was its disturbance of Nature's balance between the sexes. So fearful was the destruction of male life that polygamy became legal in several States. If many women are forced to compete for one man's attention, they must win it by abject submission. Thus superior female types are eliminated, while the virile instincts of combativeness and brutality receive emphasis. To this cause must be attributed the passing of the Khalifat, and the stagnation of every empire which fails to give women her natural place in the body politic. Nowhere in Europe is she less honoured than in Prussia; and congenital altruism leads her to accept humiliation, while it stimulates the arrogance of the male. It is more than an accident that Germans should sing of their "Fatherland," and we Britons of our "Mother Country."

The return of peace in 1648 found Germany completely exhausted. She fell into the clutches of three or four hundred lay or clerical princes, and her people's inborn capacity for self-government suffered a long eclipse. Whilst the ancient nexus of Feudalism disappeared, its conception of a country as its sovereign's personal estate remained in the fullest force. Petty despots copied King Louis XIV. of France, by wasting their subjects' substance in vulgar ostentation, and afterwards sold them to Great Britain for service in her colonial wars. If Germans are still children in politics and moral sense, if millions of highly-instructed men look for enlightenment to a poisoned Press, if all of them submit tamely to the dictation of a tyrant, the causes of their arrested development must be sought in that fearful struggle. Owing to their size and geographical features Brandenburg and Prussia Proper suffered less severely than the southern States. They had in the Elector Frederick William (1640-88) a ruler gifted with the enlightened regard for self interest that characterizes his dynasty. His administrative skill restored the harassed realm to comparative prosperity; but the methods he adopted have proved most detrimental to Prussia. Frederick William rendered homage to Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV. by founding a highly centralized bureaucracy, which placed the entire administration under his control. In 1657 he shook off the Polish yoke, securing full sovereignty of his dominions. Frederick I. (1701-13) raised the electorate to a kingdom by judicious bribery, and excited the derision of monarchical Europe by crowning himself at Königsburg. The brand-new King's successor, Frederick William I. (1713-40) was a brutal and penurious drill-sergeant, who left a brimming treasury and well-drilled army to his son Frederick II. (1740-86).

This extraordinary man was one of the rare instances of genius born in the purple. Throughout his chequered career, dynastic interests were kept steadily in view without the smallest regard for morality. In 1741 he deluged Europe with bloodshed by invading the Austrian province of Silesia, to which he had about as much right as the Emperor of China. During the War of the Austrian Succession Frederick sat on the fulcrum of the European lever, making and

breaking treaties as his ambition might dictate; and Prussia was the only contending Power which reaped solid advantages from the slaughter. In 1756 Silesia again became a bone of contention between Hohenzollern and Hapsburg. France intervened, true to her ancient policy of setting Germans by the ears. Great Britain and Russia were also involved, and for seven years two hemispheres re-echoed the clash of arms. Frederick was enabled to make headway against a coalition of foes by lavish subsidies from England, whose sovereign preferred his Hanoverian dominions to the country which loaded him with wealth and honour. But he owed far more to an indomitable will. By suffering repeated reverses he learnt the man-slaying art to perfection; and emerged from the fray with enlarged territories, the greatest soldier of his age. Great Britain, too, began the Seven Years' War a European Kingdom, and ended it a world-shadowing empire. Canada and India were won on the battlefields of Germany, and Frederick was unwittingly one of the Empire's founders. It is the fruit of our genius for colonization and commerce, of sea-power arising from an insular position, and of governing faculties inherited from ancient Rome. It stands everywhere for freedom; yet millions of Germans who have waxed wealthy under its ægis now regard it with bitter and unreasoning hatred.

Frederick, miscalled "The Great," was a finished type of the able despot. His fiscal system was mediævally oppressive. The bureaucracy increased in servility and power; the last embers of civic freedom were quenched. He kept five per cent. of his male subjects under arms, fashioning them into a machine by iron discipline and cruel punishments. Frederick lavished favours on the landed nobility as the real source of his military power. In his day it became more closely welded together by marriage, and assumed all the characteristics of a caste. Junkerdom was the nursery of his standing army. During the stress of the Seven Years' War, many commoners obtained commissions, but all received dismissal after return of peace. The nobles enjoyed a practical monopoly of high administrative office, and were exempt from the taxation which crushed the citizen and peasant classes. They alone could hold knightly land, or *Rittergut*, which carried sporting privileges; and they were absolute masters of the serfs. Frederick's policy was essentially selfish and unmoral. In 1772 he instigated the first Partition of Poland—a political crime of the deepest dye, for which tardy reparation will soon be made. In correspondence with Voltaire he candidly wrote himself down a "brigand." Such was the man whom the reigning Hohenzollern has taken as his model. Divergencies of the personal equation are, perhaps, the chief objection to dynastic rule. Frederick's nephew and successor, Frederick William II. (1786-97) was a coarsely sentimental voluptuary, ruled by unworthy favourites of both sexes. Every branch of the administration suffered from the disappearance of a master hand. In the Army punctilious manœuvring ranked above initiative; the bureaucracy was governed by a camarilla, and the Junkers' oppression knew no bounds.

In France hoary abuses had become even more rife; and the entire administrative machine was out of gear. But her people are artists

by temperament; they can never be drilled into abject submission as their German neighbours. A constitutional revolution, inspired by the American Declaration of Rights, was planned by the intellectual classes, with "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," as its watchwords. It stood for two great principles which have now found acceptance in Western Europe—Nationalism, which asserts the right of every community to conduct its affairs without foreign interference, and Democracy, defined as "Government of the People by the People for the good of all." The new movement excited alarm in royal and aristocratic castes. A coalition of kings hurled insults at France, and invaded her territory with the avowed object of restoring a thoroughly rotten régime. Prussia played a leading part in the conspiracy, and her troops crossed the frontier in 1792. The soul of France was stung to fury by their approach, and every success of the Allies led to massacres in Paris. Political power was wrested from the intellectuals by the mob, and a Reign of Terror began. Fear ranks next to love as a stimulus to human action: it is employed to-day by the Hohenzollerns with infinitely less excuse than can fairly be urged on behalf of the untaught and uncared-for Jacobins. At Danton's clarion call, a *Levée en Masse* was decreed, and the Republic's improvised armies soon hurled back the tide of invasion. For Prussia the campaign of 1792 was a complete fiasco; and should have warned the deluded King to set his military house in order. He was succeeded by Frederick William III. (1797-1840), who rose to a higher level, thanks to the influence of his noble-hearted queen Luise—a thorough German of antique mould. Her husband strove to act up to his narrow lights, but with all the instincts of a feudal despot he submitted to the dictation of a stronger will, met every crisis of his career with vacillation, and requited faithful service with ingratitude. After some desultory fighting he was glad to conclude an advantageous peace with the young Republic.

There now appeared a soldier of fortune who effectually tamed the Jacobin fury, only to employ a citizen army for dynastic ends. Napoleon's amazing genius for war and administration, his lust for universal dominion and entire freedom from scruples, have made modern Germans forget the woes he inflicted on their country. Until he grasped the imperial sceptre Napoleon worked only for France; thereafter only for himself. The Vendôme Column, made from captured cannon and surmounted by his statue, typifies the colossal egoism of a man who, with overwhelming power, did less good to humanity than any imitator—Kaiser William II. excepted. After the truce of Amiens, William Pitt formed a Coalition against Napoleon, and Frederick William III. undertook to help Austria and Russia with an army 20,000 strong, in return for heavy annual subsidies from Great Britain. But he kept his forces on a peace footing, and stirred not a finger while his allies suffered signal defeats at Ulm and Austerlitz. When they complained of his egregious disregard of treaties, he declared that he would summon Napoleon to evacuate German territory: and sent Count Haugewitz on a mission to the conqueror at Schoenbrunn. His envoy brought back a treaty of alliance with

France, and Hanover as the price of his master's treachery! That Frederick William III. was a Hohenzollern to the backbone is proved by his favourite dictum:—"Treachery is hateful only if it does not profit the State."

Less than four months after this abominable transaction, he was forced by Queen Luise and the military caste to declare war against Napoleon. Punishment for his tergiversation came swiftly. The victories of Jena and Auerstädt (1806) destroyed his over-confident army, and Prussia grovelled under Napoleon's feet. The conqueror showed a singular lack of statesmanship in his treatment of the humbled foe. Prussia lost half her territories, her strong places were occupied by French garrisons, war indemnities and exactions were levied to the tune of £70,000,000. Had the Corsican been capable of magnanimity he might have attached Frederick William to his chariot, with the other puppet-kings whom he created in Germany. By driving the soul of Prussia to desperation he raised up an inveterate foe who helped to consummate his ruin.

Adversity has bitter but salutary lessons. At the period of her deepest debasement hope of redemption dawned on Prussia through the efforts of a group of non-Prussian statesmen and soldiers. Hardenburg and Von Stein forced drastic reforms on the irresolute king. Serfdom was abolished, the Junkers lost their most exasperating privileges, fiscal burdens were more equally distributed, and education became compulsory. Unhappily for the world, universities were founded at Berlin and Bonn under the control of Government, which also assumed the direction of higher teaching throughout Prussia. The Army had hitherto been partly feudal, partly recruited in the same fashion as our own. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau gradually replaced it by one which swept the whole manhood of Prussia into its net. The obligation of universal and short-term service was introduced in the teeth of opposition from Frederick William. Napoleon had forbidden him to maintain a standing army of more than 42,000 men, but Scharnhorst suggested a method of evading these hard conditions. Young Prussians were called in batches to the Colours; each contingent received a thorough military training, and was then relegated to civil life, with the obligation that every man should join his appointed unit on mobilization. These great organizers doubtless borrowed the idea of a citizen-force from the Directory, which had introduced Conscription in 1798, but they improved on the French model. Prussia possessed (1) a standing army, always kept below the 42,000 limit, with its reserve, (2) a Landwehr, or Militia, and (3) a Landsturm, consisting of middle-aged men who had passed through the other categories. The military machine as they devised it survives at the present day, but a defensive force originating in the noblest patriotism has been captured by the Hohenzollerns for anti-social ends. Meantime, the soul of Prussia revolted against Napoleon's tyranny. Every turn of his screw raised national resentment to a higher pitch. Philosophers sounded the trumpet-call of duty; and straightway Prussia was honeycombed with Student Associations, pledged to liberate their country from the foreign yoke. An outburst of patriotic song stirred every breast, and inspired

yearnings for unity. The general uprising was headed by German Princes, who obtained willing allegiance from their subjects by promising constitutional government. So Frederick William was borne almost against his will on a wave of popular enthusiasm. A nation in arms rose in Napoleon's rear after his Russian fiasco, and the War of Liberation (1813-15) purged Germany of his legions.

The general Peace of 1815 found Europe prostrated by twenty-three years of almost incessant warfare; and her rulers assembled at Vienna were able to recast the Continental map with a sole regard for their own advantage. The principles of democracy and nationalism were alike ignored; and under Metternich's fell influence Germany was once more placed under the yoke of territorialism. It is a noteworthy fact that the idea of unity to be attained by means of war with France dawned on Gneisenau's brain at the Congress of Vienna, and has never since been lost sight of. Throughout Germany the thirty-three years which followed 1815 was an epoch of reaction. Her rulers exasperated their subjects by refusing to fulfil pledges of constitutional reform, and unrest prevailed in every State. The citizen army as projected by Scharnhurst took a new colouring. His aim had been to make the Landwehr counterbalance the professional Army by embracing all that was best in the non-noble classes. He reckoned without the Junkers, who had persuaded Frederick William that such ideas savoured of Jacobinism. They obtained complete control of the active forces, and thrust the militia into an inferior position. Princes William and Frederick Charles of Prussia played a leading part in organizing an all-powerful General Staff, which has dictated Prussian strategy from their day to ours. But the conception of a united Germany under the Hohenzollern ægis assumed a more concrete form. Hitherto every State had kept up its own tariffs and customs barriers, to the inconceivable injury of internal trade. In 1818 a Zollverein, or Customs Union, was projected, and within fifty years it embraced the whole of Germany with the exception of Austria. The Fatherland could be little else than a geographical expression while purely conventional boundaries separated it from uncongenial neighbours. The Zollverein increased vague longings for political unity, and inspired the thought that German provinces on both frontiers might be restored to the fold.

Frederick William IV. (1848-1860) was a highly-emotional pietist, with inclinations towards strong drink. Yet this besotted mystic exhumed the mediæval doctrine of Divine Right in favour of his House. It is, of course, a corollary of dualism in Church and State, which was seldom more than an ideal during the Age of Faith, and had disappeared from Germany at the Reformation. In 1848 he saw Continental Europe reaping an aftermath of the French Revolution. Every throne shook to its foundations, and his reactionary brother, who afterwards reigned as William I., sought refuge in London from mob violence. But, unlike Great Britain and America, Germany had never worked out her political salvation. The army proved staunch to Hohenzollern despotism, and the revolutionaries returned sullenly to heel. A stern reaction followed; and Prussian prestige rose to such a height that the

Confederalational Parliament assembled at Frankfort offered the Imperial Crown to Frederick William. In his feudal mind that body had a democratic taint. He refused the gift with ill-concealed contempt.

On Frederick William's death from softening of the brain he was succeeded by William I. (1860-88), a narrow-minded corporal, more honest than any of his predecessors, but essentially a despot of the true Hohenzollern type. Hatred of France as the oppressor of his mother, Queen Luise, was his consuming passion; and level-headed Germans found to their amazement that this matter-of-fact old soldier claimed to rule over them by inspiration from on High.

In 1864 the Schleswig-Holstein imbroglio raised Prussia's hopes of obtaining the leadership. Fourteen years earlier those provinces had been declared hereditary possessions of the Danish Crown at a Convention signed in London by all the great Powers. Owing to our habitual *laissez-faire*, we stood aside while Prussia and Austria robbed the little kingdom of its fairest territories. The Danish War of 1864 is an important link in the chain of causation leading up to the present catastrophe. From that moment a belief took root in the German mind that Great Britain would never again enter the lists against any Great Power. Moreover, the possession of Holstein has enabled Germany to construct the Kiel Canal.

William I. had a characteristic rarely found in second-rate sovereigns—that of divining and leaning on a man of genius. Such was Count Otto Von Bismarck—Schœnhausen, a typical Junker, permeated with nobiliary pride. Men of his calibre are under no illusions. Bismarck used Divine Right, the popular worship of hereditary kings, the old tribal instinct which inspires devotion to a War lord, as leverage for securing German unity under the Hohenzollern eagle. To these aims he sacrificed his own peace of mind, and cast every scruple to the winds. He moulded public opinion by suborning the Press, manipulated the Parliament through a clique of sycophants, and framed his foreign policy with a sole eye to German interests.

His first move was to assert royal prerogative against the power of the purse claimed by Parliament. By ignoring its vaguely-defined privileges he secured the sinews of a war of aggression. Working hand and glove with the General Staff, he gave the army breech-loading artillery and rifles, decoupling its power as an instrument of destruction. His next step was to humble Austria, still clad with the halo of Cæsarism, and supreme in the German Confederation. At Bismarck's instigation the two bullies fell out over the spoils of Denmark, and Prussia's superior equipment prevailed in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. She annexed most of the States which had fought for Austria, and became the leader of a North German Confederation.

In 1867 Bismarck caused a mighty flutter in Junker dovescotes by persuading his pliant master to introduce universal suffrage. It was, however, the merest window-dressing, calculated to bring democracy within his grasp. The kingdom was adroitly gerrymandered, in view of securing predominance for the Junkers of East Prussia. A system of double voting enabled one wealthy man to counterbalance thousands of his poorer neighbours at the polls. The impotence of the Prussian

Lower House was proved by the multiplicity of its parties; and Bismarck's clique enabled him to secure ample supplies for a coming war.

Having obtained the overlordship of North Germany for his Chief, Bismarck proceeded to pick a quarrel with Napoleon III. He played the part of *agent provocateur*, knowing full well that Imperial France was a powder-magazine. At his instigation a scion of the Hohenzollerns came forward as candidate for the vacant throne of Spain. The prospect of Prussia established in the south of the Pyrenees stirred French chauvinism to fury, and the public excitement was increased by a vigorous campaign directed against France by Bismarck's "reptile" Press. The writer happened to be in Paris during the earlier stages of the War of 1870 and, young as he was, deplored the midsummer madness of that fateful year. A crisis came when Bismarck falsified a despatch to his Sovereign in order to make the French believe that the old king had insulted their ambassador. It is needless to enlarge on the Franco-Prussian War. Napoleon's gallant army was hopelessly outnumbered and out-manceuvred; machine-like organization achieved a crushing victory. Bismarck had cleverly contrived to put his foes in the wrong, and British sympathies were at first on Prussia's side. A reaction came when stories of her treatment of the civilian population became public property. Horrible as the arson, murder and robbery of 1870-1 seemed to our fathers, they were on an infinitely smaller scale than the atrocities perpetrated by the German Army to-day.

When France had been effectually humbled Bismarck induced his master to assume the high office of German Emperor at Versailles—the palace dedicated by its megalomaniac builder to "All the Glories of France." Never was there such an instance of arrogance and bad taste. The temper of the new régime was foreshadowed by old William's action in thrusting deputations from representative bodies aside at Versailles, and accepting German princes as sole mouthpieces of the national will. Bismarck's peace conditions appalled Europe by their severity. A war indemnity of two hundred millions sterling, and the loss of two provinces whose sympathies were wholly French, were intended to crush the prostrate nation. Thanks to her marvellous recuperative power France emerged from the ordeal chastened and free, while the impolitic annexation of Alsace-Lorraine made a war of revenge inevitable.

The brand new empire's constitution was Dahomeyan in its absolutism. The King of Prussia was placed on a pinnacle which no sovereign of our times had reached. The might of Germany was at its disposal, without any of the salutary checks which poor human nature requires. William I. had a sincere regard for his duty towards God, and Bismarck's complex character had its tender side. In their day the evils flowing from unbounded license were not too apparent; but the Empire of Blood and Iron offered terrible opportunities to a sanguinary despot. But as are the effects of unbridled power on the individual, its influence on the inchoate soul of a nation is even worse. Germany went stark mad over her successes. Historians rehandled the world's annals in order to glorify material force; scientists exhumed

the Darwinian doctrine of Struggle, forgetting that the law of mutual help is a higher phase in evolutionary processes. A half-insane doctrinaire conceived the whole world under the heel of a caste of "Supermen"—as though any caste could be unselfish! Admission to the new Olympus would depend on the strength of the aspirant's "will-to-power," and Supermen were a law unto themselves, all ethical systems being mere figments devised by slaves in order to drag masters down to their own level. Nietzsche had the poorest opinion of his countrymen, and dubbed their present ruler a "canting bigot," but truculent Germans assumed that they were a race of Supermen, entitled to impose their culture on a vanquished world. Fanatical patriotism ousted the cosmopolitan spirit of Goethe and his generation. In an age when perfected communications bade fair to make the whole world kin, the deluded people of Germany deliberately cut themselves off from the human nexus. A religion of Force took root among them, proclaiming warfare to be "a necessary factor of culture, in which the really civilized nation finds the highest expression of its vitality." The military caste were high priests of this monstrous creed, adored by servile civilians and adoring their Supreme Pontiff—War Lord on Land and the Sea and in the Air. Supple-backed university professors obtained imperial favour by inculcating hatred of foreign nations who might thwart Germany's ambition. In their eyes Great Britain was living on her capital, Russia a barbarian empire, France mortally stricken by ancestral vices; little nations had no rights; any measure was justified which might help to give Germany the leadership of mankind. Such arrogance has no parallel in history. The only conceivable explanation of its rapid growth is that elemental instincts prompting to murder and rapine had surged up from Germany's sub-conscious self to paralyse her reasoning faculties.

Kaiser William I. slept with his fathers in 1888, and was succeeded by a wholly abnormal Hohenzollern. Frederick III. held war in horror from personal experience of the misery it causes. His Empress, our much loved Princess Royal, was one of those bright, energetic and broad-minded souls who shine out at intervals to lead the van of human progress. Had Frederick the Noble's life been spared his people might have cast off the slough of militarism, and evolved on lines marked out by their good genius. Friendship with neighbouring Powers paving the way for a United States of Europe, the reduction of bloated armaments in view of ultimately superseding war by arbitration, constitutional government, a higher standard of comfort as a means of checking an undue growth of population, and State-assisted emigration in view of reducing its pressure on the means of subsistence—such we know to have been Frederick's ideals. No one who has observed the splendid qualities displayed by Germans during the present war can doubt that they might well have gained a "place in the sun" without wading through seas of slaughter in order to cast a shadow over the world. *Dis aliter visum*: the Power that rules this universe decreed otherwise. Large-hearted Frederick was cut short in his prime, and Germany fell into the hands of his unworthy son.

A bare enumeration of William the Second's misdeeds would fill several volumes. No shadow of a doubt remains that his entire policy has been dictated by a lust of world dominion. His greatest crimes are found in the fact that he has warped a mighty people's evolution, and poisoned their soul. Under his malign influence economic life received unhealthy stimulus. The huge war indemnity wrung from France had fed orgiastic speculation; and it was not until 1884 that Germany's foreign trade began to soar upwards. During the decade ending 1913 it increased by 80 per cent., but suffered a set-back from the Balkan War. Economic stress was heightened by inordinate taxation, imposed in view of the present struggle. On the one hand wealth poured into Germany, but it had the same centripetal tendency as it shows in Great Britain and America. A network of gigantic Trusts overspread the Fatherland, and William II. had his fingers in most of them. In the other hand Trade Unionism was sternly discouraged by the bureaucracy. Wages, therefore, remained at a low level, the cost of living increased and, despite the hausfrau's incomparable thrift, starvation menaced millions of humble homes.

William II. has made his realm an artificially congested region. Racial fertility is extremely high throughout the Fatherland; its population shows an annual increase of 900,000 souls; and the Kaiser possesses 40 per cent. more subjects than gave allegiance to his grandfather in 1870. But for his manoeuvres a safety-valve would have been found in emigration. The following figures ought to have been a storm-signal for Europe. During the 19th century 5,000,000 Germans left their country for good; in 1881-90, 1,342,000; in 1891-1900, 530,000; in 1901-1910, 276,000; while in 1911 18,900 only emigrated, and their loss was more than counterbalanced by an influx of Russians. Meantime the Kaiser's sole accession of territory in Europe was Heligoland, out of which he cozened us in 1890. If Germans share the tendency of uncivilized man to increase in a greater ratio than the production of food, they may thank their Kaiser, who wished to keep his people at home in view of the coming War. His religion is a peculiar blend of mysticism and the grossest materialism. It makes the God of Battles his partner in consummating very mundane ambitions. This descendant of robber knights carries the doctrine of Divine Right to a pitch undreamt of by his immediate predecessors. The only excuse for his aberrations was suggested twenty years ago by Professor Quidde, of Munich, who places him with Caligula in the category of monarchs driven mad by the deification and flattery of their subjects.

This rapid sketch of German history indicates some at least of the forces which have worked havoc with the dear *gemütlich* Germany of yore. It explains the treachery, brutality and sadism of her sons, who have aroused execration throughout the civilized world and inflicted an indelible stigma on their country's good name. Every phase of the racial deterioration which I have endeavoured to depict may be traced to the Hohenzollerns, who have proved themselves a veritable curse to their subjects and the world.

THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.

By COMMANDER W. F. CABORNE, C.B., R.N.R.

IN 1889,¹ 1895,² and 1903,³ I had the honour of reading papers in the theatre of the Royal United Service Institution dealing with the Royal Naval Reserve, and giving some account of its genesis, composition, system of training, progress from time to time, and other cognate matters; and those papers practically set forth the history of this branch of the naval service from its first inception as an outcome of the Report of the Royal Commission on Manning the Navy of 1859.

Now, for the first time since its formation rather more than half a century ago, the force has been called out by Royal Proclamation for active service in the Fleet against the enemies of the Crown, and this would seem to be a particularly opportune moment for placing on record its further development, as also for expressing admiration of its recent very successful mobilization, which was due to the complete and efficient organization brought into being and perfected during long years of peace.

In 1903, I dealt largely and in a generally appreciative manner, with the Report of the Departmental Committee, presided over by Sir Edward Grey, and known by the short title of "The Naval Reserves Committee," dated the 20th of January of that year.

Since then numerous modifications and changes worthy of note have taken place.

For many years the officer in charge of the Naval Reserves was designated Admiral-Superintendent of Naval Reserves, and for the greater portion of the year he was to be found in his office in London. But in addition to the Naval Reserves, he had under his command a certain number of ships, stationed at different ports of the United Kingdom, for coast-guard duties, and these ships he periodically took to sea. When the coast-guard ships were abolished in 1902, he became the Admiral Commanding the Home Fleet, but in February, 1903, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in his annual statement to Parliament, announced that the Admiral-Superintendent of Naval Reserves, whose duties would be largely increased in the future by the growth of the Reserves, would have separate and independent functions, and would no longer command a sea-going squadron.

In February, 1904, the First Lord reported that the work of the Admiral-Superintendent of Naval Reserves had been entirely severed from the command of the Home Fleet, and that that officer had received the new designation of Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and

Reserves. Also that his office had been reorganized on a strictly naval basis. Lord Selborne added: "Although he (the Admiral) has no responsibility for command of a sea-going fleet, he holds a position analogous to that of a naval commander-in-chief at a home port with a naval staff of his own and an office in London. Great Britain and Ireland have been divided into six coast-guard districts, each under the command of a captain living on shore, who is responsible to the Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves, or, in the case of the two Irish districts, to the Senior Officer on the coast of Ireland. The responsibility of the Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves includes the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, in respect of which last force he is assisted by an Admiralty Volunteer Committee of which Mr. C. E. H. Chadwyck-Healey, K.C., acts as chairman."

The Royal Naval Reserve has a dual organization—naval and civil.

The Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves and his staff deal with all matters of a purely naval character, but for the civil administration, collaborating with them, there is another class of officials.

The latter are the Registrars of the Royal Naval Reserve (the majority of whom hold commissions as staff-paymasters, paymasters, or assistant-paymasters, Royal Naval Reserve), who are the superintendents or deputy-superintendents of the Mercantile Marine offices or are officers of H.M. Customs at the different ports around the coasts of the United Kingdom.

These gentlemen enlist the men (subject to medical examination and acceptance by the naval authorities), pay them their annual retainers, give them leave to proceed abroad on voyages of varying length, and in time of war are responsible for collecting the Royal Naval Reservists in their respective districts (which are accurately defined) and despatching them to the places or ports indicated by the Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves. It is almost needless to say that their services are invaluable.

At the head of this civil administration is the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen, who issues instructions and generally supervises, and in whose office at Tower Hill the work of the registrars is co-ordinated.

The following table shows the strength of the active list of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve on the 31st of December, 1902:—

Lieutenants	504
Sub-Lieutenants	417
Acting Sub-Lieutenants	107
Midshipmen	474
Senior Engineers	73
Engineers	193
Assistant Engineers	132

Total	1,900
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The next table gives the strength of the men's roll on the same date:—

"Qualified Seaman" Class	4,298
First Class (old system)	6,472
"Seaman" Class	5,572
Second Class (old system)	4,273
Third Class ¹	15
Stokers (old system)	—
Stokers (new system)	4,033
Total	24,663

In 1902 the granting of engineers' commissions in the Royal Naval Reserve practically ceased, but by an Order-in-Council, dated the 9th of July, 1903, a class of warrant engineers was instituted, the qualifications being the possession of a first class Board of Trade certificate as engineer, and a recommendation by their employers as to their having a thorough practical knowledge of the machinery of H.M. ships, and as being in all respects suitable for warrant rank. The limit of age is fixed between twenty-nine and forty years of age, and the first entries took place in 1904.

This latter year was a memorable one for officers of the military branch, inasmuch as by an Order-in-Council, dated the 7th of March, 1904, the creation of the rank of commander on the active list was sanctioned. Up to that date, there had been no higher grade on the active list than that of lieutenant, and the new departure was hailed with great satisfaction and pleasure by all the executive officers. It is true that for a number of years previously many lieutenants had been granted the rank of commander on retirement, but it was felt, and rightly felt, that officers of experience and long service on the active list should aspire to, and be eligible for, a position higher than that of a lieutenant.

The rating of leading-seaman was also established, and this action was very gratifying to the sailor section, for as I said many years ago when speaking in connection with this point: "Fair prospects with regard to pay and advancement are great incentives to energy and zeal in every class and position in life."

At this time, too, a class of engine-room artificers, Royal Naval Reserve, was created, the qualification for enrolment being that candidates must be of high character, hold a Board of Trade certificate as first or second-class engineer, and either be serving in the Mercantile Marine, or be employed in engineering or similar yards where their efficiency as engineers will be maintained. Men who have served as engine-room artificers in the Royal Navy with "V.G." character are also eligible for enrolment as engine-room artificers, R.N.R., provided they comply with the requirements as to age and physical standard.

¹ The old Third Class died out in 1903, and in the same year a new class of probationers (also boy sailors) took its place.

Engine-room artificers from the Mercantile Marine must upon entry not be under twenty-one nor more than thirty years of age, and all of them are eligible, under certain conditions, for promotion to the rank of warrant engineer.

The increasing requirements of the stokehold were not overlooked, and in this same year (1904) the stoker section was further enlarged by calling for recruits from among men similarly employed in gas and electric light factories and other works. An annual retainer is payable to these men on completing satisfactorily a term of three months' training on board H.M. ships; and six months' further service, together with fourteen days' drill annually in other years, entitles them to a life pension.

The year 1904 witnessed the high-water mark of the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve as regards its rank and file. The following was its composition on the 31st of December of that year:—

Leading seamen	90
Qualified seamen and first-class (old system)					
seamen	11,967
Seamen (second-class old system)	10,123
Engine-room artificers	604
Stokers	5,815
Special firemen (stoker) class	939
Total	29,538

The Royal Fleet Reserve, which is quite distinct from the Royal Naval Reserve, was established under the authority of "The Naval Reserve Act, 1900," and "The Naval Forces Act, 1903," to provide a reserve of trained seamen for service in His Majesty's Fleet in time of emergency.

It consists of A, B, and Immediate Classes.

Class A comprises life pensioners from the Royal Navy, who draw no retainer, but receive a reserve pension of five-pence a day at fifty years of age in addition to their life pension.

Class B comprises men who have served for five years or more in the Fleet, but who are not in receipt of a life pension. They receive a retainer of six-pence a day, and a gratuity of fifty pounds when they are forty years of age and have completed twenty years' service in the Fleet and Royal Fleet Reserve combined.

The Immediate Class comprises men who have served for five years or more in the Fleet, but who are not in receipt of a life pension. They receive a retainer of one shilling a day, and a gratuity of fifty pounds under the same conditions as Class B.

Men belonging to Classes A and B are required to perform one week's drill at the home ports each year. Men belonging to the Immediate Class are required to do twenty-eight days' service in the Fleet each year during the manœuvres.

It may be remarked that all life-pensioners, whether or not they belong to the Royal Fleet Reserve, are liable, if of suitable age, to be called upon by the Admiralty to serve in the Fleet in an emergency.

Men enrolled in Class B are liable to be called into active service by Royal Proclamation in the event of a public emergency. This service may continue so long as the special emergency lasts, but in no case will it exceed five years.

Men in the Immediate Class are liable for active service on the issue of a Royal Proclamation in the same manner as Class B. But they must also undertake to come into actual service for a period not exceeding three months before the issue of a proclamation, if the country is in danger and the Admiralty call them out.

Men belonging to the Royal Fleet Reserve are allowed to follow any occupation in civil life, except that telegraphists must undertake to follow their trade of wireless telegraph operator in civil life; and men are not allowed to join the Immediate Class if their employment takes them to sea for more than two or three days together.

Except in special cases, and even then leave cannot be granted for more than six months, no man is allowed to belong to the Royal Fleet Reserve if he ceases to reside in the United Kingdom, Channel Islands, or Isle of Man.

To be eligible for enrolment in the Royal Fleet Reserve, applicants must either be in possession of one or more good conduct badges, or have borne a satisfactory character generally throughout their active service, and in the case of applicants for enrolment in Class B and the Immediate Class, they must have been recommended by the commanding officer of their ship.

According to the Annual Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the total strength of the Royal Fleet Reserve on the 31st of December, 1913, was as follows:—

	Class A.	Class B.	Immediate Class.	Total.
Seamen and Naval Police ...	3,788	8,563	1,087	13,438
Stokers	2,260	5,659	1,290	9,209
Marines	1,745	2,981	389	5,115
Total	7,793	17,203	2,766	27,762

It is obvious from what has gone before, that the Royal Fleet Reserve, consisting as it does of men who have seen long, or at any rate considerable service in the Royal Navy and have been thoroughly trained in their respective duties—trained far better than any other auxiliary naval body can be in time of peace—must of necessity, so far as ratings are concerned, be our first and principal stand-by in time of war for service in the fleet.

No doubt this was the view taken by their Lordships, for in consequence of the success attending the formation of the Royal Fleet Reserve, and also looking at the fact that the numbers in the Royal Naval Reserve had reached probable requirements, recruiting for the latter body was suspended from December, 1904, until October, 1906.

In order to explain what follows it is necessary to go back for a time. Formerly, the officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve were

drilled in stationary drill-ships (old hulks) at various ports, at special batteries on the coast, and on board coast-guard ships. In 1897, the sailor classes were re-organized, and while the same general conditions as to drill remained in force, candidates for the "Qualified Seaman Class," then first established, were required to undergo six months' training in the Royal Navy—this period being reduced to three months in 1901.

Upon the abolition of the coast-guard ships in 1902, the second-class cruisers "Andromache," "Æolus," "Apollo," "Melampus," "Sappho" and "Spartan" were set apart as sea-going drill-ships for the Royal Naval Reserve, with their headquarters respectively at Harwich, Southampton Water, Holyhead, Queensferry, Queenstown, and Kingstown.

In his Annual Statement in 1905, the First Lord said:—"As anticipated, much larger numbers of the Royal Naval Reserve men have come forward for embarkation for three months' training, and the accommodation in the sea drill-ships proving insufficient, a number of seamen had to be sent to ships of the Home Fleet, which, as a rule, only take men of the qualified seaman class. This shows the growing popularity of the Royal Naval Reserve generally, attributable no doubt to improvements made in the conditions of service and more convenient facilities for training being given, especially the sea drill-ships. Recruits have come forward in such large numbers that the full strength voted for the various ratings was practically reached by the end of November, 1904."

An Order-in-Council, dated the 11th of July, 1905, provided for the transfer to the active list of the Royal Navy of officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who have been employed in the Fleet and have particularly distinguished themselves while so employed.

During this year, a Departmental Naval Reserves Committee sat, and reported on the 12th of October.

"In the 'Statement of Admiralty Policy' over the signature of Lord Cawdor, dated the 30th November, 1905, the following important pronouncement was made:—"The arrangements for the drill and training of men of the Royal Naval Reserve have been recently reviewed in order to improve the efficiency of this branch of the Reserves, and also to reduce its cost. Hitherto, Royal Naval Reserve men have been drilled on board the harbour drill ships and batteries established round the coasts of the United Kingdom, and a certain number have undergone a period of naval training on board the sea-going drill ships, or in ships of the Channel Fleet. This system is, however, no longer well adapted to the requirements of the Service, inasmuch as the greater part of the drill has been devoted to gunnery, a class of duty which is very unlikely to devolve upon Royal Naval Reserve men in war, and as (except perhaps the limited number of men who embark for nine months of naval training) they do not acquire and maintain sufficient knowledge of the general routine of a man-of-war. The establishment of the divisions of ships in commission in reserve has now given an opportunity for affording the Royal Naval Reserves the

training in which they have hitherto been wanting. These ships have only a portion of their crews on board, and can therefore accommodate a considerable number of Reserve men, with advantage both to themselves and their crews. Although the ships only go to sea for cruises once a quarter, the general routine is much the same as when they are fully commissioned for sea service, and since they will change frequently, the Reserve men will have more facilities for becoming familiar with the internal economy of a modern man-of-war. It has accordingly been decided that from the 1st April next, all drill at batteries and in harbour drill ships shall cease, and the establishments will be closed, except in a few cases, where the present system will be continued a little longer. These exceptions are the drill ships in London, Aberdeen, Bristol, and Liverpool, and the Royal Naval Reserve batteries at Penzance, Yarmouth, Wick, Stornoway, Lerwick, Greenock, Upper Cove, and Rosslare. Under this new system of training, the men will be expected to embark in the first year for three months, and thereafter for one month every alternate year."

The regulations for carrying into effect the foregoing policy were issued on the 29th of March, 1906; on the 31st of March five harbour drill ships and five torpedo gunboats were paid off, and twenty-five Royal Naval Reserve batteries closed; and on the 1st of April, 1906, the new system of training came into force.

Officers of the Royal Naval Reserve were given the option of drilling at the remaining drill stations under the old system for five years from the 1st of April, 1906, but on promotion they were required to embrace the new system.

Royal Naval Reserve men serving in the force on the 1st of April, 1906, were given the option of carrying out their drills at the remaining harbour ships or shore batteries during their current period of enrolment, or of adopting the new system, but upon re-enrolment they were required to fall in with the new system.

The remaining harbour drill ships and Royal Naval Reserve batteries were respectively and finally paid off and closed on the 31st of March, 1911.

Certain Reserve men, in addition to receiving pay while on drill or serving in the Fleet, and annual retainers, were, and are, entitled to deferred pensions, under conditions laid down, of £12 per annum upon attaining the age of sixty. However, it was decided that men who were for the first time entered in the Reserve, or were promoted from "Probationers" (sailor boys), after the 31st of March, 1906, would, subject to the discretion of the Admiralty, be granted a gratuity of £50 on discharge from the Reserve in lieu of pension.

To men who have to wait some years for a deferred pension, and who, in the event, may not live long enough to receive and enjoy it, this plan presented manifest attractions, and Lord Tweedmouth in his "Annual Statement" in 1907, said:—"The introduction of the gratuity of £50 after 20 years' service in lieu of pension at the age of 60 has apparently been much appreciated, as practically all the men who completed the necessary service since the 1st April have elected to take the gratuity."

With regard to naval instruction he added :—"The training under the new system is being carried out on board the ships of the Home Fleet, and the system has worked very satisfactorily, and has advantages over the former system, both as regards efficiency and economy."

As regards the conduct of the men, he stated :—"The commanding officers of His Majesty's ships in which the Reserve men have been embarked for training report satisfactorily on the men. Five hundred and thirty seamen and 230 stokers have been embarked for training since 1st April, 1906, in addition to the 587 stokers who served during the manœuvres, some of whom elected to count this service in lieu of their biennial training."

There are local branches of the Royal Naval Reserve in New Zealand and Newfoundland, and the First Lord further remarked :—"In the spring of 1906, some 120 of the 590 men forming the Newfoundland Reserve visited England during an extended cruise on board three of H.M. ships. The most favourable opinion was created by their general appearance, and the commodore in command of the squadron reported in high terms as to their conduct and efficiency."

In 1908 Lord Tweedmouth said :—"There is no doubt that the training under the new system is very valuable and will render the Royal Naval Reserve force a more efficient portion of the naval personnel. The fact that there is always a certain proportion of Royal Naval Reserve officers and men actually serving in the 'nucleus crew' ships at the three home ports is an additional advantage arising from the new system, as these officers and men are useful to the ships and are immediately available for mobilization. . . . In order to stimulate an interest in signalling and to encourage officers who have exhibited zeal for the subject, a short course of signals (lasting 14 days) was instituted this year for Royal Naval Reserve Officers. The signal course will take place each year at the Signal School at Portsmouth, the number of officers for each course being limited to ten. Twelve lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants, Royal Naval Reserve, have taken advantage of this course during 1907, and the superintendent of the Signal School rendered most satisfactory reports at the conclusion of the courses on the zeal and ability displayed by these officers. Instructions have also been issued for the training of officers in signals when employed afloat."

"The instruction of Royal Naval Reserve seamen, under the new system, in signals is also receiving attention, and arrangements have been made for special attention to be given to seamen showing an aptitude in signals."

"A modification in the qualifications required of midshipmen, Royal Naval Reserve, for advancement to the rank of acting sub-lieutenant, Royal Naval Reserve, has been made, as it was found that the period of service previously required resulted in officers of the rank of midshipmen, Royal Naval Reserve, attaining a position in the Mercantile Marine with which the rank of midshipman was not commensurate."

In the opinion of those acquainted with the unsatisfactory working of the former rules this was a welcome and much-needed reform.

In 1910, His Majesty the King was graciously pleased to institute a special decoration for Royal Naval Reserve officers, for good and long service, under the name of "The Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration," the regulations for its bestowal being very similar to those laid down for the Territorial Officers' Decoration. A large number of officers has been thus distinguished, and they have the letters "R.D." placed after their names in the "Navy List."

At the same time, a "Long Service and Good Conduct Medal" was authorized for the men of the Royal Naval Reserve, and many awards have been made.

In 1910, Mr. McKenna announced that "the training in the ships of the Home Fleet under the new system is very valuable, and will render the Royal Naval Reserve Force an efficient portion of the naval personnel.

"The number of officers serving in the gunnery and torpedo establishments at the home ports, and of officers and men undergoing periodical training in ships of the 3rd Division of the Home Fleet, increases as the new system becomes more generally adopted.

"Approval has recently been given to an amendment of the regulations governing the promotion of sub-lieutenants to the rank of lieutenant, Royal Naval Reserve. The main principle adopted in the new regulations is that all sub-lieutenants who have satisfactorily undergone courses and twelve months' training will, after attaining two years' seniority in that rank, be eligible for promotion to lieutenant, without regard to any fixed requirements of service in the Mercantile Marine. It is thought that this new ruling will operate more satisfactorily than the previous regulations, and will emphasize the importance of the twelve months' naval training.

"Sanction has been given to the payment of war retainers to engine-room artificers, Royal Naval Reserve, when called out on mobilization, so as to put these ratings on the same footing as seamen and stoker ratings."

The new regulations with regard to the promotion of sub-lieutenants to the rank of lieutenant, met a contention that I had more than once advanced that zeal, energy, and efficiency in naval duties should govern promotion rather than position in the Mercantile Marine.

In 1910, the formation of a Trawler Section of the Royal Naval Reserve was decided upon—a far-seeing and most valuable decision in view of the superlatively important and indispensable work now being carried out by our gallant "mine sweepers"—and the necessary regulations in connection with it were issued in October of that year.

The rank of skipper, Royal Naval Reserve, was constituted, and appointments to it are made by warrants from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. Skippers rank with but after warrant officers of the Royal Navy, and the first appointments were made in February, 1911.

Every candidate for this rank must have commanded a British steam trawler for at least two years and possess a Board of Trade certificate as skipper. The limits of age for entry are between 25 and 35 years, except in the case of a small number of short service skippers,

who may be entered for a period of five years only between the age of 35 and 45 years.

The other members of the trawler section are second hands, enginemen 1st and 2nd class, deck hands, and trimmers. The second hands and enginemen 1st and 2nd class, are classed as petty officers, Royal Navy; deck hands and trimmers as able seamen, Royal Navy; and stokers, 1st class, Royal Navy, respectively.

These various persons have to undergo a certain amount of training on board H.M. trawlers; and in addition to pay while serving, receive peace or war retainers, and a gratuity on final discharge, this last advantage not being extended to the short service men.

In 1913, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty once more decided, in order to meet the growing requirements of the Fleet, to enter a limited number of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants on a Supplementary List of the Royal Navy. Candidates for appointment to be selected from officers of the Royal Naval Reserve who had undergone, or were undergoing, twelve months' training in the Fleet. In exceptional cases, these officers will be eligible for promotion to the rank of commander.

Mr. Winston Churchill also announced that courses of strategy, international law, etc., had recently been approved for Royal Naval Reserve officers of the military branch; and that the entry and training of accountant officers had been arranged on the same lines as that of other branches of the Royal Naval Reserve. He added that a trial had been made of a new scheme of signal instruction for officers and men of the Mercantile Marine at London and Glasgow, and that since April, 1912, up to the end of November of the same year, 217 officers and 58 men had received instruction.

Mr. Winston Churchill further stated in the House of Commons that his naval colleagues had decided to advise British shipowners that it would be well for them to arm their vessels for their own protection, and that the Admiralty would lend the necessary guns and provide for the training of their crews.

In connection with the above advice, which was acted upon in a number of instances, a scheme was inaugurated to enter a limited number of probationary midshipmen, Royal Naval Reserve, and to train them in the Fleet with a view to providing officers in the Mercantile Marine competent to take charge of the self-defensive armament of merchant vessels. The course of training will last for a year and will take place on entry instead of a later date as heretofore.

The following was the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve on the 1st of January, 1914:—

Officers of the Military Branch	1,250
Probationary Midshipmen (new scheme)	51
Commissioned Engineer Officers	150
Assistant Paymasters (Accountants)	106
Warrant Engineers	174
Engine Room Artificers	546
Seaman ratings	10,223
Stoker ratings	5,019

Of the above military branch officers, 518 had undergone twelve months' training in the Fleet and were in receipt of training fees. In addition, 52 others were then serving, as well as 50 probationary midshipmen (new scheme).

There were also 135 staff-paymasters, paymasters, and assistant-paymasters on the active list, who are registrars and deputy registrars, Royal Naval Reserve.

A long list of retired officers exists, many of whom have undergone training in the Fleet, and some of whom are still of an age for active service, and are, in fact, employed in the present war.

Honorary officers need not be taken into consideration, as many of them are landsmen; they are untrained, have no duty to perform, and possess no executive command.

In March, 1914, Mr. Winston Churchill stated that the institution of a wireless telegraphy branch of the Royal Naval Reserve had been approved, and that enrolments would commence shortly.

By an Order-in-Council of the 14th of May, 1914, the rank of captain, Royal Naval Reserve, was created, and upon the occasion of the celebration of His Majesty's birthday, promotions were made both on the active and retired lists.

Another Order-in-Council, dated the 16th of July, 1914, instituted the rank of lieutenant-commander as a substantive one, to replace that of lieutenant of eight years' seniority.

Until the 13th of June, 1913, the eight years' seniority rank had been withheld from lieutenants, Royal Naval Reserve, and this had long been looked upon as a distinct and legitimate grievance.

Whatever may have been the case long ago, it cannot be said that of late years the Royal Naval Reserve has languished in the cold shade of official neglect, or has not been appreciated by the naval authorities and received due recognition from them.


On the 2nd of August war was declared against Germany, and the order was given for calling out the Royal Naval Reserve. Within forty-eight hours upwards of fifty per cent. of the men had been mobilized. In fact, they came forward so readily that it was difficult to dispose of all of them at once, and, with the exception of a few who may have been absent from the United Kingdom on long voyages, the whole number was quickly accounted for.

The rapidity with which the men of the Royal Naval Reserve, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur M. Farquhar, K.C.B., C.V.O., Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves, were got together, was due to the very complete plan of mobilization in existence, mainly elaborated by Mr. C. H. Jones, the Registrar-General of Shipping and Seamen, during many years' service in the department of which he is now the head; and zealously and efficiently carried into effect by himself and the different Registrars, Royal Naval Reserve, at the various ports, to all of whom the country owes a debt of gratitude.

The magnificent response accorded to the Royal Proclamation by the Royal Naval Reserve has not been any surprise to those having knowledge of the force, and is in itself a crushing reply to prejudiced critics who from time to time have asserted that it would not be forthcoming when called upon in an emergency.

Personally I, and others, have never ceased to combat those assertions, and now we stand fully justified in the sight of all.

Hitherto, for the last quarter of a century, I have occasionally written about the Royal Naval Reserve in time of "Peace," but when the present most just, righteous, and inevitable war is brought to a triumphant close by the Allied States, as there is no doubt it eventually will be, then I hope to have the opportunity of giving some account of the services of the Royal Naval Reserve in time of "War" in defence of our Sovereign and Empire.



THE IRISH BRIGADE: DILLON'S REGIMENT.

An Historical Summary of Dillon's Regiment will be found at p. 13, vol. I., of *Le Journal d'une femme de cinquante ans*, the eleventh edition of which has just been issued by the Librairie Chapelot, Paris. A translation will be read with interest in connection with my lecture on "The Irish Brigade in the Service of France."

IN 1688, Theobald, 8th Viscount Dillon, raised a regiment on his Irish estates in support of King James II. Two years later it was received into the French service under the command of his second son, Arthur by name. In 1728 he resigned the regiment to his eldest son, Charles, who succeeded as 10th Viscount in 1737, and soon afterwards transferred it to his younger brother, Henry. The latter became 11th Viscount in 1741, but retained command of the regiment until 1743. In that year Dettingen was fought, and the English, hitherto mere auxiliaries of Queen Maria Theresa, became her allies in the War of the Austrian Succession. In order to preserve his title and estates, Lord Dillon was compelled to quit the service of France. This he did with the consent, and, indeed, on the advice of Louis XV.

Thereupon his younger brother, James, was promoted Colonel of the family regiment; but he was killed at its head at Fontenoy. On that battlefield itself, Louis XV. named the dead hero's fourth brother, Edward, colonel of Dillon's; and he, too, met a glorious death while leading it against the English entrenchments at Laffeldt in 1747. Louis XV. was urged to give the regiment to a stranger in blood, on the plea that there were no Dillons fit to bear arms. But he remarked that Henry, 11th Viscount Dillon, had left a young family; and added that "he would never allow them to be deprived of a property cemented by so much bloodshed and such distinguished service, while any hope remained that the stock would be renewed." The regiment was, therefore, placed in temporary charge of colonels-commandant until 1767, when the 11th Viscount's second son, Arthur, became its colonel-proprietor at the age of 17.

When the Revolution broke out, the Irish Brigade was reduced to three regiments, viz., Dillon's, Berwick's and Walsh's. In 1794 their debris, including nearly all the officers, who had emigrated from France, was received into the English service. Dillon's was recruited up to full strength on the Irish estates, and its command was bestowed on Henry, third son of the 11th Viscount, and younger brother of Colonel Arthur Dillon, who had perished on the scaffold on 13th April, 1794. Soon afterwards it embarked for Jamaica, where the mortality among officers and men was so excessive that the regiment was perforce disbanded. The flags and mess equipage were sent back to Ireland,

and placed in charge of Charles, 12th Viscount Dillon. It will be seen that Colonel Count Aymar de Liederkerke-Beaufort, who has edited this intensely interesting diary, corroborates the opinion expressed by Captain Eric Dillon during the discussion which followed my lecture, that Dillon's was never merged in another unit.

The diarist was Charlotte Lucie, Marquise de la Tour du Pin, eldest daughter of the Colonel Arthur Dillon, whose execution was related in my lecture. At p. 306, vol. I., will be found a vivid word-picture of this gallant but luckless soldier. "My father," she writes, "was barely nineteen years older than myself, and seemed more like an elder brother. He had an aquiline nose, a small mouth, large dark eyes, and light brown hair. Mme. de Boufflers used to say that he reminded her of a parrot eating a cherry! In stature, grace and manly beauty he appeared a youth (at 43). No one had nobler manners and a more aristocratic mien than he. His wit, originality and sweet disposition made intercourse with him a perennial delight. He was my best friend, and at the same time my husband's comrade."

FRANCIS H. SKRINE.



SOME FRIENDS IN OUR PAY.

ATTENTION having been of late directed to the employment in the past under our Colours of soldiers of European nationalities other than British, a glance may not be without interest at the services their kind rendered to us in that fringe of the East known to our ancestors as "the Coast," and more familiar to us as the Madras Presidency.

Living amongst a population largely composed of mixed Portuguese descent, the authorities at Fort St. George naturally early sought at tense moments to expand their exiguous military force by enlisting their new and at least quasi-European subjects. The well-meant endeavour was unfortunately a failure. By 1686 it was abandoned, on the acidly expressed ground that "we can expect no very hearty service from such backward pitiful fellows." Auxiliaries were tentatively raised from them later, but never with any conspicuous success.

In 1696, Lieutenant James, and his younger brother Sergeant Francis, Hugonin, both of Swiss extraction, arrived with "a few" compatriots. They were gratefully absorbed in the garrison, and then for half a century no further attempt was made to tap the European continent.

But during the interval, several foreign officers appeared on the scene, and some of them, like the Hugonins, "behaved very well."

The brothers, with their following, put in some notable duty at Fort St. David, near Cuddalore, where Francis was appointed Chief Gunner. James had the misfortune to be kidnapped thence in 1711 by a neighbouring chieftain with a grievance, and was rigorously imprisoned at the rock fort of insalubrious Gingee, till 1713. He died at Madras in 1718, and his tomb may still be seen in that city. Francis retired in 1724, after having, it would seem, shaken the pagoda tree with some satisfaction.

Another treasure was Rodolf de Gingens, appreciatively summed up by a contemporary as "a Swiss gentleman, and, I believe, as brave as any of his nation, of great honour and some experience, having seen actions in the service of the Princes of Europe." He came out in 1742 with Major Charles Knipe, a veteran of 30 years' service, selected by the Directors to bring the meagre defences of Fort St. George up to date; took a conspicuous hand in subsequent troubles, and finished off by acting as local Commander-in-Chief for a space.

Less fortunate was Peter Eckman, a Swede, who, after trailing a musket in Flanders, fell under the alluring call of the East, and landed in India in 1706 as a "private Centinel." A varied course of unblemished conduct, pursued in face of adverse circumstances, found him a Captain forty years later and, as ill luck would have it, commanding the garrison at Madras when that unprepared settlement

succumbed to the French assault under M. de la Bourdonnais. It had been complacently unsuspected before, but he was then, too late, adjudged "superannuated and unable to bear the Fatigue." Regrettable unpleasantness ensued during the following hunt for a scapegoat, but finally Eckman secured a pension of 160 pagodas, and survived to draw it till 1758. When thus unkindly retired, he had put in 56 years' soldiering, nearly all spent under a tropical sun.

The Honourable Company were fond at this period of indenting upon foreigners to aid their embryo efforts at establishing a scientific corps. Three of their worst bad bargains was the retributive result.

In 1696, with a fine flourish of trumpets, they engaged Captain Frederick Matthew von Werlinhoffe for "Engineer Miner General and Covenant Servant," only to have him shortly returned on their hands as "a great charge to no purpose." The official career of Mr. Leopold Furstenburgh was even briefer and sadder. Within a few months of being appointed in 1709 to superintend an embryo gun factory, he was dismissed, and lightly levanted to the Great Mogul. Captain Alexander Delavaux, commissioned as "Chief Engineer and Captain of the Train of Artillery" in 1748, similarly took an early opportunity of making tracks for Pondicherry.

Undeterred by such minor disappointments, the reorganization of their scanty troops was no sooner commenced on the rendition of Fort St. George by chagrined M. Dupleix, than the Company turned wistfully again to cheap European recruiting grounds.

In 1751 an agreement was entered into with Sir Luke Schaub and Mr. Jasper Sellen for the raising of two companies of infantry in the Protestant Cantons of Switzerland, upon the following terms:—

1. Aspirants for enlistment were to be between the ages of 20 and 25, and to engage for seven years from date of landing.
2. Each company to consist of one captain valued at 10s. a day, two lieutenants at 5s. apiece, an ensign at 4s., six sergeants and a drum major each receiving 1s., six corporals, two drummers and a fifer at 1s. 2d., and 120 private centinels at 10d.
3. Captains to appoint their subalterns, and the subsequent promotion of these to go by seniority, unless for good reason to the contrary.
4. Captains to receive £7 levy per man, to provide bedding for the voyage, and be responsible for clothing.
5. A daily deduction of 2d. to be made from the men on account of vesture.

The establishment and pay were much the same as those of the Company's Europeans.

Agreeably to this covenant, eight officers and 231 men were duly put ashore at Madras during the earlier part of 1752. The officers were Captain John Chabbert, Lieutenants George Frederick Gaupp, Rodolf Wagner, and Ensign John Conrad Heidigger, of the 1st Company; Captain John Henry Schaub, Lieutenants Frederick de

Guntler, John Francis de Beck, and Ensign John Lewis Prevost, of the 2nd.

A few of the men hailed from Hanover and Alsace, but the great majority belonged to Geneva, Zurich, or Basle.

The party had no sooner been comfortably quartered, than their captains submitted claims for various privileges alleged to have been "possessed time immemorial" by "Swiss troops serving in Europe under the French, Spaniards, Sardinians, and Dutch." These mainly concerned the power to hold "councils of war" and to inflict punishments according to their own code; but liberty was also sought for wearing "a certain fixt uniform, different from the national troops, a particular manner of beating the drum," and exemption from "duties on certain commodities, such as wine, provision, etc." With the approval of Major Stringer Lawrence, Commanding on the Coast, these boons were conceded.

During the next two years, 279 men arrived to keep the ranks up to strength. After 1754 no more were enlisted, and in 1757 the Swiss companies were placed in all respects on the same footing as the Company's Europeans. These were formed into two battalions in 1758, and all the Swiss then present on the coast were drafted into them.

Meanwhile in 1753, a company of Swiss artillery had come upon the scene. Its composition and pay were laid down at one captain, drawing £200 per annum; first lieutenant £100; second and third lieutenants £90; six sergeants 2s. each daily; six corporals and 30 bombardiers at 1s. 8d.; 30 gunners at 1s. 6d.; 40 matrosses and two drummers at 1s.

These were at prevailing rates, but probably the full strength was not realized.

The roll on the good ship "Montfort" which brought out the Company has happily been preserved, and particularized its gallant members as follows:—

Captain Lewis D'Illens	...	Lucerne	age 30	} Gentlemen.
2nd Lieut. George Hilffer	...	Hanover	" 40	
Lieut. Jean Francis Paschoud	...	Berne	" 26	
Cadet Jean Jacques Vouga	...	Neufchatel	" 20	} Labourers.
" Francis Flaction	...	Yverdies	" 22	
" David Wird	...	St. Gall	" 24	
" Jean Henri Solikeffer	...	"	" 21	
" Jean Carl Erdman	...	Saxony	" 21	
" Francis Louis Tribolet	...	Berne	" 33	} Gentlemen.
" Francis Lauzun	...	"	" 19	
" Nicolas Bonjour	...	"	" 19	Watchmaker.

4 sergeants, 3 corporals, 5 bombardiers, 20 gunners, 27 matrosses, and 1 drummer; drawn from Switzerland, Frankfort, Lubeck, Wurtemberg, Hesse Cassel, Nuremberg, and other places in the Fatherland.

In 1756 the artillery were reorganized, and Swiss officers and men distributed amongst the two companies formed.

On the 1st January of that year Government, having been much moved by disputes as to precedence, issued "A List of Officers doing duty on the Coast of Chromandel in the Service of the Honourable East India Company"; an engaging document which discloses the names and dates of commission of several foreign officers. Amongst them were :

—	Date of Brevets.	Dates of Commissions.	What Corps.
<i>Captains.</i>			
Francis de Vareilles	21st July, 1751	—	Eng. Inf. Coast.
John Henry Schaub	—	21st Nov., 1751	Swiss "
Paul Polier de Bottens	—	18th Dec., 1751	" Inf. Bay (Bengal)
George Frederic Gaupp	—	3rd Aug., 1752	" " Coast.
Lewis d'Illens	—	30th Dec., 1752	Train Coast.
<i>Lieutenants.</i>			
Frederick Guntler	—	21st Nov., 1751	Swiss Inf. Coast.
Alexander Peyer Imhoff	—	18th Dec., 1751	" Bay.
Rodolf Wagner	—	3rd Aug., 1752	" " Coast.
Stephen Augustus Monchanin	—	1st Nov., 1753	Eng. Inf. Coast.
<i>Second Lieutenants.</i>			
John Francis De Beck	—	21st Nov., 1751	Swiss Inf. Coast.
Claud Philip Lutin	—	8th April, 1754	" " "
John Francis Paschoud	—	21st July, 1755	Train Coast.
Conrad Ziegler	—	13th Oct., 1755	Swiss Inf. Bay.
<i>Ensigns and Fireworkers.</i>			
John Vouga	—	7th Nov., 1753	Eng. Inf. Coast.
Francis Flaction	—	24th Dec., 1753	" " "
Daniel Frischman	—	8th April, 1754	Swiss Inf. Coast.
Ferdinand Jarger	—	10th June, 1754	" " "
John Charles Erdman	21st Jan., 1754	—	Fireworker Coast.
Nicolas Bonjour	22nd June, 1754	—	" " "
Leonard Parrot	—	13th Oct., 1755	Swiss Inf. Coast.

The ink was hardly dry on this document when news was received of the troubles in the "Bay," culminating in the terrible tragedy of "the Black Hole of Calcutta"; and as soon as possible a large portion of the available troops was hurried off to retrieve the situation. Lieuts. Paschoud, Erdman, Bonjour, and Charles de Torriano of the artillery; Captain Gaupp, Lieut. Joucher, Ensigns Vouga and Flaction of the infantry, accompanied the expedition. The two Ensigns died before the year was out; Gaupp was wounded at the Battle of Plassey.

Torriano (not mentioned before) was a scion of a family who had discovered India half a century previously. A relative of his, in the Bombay Artillery, leapt into fame as the gallant defender of Honore in 1783, and closed a lambent career as Colonel of the Kensington Volunteers. The name has been continuously represented amongst the Gunners ever since.

In September, 1758, the Madras troops serving in Bengal were transferred to the establishment of that revived Presidency. But some of the officers returned to the south, and, as will be seen below, one of

them was young Nicolas Bonjour, erstwhile watchmaker of beautiful Berne.

The course of events and the urbane laws of seniority had meanwhile wafted Captain Paul Polier de Bottens into the position of the one only major frugally allowed at a time on the Coast. He was an old fellow by now, and his lot strangely resembled that of ancient Captain Peter Eckmån; for he was in command at Fort St. David when that bulwark capitulated to ill-fated Thomas Arthur, Count de Lally, on 4th June, 1758. After that event, of course, Mr. Robert Orme, historian, and other critics, arose to point out that they had always objected to the advancement of an alien officer; but Major Polier was suffered to retire in peace.

The incident has another interest in that it led to the promotion by selection, over the heads of several horrified seniors, of Captain John Caillaud; and that gentleman was himself of French Huguenot extraction. He had served in Onslow's (presently 8th King's) regiment at Fontenoy and Culloden before joining the Company's service, wherein he rose to merited eminence. Several other Frenchmen served under our Colours soon afterwards; whilst Admiral Peter Rainier not only did them credit at sea, but left by his will most of the £250,000 prize money he had acquired to the nation which had extended him shelter and honour.

At the end of 1754, 68 foreigners, 50 of them Germans, deserted from the French to our camp, and were allotted to the Swiss companies.

An intermittent dribble from the same source ensued during the next four years, at the end of which the Governor and Council were delivered of the following resolution:—"In order to encourage desertion among the enemy's troops, it is ordered that the deserters be formed into a separate company, with officers who are conversant with their language, that they may apply to them for redress upon occasion; and agreed, that Captain Monchanin have the charge of the same company."

Upon receipt of which lucubration, Colonel Stringer Lawrence inserted in Garrison Orders:—"The foreigners who have left the French service and entered into that of the Honourable Company, to be drafted from the companies in the two battalions in order to be formed into a company commanded by Captain de Monchanin, Ensigns Faizan, Bonjour, and Villarette."

The scheme prospered, and in 1760 the wily Colonel (afterwards Sir Eyre Coote foreshadowed a further development. "As our French company" he reported, "is increasing daily, and I want to save our people as much as I can by their means, I have formed the following scheme, which is to make the best of their sergeants an officer, and to pick out 50 men who I intend calling volunteers, and who are always to be ready upon any particular attack where I may expect to lose men."

Accordingly the heroes were selected, and Ensign Rodolf Marchand placed at their head.

With the fall of Pondicherry in 1761 an embarrassing number of our late foes were thrown on our hands. Lieutenant Martin, the future founder of the Martinière at Lucknow, had previously joined our service, and a "free company consisting of infantry and artillery" was packed off under him to the Bay.

In August, 1762, two more "French companies" sailed with the expedition to Manila, but unhappily failed to justify the high expectations formed of them. In December the authorities in the island had "the mortification" to report that 20 men had bolted, and that the remainder, "particularly as they are Catholics," evinced strong inclination to follow their example. They unanimously did so before the troops were withdrawn in 1764.

A troop of "foreign Hussars," which had been acclaimed on the strength in 1762, shared in the operations before Madura of 1763-4 and were likewise despatched north in 1767.

During the latter year, after the defeat of their Mysorean allies at Vaniambaddy, another troop of "about 50 French Hussars" under Captain Aumont, placed their sabres at our disposal.

Six months afterwards, a valiant programme for a "Foreign Legion" was adumbrated, and Government thus addressed Major Bonjour:—

"Having determined to entertain a body of foreigners in our service, it has been resolved to put them under your command; you will therefore repair to Vellore, and endeavour to form the companies, and discipline them as soon as possible.

"Captain Aumont is to command a troop of hussars, and has Chevalier and Dumard for his subalterns. Captain Allie is to command a company of infantry composed two-thirds of European foreigners, and the rest of Topasses. He has as yet no lieutenant or ensign. Pedro Manuel is also nominated for Captain, and is to command a Portuguese Topass Company, to whom Antonio Lewis is lieutenant . . .

"The Infantry shall each have a light jacket of green, faced with red, and a cap given them this year, and the next year full clothing; they should have breeches and stockings, all in one, with black gaiters which they must provide themselves . . .

"The intention of forming these people is to use them as light troops, and to serve as escorts in detached parties to alarm, or attack the enemy . . .

"The officers and private men having engaged to serve the Company for one year certain, you will please to make each of them sign the enclosed agreement for that purpose."

Alas! peace befell in 1769, and the fond dream of a Foreign Legion clad in engaging green never materialised. Instead, two existing companies were incorporated with another of Coffres, lately raised in Madagascar, and Captain Aumont's gay Hussars given the painful alternative of transfer to these, or discharge.

Nothing more is heard of foreign troops until in January, 1782, during the progress of the Second Mysore War, the Directors concluded an "agreement in conformity with which two regiments were raised

in Hanover for service in the East Indies, by permission of the Elector, H.M. George III."

Enlistment was for seven years.

Pay, rank and duty the same as those of King's corps in India.

All expenses whatever paid by the Company, who also granted a £5 levy for each recruit.

Passage allowed for two women per company, but no children.

Command and promotions depended on His Majesty's will and pleasure.

Discipline conformed to the ordinances of the Electorate.

Strength: one regiment of two battalions. Each battalion of eight fusilier, one grenadier, and one light company. Each company 100 men, of all ranks.

Battalion staff: one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one captain-lieutenant. One adjutant-major ranking as lieutenant, another as ensign, and a chaplain as lieutenant. One surgeon, two cadets, five surgeon's mates, "like sergeants." One drum major "as sergeant." Four musicians as "lance-corporals," one armourer, and one provost "as private."

To each company one captain, two lieutenants, one ensign, three sergeants, one clerk, three corporals, two drummers, 12 lance-corporals, 74 privates.

The company provided two 3 or 6-pounder guns per battalion, and for their service an additional sergeant, two corporals, and 12 cannoniers were borne by that unit.

A slight departure from the agreement was actually made by the formation of two regiments of one battalion instead of one of two; and they temporarily embellished history as the 15th and 16th Hanoverians. Colonel Reinhold commanded the former, Colonel Wangenheim the latter. I am regrettedly ignorant of the names of their subordinates.

At the end of October, the 15th were landed at Madras from a fleet under Admiral Sir R. Bickerton, which brought out large reinforcements; and next January, when the army was assembled, Colonel Reinhold was placed in charge of the 1st line, whilst his corps was posted to its 1st brigade.

February, 1783, was consumed in a leisurely and innocuous pursuit of Tippoo Sultan and his French allies; Vellore was relieved in March, and the troops setting out thence on April 21st, eventually arrived before Cuddalore on June 7th. The position they occupied was two miles south of the town, and stretched for an equal distance in a westerly direction from the sea to a low range of hills. The French immediately began to strengthen the boundary hedge upon their front by supplementing it with a line of parapet, three bastions, and several batteries.

On the 12th orders were issued for an attack early the next morning, and these disclose for the first time the presence of the 16th Hanoverians.

The assault was to be delivered by three columns, that in the centre being privileged to contain the two battalions from the Electorate.

By dawn of the 13th an advanced party of the left column duly reached the hills for which it was bound, and halted on an eminence from which it could see along the rear of the French line, without being able materially to discompose its occupants. It was supported by its comrades of the grenadiers from the European regiments, a King's and two native battalions. The whole marched at 8.30 against the enemy's right redoubt. They made, however, little progress against the heavy fire opened upon them, and were compelled to retire.

The right attack was similarly held up.

At 10 o'clock the centre column was launched, with yet more lamentable results. Not only was the effort a failure, but our opponents, excitedly leaving their shelter, cruelly expedited for a quarter of a mile the party's strategic movement to the rear.

The situation was saved by an undismayed native battalion which seized the redoubt. It was ably seconded by the rested left column, and by the time firing ceased, towards 5 p.m., a portion of the hotly contested lines was in our hands.

The French evacuated them during the night, removing their heavy guns, but abandoning some field pieces.

Our losses were heavy, and the Hanoverians had 66 killed and 156 wounded.

Although the grenadiers were complimented next day in general orders, the behaviour of the centre column aroused unfavourable comment.

On the 16th, Admiral Suffren landed a reinforcement of 1,200 men. Next day he engaged and beat off a fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, the "Old Durbar" of contemporary cynics; and returning to his anchorage, sent 2,400 bluejackets ashore.

Stimulated by these proceedings, the French made a lively sally early on the 25th. It was beaten off with trifling loss upon our side, and amongst the prisoners taken was Sergeant Bernadotte, destined in the future to ascend the throne of Sweden.

To him Colonel Wanganheim extended friendly hospitality; repaid, it is said, some years later when their positions were reversed by the fortunes of war, and the old Hanoverian had to give up his sword to Marshal Bernadotte.

On the 2nd July, news arrived of the peace concluded at home, and hostilities terminated.

Colonel Fullerton was at this time engaged in arduous but successful operations against various truculent Polygars around Tinnevely and Madura, and most of the force no longer required at Cuddalore was directed to await him at Dindigul. It arrived there at the end of August. Colonel Fullerton joined it during the next month, and the detachments of the 15th and 16th Hanoverians were posted to the 1st line.

October was spent in a parlous tramp through the Annamully forests, under incessant heavy rain. But the strongly stockaded fort of Palghautcherry, reached on 5th November, surrendered on the 13th,

and a share in the 50,000 pagodas found within it assuaged the sufferings of its captors.

Peace was patched up with the Sultan of Mysore in March, 1784, and the sorely tried Hanoverians then returned to cantonments at Madras.

They had not long settled down there, when an official decree reducing allowances created a mighty ferment. Protests poured in from every corps, amongst them being one signed by Major Honey and 17 other officers of the Hanoverians. Eventually, during January, 1785, threatened trouble at Poonamallee was averted by the bland action of Colonel Wangenheim, supported by 400 of his beloved 16th, and a compromise resulted.

In 1788, the 15th Hanoverians were employed in the peaceful penetration of the Gunttoor district, and mustered 35 officers and 568 rank and file.

A muster roll of European troops serving in the Presidency in November, 1789, gives the 14th as parading 558 men, and the 15th, 571; 443 of these were time expired or invalids. Each battalion had 12 companies.

What was the reason for the altered numbers, I am unable to say.

13 officers and 200 men of the 14th furnished part of the firing party detailed early in October, 1791, for the funeral of Lieutenant Colonel Moorhouse, at St. Mary's Church, Fort St. George.

The corps must have left India soon after. They were not present when the army was concentrated for the Third Mysore War in 1792.

In 1794, four Dutch companies of infantry were temporarily entertained. They were borrowed from the Batavian garrison of Ceylon, and three of them shortly returned to the Island where every prospect is said to please.

The misunderstanding with Holland in 1795, and the immediate conquest of Ceylon which ensued, introduced us to the Swiss battalion of the Comte de Meuron and a company of Wurtembergers, who were received into our service during 1796.

The history and exploits of the Regiment de Meuron are too well known to need recapitulation.

68 Wurtembergers shared in the expedition of 1796 to the Spice Islands, and a melancholy remnant of 36 survived to be again employed there in 1801.

Most of these notes have been compiled from Colonel H. D. Love's "Vestiges of Madras" (Indian Records Series), the Rev. F. Penny's "The Church in Madras," and the "History of the Madras Army," by the late Colonels R. S. and W. J. Wilson; the last a standard tome exasperatingly unprovided with an index, and so entailing much trying labour upon affectionate research. They are submitted merely as incomplete gleanings from a field which has long fascinated the writer.

E.E.F.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK.

Epitomized from an article in the August number of the *Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine*.

By GENERAL KLINGELHÖFFER.

BEGINNING by the reminder that, unlike the other arms, the infantry is often worn out *before* the commencement of the advance on its objective, the writer points out that the infantryman, more than any other fighting man, has to rely upon himself, and is able to be influenced in a less degree than the horseman or the gunner by the presence or example of his superiors—owing, of course, to the great extension of the modern firing line. The support required by infantry—moral and material—can only be afforded by the artillery; their guns must actually accompany infantry so that this arm may be revived and urged forward by their thunder, and by the knowledge that they are immediately at hand. The General says that the ability of the guns to do this has often been denied; it had been denied in 1866, but was done in 1870, the guns being, on occasion, driven right up into the firing line, as on the 18th August, at St. Privat, on the right flank of the attack by the Prussian Guards. The intervention here of the guns was decisive, and the losses among the detachments were not heavy in comparison with those of the infantry—artillery, 11 per cent., infantry, 35 per cent., and in those days guns were not shielded.

The author utters a word of warning against expecting too much of the actual effect of artillery fire, and seems to suggest that there may be a disposition not to risk guns when no great material effect seems likely to result. If guns, in moving to an advanced position, come under a very heavy or even devastating fire, they can at once come to "action front," and fire can be opened from behind the shields. "But this," it may be objected—the check to the artillery advance, "may have a doubly disheartening effect on the infantry it is supporting?" "Certainly not," is the reply, "for so long as the infantry *hear* the guns at hand, it is immaterial whether they are a few hundred yards or so further off." The artillery should regard it as an honour to share equally the losses with the infantry: in the war of 1870, the infantry casualties amounted to 17.6 per cent., those of the artillery only to 6.5 per cent., the losses in the cavalry to no more than 6.3 per cent.

But, above everything, we must win, and we can only hope to do so when the infantry actually gets home on the enemy. Doubtless the infantry expect to do this "on their own," but, at the same time, the

work should be lightened for them, and as far as possible made certain, all the more that there are many modern influences which oppose the power of self-sacrifice.

Infantry are, of course, supported, to a minor extent, by machine gun fire; but the enemy also possesses these, and his are shielded. These must be engaged by artillery, and at such short ranges as admit of observation and accuracy of fire, as when the enemy may bring these up in the final stages of the infantry attack. Therefore, it is always desirable that the infantry attack should be accompanied by guns.

The writer disapproves of the suggestions made by some writers that only single guns or sections should accompany the infantry attack; he would have as many batteries pushed forward as will be required to exert a moral influence over every portion of the firing line; he proposes, at least, one battery per infantry regiment (*anglice*—brigade.) He does not forget the difficulty of ammunition supply, but has no suggestions to offer as to how this may be overcome.

Orders for the accompanying artillery should be issued with those for the infantry attack, in order that the artillery and infantry commanders may confer together; this is rarely practised during peace manoeuvres. The author lays much stress upon the artillery *accompanying* the infantry attack, as obviating any risk of the infantry being fired into from behind by their own guns. He states that nothing is more likely to bring an infantry advance to a standstill than this, while when guns are seen firing in line with the infantry attack, other guns, supporting from further in rear, can have no excuse for failing to recognize their own infantry.

But it is not only during the infantry advance that the accompaniment of artillery is necessary; the guns will also be wanted when the enemy's position is reached, and when it may be necessary to engage reserves or other hostile bodies, which have not yet been brought into action, and if guns have to be specially driven up from the rear for this purpose they will usually arrive too late. The French manner of fighting particularly requires that the German guns should be well forward, since one must, with the French, be always on the look-out for something of the nature of a counter-attack—certainly after entry into the position, there will always be the counter-offensive by the general reserve, which may be delivered with decisive effect against the exhausted and disordered infantry attackers, especially if supported by the fire of guns till then held back. At such a moment even the batteries accompanying the infantry will not be sufficient, but steps must be taken to have strong artillery support immediately available.

What has been said about guns applies equally to machine guns. The regulations as to the employment of these seem equally based upon the fear of loss, for it is actually laid down that machine guns should not be too readily advanced, lest a repulse might cause their capture! The author, however, sensibly observes that it is just to assist in the avoidance of such repulses that they *ought* to be advanced, and the occasional loss of a few machine guns cannot properly be set against the importance of the reverse they may help to beat off.

SECRETARY'S NOTES.

I.—Council.

The Council regret to announce the death of General J. H. Bor, C.B., C.M.G., Royal Marine Artillery, a Member of the Council. General Bor joined the Institution in 1897, became a Member of the Council in 1898, and was Chairman in 1912.

The Council also regret to announce the death of Colonel Sir Lonsdale A. Hale, Kt., late R.E. Sir Lonsdale Hale joined the Institution in 1871, became a Member of the Council in 1884, and was Chairman in 1913. He was also Chairman of the JOURNAL and Library Committees from 1895 to 1913. In 1913 he was awarded the Chesney Gold Medal by the Council in recognition of his long connection with home and foreign military literature.

(A short obituary is inserted elsewhere in the JOURNAL).

II.—Officers Joined.

The following officers joined the Institution during the months of August, September and October:—

Captain L. G. Hart, I.A.

Colonel A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., General Staff, I.A.

Second-Lieutenant F. B. F. Bibby, 1st Life Guards.

Second-Lieutenant Viscount Ipswich, Coldstream Guards.

Lieutenant A. E. P. Lyons, R.N.

Owing to the war there will, unfortunately, be a large decrease in the membership of the Institution (up to the end of October 63 members have either been killed in action or died of their wounds), and the Council hope, therefore, that members will use every endeavour to induce officers to join.

III.—Closing of the Institution Building.

The Council beg to state that the whole of the Institution building, with the exception of the Secretary's office and the Library and a portion of the Crypt, have been taken over by His Majesty's Government for the use of the Official Press Bureau. The Council regret, therefore, that until the end of the war members will be unable to use the building; letters, however, can be obtained by applying to the Hall Porter as heretofore. The Museum remains open.

IV.—Gold Medal Essay (Naval) 1914.

The Council have decided that owing to the War, the Gold Medal for 1914 for the Naval Essay will not be awarded; also that the Military Essay for 1915 must stand in abeyance.

The following Naval Essay has already been received:—

"Where law ends, tyranny begins," and the writer is requested to communicate with the Secretary, who will be pleased to return it on application.

V.—Lectures.

Owing to practically the whole of the lectures which had been announced for the coming session having now fallen through, and the occupation of the Theatre by His Majesty's Government, the Council regret that the lectures must cease for the present.

VI.—Journal.

At the meeting of the Council held in October last the question of continuing the publication of the JOURNAL was considered. Owing, however, to there being no proceedings of meetings to report, and the supply of articles having almost entirely ceased, the Council reluctantly decided that they would be compelled to cease publishing the JOURNAL until after the war.

VII.—Lending Library.

The Library is now closed, but members of the Lending Library can obtain books on written application.

VIII.—Naval and Military Scraps, etc.

The Naval and Military Prints and a large number of small Engravings and Illustrations which are kept in portfolios have now been catalogued, and it is hoped that this will be found of great use to members when the Institution is again opened.

IX.—Additions to the Museum.

- (3420) First Field Gun captured from the Germans by the 1st Bn. The Lincolnshire Regiment, date and place at present unknown.—Deposited by the Army Council.
- (3421) The following Head-dresses, captured from the Germans, date and place at present unknown, viz. :—
 Prussian Guards' Helmet.
 German Infantry Helmet.
 Uhlran Cap.—Deposited by *The Daily Express*.
- (6738) An Aquatint published in 1817 by Edward Orme, entitled "Review of the British Troops, Montemarte, near Paris, by the Duke of Wellington, 31st October, 1815."
- (6739) An Aquatint published in 1817 by Edward Orme entitled "Encampment of the British Army in the Bois de Boulogne, 1815."
- (6740) An Engraving in Colours entitled "A Peep into Camp," by "Corporal Trim," published in 1797 by W. S. Fores.
- (6741) An Engraving of Major John André, late Adjutant-General of the British Army in North America.
- (6742) An Engraving of Field-Marshal Earl Harcourt, when Lieutenant-Colonel of the 16th Light Dragoons, taking prisoner General Lee, Commander of the American Army; from a drawing by J. S. Templeton, and published by Englemann.
- (6743) An Engraving entitled "A Correct View of the Hessian Camp at Barton Farm, near Winchester," with an explanation of the tents and a description of the Army at Divine Service, by William Godson, Land Surveyor to the Right Worshipful Corporation of Winchester, published in 1756.
- (6744) A Line Engraving, dated 1760, of the Camp near Winchester, under the command of Major-General the Earl Effingham, consisting of the following regiments :—34th Foot, Berkshire, Dorsetshire, Bedfordshire, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire Militia.

- (6745) An Engraving by the Emery Walker Process of the portrait of Lieutenant-General Albert Borgard, first Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, from the picture in possession of the donor. The original is believed to have been painted by Sir Godfrey Kneller about 1720.—Given by B. H. de Bertodano, Esq.
- (6746) Boer Shell taken on the occupation of Pretoria by the British Troops during the South African War, 1899—1902.—Given by Major A. J. Menzies, late Gloucester Regt.
- (6747) The following Exhibits collected from the various battlefields in the to Crimea during recent years :—
- 6749) (1) Cap Plate, 17th Lancers.
 (2) Shako Plates and Badges, etc., of the following Corps :—Royal Artillery (3), Grenadier Guards, Scots Guards, 4th, 7th, 17th, 19th (3), 23rd, 30th, 33rd, 49th, 68th, 77th, and 88th Regiments of Foot.
 (3) Portions of the Belt Plates of the following :—33rd, 55th, 72nd, 88th and 97th Foot.
 (4) Officer's embroidered Badge of the Scots Guards.
 (5) Buttons of the following Regiments :—Staff, Royal Artillery, Royal Sappers and Miners, Army Ordnance Corps, Grenadier Guards (2), Scots Guards (2), and the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 34th, 49th, 57th, 60th, 63rd, 68th, 88th, 90th, 95th, and 97th Foot.
 (6) A Soldier's Clay Pipe, "A French Souvenir," bearing the Flags of England and France upon it.
 (7) Portion of a Soldier's Knife marked "Corporal F. Watkins."
 (8) The remains of a Soldier's Water-bottle taken out of a well.—Presented by Alexander Murray, Esq. (formerly British Consul at Sevastopol).
- (6750) Photograph of a painting of H.R.H. Prince Edward, Duke of Kent, by James Gillray, in the historical collection in the Public Library, Toronto.—Given by J. Ross Robertson, Esq.

The attention of members is drawn to the Museum Purchase Fund.

The amount taken at the Museum Public Entrance during August was £68 11s. 6d.; September, £52 10s. 6d.; October, £192 14s. 3d.

X.—Cavalry Journal.

Owing to the absence of the Managing Editor, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arthur Leatham, and the whole of the Editorial Staff, who are actively employed, it has been found quite impossible to bring out the October issue of the "Cavalry Journal."

The Managing Editor hopes, however, that the Journal will resume its issues when the war is over, and possibly pick up the numbers which at present will not be published.

Meanwhile it is hoped that subscribers will continue their subscriptions as heretofore.



Photo—Pierre Petit, Paris.

GENERAL J. J. C. JOFFRE,
Commanding the Allied Forces in the Western Field of Operations.

For Biographical Notice see over.

THE WAR.

ITS NAVAL SIDE.

Preliminary Naval Movements.

It has been deemed advisable to deal with the naval operations of the war chronologically, arranged in four divisions, *viz.*, North Sea, Baltic, Mediterranean, and the Protection and Capture of Commerce. In the present volume, the narratives are brought down to October. Conjoint naval and military expeditions for the subjugation of the German colonies are treated separately.

EVENTS PRECEDING DECLARATION OF WAR.—Diplomatic relations between Austria and Servia were broken on July 25th. At midnight on the following day, the first precautionary measures were ordered by the Admiralty. In the last issue of this JOURNAL, there was described in the Naval Notes the test mobilization of the Third Fleet which had been ordered by the Admiralty some months before, and which was carried out on July 15th and subsequent days; the assembly of the First, Second and Third Fleets, destroyer and submarine flotillas, etc., at Spithead, where they were inspected by King George on July 19th and 20th; and the fleet exercises in the Channel which followed the inspection, terminating on July 24th, when the First Fleet proceeded to Portland and the others to their home ports. It had been arranged that manœuvre leave should be given to the First Fleet. This was cancelled by the following notice, issued by the Admiralty, as already stated, at midnight on the 26th:—"Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave for the present. All vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at their home ports in proximity to their balance crews." On July 27th, Austria formally declared war against Servia. On July 29th, the First Fleet left Portland. On July 30th, Germany demanded that Russia should stop the mobilization of her forces, to which Russia replied that it was technically impossible to do this. A proclamation of martial law by the Kaiser followed.

WAR DECLARATIONS.—On August 1st, Germany declared war upon Russia. On August 2nd, German troops invaded Luxembourg and Belgium, and the same afternoon the British Admiralty called up the naval reserves. Some of the latter who had voluntarily served afloat for the test mobilization had only returned to their homes a week previously. The response was very prompt, and the Admiralty were able on August 3rd to issue the following notice:—"The mobilization of the British Navy was completed in all respects at four o'clock this morning. This is due to the measures taken and to the voluntary response of the Reserve men in advance of the Royal Proclamation which has now been issued. The entire navy is now on a war footing." On the same day, a state of war came about between France and Belgium on the one side, and Germany on the other, owing to the infringement of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium. On the morning of August 4th, the British Government's ultimatum to Germany was despatched; owing to its summary rejection it was officially announced from the Foreign Office that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on August 4th.

DISPOSITION FOR WAR.—The disposition of the British Fleets and Squadrons at the time immediately preceding the declaration of war will be found in the

official "Navy List" for August. Since then, no information with regard to the disposition or movements of any vessels of the Allies has been permitted to appear in the newspapers at home, except such information as is contained in the official announcements of the Secretary of the Admiralty issued from the Press Bureau. A Press censorship was established some few days before the constitution of the Press Bureau on August 11th. The steps taken to maintain secrecy in regard to naval and military operations and movements have been very successful. Nothing whatever was published during the transport of the Expeditionary Force to the Continent, and in spite of the large character of the undertaking, and of the measures of naval protection, including those of submarines and aircraft, which were being executed, no information appeared until the operation was quite completed. The patriotic and loyal co-operation of the Press which made this silence possible was generously acknowledged in Parliament.

BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—On the evening of August 4th, it was officially announced that Vice-Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe had assumed command of the Home Fleets, with the acting rank of Admiral. Sir John had been nominated to this command in July, and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick T. Hamilton was appointed to succeed him as Second Sea Lord, but in other circumstances he was not to take up the post until the end of the year. Admiral Sir George Callaghan, however, under whom the fleets had been trained for nearly three years, handed over the command to a younger Admiral fresh from the Board, and hauled down his flag, undertaking special duty on the Admiralty War Staff, where his organizing talents and long sea experience might be utilized for the country's benefit. Rear-Admiral C. E. Madden was appointed Chief of the Staff to Sir John Jellicoe.

AUXILIARY WARSHIPS.—Numerous other appointments took place at this time, both of active and retired officers, especially in connection with the large number of merchant vessels taken up for the service of the navy. Nearly 30 liners and fast steamers were shown in the September "Navy List" as having been taken over by the fleet, and many of these were commissioned as auxiliary cruisers. About a dozen vessels were fitted out as hospital ships, and 35 others as mercantile fleet auxiliaries. A much larger number of "auxiliary small craft" were commissioned for patrol duty in the North Sea or as mine-sweepers. Among the armed yachts in the former category were two placed under the command of Admiral Sir Alfred Paget and Vice-Admiral James Startin respectively, who retired from the active list and received temporary commissions as commander and lieutenant-commander in the Royal Naval Reserve in order to undertake this patriotic work. Many other yachtsmen received temporary or honorary commissions as Royal Naval Reserve officers on volunteering for duty in the auxiliary small craft. A Motor-Boat Reserve was also organized as a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, administered by a committee at the Admiralty, of which Admiral Sir Frederick Inglefield was appointed President.

PURCHASED WARSHIPS.—Prior to the declaration of war, the Admiralty exercised their right of pre-emption upon the vessels building in Great Britain for foreign navies. The purchase of these ships added two battleships, two scout-destroyers, and three monitors or gunboats to the fleet. The battleships were the "Reshadieh" and "Sultan Osman I." completing for Turkey at Barrow and Elswick respectively, which were renamed "Erin" and "Agincourt." [Excision by Censor.] The scout-destroyers were intended for Chile, having been built by Messrs. White & Sons, at Cowes, and were renamed "Broke" and "Faulknor." The monitors had been constructed by Messrs. Vickers for Brazil, and were known as the "Javary" class. They were renamed "Severn," "Humber," and "Mersey," and rendered good service off the Belgian coast in October.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS.—The September "Navy List" showed that ten additional flag officers had taken up appointments afloat, hoisting their flags in ships of the Second and Third Fleets. Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir A. E. Bethell, in the "Vengeance," became Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battleships of the Third Fleet. The other officers were of Rear-Admiral's rank. Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant hoisted his flag in the "Drake"; Rear-Admiral H. L. Tottenham in the "Albion" (afterwards transferred to the "Sutlej"); Rear-Admiral D. R. S. De Chair in the "Crescent"; Rear-Admiral H. H. Campbell in the "Bacchante"; Rear-Admiral R. S. Phipps Hornby in the "Doris" (afterwards transferred to the "Glory"); Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss in the "Charybdis" (afterwards transferred to the "Euryalus"); Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby in the "Queen"; and Rear-Admiral J. M. de Robeck in the "Amphitrite." On October 12th, it was officially announced that Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff had been appointed Rear-Admiral in the Fourth Battle Squadron, his flag to be hoisted in the "Emperor of India"; that Rear-Admiral the Hon. L. A. Hood had become Admiral in Command of the Dover Patrol, his flag flying in the "Forth"; and that Rear-Admiral H. F. Oliver was to succeed the latter as Naval Secretary to the First Lord. It was not until the publication of the first naval despatches, dated October 21st, that it was revealed that Rear-Admiral A. H. Christian had a separate command in the Channel, with his flag in the "Euryalus," and a cruiser force under Rear-Admiral Campbell.

KING'S MESSAGE.—On his appointment to the supreme command of the Home Fleets, King George sent to Sir John Jellicoe a gracious message, as follows:—"At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the Fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial." Admiral Jellicoe sent the following reply:—"On behalf of the officers and men of the Home Fleets I beg to tender loyal and dutiful thanks to your Majesty for the gracious message, which will inspire all with determination to uphold the glorious traditions of the past." On August 27th it was announced through the Press Bureau that the following telegram had been sent to Field-Marshal Sir John French by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, in which the designation of "Grand Fleet" was officially used for the first time:—"Officers and men of the Grand Fleet wish to express to their comrades of the Army admiration of magnificent stand made against great odds, and wish them the brilliant success which the Fleet feel sure awaits their further efforts."

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

North Sea.

"KÖNIGIN LUISE" SUNK.—At noon on Wednesday, August 5th, the Hamburg-America liner "Königin Luise" was caught by the Third Destroyer Flotilla about 60 miles off the Suffolk coast. She had been equipped as a mine-layer, and it was officially stated that a line of mines had probably been sown by her from Aldeburgh Ridge to lat. 52.10 deg. N., long. 2.25 deg. E. After a chase, she was sunk without loss on the British side. The "Amphion," Captain C. H. Fox, was parent ship of the flotilla at the time, and the "Lance," "Lark," and "Linnet" were mentioned as having taken part in the action.

"AMPHION" DESTROYED.—On the morning of August 6th, while on patrol, the light cruiser "Amphion" struck a mine and foundered. The explosion destroyed the fore part of the vessel, a sheet of flame enveloped the bridge, rendering the

captain insensible, and it was impossible to flood the fore magazine. Twenty minutes after striking the mine, the cruiser was abandoned. She was already settling down by the bows, and three minutes later the fore magazine exploded. Captain Fox, 16 officers, and 135 men were saved, but the lost included Staff-Paymaster J. T. Gedge and 131 men.

"U.15" SUNK.—On August 9th, an attack by German submarines was made upon a light cruiser squadron of the Grand Fleet. The attack was unsuccessful, none of the cruisers being damaged. One of the submarines, "U.15," built at Danzig in 1911-12, and carrying a crew of 23, was sunk by the "Birmingham," Captain A. A. M. Duff. Special interest attached to this as the first recorded encounter between cruisers and submarines in modern naval warfare. No official explanation of how the German boat was destroyed was issued, but it was reported that she was rammed by the "Birmingham."

GERMAN MINE-LAYING.—A communication issued through the Press Bureau on August 12th, after describing the steps taken to safeguard the ocean trade routes, stated that "In the North Sea alone, where the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately, and where the most formidable operations of naval war are proceeding, the Admiralty can give no reassurance." Several mishaps were caused to British and neutral vessels by this mine-laying, an official list corrected up to September 23rd giving the names of 15 ships sunk thereby. The largest was the Danish steamer "Maryland," of 5,136 tons; while the Wilson liner "Runo," of 1,679 tons, was the largest British vessel, but the latter departed from Admiralty directions which would have ensured her a safe voyage.

BRITISH MINE-LAYING.—On October 2nd, it was announced from the Admiralty that the German policy of mine-laying, combined with their submarine activities, made it necessary on military grounds for the Admiralty to adopt counter-measures. A system of mine-fields had therefore been established, and notice was given that it was dangerous for ships to cross the area between lat. 51.15 deg. N., and 51.40 deg. N., and long. 1.35 deg. E., and 3 deg. E. It was added that the southern limit of the German minefield was lat. 52 deg. N., but that it must not be supposed navigation was safe in any part of the southern waters of the North Sea.

GERMAN SMALL CRAFT ACTIVITY.—In the latter part of August, German torpedo craft did some damage to the fishing industry in the North Sea. An official notice on August 19th referred to "some desultory fighting" which had taken place between British patrolling squadrons and flotillas and German reconnoitring cruisers, without loss on either side. An instance of this desultory fighting was afforded in the list of ships captured and sunk by the Germans up to September 23rd, which was issued on September 28th. Therein were the names of 22 fishing vessels sunk between the 24th and 28th August by a flotilla which was probably composed of the mine-layer "Albatross" and three or four torpedo boats.

ACTION OFF HELIGOLAND.—On the morning of August 28th, a concerted operation described as a "scooping movement" and a reconnaissance in force was successfully carried out in the Heligoland Bight. The First and Third Destroyer Flotillas, supported by the First Light Cruiser Squadron and First Battle-Cruiser Squadron, and working in conjunction with submarines, intercepted and attacked the German destroyers and cruisers guarding the approaches to the German coast. An official statement described the operation as having been "fortunate and fruitful." Three German cruisers, the "Mainz," "Köln," and "Ariadne," were sunk, and also two destroyers, one of which was the German commodore's boat, "V.187." There were no British vessels lost, and only the "Arethusa," light cruiser, and "Laurel" and "Liberty," destroyers, were damaged, the loss of life being comparatively small.

PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT.—[Excision by Censor.] The smaller craft penetrated well into the Heligoland Bight, while the larger vessels took up positions to intercept any enemy's ships chased to the westward. The destroyers "Lurcher" and "Fire-drake," in the former of which Commodore Roger Keyes was embarked, searched the area through which the battle-cruisers were to advance, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of submarines "E.6," "E.7," and "E.8," which exposed themselves to attract the enemy to westward. Meantime, the "Arethusa," with Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, and the Third Flotilla sighted and attacked numerous German destroyers and torpedo boats making for Heligoland. The "Arethusa" was afterwards attacked by two cruisers, and considerably damaged. The "Fearless," Captain W. F. Blunt, with the First Flotilla, after sinking the German commodore's boat, came to the assistance of the "Lurcher" and "Fire-drake," which were chased by enemy cruisers. The "Arethusa" and "Fearless," with destroyers, were afterwards engaged with the "Mainz." At an opportune moment, the Light Cruiser and Battle Cruiser Squadrons came into action, completing the destruction of the German cruisers and covering the retirement of the British torpedo craft.

THE COMMANDERS' DESPATCHES.—In a statement issued through the Press Bureau on the evening of the fight, it was mentioned that the commanding officers concerned were Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Rear-Admirals Sir Archibald Moore and A. H. Christian, and Commodores R. Y. Tyrwhitt, R. J. B. Keyes, and W. E. Goodenough. Reports from Sir David Beatty, Rear-Admiral Christian, and Commodores Tyrwhitt and Keyes were published on October 22nd as a supplement to the *London Gazette*. The C.B. was at the same time conferred upon Commodore Tyrwhitt, and the D.S.O. upon Captain W. F. Blunt and other officers.

"SPEEDY" MINED.—On September 3rd, the torpedo gunboat "Speedy," Lieutenant-Commander E. M. C. Rutherford, was sunk by a mine 30 miles off the East Coast. The crew were saved, with the exception of an officer's steward. A. C. Bright, gunner, and a petty officer were injured. The "Speedy" was in company with mine-sweepers at the time, apparently affording them protection. One of the latter, the steam drifter "Linsdell," struck a mine and sunk 15 minutes before the "Speedy." Her skipper and four men were lost. The "Speedy," an old vessel built at Chiswick in 1893, was the second British warship to be destroyed by a mine.

"PATHFINDER" SUNK BY SUBMARINE.—At 4.30 p.m. on September 5th, the light cruiser "Pathfinder," Captain F. M. Leake, was destroyed by a German submarine [Excision by Censor.] The submarine was reported to be "U.21," commanded by Lieutenant Hersing. The Captain, who was wounded, and about 20 of the officers and men were saved, but the rest of a crew of 270 were killed or drowned. The vessel was shattered to pieces by the force of the explosion, and went down immediately. Only small fragments of wreckage were found by the ships which proceeded to the scene—the "Pathfinder" being alone at the time—and which included a destroyer, a motor lifeboat, and some fishing craft. This misfortune happened ten miles north of St. Abb's Head. This was the first ship to be destroyed by a submarine in the war.

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION ORGANIZED.—On September 7th, the First Lord announced the formation of a Royal Naval Division, to be composed of surplus men from the Royal Marines, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Fleet Reserve, and Royal Naval Reserve, augmented to a strength of approximately 15,000 men from recruits for Lord Kitchener's Army. The seamen and marines were available "after providing for all present and foreseeable future needs of the fleets

at sea," and the Division was to be organized and trained under the Admiralty for service afloat or ashore as required. The Division was originally formed of three brigades, two naval, under Commodores Wilfred Henderson and Oliver Backhouse, and one marine, under Brigadier-General Sir George Aston. Admirals of the Fleet Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson were appointed Honorary Colonels of the naval brigades, and Admiral Lord Charles Beresford of the marine brigade. The last-named had already been employed on active service at Ostend, where it was landed on August 27th for the occupation of the town and surrounding district.

"OCEANIC" LOST.—On September 8th, the auxiliary cruiser "Oceanic" was wrecked near the north coast of Scotland, and became a total loss. The crew were saved. It was after several days of bad weather that the vessel went ashore. She was taken over from the White Star Line at the beginning of the war and commissioned on August 11th for naval service by Captain W. F. Slayter, from the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. The "Oceanic" was the first auxiliary cruiser to be lost during the war.

NORTH SEA SWEEPS.—On September 10th, it was officially announced that on two successive days strong and numerous squadrons and flotillas had made a complete sweep of the North Sea up to and into the Heligoland Bight. The German Fleet made no attempt to interfere with these movements, and no German ship of any kind was seen at sea. It has been stated unofficially that this was not the first time such a sweep of the North Sea, or a reconnaissance in force, was made by ships of the Grand Fleet under Sir John Jellicoe, and although no further statements on the matter have been made by the Admiralty the operation was understood to have been carried out on subsequent occasions.

"HELA" SUNK BY SUBMARINE.—On the morning of September 13th, the German light cruiser "Hela" was sunk by submarine "E.9," under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton. The cruiser was an old one, launched at Bremen in 1895, with a displacement of 2,000 tons and an armament of four 3.4-in. guns. On being struck by torpedo from the "E.9," she remained afloat long enough for nearly all the crew to be saved. Lieutenant-Commander Horton had the distinction of making the first successful submarine attack on a German vessel in the war.

THREE CRUISERS SUNK.—On the morning of September 22nd the most serious misfortune suffered by the British Navy in the first three months of the war occurred when the cruisers "Aboukir," "Hogue," and "Cressy" were torpedoed successively by the submarine "U.9," commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Weddigen, off the Hook of Holland. The "Aboukir" was struck first, and the other two vessels stopped and lowered boats to save life, thus exposing themselves to similar destruction. There were no other warships in company, but many survivors were picked up by Dutch steamers and later transferred to the "Lowestoft" and destroyers. The number of lives lost amounted to 1,400, including 60 officers.

OFFICIAL WARNING.—On September 25th the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the sinking of the "Aboukir" was an ordinary hazard of patroling duty, but the other ships were sunk in stopping to save life. It was necessary to point out for the future guidance of ships that the rule of leaving disabled ships to their own resources, as in action, was applicable in such cases. "No act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should lead to a neglect of the proper precautions and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military situation." Small craft, it was added, should be directed by wireless to close on the damaged ship with all speed.

EAST COAST PRECAUTIONS.—On September 29th, an Admiralty order was made public prohibiting foreign trawling vessels from entering East Coast ports. This step was attributed to an intention to prevent as far as possible the leakage of information by means of neutral vessels. A fortnight earlier, the Admiralty closed certain channels in the approaches to the Thames, and from noon on September 14th it was ordered that all incoming vessels flying foreign flags and all British vessels from foreign and Colonial ports must call at the new pilot station near the Tongue light vessel, or at one of the established pilot stations, and be conducted to their destination by a licensed pilot.

NAVAL AIR RAIDS.—On October 2nd, a report was issued upon the work performed by the naval airmen. [Excision by Censor.] At the occupation of Ostend by the Marines on August 27th, an aeroplane squadron under Wing-Commander Samson was also sent over. Later this Camp was moved, and good work done by its machines, supported by armed motors. Occasional skirmishes with bands of Uhlans had occurred with loss to the enemy. A detached squadron of aeroplanes was under Squadron-Commander Gerrard, whose machines had crossed the Rhine and attacked Dusseldorf on September 22nd.

GERMAN DESTROYER SUNK.—On October 6th, Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton, in submarine "E.9," achieved his second success by sinking a German destroyer off the Ems River. The boat was "S.126," of 420 tons, built in 1904-5. Nearly all her crew were saved. Unofficial reports showed that there were two destroyers patrolling slowly near Borkum, and "E.9" got off a torpedo at one of them at about 600 yards, followed by a second. The destroyer was hit amidships and appeared to break in two; the other boat made off at full speed.

DUSSELDORF AIR-SHED ATTACKED.—On October 9th, it was announced through the Press Bureau that Squadron-Commander Spenser Grey had reported a successful attack on the Dusseldorf airship shed. Flight-Lieutenant R. L. G. Marix dropped bombs upon the shed from 500 feet, which went through the roof and destroyed a Zeppelin. Flames were observed 500 feet high, the result of igniting the gas of an airship. The officers returned safely, but lost their machines. "The feat would appear to be in every respect remarkable," added the official statement, "having regard to the distance—over 100 miles—penetrated into country held by the enemy, and to the fact that a previous attack had put them on their guard."

DESTROYER DIVISION SUNK.—On the afternoon of October 17th, a German destroyer division of four vessels was sunk off the Dutch coast by a British division composed of the light cruiser "Undaunted," Captain C. H. Fox, and the destroyers "Lance," "Legion," "Lennox," and "Loyal." The German boats were "S.115," "S.117," "S.118," and "S.119," of 413 tons, launched in 1903. They were sighted about two p.m., when the British vessels at once manœuvred to cut off their retreat, and then engaged them. All were sunk within an hour. Of the crews, 230 in all, 31 survivors were made prisoners. On the British side, the first lieutenant of the "Loyal" and four men—of whom one died subsequently—were wounded.

"HAWKE" SUNK.—On October 16th, the Admiralty announced that the cruiser "Hawke," Captain H. P. E. Tudor Williams, had been sunk in the northern waters of the North Sea by a submarine, afterwards reported to be Commander Weddigen's boat, "U.9." An attack was delivered about the same time at the "Theseus," Captain Hugh Edwards, but the ship was missed. The "Hawke" and "Theseus" were employed alone on blockade duty, examining all ships on a line between the Scottish and Norwegian coasts. The former was struck near a magazine, and heeled over too quickly for the officers and men

to take to the boats. Over 400 of her crew of 540 were lost, including practically all the officers except the first lieutenant.

BELGIAN COAST OPERATIONS.—On October 21st, it was announced by the Admiralty that a squadron of "monitors" had been engaged in operations on the Belgian coast, firing on the right flank of the German Army. Their light draught enabled them to contribute materially to the success of the operations in this district. The vessels were the "Severn," Commander E. J. A. Fullerton, "Humber," Commander A. L. Snagge, and "Mersey," Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Wilson, and were purchased from Messrs. Vickers on the outbreak of war. Actions took place off Middlekerke, between Ostend and Nieuport, on October 18th, and subsequent days. Detachments with machine guns were also landed from the vessels to assist in the defence of Nieuport.

ADMIRAL HOOD'S FLOTILLA.—On October 24th, the Admiralty stated that the naval bombardment of the German right had been continued. All German attacks on Nieuport were repulsed, and the enemy's lines enfiladed, fire being also opened on the German batteries near Ostend. Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, commanding the Dover Patrol, was in charge of these operations, and had under his command "a fine flotilla of vessels very suitable for this work, but at the same time not of great naval value." Naval aeroplanes and balloons were employed to assist in the direction of the fire.

SUBMARINE ATTACKS FRUSTRATED.—German submarines made several attempts to destroy or drive off the vessels operating on the Belgian coast, but without success up to the end of October. The light draught of the vessels engaged on this duty rendered submarine attack difficult. Torpedoes were fired at the "Wildfire" and "Myrmidon" without result. On the other hand, the destroyer "Badger," Commander C. A. Fremantle, rammed and sunk one of the German submarines with slight damage to her own bows. In announcing this on October 24th, the Secretary of the Admiralty added that a telegram had been sent to the "Badger":—"Admiralty are very pleased with your good service."

SUBMARINE "E.3" LOST.—On October 20th, a report was circulated by the German Admiralty through their wireless service to the effect that submarine "E.3" had been sunk on the 18th in a German bay in the North Sea. The non-appearance of the boat at her base confirmed the report. The vessel was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander G. F. Cholmley, and was completed in 1912. She was the first British submarine to be lost by an operation of war, as the disappearance of the Australian boat "AE.1," sunk on September 14th, was attributed to an accident due to an unknown cause.

Baltic.

LIBAU BOMBARDED.—On August 2nd, the day after war was declared between Germany and Russia, the light cruiser "Augsburg" appeared off Libau and bombarded the place, but not heavily. In the course of a summary of the naval operations on October 2nd, the Russian Headquarters Staff described the bombardment as "insignificant."

LIGHTHOUSES SHELLED.—On August 13th, reports came to hand of lighthouses at Dagerot and elsewhere having been shelled by some German vessels. These "acts of futile hooliganism," as they were called by *The Times* Petrograd correspondent, were not of great consequence, and the damage inflicted was slight.

"MAGDEBURG" LOST.—On August 27th, the German cruiser "Magdeburg" ran ashore in a fog on the Island of Odensholm, Gulf of Finland, and a Russian naval force appearing, the captain blew up the vessel after a short resistance to the latter's fire. Some of the officers and men were taken prisoners.

STEAMER CAPTURED.—Early in September, it was reported that the Finnish passenger steamer "Uleaborg," employed between Stockholm, Helsingfors, and Petrograd, had been captured by the Germans and taken to Danzig, but the Russian Headquarters Staff on October 2nd referred to the vessel as having been destroyed.

TWO MONTHS' REVIEW.—On October 2nd, it was officially announced from Petrograd that "up to the present no Russian ship has been lost or damaged, thanks to the incessant efforts of our fleet. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the enemy's navy, we have baffled all his schemes."

"PALLADA" TORPEDOED.—On October 11th, the cruiser "Pallada" was destroyed by submarine attack off the Gulf of Finland, all her crew being lost. The "Bayan" was with her, both vessels being on patrol, and it was stated by the Headquarters Staff that two of the German submarines were sunk by gunfire, but this was not confirmed. On the previous day, the cruiser "Admiral Makaroff," having stopped to search a suspicious trawler flying Dutch commercial colours, was torpedoed, but without success.

RUSSIAN MINE-LAYING.—On October 17th, it was officially announced that in view of the presence of German submarines at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, the Russian Government had been compelled to lay mines, and navigation was declared dangerous in the northern zone beyond lat. 58.50 deg. N., and long. 21 deg. E.; in the entrance to the Gulf of Riga; and the waters of the Åland Archipelago. Entrance to (and exit from) the Gulfs of Finland and Riga was declared closed.

Atlantic.

COMMERCE RAIDERS.—The naval operations in the Atlantic during the first three months of the war were confined to the work of commerce raiding and protection, and the transport of troops. On August 12th, it was officially stated that the Admiralty had despatched a large number of mobilized cruisers to their stations commanding the trade routes. These were said nearly to treble the enemy cruiser forces there, and as far as the Atlantic was concerned, there were 24 British cruisers, besides French, searching for the five German cruisers known to be in that ocean. "The enemy's vessels," added the official statement, "will be hunted continuously, and although some time may elapse before they are run down they will be kept too busy to do mischief. A number of fast merchant vessels, fitted out and armed at British naval arsenals, are being commissioned by the Admiralty for the purpose of patrolling the routes and keeping them clear of German commerce raiders."

SOUTH AMERICAN TRADE.—It was also announced on August 12th that, at the request of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty had considered attentively the position of Brazil, Uruguay, the Argentine, and Chile, with the intention of so concerting their naval measures as to protect and sustain Anglo-Brazilian, Anglo-Uruguayan, Anglo-Argentine, and Anglo-Chilean trade. The Admiralty expressed full confidence in their ability to do this. "Although the German Government," it was pointed out, "are trying, and will try, to harass the trade routes and to arrest the flow of commerce, their power to inflict injury diminishes with every day that passes."

"DRESDEN'S" CAPTURES.—On August 16th, the German cruiser "Dresden" captured the steamer "Hyades," of 3,755 tons, belonging to the Houston Line, 180 miles east of Pernambuco. Captain Morrison and the officers and crew were made prisoners, and the steamer was sunk after 45 rounds had been fired at her, the first ten of which missed. The crew were afterwards handed over to the German steamship "Preussen," which landed them at Rio de Janeiro, from whence they arrived at Liverpool on September 13th. A second victim of the "Dresden"

was the "Holmwood," of 4,233 tons, belonging to Messrs. F. S. Holland, which was captured and sunk on August 26th, 160 miles south of Santa Maria Grande.

"KARLSRUHE'S" CAPTURES.—On August 18th, the cruiser "Karlsruhe" captured and sunk the Lancashire Shipping Company's steamer "Bowes Castle," of 4,650 tons, 180 miles east of Barbados. This was the first of a series of vessels destroyed by this cruiser, which was the latest and fastest of all the German cruisers in the outer seas, having been completed in 1913. Up to the end of October, the following vessels, ranging from the 3,053 tons of the "Condor" to the 5,706 tons of the "Indrani," were reported to have been sunk or taken:—"Strathroy," August 31st; "Maple Branch," September 3rd; "Highland Hope," September 14th; "Indrani," September 17th; "Maria" (Dutch), British cargo, September 21st; "Cornish City," September 21st; "Rio Guassu," September 22nd; "Farn," October 5th; "Niecto De Larrinaya," October 6th; "Lynrowan," October 7th; "Cervantes" (four first-class passengers), October 8th; "Pruth," October 7th; "Condor," October 11th.

THE "KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE."—On August 26th, the British cruiser "Highflyer," Captain H. T. Buller, fought and sunk the German auxiliary cruiser "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse," of 14,000 tons, armed with ten guns of approximately 4-inch calibre. In announcing the news in the House of Commons on the following day, Mr. Churchill said that the raider was sunk off the Oro River on the West African coast. She had been endeavouring to arrest traffic between Great Britain and the Cape, and was one of the very few German armed auxiliary cruisers which succeeded in getting to sea. The survivors were landed before the vessel sunk. The "Highflyer's" casualties only amounted to one man killed and five slightly wounded.

THE "KAISER'S" CAPTURES.—Before being sunk, the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" managed to intercept and sink three British vessels, while at least two others were held up, but hurriedly released on the appearance of the "Highflyer" in the neighbourhood. The ships destroyed were the small fishing boat "Tubal Cain," of 227 tons, picked up off Iceland on August 7th as the raider was making her way round into the Atlantic; the liner "Kaipara," of the New Zealand Shipping Co., and of 7,392 tons, taken on August 16th, off the Canaries; and the Elder Dempster liner "Nyanga," of 3,066 tons, taken also on August 16th, 260 miles east of Las Palmas. The crews of these three ships were made prisoners in the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" until, at 2 p.m. on August 26th, while she was coaling from the "Arucas," "Magdeburg," and two other German colliers, the "Highflyer" was sighted. Coaling was abandoned, and to the "Arucas" the British officers and men were transferred. They arrived at Las Palmas on August 29th. The vessels which were stopped, but afterwards released on account of having women and children on board, were the liners "Galician" and "Arlanza." These were inspected by the Germans, who destroyed their wireless installations, and took from the former two British military men.

MORE RAIDERS CAPTURED.—The auxiliary cruiser "Bethania," of 7,000 tons, formerly of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, like the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse," was captured about the middle of September by a British cruiser [Excision by Censor] and taken to Kingston, Jamaica. The "Bethania" had been one of the vessels in attendance upon the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse," which coaled from her on the morning of the same day that she was captured. Most of the 400 prisoners in the "Bethania" when she was taken were from the larger vessel, having escaped in boats after the action. The "Bethania" had 600 tons of coal and six months' provisions on board. She had thrown her armament overboard before being taken. The auxiliary cruiser "Spreewald," of 3,899 tons, also from the Hamburg-Amerika Line, was captured on September 12th by the

British cruiser "Berwick," Captain L. Clinton-Baker, operating in North Atlantic waters. At the same time, two colliers operating with the German raiders in the Atlantic were captured. They had between them 6,000 tons of coal and 180 tons of provisions.

THE "CARMANIA'S" ACTION.—On September 14th, the auxiliary cruiser "Carmania," of the Cunard Line, under the command of Captain Noel Grant, R.N., met and defeated the German auxiliary cruiser "Cap Trafalgar," of the Hamburg-Süd-Amerika Line, in the first single-ship action between auxiliary cruisers which


had occurred in the war. The vessels were evenly matched, and the British ship sank her opponent after an action of about one hour and three-quarters. The "Carmania" is of 19,524 gross tonnage, and the "Cap Trafalgar" was of 18,710 gross tonnage. The latter had eight 4-inch guns and pom-poms. It was off the island of Trinidad, in the South Atlantic, to the eastward of Rio de Janeiro, that the action was fought. The "Carmania" sustained some damage, which she proceeded to Gibraltar to make good.

Mediterranean.

THE "GOEBEN" AND "BRESLAU."—At the outbreak of war, Germany had still in Mediterranean waters the cruiser division which she first sent there in the autumn of 1912, when the turn of events in the Balkan War aroused anxiety for the safety of the European population at Constantinople. The division consisted of the "Goeben," a battle-cruiser only completed in 1912, and the "Breslau," a light cruiser commissioned in the same year. On the morning of August 4th, the two ships appeared off Phillippeville and Bona, and began a bombardment, damaging a few buildings and two ships. The steamer

"St. Thomas," a French vessel, was hit and had to be beached, while the British steamer "Isle of Hastings" had the lower part of her funnel demolished, and sustained other damages which made it impossible for her to proceed. There were few victims in the towns themselves.

AT MESSINA STRAITS.—The German cruisers on leaving Bona and Phillippeville headed for Messina, where they arrived on the morning of August 5th. In accordance with international law, they had either to remain in this neutral port indefinitely and be disarmed, or to leave within a specified time. The Rear-Admiral was reported to have landed and handed his will and personal effects to friends,



while his officers entrusted theirs to the German Consul. The cruisers obtained as much coal as possible from passing German steamers and from a local German firm, and with colours flying and bands playing they left Messina at five o'clock on August 6th.

IN THE DARDANELLES.—The next authentic news of the vessels was that they had made for the Dardanelles. They arrived there on August 10th. A statement issued through the Press Bureau on August 11th, besides mentioning that the ships had taken refuge in the Dardanelles, said that there were good reasons for believing that "both ships will be dealt with according to international usage." There were reports at this time that the "Goeben" had been damaged by the vessels in pursuit of her. Two of her big guns were said to have been injured by shells, and one of the boilers damaged by the excessive speed developed during her flight, three or four furnace crowns having fallen in. One of the large cranes was also reported missing, while 27 wounded German sailors were sent to hospital.

THE "GLOUCESTER'S" CHASE.—Among the ships in chase of the Germans, the light cruiser "Gloucester," Captain W. A. H. Kelly, appears to be the only one which got within range of them. Letters from her crew show that she was on duty at the eastern entrance of the Straits of Messina when the ships escaped. They came out in the dusk and under cover of the land, and it was thought they were attempting to run for the Adriatic with the intention of joining the Austrian Fleet. The "Gloucester," after steaming abreast of the ships for a time, crossed their sterns to get the land side, but hung on to the vessels all night and next day. On the afternoon of the 7th, the "Breslau" dropped back to throw off the "Gloucester" from the big ship. The British cruiser opened fire at 11,000 yards, and the "Breslau" replied vigorously, but of the 30 rounds she is stated to have fired only two did any damage, smashing some boats in their davits. The "Goeben" then turned to join in, and fired a torpedo, which missed, but immediately afterwards they turned and continued their flight, the "Gloucester" keeping after them as far as Cape Matapan, where a wireless message ordered her not to pursue the chase any longer.

THE BRITISH ADMIRALS.—The two British flag officers afloat in the Mediterranean when war broke out were Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne, Commander-in-Chief, and Rear-Admiral Ernest C. T. Troubridge, commanding the First Cruiser Squadron. On August 30th, it was officially announced that the former had returned home, having given over the command of the combined Anglo-French Fleet in the Mediterranean to Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière, the French Commander-in-Chief. The conduct and disposition of Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne in regard to the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been the subject of examination by the Board of Admiralty, who "approved the measures taken by him in all respects." On September 20th, it was officially announced that Rear-Admiral Troubridge had been recalled to England in order that an inquiry might be held into the circumstances leading up to the escape of the German cruisers from Messina Straits. Admirals Sir Hedworth Meux and Sir George Callaghan were appointed to form the Court of Inquiry.

SHIPS "SOLD" TO TURKEY.—On August 13th, it was unofficially stated that the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had been sold to the Turkish Government, which had given an assurance that the officers and crews would be removed. The vessels were said to have been renamed respectively the "Sultan Yawuz Selim" (Sultan Selim the Grim) and the "Midellu" (Mitylene). Promises to send away the German officers and men of the vessels were not fulfilled by the Turks, however, and the two cruisers, as shown by the official documents published by the Foreign Office on November 1st, visited and searched British ships in the

Government. The squadron was then reported as having divided into three parts, two of which disappeared in different directions, while the third remained five miles off the town.

RUSSIAN TOWNS BOMBARDED.—On October 29th, the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" appeared off Novorossiysk, and the ex-German cruiser "Breslau" off Theodosia and shelled these unfortified places. The bombardment of the former place lasted three hours, and 200 shells were said to have been fired. Half as many were fired at Theodosia. In addition to these two places, Odessa was also subjected to a bombardment by the two cruisers mentioned and the "Goeben." The Russian gunboat "Kubanetz" was also sunk in the harbour of Kabotazhny. These attacks by the Ottoman ships, inspired no doubt by Germany, were entirely wanton and unprovoked, and made without warning, no declaration of war having been made. A note was to have been presented to the Porte on October 30th, asking for an explanation of the attacks in the Black Sea, and for the withdrawal of the German crews from the "Goeben" and "Breslau," and the dismantling of the ships. On November 2nd, however, it was announced that the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers at Constantinople had already left.

Adriatic.

ANTIVARI BOMBARDED.—The first reported act of war in the Adriatic was the bombardment of Antivari by an Austrian division on August 8th. Twenty minutes notice was given, and fire was then opened upon the wireless station and harbour offices. The cruiser "Szigetvar" took a prominent part in this affair, which was attributed to a desire for reprisals on account of the Montenegrin occupation of Spizza and Plevje. On August 9th, bombardment by the Montenegrins of the Austrian positions at the mouth of Cattaro harbour was reported.

FRANCO-BRITISH OPERATIONS.—It was on August 10th that France declared war on Austria, and Great Britain followed suit two days later, the message to the Fleet to begin hostilities being despatched at midnight (Austrian time) on the 12th. The Austrians had prepared for the declaration by withdrawing their ships into their harbours and protecting them by mines. The first incident of the war, indeed, was the blowing up of the Austrian-Lloyd steamer "Baron Gautsch" on August 14th by striking a mine when on passage from Lussin-Grange to Trieste. Of her crew and passengers, numbering 310, 179 were rescued.

SWEEP UP TO CATTARO.—On August 16th, the Allied Fleets made a sweep up the Adriatic as far as Cattaro with success. The light cruiser "Zenta" was sunk, and several other ships driven into port. The battleships went up the Italian coast, and crossing the Adriatic, approached Cattaro from the north. The cruisers and destroyers swept up the eastern shores, to Antivari, south of Cattaro. The two forces met at nine a.m., the object of the operation being to round up the Austrian Fleet if it was at sea. The "Zenta" and two destroyers, however, were the only units actually sighted, and the latter escaped to harbour. The "Zenta," in the midst of such overwhelming force, refused to haul down her colours, and so maintained the traditions of the Austrian Fleet. Six French battleships, led by the flagship "Courbet," opened fire, and in six minutes she was in flames. Ten minutes afterwards, there was an explosion, and in another ten minutes she was sinking by the stern. 201 of her crew of 302 perished.

MINING MISHAPS.—On August 18th, the Austrian torpedo boat No. 19 struck a mine in the entrance to the harbour at Pola and was destroyed. Only one of her crew survived. Many other mishaps from mines occurred, including some

to neutrals. The damage caused to Italian shipping from this source was the subject of discussion between the Austrian and Italian Governments, and eventually the former gave a pledge to discontinue mining operations. Italy reserved the right to demand indemnities after the Arbitration Court at the Hague had adjudicated on the question of the disasters caused by mines.

BOMBARDMENT OF CATTARO.—An almost continuous bombardment of the harbour and town of Cattaro was maintained from a date in August. At the end of October, several of the forts had been reported to be destroyed, and on more than one occasion Austrian ships inside the harbour were said to have attempted a sortie for Pola. Supplementing the attack from the sea, the Montenegrins on land joined in the bombardment. On September 23rd, statements were published from Bordeaux, the seat of the French Government, that heavy guns had been landed from French warships at Antivari, together with artillery detachments, to occupy Mount Lovtchen, and from that position to bombard the town and harbour at Cattaro.

ISLANDS OCCUPIED.—Early in September, the Allied Fleet began to establish itself within the Adriatic, and by occupying islands to work its way up gradually to Pola, the chief Austrian naval base. It was necessary that progress should be steady, owing to the necessity of clearing out possible lurking places for torpedo craft in the neighbourhood of the islands along the Dalmatian coast. Puntadostro was bombarded on September 1st. On the 10th, the Fleet made another demonstration in force off Cattaro, and swept on to Lissa, which was occupied, and a general inspection was made of Southern Dalmatia, signal and wireless stations being destroyed and mines swept up. After the bombardment of Lissa and Pelagosa, the population of the islands of Lagosta, Curzola, Lesina, Brazza, and Meleda were panic-stricken, and hurriedly abandoned the islands.

AUSTRIAN SUBMARINE REPORTED SUNK.—On October 17th, the destruction of an Austrian submarine was reported. The boat, in company with another, left Cattaro on that day to make an attack on the Allied Fleet, proceeding from Antivari, towards the Dalmatian coast. Neither of the vessels had any success, however, and it was claimed that one had been sunk by the French cruiser "Waldeck Rousseau." One explanation of the attack was that the submarines were scouting for the squadron in Cattaro harbour, which contemplated making a dash for Pola. The squadron was reported to consist of three cruisers, 12 destroyers and torpedo boats, and three auxiliary ships. The squadron was warned in time of the presence of the Allied Fleet, but one of the cruisers was damaged.

Indian Ocean.

DAR-ES-SALAAM RAIDED.—In the first week of the war, the British cruisers "Astræa," Captain A. C. Sykes, and "Pegasus," Commander J. A. Ingles, belonging to the Cape Station, proceeded to the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, East Africa, where the wireless station was destroyed and the gunboat and dépôt-ship "Moewe" was sunk. With the surrender of the place three German East Africa Company's mailboats, a large floating dock, and smaller craft were taken as prizes of war.

EMDEN'S EXPLOITS.—On September 10th, the light cruiser "Emden," Captain von Muller, formerly belonging to the China Squadron, turned up in the Bay of Bengal after being completely lost for six weeks, or ever since war began. Within four days, she captured six steamers in the Indian trade, the "Indus," "Lovat," "Killin," "Diplomat," "Trabook," and "Kabanga." Five of these

vessels were sunk by gun-fire or by mines placed under the bows, and the sixth was sent into Calcutta with the crews. A seventh steamer was shortly afterwards captured by the "Emden," the "Clan Matheson." The loss of these vessels and their cargoes was estimated at a quarter of a million sterling.



"PEGASUS" DISABLED.—On September 20th, the light cruiser "Pegasus," Commander J. A. Ingles, which had been working from Zanzibar, was surprised in the harbour there, whilst cleaning out her boilers and repairing machinery, by the German cruiser "Königsberg." In addition to being taken at such a disadvantage, the "Pegasus" was outranged by the newer 4-in. guns of the "Königsberg," and was completely disabled after suffering a loss unofficially reported as 25 killed, and 72 wounded and missing, or nearly half her total crew of 234. The damage sustained by the German ship was not known, and she was seen to steam away to the southward. In the course of the action, the British flag was twice shot away, but was held up by hand by marines.

MADRAS BOMBARDED.—On September 22nd, the "Emden," after having been reported at Rangoon, appeared off Madras, and opened fire on the town. Two oil tanks were set alight, but the other damage done was slight. The bombardment lasted for about 15 minutes, when the vessel left for Pondicherry. She anchored there on the morning of the 24th, but was content merely to show herself, and left immediately, heading south-east. The futile bombardment of Madras and the visit of the ship to Pondicherry had, as was no doubt intended, a moral effect in India and upon the trade, but it was of no military significance whatever.

FURTHER MERCHANT CAPTURES.—On September 29th, a further haul of trading vessels was reported to have been made by the "Emden," the steamers "Tymeric," "King Lud," "Ribera," "Foyle," "Buresk," and "Gryfevale" were all captured by her in the neighbourhood of Cape Comorin. The last-named steamer was released to take the crews into Colombo, while the "Buresk," a collier, was retained to supply the "Emden." The value of the tonnage destroyed was about the same as that on the first raid.

"MARKOMANIA" SUNK.—On October 15th, it was officially announced that the light cruiser "Yarmouth," Captain H. L. Cochrane, had sunk the Hamburg-American liner "Markomania" in the vicinity of Sumatra. This vessel was fitted as an auxiliary cruiser and was working in conjunction with the "Emden." The "Yarmouth" took 60 German prisoners of war on board. At the same time, the "Yarmouth" captured, and took into harbour, the Greek steamer "Pontoporos," which had been requisitioned by the "Markomania" for her coal and stores.

"EMDEN'S" THIRD HAUL.—On October 22nd, a third list of merchant steamers sunk or captured by the "Emden" was officially announced. These vessels were the "Benmohr," "St. Egbert," "Clan Grant," "Chilkana," and a Government dredger on passage to Tasmania. The collier "Exford" was reported to have been captured, but not sunk, and in her the crews of the other ships were sent into Cochin on October 21st. The ships were intercepted between October 15 and 19. On October 27th, a Japanese steamer, the "Kamasaka Maru," also fell a victim to the "Emden," making the total she had held up 21, including the "Pontoporos."

RAID AT PENANG.—On October 28th, the "Emden," having disguised herself by the rigging of a dummy funnel and the hoisting of the Russian flag, appeared off Penang, and approached at full speed the Russian cruiser "Jemchug," which was at anchor. Two torpedoes were fired, and the "Jemchug" was destroyed, with 85 of her crew. Of 250 men saved, over a hundred were wounded. The French destroyer "Mousquet" was on patrol duty, and attacked the "Emden," but she was quickly sunk in the unequal fight.

Pacific.

THE "GEIER'S" WHEREABOUTS.—On August 6th, the German gunboat or light cruiser "Geier," stationed in Australasian waters, was reported to have stopped the Dutch steamer "Houtman" in the Macassar Straits between Borneo and Celebes. Her papers were examined, and she was afterwards permitted to proceed to Batavia.

CANADIAN SUBMARINES.—On August 10th, the Admiralty announced that the Canadian Government had placed two submarine boats at their disposal for general service. The offer had been gratefully accepted, and the submarines were to be employed on the Pacific coast. The vessels were understood to have been originally built for Chile.

AUSTRALIAN NAVY'S WORK.—Immediately on the outbreak of war, according to a statement of Mr. Millen, the Australian Defence Minister, the Australian Fleet, which had been placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government, co-operated with the China Squadron in the search for German cruisers and in the work of dismantling German wireless stations. From August 1st to September 12th, the cruiser "Melbourne," Captain M. L'E. Silver, covered 11,170 miles, mostly in the Tropics, and other ships of the Royal Australian Navy also travelled great distances. Tribute was paid by Mr. Millen to the fine leading of Vice-Admiral Sir George Patey and the enthusiasm of all under him.

SAMOA OCCUPIED.—The occupation of German Samoa was announced by the Colonial Office on the evening of August 29th. The naval covering force for the military expedition consisted of six vessels, British, Australian and French. The three cruisers of the New Zealand Division, "Psyche," "Pyramus," and "Philomel," were present under Captain H. J. T. Marshall; the "Australia" and "Melbourne," the former with Sir George Patey's flag flying, were also lent to protect the

expedition in case of attack from the large German cruisers; and the French cruiser "Montcalm" was met at New Caledonia. The distance travelled by this expedition from New Zealand was nearly 2,000 miles.

PACIFIC CABLE CUT.—On September 7th, the cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and Fanning Island, was reported to have been cut by the German cruiser "Nürnberg," Captain Schoenberg. The vessel did not bombard the island, but landed a party of men who destroyed the telegraphic instruments and damaged the station buildings. The "Nürnberg" made only a short stay at the island. She was afterwards reported at Honolulu, where she was said to have been chased by the "Australia" and the destroyer "Warrego."

LAST WIRELESS STATION DESTROYED.—On September 22nd, it was reported from Sydney that the German wireless station on the island of Nauroh had been destroyed. This was the last German installation in the Pacific to be put out of action. The capture or destruction of the wireless stations was one of the first objects of the operations in the Pacific, as they had been affording valuable help to the German cruisers.

NEW POMMERN OCCUPIED.—On September 11th, the town of Herbertshöhe, in New Pommern Island, the largest of the Bismarck Archipelago, was occupied by an Australian Naval Brigade, under the command of Commander J. A. H. Beresford, R.A.N. The brigade established itself on shore at dawn without the enemy's knowledge, but in proceeding to destroy the wireless station its progress was stoutly opposed. Guns were landed, and after 18 hours' fighting the station was captured at 1 a.m. on September 12th. Two officers and four seamen were killed and an officer and three seamen wounded.

NEW GUINEA OCCUPIED.—On September 24th, the town of Friedrich Wilhelm, in Kaiser Wilhelm's Land (German New Guinea), was occupied by the Australian naval forces without opposition, the Germans having concentrated at Herbertshöhe, already mentioned. The last-named town was the seat of government not only for New Pommern Island, but for Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Caroline and Marshall Islands, the whole being administered by the Governor of German New Guinea. Consequently the defeat of the Germans at Herbertshöhe on September 11th and 12th had a decisive rather than a local effect upon the German colonial empire in the Pacific, and little further opposition was manifested to the efforts of the British and Australians in destroying the wireless stations at Yap, in the Caroline Islands, Nauroh, in the Gilbert Islands, and elsewhere.

THE "GEIER'S" LOST PRIZE.—On October 1st, the British steamer "Southport" arrived at Brisbane from Kusai, one of the Caroline Islands, and reported having been captured there on September 4th by the "Geier." The steamer's papers were taken and her machinery damaged to render her incapable of putting to sea. The engineers, however, repaired the machinery sufficient to allow her to escape and proceed slowly to Queensland. In October, the "Geier" was reported at Honolulu repairing her engines.

BOMBARDMENT OF TAHITI.—On September 22nd, the German cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau," formerly in the China Squadron, bombarded Papeete, the centre of the French establishments in Australasia and the capital of Tahiti, in the Society Islands. The gunboat "Zélée," which had been disarmed on September 14th and was without guns or crew, was sunk, and the town half destroyed.

"LEIPZIG'S" EXPLOITS.—On September 15th, the German cruiser "Leipzig," which was attached to the China Squadron, like the "Emden," made her first reported capture of a merchant ship when she took the "Elsinor," an oil tank

steamer, whose crew of 20 were landed on Galapagos Island. After 15 days there they were able to get to Guayaquil, Ecuador. About a fortnight later, the "Leipzig" made her second capture, the victim being the steamship "Bankfields," which was seized off North Peru, with a cargo of sugar. The German auxiliary steamer "Marie" took her crew to Callao.

JAPANESE ASSISTANCE.—On October 6th, the Japanese Ambassador in London announced that with the object of assisting in the search for German raiders, Japanese vessels had arrived at Jaluit Island, which was considered to be one of the possible bases of the enemy's ships in the Marshall Islands. The German authorities surrendered without resistance, and the Marines on landing destroyed all establishments of a military nature and seized all munitions of war. On October 21st, telegrams which had been exchanged between the British First Lord and the Japanese Minister of Marine were published in which it was revealed that "apart from the great object of the extermination of the main German base in the Pacific," Japanese ships and squadrons were everywhere giving help to Great Britain in "the protection of trade, the search for enemy's ships, and the convoy of troops to the decisive theatre of the conflict."

THE "COMET" CAPTURED.—On October 18th, the Admiralty announced that the German auxiliary sailing vessel "Comet" had been captured by the Australians. Nine days previously, the "Nusa" had been commissioned by Lieutenant-Commander J. M. Jackson, R.N., with a detachment of infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Paton, to search for the "Comet" off the north-east coast of New Guinea. The expedition was successful, and the "Comet" was taken with a complete wireless installation, the captain and crew being taken prisoners, while the ship herself was added to the Australian Navy.

Kiao-Chau.

FLEETS' MOVEMENTS.—The Russian Squadron in Far Eastern waters was reported to have left Vladivostok on August 4th. The German Squadron was similarly reported to have left Kiao-chau on August 6th and to have proceeded northwards. The Japanese Fleet, consisting of the First and Second Squadrons under Admiral Deva, was stated to have left Tokio on August 9th. These movements were announced in the Press before the censorship had got to work. No subsequent reports have, of course, been allowed to appear.

JAPANESE ULTIMATUM AND DECLARATION.—On August 16th, Japan sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of all German warships from the Orient and the surrender of Kiao-chau, with a view to its ultimate restitution to China. A reply was asked for within a week, but none was forthcoming, and a state of war thus came about on August 23rd. Austria declared war upon Japan on August 26th.

"KENNET" HIT BY SHELLS.—On August 22nd, the British Commander-in-Chief in China, Vice-Admiral T. H. M. Jerram, reported that the destroyer "Kennet," Lieutenant-Commander F. A. H. Russel, while chasing the German destroyer "S.90," approached too close to the battery at Tsing-tao, the naval port of Kiao-chau, and sustained a few casualties. The vessel herself was not materially damaged.

THE "KAISERIN ELIZABETH."—This Austrian cruiser was in Far Eastern waters at the time war broke out, and proceeded to join the German squadron at Kiao-chau. There was a report on August 24th, that the Austrian Government had ordered her to disarm and her crew to proceed to Tientsin, but on the declaration of war between Austria and Japan two days later it was stated that she would assist the German defence at Kiao-chau.

BLOCKADE OF KIAO-CHAU.—On August 27th, from nine a.m., a blockade of the coast of the German leased territory at Kiao-chau was announced by the Japanese Admiralty. The island of Tachieu was at the same time reported to have been occupied by the Japanese, who proceeded to occupy six other islands. The Japanese destroyer "Shirataye" ran ashore on a rock near Kiao-chau at the beginning of September, but her crew were saved. Some casualties to vessels engaged in sweeping up German mines were reported. On October 1st, a naval brigade was reported to have been landed from the Japanese vessels and to have begun operations on the extreme left against Tsingtau. Slow but continuous progress was made by the Japanese in the attack from the sea, but no decisive result had been reported up to the end of October.

"TAKACHIKO" LOST.—On October 17th, the Japanese cruiser "Takachiko" was destroyed by a mine in Kiao-chau Bay while on patrol duty. Destroyers quickly closed on her, but she sank rapidly and rescue work was difficult owing to darkness. Twenty-eight officers, 54 petty officers, and 189 seamen were lost.

THE WAR.

MILITARY NOTES by J. D. F.

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SECTION I.

General Remarks.

The object of these notes is, to give a brief general outline of the war now in progress. It is, of course, at present, impossible to do more than describe the various movements in diary form, but it is hoped that a short summary of this kind may be found useful by those who desire to make a preliminary study of the course of events.

SECTION II.

Dates of Declarations of War.

The dates are as follows:—

Austria against Serbia: July 28th, 1914.
 Germany against Russia: August 1st, 1914.
 Germany against France: No declaration; invasion August 2nd, 1914.
 Germany against Belgium: No declaration; invasion August 3rd.
 Great Britain against Germany: August 4th, 1914.
 Servia against Germany: August 6th, 1914.
 Montenegro against Austria: August 6th, 1914.
 Montenegro against Germany: August 11th, 1914.
 France against Austria: August 12th, 1914.
 Great Britain against Austria: August 12th, 1914.

SECTION III.

The Armies of the Countries at War.

It is exceedingly difficult to obtain anything like accurate information as to the real armed strength of a nation, as practically speaking all nations conceal their true strengths as much as possible.

The actual number of men for whom funds are voted annually, is of course easily ascertainable, but to make an estimate of the very large additional numbers who, though not trained, are, so to speak, trainable, is by no means easy.

Some idea of the maximum numbers can be obtained from the population statistics. If it is assumed that the number of men in a nation is 21,000,000, then for the ages given below the approximate numbers are as follows:—

	Percentage.	Numbers.
Under 15 years	33 ...	6,930,000
From 15—40 years	42 ...	8,820,000
From 40—60 years	15 ...	3,150,000
Over 60 years	10 ...	2,100,000
Total		21,000,000

Taking the fighting age to be from 15 to 60, then the maximum numbers available in this case will be 11,970,000 men. This is perhaps somewhat high, as 15 years is low for the fighting age, but on the other hand, a good many men over 60 are fit to take part in a campaign and their numbers would compensate for, say, youths from 15 to 17 unable to take the field.

From these numbers, however, a considerable deduction must be made, for those physically unfit, engaged in the warlike trades, etc., and probably this will amount to some 30 per cent. of the above. Hence, a nation of 21,000,000 men would not be able to turn out more than about 8,000,000 fighting men of suitable age, though this might be materially increased if the women took over some of the less arduous work of the warlike trades, such as packing stores, light transport work, etc.

Next as regards the number of trained men available when war breaks out. This is unfortunately almost impossible to foretell, as it depends entirely upon the ideas on war animating a nation, the cost of training, etc. Probably in a well-organized nation, the men with the Colours, immediate reserves, etc., would amount to one-ninth of the male population, or rather more than one-fourth of the maximum fighting force as above estimated, say, in the case quoted, about

two million men, leaving a further reserve of about six millions in hand. Of these six millions another two millions would probably have had some kind of military training as territorial forces, etc., so that the balance of untrained men would be something under four millions, and the calling up and training of these would be one of the first duties of the nation when war broke out. The following table gives some idea of the opposing forces:—

Name.	Male Population.	Maximum Fighting Force.	Forces at Out-break of War.	Further forces available.
ALLIES.				
Great Britain ...	22,000,000	8,360,000	600,000	7,760,000
Belgium ...	3,500,000	1,330,000	140,000	1,190,000
France ...	20,000,000	7,600,000	2,500,000	5,100,000
Russia ...	85,000,000	32,300,000	3,000,000	29,300,000
Servia ...	2,300,000	874,000	450,000	424,000
Montenegro ...	250,000	95,000	50,000	45,000
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.				
Germany ...	32,000,000	12,160,000	4,000,000	8,160,000
Austro-Hungary ...	14,000,000	5,220,000	2,000,000	3,220,000

Notes.

- 1.—On outbreak of war Great Britain called out another 1,000,000 men for training (Indian troops and Colonial forces not included).
- 2.—The maximum fighting force is taken as explained above at .38 of the total male population.
- 3.—The figures in the fourth column are approximate.
- 4.—The very large reserves shown in the case of Russia would only be available after many months.

SECTION IV.

The Theatre of War.

Speaking generally, this includes the whole of the countries (including colonies) of the Allies on the one hand, with Germany, and Austria and their colonies on the other. The most important part of the theatre of war is, however, Belgium, France, Russia (west of long. 30° E.), Germany and Austria, as it is somewhere in this district that the final settlement will be made. Consequently, only these countries are described, the descriptions being limited to the more important military details.

BELGIUM.

This is a flat low-lying country with a hilly region not much exceeding 1,000 feet in height in its southern area. The frontier offers no special definite features except in the south, where the hilly district makes the movement of troops somewhat difficult.

The rivers of greatest importance are the Meuse, with its tributary the Sambre, running through Namur and Liège, in the south part of the country, and the Scheldt, passing through Tournai, Ghent and Antwerp. The north-west part of the country north of Tournai, etc., can be flooded, and forms in certain areas in the neighbourhood of Antwerp a useful defence against invasion. The two principal railway lines are: (1) St. Quentin (France)—Namur—Liège to Cologne

(Germany); (2) Lille (France)—Ghent—Antwerp and thence to Germany. Both are of great importance as they are well adapted for lines of communication for an invader from the east or west. They are likely to be of great value to Germany, as they give the best lines of advance on Paris, in a war with France.

As regards the defensive system of the country, the fortress of Antwerp forms the main centre; the two second-class works at Liège and Namur acting as outposts. The active army is intended to operate within this area and threaten the flanks of an invader from the west or east. The climate is temperate: in summer the temperature varies between 60° and 70° , in winter between 0° and 32° . The annual rainfall is from 25 to 40 inches.

FRANCE.

The north-east, west and south-west parts of France are low-lying fertile plains seldom over 1,000 feet in height. The east portion from the Belgian Ardennes to the Gulf of Lyons is hilly, or mountainous. The mountain systems are: (1) the Alps in the south-east, over 10,000 feet high; (2) the Mountains of Auvergne running north and south of Clermont; (3) minor ranges west of the River Rhone running north and south and connecting with the Belgian Ardennes. The principal rivers in the north-east rise chiefly in the hilly country west of Belfort and run to the north-west or north and north-east. The Marne and the Aisne to the north of the line Paris—Belfort are of great importance, as they lie perpendicular to the line of advance of an invader coming through Belgium.

As regards railways, these are based chiefly upon Paris, the chief lines running from there: (1) Laon—Mezières; (2) Châlons—Verdun; (3) Vitry—Toul—Luneville; (4) Langres—Epinal; (5) Langres—Belfort and thence into Germany. They are, of course, of the greatest importance, as by means of them the French armies are brought up into the defensive positions described below. The roads in France are excellent, and very suitable for military motor car work.

As regards the general defensive system, this consists of three parts, *viz.*, the central entrenched camp of Paris in the third line, a second line of prepared positions, at (1) Arras—Peronne and Laon—La Ferté; (2) the Rheims position; (3) a position about Langres; (4) one about Besançon. The first line defences consist of a long line stretching from the North Sea by Lille, Maubeuge, Mezières, Verdun, Toul, Epinal to Belfort, with further works to the south opposite the Italian frontier.

The first section from the North Sea to the River Lys is noticeable, because the country there can be flooded, and is consequently difficult for an invader. The second section runs from the River Lys to the River Scarpe, with Lille as a central point, while the third section lies between the River Scarpe and the fortress of Maubeuge, with three fort d'arrêts at Maulde, Fines and Courges. The fourth section is called the "Trouée de Chimay," and is supported on its flanks by Maubeuge on one side and the Forest of Thierache on the other. Except for a fort d'arrêt at Hirson this section is undefended. The fifth section, Mezières—Longwy depends chiefly on the River Meuse and the second-class fortress at Montmédy. The sixth section runs between Verdun—Toul, both strong fortresses and entrenched camps; minor works, Troyon—Camp des Romaines—Lionville, Gironville, and Jony sur les Côtes lie between them. The seventh section is the "Trouée d'Epinal"; it is undefended except for the protection given by the River Moselle. The eighth section lies between the two entrenched camps of Epinal and Belfort, the smaller works being Parmont, Rupt, Chateau Lambert, Ballon de Servance, and Giromagny. Montbard and Lomont are two works south of Belfort to protect it against a turning movement on the right flank.

The climate of France is temperate. The north half has a mean temperature of from 60° to 70° in summer, while for the southern half the variation is from 70° to 80° . In winter the variations are from 32° to 40° , but the Riviera district to the south varies from 40° to 50° . The annual rainfall is from 25 to 40 inches over nearly the whole country.

RUSSIA (west of Long. 30° E.).

This part of Russia is, practically speaking, a large plain, the only heights being the Valdai Hills, some 1,200 feet high. The principal rivers are the Niemen and the Vistula, both flowing in a northerly direction at right angles to any line of advance from east to the west. In winter these rivers are frozen over to a great extent, as are also the very large tracts of marshy country in their immediate neighbourhood. The chief railway centre is at Moscow, most of the lines converging at that place. The main lines running to the west are (1) Petrograd—Warsaw and German frontier; (2) Moscow—Warsaw to Germany; (3) Kiev—Kovel—Lublin—Warsaw; (4) Moscow—Brest Litovski—Ivangorod—Cracow (Austria); (5) Vilna—Königsberg (E. Prussia). The Russian railway gauge is larger than the usual Continental gauge; the break is at Warsaw. The railway system is not at present fully developed, and consequently the mobilization cannot be carried out quite as quickly as in other countries.

The defensive system depends largely on the marshy, difficult country in West Russia and West Poland. It is, however, aided by two important lines of entrenched camps: (1) Ostrolenka—Novo Georgievsk—Warsaw—Ivangorod; (2) Kovno—Grodno—Osowiec—Brest Litovski—Roono, all well found works, fully equipped.

As regards climate, the winter temperature varies between 0° to 32° , with a very heavy snowfall; in summer the northern half of the country varies from 60° to 70° , the variation for the south half being from 70° to 80° . The annual rainfall is from 25 to 40 inches.

GERMANY.

This country may be divided into two parts, viz., the north plain, and the highlands to the south. The north plain is a continuation of the similar formation in Russia, and like it has an altitude of under 1,000 feet. The mountainous country to the south reaches heights of from 8,000 to 10,000 feet, but the average elevation is from 3,000 to 5,000 feet. This district is often densely wooded. The principal rivers are: the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, Weser, and Rhine, all flowing in a generally northerly direction at right angles to the line of advance of an invader from the east or west. The Danube rising in Baden is an exception to the above, as it flows east, through Austria into the Black Sea. All these rivers are navigable for considerable parts of their courses and are much used for traffic. There is a very important ship canal from Kiel on the Baltic to the mouth of the river Elbe on the North Sea; the largest warships can pass through it, and consequently troops and ships can be transferred from one sea to the other as required. The railways are of great importance as they have been specially designed to meet the strategical requirements of the country. The chief centre is Berlin, but the various lines run east and west to the Russian and French borders, and it is possible to transfer very large bodies of troops from one district to another with very great rapidity. Special attention has been paid to entraining and detraining facilities, and all important stations are specially adapted for this kind of work.

As regards the defensive system, it may be said that the German idea is to make the most careful preparations in time of peace and when war breaks out to use the railway system to the fullest possible extent, for making an immediate

and vigorous attack upon the enemy. There are, however, two very strong defensive lines of fortresses and entrenched camps, one to the west, the other to the east. On the west, there are the large frontier fortresses of Metz and Strassburg in the first line, while the second line consists of a number of entrenched camps, etc., such as Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz and Gemersheim. The Eastern system is equally good. In East Prussia, Königsberg and Lötzen stand in the front line with a second line of works Doischau—Gaudenz—Thorn. On the West Poland frontier of Russia, from Thorn to the junction with Austrian territory, the country is very marshy and difficult to traverse; consequently there are no permanent defences in this line. In rear, however, there is an important line of fortresses Bromberg—Posen—Glogau—Neisse acting as a support to the first line.

It should be particularly noticed that all the German fortresses, etc., are strong, well-designed, up-to-date works, capable of accommodating large bodies of troops and able to render stout resistance to attack.

As regards climate, in winter the temperature varies from 0° to 32° over the greater part of the country; in summer the variation is from 60° to 70° . The annual rainfall is from 25 to 40 inches; the river districts are often flooded to excess.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

This country may be divided into two parts, the east, or Hungary, and the remainder, to the west and north, Austria. Hungary consists of a very large plain, mostly under 1,000 feet in height, surrounded by mountains. The Austrian area is chiefly highland, with mountainous districts to the south. The most important mountain systems are: (1) the Alps in the south-west; (2) the Carpathians, forming the north boundary between Hungary proper and Galicia; (3) the Erz mountains in Bohemia to the north-west of Austria. The principal rivers are the Dniester in Galicia flowing into the Black Sea, the Danube, with its large tributaries the Save, Drave and Theiss, and the Vistula which rises in the Carpathians, flowing north into Poland. The Elbe, flowing north, rises in Bohemia. The general line of the rivers is more or less north and south at right angles to the direction of movement of a force invading the country from the east. The Save and the Danube (except from Buda-Pesth to Belgrad) run generally from west to east. The principal railway lines are: (1) Vienna—Cracow; (2) Vienna—Buda-Pesth—Temesvat—Orsova; (3) lines from Buda-Pesth to Belgrad, Cernovitz—Cracow and Lemberg; (4) Cracow—Jaroslav—Przemysl—Lemberg. The system is fairly complete; it is especially designed for action on the north-east frontier. The chief defences are on the north-east frontier; there are large fortresses, etc., at Cracow and Przemysl.

The climate varies a good deal according to the locality. The summer temperature is from 70° to 80° ; the winter, from 0° to 32° . The rainfall in the mountainous district is from 40 to 80 inches, in the plains, from 25 to 40 inches.

SECTION V.

Plans of Campaign.

It is somewhat difficult to discuss the plans of campaign as comparatively little is known of the real intentions of the combatants. A fair general idea of the German-Austrian arrangements can be given, but it is on the whole undesirable to say more than a few words on those of the Allies.

The German-Austrian Plans.

These are based upon certain fundamental ideas regarding war, and it is most important that these principles should be understood, if the plans of action are to be realized. They are:—

1st.—It is the duty of a nation to be thoroughly prepared for war at any time. Such preparation includes not only a sufficiency of troops, ships, etc., but an absolutely complete preparation as regards transport, food, munitions of war, etc. Further still, a full knowledge of the enemy's armies, navies, warlike resources of every kind is essential, and all the necessary information must be obtained in time of peace, so that there may be no delay when war breaks out.

2nd.—Once war is declared, it should be carried on with the utmost rigour, ample troops should be poured into the fighting line at once, and every effort should be made to crush the enemy as rapidly as possible and compel him to sue for peace.

3rd.—All opponents are classified as "combatants" and "non-combatants." Combatants are soldiers, sailors, etc., definitely acknowledged as such by their own Governments: they must wear the Government uniform, be under Government control, and be clearly recognizable as fighting men. Non-combatants comprise all other classes of an enemy. They are not allowed to take part in any kind of fighting, they must not assist their own troops in any way, and they must comply with all demands for provisions and stores made upon them, and if they do not comply with these rules they can be punished with the utmost severity. Provided, however, they act as required by the German commanders, they will not be molested in any way, and all stores supplied by them will be paid for in cash, or notes redeemable at the conclusion of the war.

4th.—War should always, as far as possible, be carried on in the enemy's country, so as to reduce the strain on the German nation to a minimum.

It will be seen from the above, that with the Germans and Austrians, war is essentially a business, to be carried out on business lines, and that nothing is allowed to interfere with the arrangements necessary to carry it to a successful conclusion.

As regards the actual plan of campaign, it was divided into three parts:—

A. Against France, and if necessary, Belgium.

In this case the idea was to move an army of some two and a half millions of men against France, defeat her and compel her to sue for peace, as quickly as possible. Owing to the strength of the French frontier south of Verdun the main line of attack was to be through Belgium, whether that country gave permission or not. While the attack on France was in progress, the Austrians, assisted by the rest of the German Army, were to advance into Russia against Warsaw and keep the Russian forces in check until the French campaign was finished.

B. Against Russia.

As soon as the whole of the German armies became available the combined forces of Germany and Austria were to attack Russia and prevent her taking any further part in the operations.

C. Great Britain.

If she joined France and Russia, was to be attacked later, either after the defeat of the French or at some other convenient time.

THE ALLIES' PLANS.

Western Theatre of War.

These can hardly be discussed at present. The general control in this part was given to the French. The British force was directed to conform to the French plans, while the Belgians, assisted as far as possible by both British and French, were to check the first German rush, if they were invaded.

Eastern Theatre of War.

The Russian plans, like those of the French, have not been disclosed, but the main object was to keep the Germans fully employed and to prevent them sending assistance to their troops in France.

SECTION VI.**The Campaign in Belgium from August 2nd to 20th, 1914.**

AUG. 2ND.—On this date a German force composed chiefly of some of the covering troops from Coblenz, advanced on Luxembourg and occupied the capital and the Duchy generally. The object of this movement was to seize the railways running through the State towards France and utilize them for the movements of the German troops.

At the same time a force consisting of the VIIth, IXth and Xth German Army Corps was moved towards the frontier about Aix-la-Chapelle ready for an immediate advance through Belgium.

To the Belgian Government an offer was made at 7 p.m., that if the German troops were allowed to pass through the country without molestation, the independence of Belgium would be guaranteed by Germany, and that the latter country would pay the cost of all damage done by the troops, etc. The German Government asked for a definite answer to be given by 7 a.m. the next morning.

AUG. 3RD.—At 4 a.m. the Belgian Government sent a despatch refusing the German offer, and on the same evening the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier for the attack on the fortress of Liège, the main lines of advance being through Verviers and Visé.

[N.B.—Liège was a second-class fortress of the well-known ring type. The ring was composed of six large works, and an equal number of smaller ones, with field entrenchments connecting them. The large works were all of the same type, triangular in plan with guns at each corner and a substantial ditch all round. In the centre was a steel turret with two 6-inch howitzers, and in a square round this were four other turrets with 5-inch quick-firing guns. The total number of guns is said to have been about 400 (probably less); the garrison of the forts was apparently about 10,000 strong, and a small field army of some 20,000 men co-operated in the defence. The old citadel lay just to the north of the town, and an old work, Fort Chartreuse, was to the immediate south-east.]

AUG. 4TH.—Late in the evening, after a preliminary bombardment of Forts Fleron and Evegnée to the east of the town, the German VIIth Army Corps made a vigorous attempt to rush the defences, but was repulsed with very heavy loss. No siege guns had been brought up, and the light corps artillery was quite unable to overcome the comparatively heavy guns in the forts. The German cavalry divisions began to move round north and south of the fortress to cover further advances.

AUG. 5TH.—All this day the Germans were kept more or less in check by the fire from the forts, and no progress was made by them.

AUG. 6TH.—The Germans summoned the town to surrender; this was refused, the civilian population evacuated the place, and a heavy bombardment lasting some seven hours ensued, very considerable damage being done.

Against the forts a very heavy assault was made by the three army corps acting together, the chief attacks being on the south defences, Forts Flemalle, Boncalles, and Embourg. All the attacks were again repulsed, but it being clear that the Belgian field army was not strong enough to maintain such a long line of defence it was decided to withdraw it, and it was this retirement which

enabled the German troops to capture the city. Although the forts under the personal command of General Leman still held out vigorously, the enemy's troops succeeded in getting in through the intervals, and as there was no inner line of defence, the city itself was soon captured. A party of cavalry very nearly succeeded in making the Commander-in-Chief a prisoner, but the attempt to carry out this attack failed.

AUG. 7TH.—The siege train having come up the bombardment of the forts was continued with a heavier type of gun, but the works still held out.

AUG. 10TH.—The Germans had now full possession of the town, but had not succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the forts.

At this date the cavalry screen, after some fighting at Haelen, was well west of Liège, preparatory to advancing on Brussels—at the same time this force covered the attack on Liège.

AUG. 12TH.—On this date the Germans were holding an entrenched line from Maestricht to Liège, attacking the forts and holding an advanced cavalry line towards Brussels, approximately Hasselt—west of Liège—Huy.

AUG. 13TH.—The Germans now succeeded in getting their heaviest guns (reported to be 42 cm.) nearer to the forts, and the south and east defences were soon in their hands. Fort de Loncine, which the Commander-in-Chief used as his headquarters, was very seriously damaged, and General Leman himself was nearly killed by the explosive gases in the heavy shells. The Germans eventually captured the forts and the siege was ended.

AUG. 14TH.—The French cavalry was reported to be in touch with the Belgian field forces west and south of Brussels.

AUG. 16TH.—The British Expeditionary Force was landed in France and commenced moving towards the Belgian Frontier.

AUG. 17TH.—The Belgians decided to remove the seat of Government from Brussels to Antwerp.

AUG.—20TH.—The Belgian Government evacuated Brussels and it was occupied by the Germans.

The Germans now held the line Liège—Eghezee—Hal, and to the south-west of Brussels.

SECTION VII.

The Campaign in France, North-East of Paris, from August 22nd to September 10th.

During the first three weeks of August the French and British mobilizations were in progress as also the movements of the troops to the desired stations.

AUG. 22ND.—The general positions of the opposing armies were:—

German Armies.

I. Von Kluck (5 army corps).....	{ In Belgium on the line Oudenarde—Hal—Eghezee, with advance guards about Soignies, Seneffe and Gembloux. Troops also at Brussels and Liège.
II. Von Bülow (3 army corps).....	
III. Von Hausen (2 Saxon army corps).....	
IV. Duke of Wurtemberg.	Huy—Marche—Neufchâteau.
V. Crown Prince of Germany.....	Arlon—Luxembourg.
VI. Crown Prince of Bavaria.....	In Lorraine.
VII. Von Heeringen.....	Guarding North Vosges.
?	Guarding South Vosges.

Allied Armies.

Belgian Forces..... Operating on the flank of German forces, south from Antwerp.

French Forces

V. Army (3 army corps and 2 reserve

army corps).....

Remainder (no details).....

Charleroi—Namur.

Namur—Mezières, along the frontier south to Belfort. Also about Paris, Chalons, etc.

British Forces.

Ist Army Corps (Haig).....

IIInd Army Corps (Smith-Dorrien)....

Cavalry { 5th Brigade.....

Division { Remainder, 4 brigades.....

III. Corps ?

Mons—Binche.

Condé—Mons.

Binche.

Western flank.

Base in France.

During this day the Germans succeeded in getting possession of the line Namur—Charleroi and the crossings over the river Sambre. Later on they made a very heavy attack against the east defences of Namur itself.

[N.B.—Namur was a second-class fortress of the ring type with nine modern forts somewhat similar to Liège.]

AUG. 23RD.—The German attack continued, being specially severe about Namur, the junction of the Rivers Meuse and Sambre.

British Forces.—In the early morning the Commander-in-Chief received information from the French that the German troops in front of him amounted to about two army corps and one cavalry division. This was confirmed by the British flying corps and the reconnoitring patrols; so that an outflanking movement to the west did not seem very probable. At 3 p.m. the German attack became very severe on the Mons line, the Ist Army Corps, from Mons to Bray, being specially threatened. This corps, therefore, retired its right flank to the south of Bray, while the 5th Cavalry Brigade moved south of Binche, which latter town was occupied by the enemy. Mons being a somewhat dangerous salient the Commander of the IIInd Army Corps was directed to draw back his centre behind that place if he was seriously pressed, and this was done before dark. About 5 p.m. information was received from the French that the IVth, IXth and a reserve German Corps were moving for a frontal attack against the British, while the IIInd Army Corps was engaged in a turning movement from Tournai district. It was also stated that the Fifth French Army with its two reserve divisions was retiring south in the direction of Hirson, and the British commander was requested to conform to the movement. There was a certain amount of fighting along the British line all night, and arrangements were made for the retirement to a previously selected position on the line Jenlain—Maubeuge.

The 4th British Division (IIIrd Army) entrained at the base for Le Cateau, the 19th Infantry Brigade moving south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the IIInd Army.

French Forces.—Very heavy fighting took place along the front and at Namur, which place was taken by the Germans at about 5 p.m. The French Fifth Army then commenced a retirement to the south as above stated.

AUG. 24TH: *British Forces.*—The retirement to the Jenlain—Maubeuge line commenced at daybreak, the movement being covered by a demonstration towards Binche. This was carried out by the Ist Army Corps from Harmignies very successfully. In the meanwhile, the IIInd Army Corps retired on the line Dour—Frameries, held it for some time, eventually reaching the Jenlain—Bavai line about

7 p.m. The 1st Army Corps covered the retirement and arrived on the Bavai—Maubeuge line about the same hour. The cavalry division acted vigorously to protect the outer flank.

At 7.30 p.m. the 5th Division, IInd Army Corps, were very hard pressed, and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was sent to its assistance. The cavalry, unfortunately, suffered very severely from being caught in an entanglement, but eventually, with the help of the 19th Infantry Brigade, the retirement was successfully carried out. At nightfall the British positions were: 1st Army Corps, Bavai—Maubeuge; IInd Army Corps, Jenlain—Bavai; 19th Infantry Brigade, Jenlain—Bry; cavalry on west flank.

French Force.—The French force continued its retirement throughout the day.

AUG. 25TH: British Forces.—As the French were still retiring the Commander-in-Chief decided to move still further back to the line Cambrai—Le Cateau—Landrecies.

By this morning the 4th Division (Third Army) had partially detrained at Le Cateau, 11 battalions and a brigade of artillery being available.

At 5.30 a.m. the very difficult and dangerous retirement commenced. The newly arrived 4th Division (Third Army) was directed to take up a position at La Chaprie, south of Solesmes, and did excellent service. The IInd Army Corps, covered by two cavalry brigades and assisted by the 19th Brigade on its left flank, commenced its retirement and eventually reached its new position Le Cateau—Caudry about 6 p.m. after very heavy fighting. The 1st Army Corps retired east of the Forêt de Mormal, and after being heavily attacked about Landrecies and south-east of Maronilles, reached its new position about 10 p.m.; the two French Reserve Divisions giving most valuable help at the latter place. The 4th Division and 19th Infantry Brigade halted about Seranvillers. The cavalry had been very much scattered during the numerous severe actions on August 24th and 25th, but in the evening two brigades were concentrated south of Cambrai.

French Forces.—The retirement was still continued.

AUG. 26TH: British Forces.—Owing to the continued retirement of the French and the extremely heavy outflanking pressure by the enemy, a further movement to the rear became imperative.

At daybreak, therefore, the retirement was ordered, but it was soon found necessary for the IInd Army Corps to remain, at least for a while, in its overnight position. As no help could be sent by the 1st Army Corps, which was temporarily incapable of movement, and the IInd Army Corps was very seriously pressed and in great danger, a message was sent to General Sordêt's Cavalry Division asking for immediate assistance. Unfortunately, owing to the fatigued state of the horses, this assistance was not available, and the IInd Army Corps had therefore to rely on its own resources. At 3.30 p.m. it became evident that if annihilation was to be avoided an attempt at retreat must be made, and about 3.30 p.m. this was ordered. The movement was splendidly carried out and the enemy at least partially thrown off by nightfall.

French Forces.—The retirement still continued.

AUG. 27TH.—The Allies retired still further, and at night the positions taken up were:—

French: Mezières—Hirson—Guise.

British: Guise—North St. Quentin to River Somme.

During this day General Sordêt's Cavalry Division gave much assistance in driving the enemy back on Cambrai, while General D'Amade, with the 61st and 62nd Divisions, helped considerably by acting on the enemy's flank from Arras.

AUG. 28TH.—The pursuit of the enemy was not so severe. The French line was Guise—north of Rethel—Verdun; the British, Noyon—Chaulny—La Fere. In the evening the retirement was continued; the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades which covered the British retreat had numerous severe engagements with two German columns moving south-east from St. Quentin.

AUG. 29TH.—The retirement still continued.

The French Sixth Army, consisting of the VIIth Army Corps with four reserve divisions and Sordêt's Cavalry Division, came up on the left of the British force towards Amiens; the Fifth French Army being south of the River Oise from La Fere to Guise. The general line was : between Hirson and Rethel—south of St. Quentin—Peronne—Baupaulme. The enemy's pursuit was very vigorous. At 1 p.m., three or four corps were opposing the French Sixth Army, at least two the British force and five or six the French Fifth Army.

After a consultation between the two Commanders-in-Chief, it was decided to continue the retreat to the south, but the French Fifth Army was to demonstrate against the enemy about the River Somme, while the British force was to move towards the line Compiègne—Soissons in such a way that they were to be within one day's march of the French Fifth Army.

AUG. 30TH.—The general line was Compiègne—Soissons—Rheims—Verdun.

The French 1st and IIIrd Army Corps during the day drove back the German Guard, Guard Reserve and Xth Corps, but the French Commander-in-Chief decided to carry his retreat still further. A new French Army, the Ninth, comprising three Army Corps, was brought up and took its position between the Fifth and Fourth French Armies. The main idea of the operations was to draw the enemy southwards until a suitable opportunity arrived for a vigorous counter-attack.

AUG. 31ST.—The retreat was continued.

SEPT. 1ST.—The retirement continued. The 1st Cavalry Brigade had a successful encounter south of Compiègne, recovering six of its own guns and capturing 12 belonging to the enemy. The 4th Guards Brigade had a very severe encounter at Villers Cotterêts.

SEPT. 2ND.—The general retirement continued. The general line of battle was : North of Verdun—Triancourt—Vitry le François—Sezanne—Coulommiers—Meaux—Senlis—Clermont.

SEPT. 3RD.—The British force retired to the position Lagny—Signy—Signets as requested by the French Commander-in-Chief; but later on in the day a further retirement was suggested to a line about 12 miles in rear of the above, viz., Jouy-le-Châtel Faremontiers—Villeneuve-le-Coute, and this was duly carried out. The enemy crossed the River Marne in force.

SEPT. 4TH.—The enemy on this date made a decided change in his plan of operation. This was apparently due to the exhaustion of his troops, the reduction in numbers caused by the despatch of men to the Eastern theatre of war, and to the discovery of unexpected French supports.

The new plan was to make a vigorous effort to break the Allies' line between Chateau Thierry and Vitry-le-François.

SEPT. 5TH.—The Germans decided on the following movements: Part of the First Army to hold the River Ourcq, the remainder to cross the River Marne, about Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Chateau Thierry and Mezy, moving generally on the line Coulommiers—Montmirail. Other armies to conform to this movement.

The French Commander-in-Chief now decided that the time had come for a vigorous offensive, and made the following arrangements:—

Sixth French Army, pivoted on the River Marne, to wheel to the right and attack the Germans on the River Ourcq. British force, with left resting on the River Marne and right on Fifth French Army, to fill the gap between the Fifth

and Sixth French Armies and the whole Allied forces to make a vigorous offensive movement.

SEPT. 6TH.—The Germans now began to realize the danger to their right flank, and decided to retreat. In the evening the positions were :—

Allies.

French Sixth Army	Meaux towards Betz.
British force	Langy—Mauperthius—Coulommiers.
British cavalry	Between British force and Fifth French Army.
Fifth French Army	Courtegan—Esternay.
9th French Army	Left at Charleville.
4th } French Army	To a point north of Verdun.
3rd }	

Germans.

I. Army.	IV. Reserve and II. Corps	East of River Ourcq.
	9th Cavalry Division	West of Crecy.
	2nd Cavalry Division	North of Coulommiers.
	IVth Army Corps	Rebais.
II. Army.	IIIrd and VIIth Army Corps	South-west of Montmirail.
	IXth, Xth, Xth Reserve and Guard Army Corps	Moving against the centre and right of the French Fifth and Ninth Armies about Montmi- rail-Vitry-le-François.
III. Army.		Against the line Vitry-le-Fran- çois—Revigny.

SEPT. 7TH.—On this day, there was very severe fighting all along the line. The French VIth Corps made some headway on the River Ourcq, and the Fifth French Army forced the enemy back towards the Petit Morin with heavy loss, especially about Montceaux. The British force inflicted heavy losses on the 2nd, 9th and Guards Division.

SEPT. 8TH.—The German retreat to the north continued. Both the British force and the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were heavily engaged with the rear guards holding the Petit Morin line; all the enemy's counter attacks were repulsed and he lost a great many prisoners and some guns. The IIIrd British Army Corps was in action this day as a complete unit.

SEPT. 9TH.—The forward movement of the Allies continued. The Sixth French Army met with serious opposition on the River Ourcq as the enemy had largely increased his forces. The Fifth French Army, after very heavy fighting about Montmirail, succeeded in driving the enemy across the River Marne at Chateau-Thierry. The 1st and IInd Corps of the British force drove the enemy across the River Marne and advanced to a line a little north of the river, but the IIIrd Corps met with great opposition at La Ferté before it gained the passage at night-fall.

The Second German Army crossed the River Marne about Epernay, followed by the Fourth French Army.

SEPT. 19TH.—The advance of the Allies continued, the French Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Armies meeting with comparatively little opposition.

The British force, however, had some very severe fighting with the German rearguards. Some 2,000 prisoners with 13 guns and seven machine guns were captured during the day.

The First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, and the Battle of the Marne which had been in progress since September 6th was now completed.

SECTION VIII.

The Campaign in France, North-East of Paris, from September 11th to September 28th, 1914.

SEPT. 11TH: *British Forces*.—In the early morning the advance to the north continued. Third and 5th Cavalry Brigades moved south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd and 4th towards Courcelles and Cersuil. The British and French forces (Sixth and Fifth Armies) crossed the River Ourcq unopposed.

SEPT. 12TH.—By the afternoon it became evident the Germans were preparing to make a vigorous stand on the whole River Aisne position. Heavy fighting was going on all along the line. By the evening the British forces were disposed as follows: 1st Army Corps, Vauxcéré; IIInd Army Corps, Missy and Vailly; IIIrd Army Corps, south-east of Soissons.

The general line of battle was: North of Verdun—north of St. Menéhould—north of Rheims—south of Soissons—north of Compiègne—Montdidier—towards Amiens.

SEPT. 13TH.—On this morning the "Battle of the Aisne" commenced.

British Forces.—The general advance was as follows:—

Cavalry Division: In advance towards the river.

1st Army Corps, 1st Division: Chanonille via Bourg Bridge; 2nd Division, Presles via Pont d'Arcy.

IIInd Army Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions): Condé.

IIIrd Army Corps (4th and 6th Divisions): Venizel for Vregny plateau.

1st Army Corps.—The cavalry and 1st Division met with only slight opposition, crossed the river and drove the enemy back. At night its line was: Moulins—Paisey—Geny with outposts in Vendresse. The 2nd Division reached the river by 9 a.m. and the 5th Brigade after very severe fighting managed to cross by a broken bridge. A new pontoon bridge was completed by 5 p.m., but the fighting was still very heavy. The 4th Guards Brigade managed to ferry one battalion across at Chavonne late in the afternoon. By nightfall the positions were: 5th Brigade north of the river protecting the bridge head, remainder of the Division south of the river in bivouac.

IIInd Army Corps.—All the bridges were found broken except the one at Condé.

The 5th Division got the 4th Brigade across by rafts east of Venizel and reached St. Marguerite: the 13th Brigade suffered severely. The 3rd Division, 15th Brigade, got across to St. Marguerite, and with the 14th Brigade supported the 4th Division on their left against a very severe attack.

IIIrd Army Corps, 4th Division.—The 12th Brigade crossed at Venizel and reached Bucy-le-long by 1 p.m. At 2 p.m. this Brigade attacked towards Chivres and Vregny, making good progress, but it had to halt at 5.30 p.m. owing to the heavy fire of the enemy. (During the night the 5th Division took over this position). The 10th Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel and also moved to Bucy-le-long. A great deal of bridging work was done throughout this day.

At night the enemy retired on all points and entrenched himself about two miles north of the river on the Chemin-des-Dames, with very strong infantry detachments on the north slopes of the river, aided by very powerful artillery.

SEPT. 14TH.—*British Forces*.—In order to ascertain whether the enemy really intended to make a stand a further general advance was ordered.

The 1st Army Corps was directed to cross the line Moulins—Moussy by 7 a.m., and the other two Army Corps being ordered to continue their previous operations.

Ist Army Corps.—The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division was sent at daybreak towards Vendresse, to protect the divisional movement. The enemy was found to be in great force near the factory to the north of Troyon. At 3 a.m. two battalions of this brigade were ordered to move towards Troyon while another was directed (4 a.m.) to occupy the spur south-east of the village. The fourth battalion moved to Vendresse at 5.30 a.m., but as the fighting was very severe it was ordered to assist the battalions despatched at 3 a.m. No progress was made, and when the 1st Brigade came up, one battalion was sent to the right of the 2nd Brigade, while the other three formed up on the left. At 12 noon a detachment seized the factory, and the whole line extended in an east and west direction in front of it. The enemy were to the north and east, and further progress at that time was not feasible. At 10 a.m. the 3rd Brigade had reached a point a mile south of Vendresse, and was ordered to connect up the line to the left, with the 2nd Division.

The 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division advanced, passed through the line held by the 5th Brigade during the previous night and occupied the Courteçon ridge, while the 4th Guards Brigade and artillery moved to a point east of Ostel. The former force reached the line Tilleul—La Buvelle by 9 a.m., but owing to the heavy fire could not advance further until supported by the heavy artillery. The latter force crossed the river at 10 a.m. meeting with very severe opposition; at 1 p.m. its left was south of the Ostel ridge.

About this time the enemy managed to gain a footing between the 1st and IIInd Army Corps, threatening the line of communications of the former. The 1st Corps was very severely pressed, but after some very heavy fighting, it managed with the help of the cavalry division to drive the enemy off. At 4 p.m. a general advance of the 1st Army Corps was ordered, and with much difficulty the important position Chemin-des-Dames—Chivy—Le Cour de Soupir was captured and definitely held.

IIInd Army Corps.—The 3rd Division advanced and very nearly reached the Aizy plateau. The 5th Division held its ground throughout the day.

IIIrd Army Corps.—The 4th Division also retained its position.

SEPT. 15TH: British Forces.—It now became evident that the enemy was prepared to make a strong defence. His general position was: north of Compiègne—east and south-east along the valley of the River Aisne beyond Rheims, etc. It was noticed this day that the enemy was using a heavier class of artillery; the guns were evidently siege guns brought from Maubeuge, which had fallen a few days previously.

During the day a very heavy encounter was in progress. The 3rd Division advanced and gained the Aizy plateau, but the 5th Division had to retire slightly to the line Marguerite—north of Missy—to the river east of Missy.

SEPT. 16TH.—The French Commander-in-Chief decided to strongly reinforce the Sixth French Army with a view to driving in the enemy's right and compelling his retirement.

The British 6th Division, which had now come up, was ordered to join the IIIrd Army Corps on the left. It remained south of the river as a reserve.

SEPT. 17TH.—There was a very heavy bombardment by the enemy. In the afternoon the right flank of the 1st Division (1st Army Corps) was very seriously threatened, but a vigorous counter-attack was made, which not only repulsed the attack, but eventually allowed further ground to be gained. The German general line was: East of Noyon—south of Chauny—south of Laon—high ground to north of Rheims—north of Ville sur Tourbe—north of Varenne—north of Verdun.

SEPT. 18TH.—The bombardment was continued. The First Army was constantly and severely attacked, but maintained its position well.

The French Commander-in-Chief now decided to try and envelop the enemy's right flank.

SEPT. 19TH—20TH.—The heavy attacks on the First Army and the 3rd Division continued.

SEPT. 21ST—22ND.—The attacks continued; during the night of September 22nd a very severe one was made on the 3rd Division, but it was repulsed with considerable loss.

SEPT. 23RD: *British Force*.—Four 6-inch howitzer batteries arrived; two were allotted to the First Army and two to the Second Army.

The Sixth French Army on the left was very heavily engaged; this to a certain extent relieved the pressure on the British force.

SEPT. 24TH.—The howitzer batteries came into action and were very useful.

The French made some progress about Lassigny.

SEPT. 25TH.—The enemy's attacks appeared to slacken off.

SEPT. 26TH.—The enemy began a very vigorous bombardment and made a heavy attack on the 1st Division, sapping up to the position.

SEPT. 27TH—28TH.—Further attacks were made by the enemy all along the front, especially on the 1st Division, but all were repulsed.

General position of the Allies—ground gained on the left flank towards Roye and Peronne; other positions much as before.

General German position—on the right north of St. Quentin; other positions much as before.

SECTION IX.

The Operations in Alsace Lorraine, from August 7th to 23rd.

AUG. 7TH.—The French decided to make a reconnaissance towards Mulhausen, partly to encourage the inhabitants of Alsace to revolt against German rule and partly to ascertain in what strength Upper Alsace was held.

A brigade from Belfort advanced on Thann and Altkirch, and by the evening had carried the German position.

AUG. 8TH.—By nightfall the French had occupied Mulhausen.

AUG. 9TH.—The XIVth German Army Corps acting from Colmar and Neu Breisach advanced against Mulhausen threatening the French communications about Cernay. As the main object of the reconnaissance, *viz.*, to ascertain the German strength, had been attained the French retired to Altkirch, and Mulhausen was again occupied by the Germans.

AUG. 10TH.—As the general position in France and Belgium appeared to the French Government to be satisfactory and the mobilization was completed, it was decided to send a force of (three army corps ?) under General Pau to act against the German left in Alsace.

By this date the French held all the passes of the Vosges and were preparing for an advance against the line Strassburg—Neu Breisach (the Rhine fortresses).

AUG. 11TH.—A German force from Metz attacked Spincourt, but was repulsed.

AUG. 12TH.—The Germans attacked Blamont, but were unsuccessful.

AUG. 16TH.—The French held the whole line of the Vosges Mountains, with Blamont and Avricourt to the north-west of Mount Donon (northern height of the Vosges).

AUG. 18TH.—The French advanced and occupied Saarburg, thus cutting the main line between Metz and Strassburg.

AUG. 19TH—24TH.—The Germans advanced against Avricourt, captured Lunéville, and drove the left of the French back on Nancy with some loss; the French right then evacuated the north Vosges passes. Further attacks by the Germans failed.

It was now decided, owing to the rapid advance on Paris, to abandon the Alsace operations.

AUG. 25TH.—The French evacuated Mulhausen and the line of the Vosges Mountains and the operations came to a close.

SECTION X.

Operations in Belgium, from September 14th to the Fall of Antwerp on October 8th, 1914.

SEPT. 14TH.—After the capture of Brussels, the Germans decided to hold the town and take up a position covering the right and right rear of their armies operating in north-east France. Brussels itself was fortified temporarily, and an advanced entrenched line from about Termonde to Aerschot established. This enabled them to ward off attacks from the Antwerp area, and served as a preliminary base for any operations against the fortress which might be considered advisable. In addition to this, it was arranged for cavalry to move out towards Ostend and Dunkerque, so as to protect the western flank of a force moving against Antwerp itself.

SEPT. 15TH—26TH.—A good many encounters took place in the Termonde—Malines district during this period, the object of the Belgians being to prevent the Germans moving troops to assist the armies in north-east France.

On the 26th the Belgians surprised a German detachment moving on Termonde and drove it back with considerable loss.

SEPT. 27TH.—A reconnaissance by the Germans towards the Malines district failed.

SEPT. 28TH.—It was generally reported that the Germans had decided definitely to attack Antwerp, and that they were bringing up siege guns for the purpose.

By the evening the German line was about Termonde—Malines—Heyst op Berg, and a preliminary bombardment of the southern works commenced.

[N.B.—Antwerp was generally considered to be one of the strongest fortresses of its class in Europe. It was originally designed by Brialmont, the celebrated Belgian engineer, who in the 'sixties constructed a citadel, with an inner line of ramparts and a series of detached forts on the ring principle. In recent years it was found that these latter works were much too close to the city, and consequently an entirely new series some eight to ten miles from the town were constructed. The old detached forts were connected by a rampart, to form an inner line of defence, and the intervals between the new outer ones (which occupied a perimeter of over 70 miles) were filled up with subsidiary defences. The outer works had armoured turrets and heavy guns, while a system of inundations to the north on both sides of the River Scheldt, and to the south about the River Nethe further added to the defensive power of the place. The actual condition of the fortress as to guns, state of the forts, etc., is not at present known.]

SEPT. 29TH.—The artillery bombardment of the section of the defences (south), viz., Forts Liezel, Waelhem, Catherine St. Wavre and Lierre commenced. Fort Wavre was put out of action, and Fort Waelhem was a good deal damaged.

SEPT. 30TH.—The German fire was specially concentrated on Fort Waelhem, and at 4 p.m. some shells practically destroyed the town waterworks in rear of it. The Germans suffered considerable loss by attacking this work before it had been properly silenced.





By midnight Fort Waelhem was in a critical state, but a night attack upon it and the southern position generally was repulsed with vigour.

OCT. 1ST.—Further attacks were made on the south-east defences from Fort Kessel to Fort Willebroek, and the whole position was heavily bombarded. At Duffel the attack more or less succeeded, but Fort Lierre still held out.

OCT. 2ND.—At 10 a.m. Fort Waelhem was silenced after making a very vigorous defence.

At nightfall it was generally reported that a British force was coming to the assistance of the fortress.

OCT. 3RD.—The garrison of the south-east defences had to fall back behind the River Nethe. A very heavy bombardment was in progress during this night.

OCT. 4TH.—The force in rear of the River Nethe still held out; a fresh attack was made on Lierre, and this was repulsed.

In the evening the British force, 8,000 strong, consisting of a brigade of Royal Marines and two of the newly-formed naval brigades, arrived and took up positions to assist the defence.

OCT. 5TH.—The garrison held out on the River Nethe nearly all day, but during the night the Germans succeeded in forcing the line at Duffel, and a retirement became inevitable, especially as all the forts were now very seriously damaged.

OCT. 6TH.—A good deal of heavy fighting took place both on the defence line and inside it.

OCT. 7TH.—The Germans were reported to have offered to refrain from shelling the town if the Belgian Government would give an undertaking not to molest any of their troops south of Antwerp. The offer was refused.

OCT. 8TH.—The bombardment of the city began at 1 p.m. and was continued from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m.

It was decided to evacuate the fortress, the troops were withdrawn and the oil tanks at Hoboken opened, so as not to leave any oil or petrol for German use.

In the final retirement the Germans attacked the retreating force about Lokeren and succeeded in driving about 2,000 British and a large number of Belgian troops across the Dutch border to the north.

OCT. 9TH.—The Germans took possession of the place this day.

APPENDIX I.

Despatch from Field-Marshal Sir John French, dated September 7th, 1914.

War Office, September 9, 1914.

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field:—

September 7, 1914.

My Lord,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of the Field Force under my command up to the time of rendering this despatch.

1. The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination in this country well within the scheduled time.

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the Force during Saturday, the 22nd, to positions I considered most favourable from which to

commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows :—

From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the Cavalry Division as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnaissance was entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.

During the 22nd and 23rd these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.

2. At 6 a.m., on August 23rd, I assembled the Commanders of the First and Second Corps and Cavalry Division at a point close to the position and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of my position ; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate.

About 3 p.m. on Sunday, the 23rd, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.

The Commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south ; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.

The right of the 3rd Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient ; and I directed the Commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 p.m., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German Corps, viz., a reserve corps, the 4th Corps and the 9th Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the 5th French Army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur.

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavoured to confirm it by aeroplane reconnaissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night, and at daybreak on the 24th the 2nd Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the 1st and 2nd Divisions, whilst the 1st Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The 3rd Division on the right of the Corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially entrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 p.m. Towards mid-day the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.

I had previously ordered General Allenby with the Cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavour to take the pressure off.

About 7.30 a.m. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding 5th Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the Cavalry and endeavoured to bring direct support to the 5th Division.

During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyse the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the Brigade.

The 19th Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the Line of Communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22nd and 23rd. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.

With the assistance of the Cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so.

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the 19th Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the Cavalry on the outer flank.

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted, and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops.

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge—Bavai—Eth road by 5.30 a.m.

Two Cavalry Brigades, with the Divisional Cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the Cavalry Division, with the 19th Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.

The 4th Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23rd, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a Brigade of Artillery with Divisional Staff were available for service.

I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the Division rendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts—owing to the information I received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II.) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.

The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Forêt De Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the Corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 p.m. a report was received that the 4th Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the 9th German Army Corps, who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his 1st Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the Commander of the two French Reserve Divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his Corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south towards Wassigny on Guise.

By about 6 p.m. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry, and the line of defence was continued thence by the 4th Division towards Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.

The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army Corps.

On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division.

At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.

The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.

There had been no time to entrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.

The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p.m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the Artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the Cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of August 26th could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.

On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordêt and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.

General D'Amade also, with the 61st and 62nd French Reserve Divisions, moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces.

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23rd, and which really constituted a four days' battle.

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present despatch.

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces have suffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of the fact that the British Army—only two days after a concentration by rail—was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German Army Corps.

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men.

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines.

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance I received from the general and personal staffs at headquarters during this trying period.

Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff; Major-General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under them have worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by me to Brigadier-General Hon. W. Lambton, my military secretary, and the personal staff.

In such operations as I have described the work of the quartermaster-general is of an extremely onerous nature. Major-General Sir William Robertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficulties with his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it is largely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of the troops—inseparable from such operations—were not much greater.

Major-General Sir Nevil Macready, the adjutant-general, has also been confronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection with disciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He has been indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situations which arose.

I have not yet been able to complete the list of officers whose names I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice for services rendered during the period under review; and, as I understand it is of importance that this despatch should no longer be delayed, I propose to forward this list, separately, as soon as I can.—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field.

APPENDIX II.

Despatches from Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief British Forces, dated September 17th and October 8th, 1914.

I.

17th September, 1914.

My Lord,—In continuation of my despatch of September 7th, I have the honour to report the further progress of the operations of the forces under my command from August 28th.

On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by two of the enemy's cavalry columns, moving south-east from St. Quentin.

The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme, General Gough, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerable loss.

General Chetwode, with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, encountered the eastern column near Cérizy, moving south. The Brigade attacked and routed the column, the leading German regiment suffering very severe casualties and being almost broken up.

The VIIth French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up from the south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed its detrainment, and the French Sixth Army got into position on my left, its right resting on Roye.

The Fifth French Army was behind the line of the Oise between La Fère and Guise.

The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous, some five or six German corps were on the Somme, facing the Fifth Army on the Oise. At least two corps were advancing towards my front and were crossing the Somme east and west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the Sixth French Army on my left.

This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.

I strongly represented my position to the French Commander-in-Chief, who was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told me that he had directed the Fifth French Army on the Oise to move forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on my left flank, composed of the VIIth Army Corps, four reserve divisions, and Sordêt's corps of cavalry.

I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short retirement towards the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.

In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to a position a few miles north of the line Compiègne-Soissons on the 29th.

The right flank of the German Army was now reaching a point which appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I had already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division was reported to have moved.

Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an advance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by the Inspector-General of Communications.

In spite of the severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard, Xth, and Guard Reserve Corps of the German Army by the Ist and IIIrd French Corps on the right of the Fifth Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to pursue this advantage, and a general retirement on to the line of the Marne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more eastern theatre were directed to conform.

A new Army (the Ninth) had been formed from three corps in the south by General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the Fifth and left of the Fourth Armies.

Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general situation.

In conformity with the movements of the French forces my retirement continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.

On September 1st, when retiring from the thickly-wooded country to the south of Compiègne, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German Cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, and several officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of some detachments from the IIIrd Corps operating on their left, they not only recovered their own guns but succeeded in capturing 12 of the enemy's.

Similarly, to the eastward, the 1st Corps, retiring south, also got into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the 4th Guards Brigade suffered considerably.

On September 3rd the British forces were in position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requested by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to a point some 12 miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and was threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and the Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several small outpost actions took place.

On Saturday, September 5th, I met the French Commander-in-Chief at his request, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive forthwith, as he considered conditions were very favourable to success.

General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to move on the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, which was then moving in a south-easterly direction east of that river.

He requested me to effect a change of front to my right—my left resting on the Marne and my right on the 5th Army—to fill the gap between that army and the 6th. I was then to advance against the enemy in my front and join in the general offensive movement.

These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6th, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left flank of the 6th French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Maupersuis, which was about the British centre, Courtecon, which was the left of the 5th French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the 9th Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the 9th, 4th, and 3rd French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun.

This battle, in so far as the 6th French Army, the British Army, the 5th French Army, and the 9th French Army were concerned, may be said to have concluded on the evening of September 10th, by which time the Germans had

been driven back to the line Soissons-Reims, with a loss of thousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport.

About September 3rd the enemy appears to have changed his plans and to have determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris; for on September 4th air reconnaissances showed that his main columns were moving in a south-easterly direction generally east of a line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq.

On September 5th several of these columns were observed to have crossed the Marne; whilst German troops, which were observed moving south-east up the left bank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château Thierry, and Mezy.

Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on Montmirail, whilst before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located in the neighbourhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny.

I should conceive it to have been about noon on September 6th, after the British Forces had changed their front to the right and occupied the line Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremontiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advance of the 6th French Army north of the Marne towards the Ourcq became apparent, that the enemy realized the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the great retreat which opened the battle above referred to.

On the evening of September 6th, therefore, the fronts and positions of the opposing armies were roughly as follows:—

ALLIES.

6th French Army.—Right on the Marne at Meux, left towards Betz.

British Forces.—On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison.

5th French Army.—At Courtagon, right on Esternay.

Conneau's Cavalry Corps.—Between the right of the British and the left of French 5th Army.

GERMANS.

4th Reserve and 2nd Corps.—East of the Ourcq and facing that river.

9th Cavalry Division.—West of Crecy.

2nd Cavalry Division.—North of Coulommiers.

4th Corps.—Rebais.

3rd and 7th Corps.—South-west of Montmirail.

All these troops constituted the 1st German Army, which was directed against the French 6th Army on the Ourcq, and the British Forces, and the left of the 5th French Army south of the Marne.

The 2nd German Army (IX., X., X.R. and Guard) was moving against the centre and right of the 5th French Army and the 9th French Army.

On September 7th both the 5th and 6th French Armies were heavily engaged on our flank. The 2nd and 4th Reserve German Corps on the Ourcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French towards that river, but did not prevent the 6th Army from gaining some headway, the Germans themselves suffering serious losses. The French 5th Army threw the enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflicting severe losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carried at the point of the bayonet.

The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his 2nd and 9th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely.

Our cavalry acted with great vigour, especially General De Lisle's Brigade with the 9th Lancers and 18th Hussars.

On September 8th the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our Army was successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of all arms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progress of the French Armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy was making his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown back with very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubborn resistance at La Trétoire (north of Rebais). The enemy occupied a strong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the Petit Morin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machine guns and many prisoners were captured, and upwards of two hundred German dead were left on the ground.

The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by the Cavalry and the 1st Division, which crossed higher up the stream.

Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by the 1st Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again falling into our hands.

On this day (September 8th), the IInd Army Corps encountered considerable opposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss, making considerable captures.

The IIIrd Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy's infantry and made some captures.

On September 9th, the 1st and IInd Army Corps forced the passage of the Marne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The IIIrd Corps encountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté was destroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in some strength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of a bridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall.

During the day's pursuit, the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed and wounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands, and a battery of eight machine guns was captured by the 2nd Division.

On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the River Ourcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them, and very heavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout.

The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighbourhood of Château Thierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemy completely north of the river with great loss.

The fighting of this Army in the neighbourhood of Montmirail was very severe.

The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of the Ourcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The 1st and IInd Corps, assisted by the Cavalry Division on the right, the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northwards. Thirteen guns, seven machine guns, about 2,000 prisoners, and quantities of transport, fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field. On this day the French Fifth and Sixth Armies had little opposition.

As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, this evening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on the morning of the 6th inst., and it is at this point in the operations that I am concluding the present despatch.

Although I deeply regret to have had to report heavy losses in killed and wounded throughout these operations, I do not think they have been excessive in view of the magnitude of the great fight, the outlines of which I have only

been able very briefly to describe, and the demoralization and loss in killed and wounded which are known to have been caused to the enemy by the vigour and severity of the pursuit.

In concluding this despatch I must call your Lordship's special attention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23rd, up to the present date (September 17th), from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from the Seine to the Aisne, the Army under my command has been ceaselessly engaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind.

Since the date to which in this despatch I have limited my report of the operations, a great battle on the Aisne has been proceeding. A full report of this battle will be made in an early further despatch.

It will, however, be of interest to say here that, in spite of a very determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who is holding in strength and great tenacity a position peculiarly favourable to defence, the battle which commenced on the evening of the 12th inst. has, so far, forced the enemy back from his first position, secured the passage of the river, and inflicted great loss upon him, including the capture of over 2,000 prisoners and several guns.—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J. D. P. FRENCH, Field-Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
The British Forces in the Field.

II.

October 8th, 1914.

My Lord,—I have the honour to report the operations in which the British Forces in France have been engaged since the evening of September 10th.

1. In the early morning of the 11th the further pursuit of the enemy was commenced, and the three Corps crossed the Ourcq practically unopposed, the cavalry reaching the line of the Aisne River; the 3rd and 5th Brigades south of Soissons, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th on the high ground at Couvrelles and Cerseuil.

On the afternoon of the 12th, from the opposition encountered by the Sixth French Army to the west of Soissons, by the IIIrd Corps south-east of that place, by the IInd Corps south of Missy and Vailly, and certain indications all along the line, I formed the opinion that the enemy had, for the moment, at any rate, arrested his retreat, and was preparing to dispute the passage of the Aisne with some vigour.

South of Soissons the Germans were holding Mont de Paris against the attack of the right of the French Sixth Army when the IIIrd Corps reached the neighbourhood of Buzancy, south-east of that place. With the assistance of the artillery of the IIIrd Corps the French drove them back across the river at Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges.

The heavy artillery fire which was visible for several miles in a westerly direction in the valley of the Aisne, showed that the Sixth French Army was meeting with strong opposition all along the line.

On this day the cavalry under General Allenby reached the neighbourhood of Braine and did good work in clearing the town and the high ground beyond it of strong hostile detachments. The Queen's Bays are particularly mentioned by the General as having assisted greatly in the success of this operation. They were well supported by the 3rd Division, which on this night bivouacked at Brenelle, south of the river.

The 5th Division approached Missy, but were unable to make headway.

The 1st Army Corps reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much opposition.

In this manner the Battle of the Aisne commenced.

2. The Aisne Valley runs generally East and West, and consists of a flat-bottomed depression of width varying from half a mile to two miles, down which the river follows a winding course to the West at some points near the southern slopes of the valley and at others near the northern. The high ground both on the north and south of the river is approximately 400 feet above the bottom of the valley, and is very similar in character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on the left. Near the latter place the general plateau on the south is divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which the small River Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which also stretch upwards and backwards over the edge on to the top of the high ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of Soissons.

The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but, being 15 feet deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the west and Villers on the east (the part of the river attacked and secured by the British Forces), there are eleven road bridges across it. On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly, where it crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank. From Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south bank, turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley towards Bazoches.

The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for a delaying action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top of the plateau on the other side be seen except for small stretches. This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another important point is that all the bridges are under either direct or high-angle artillery fire.

The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is well adapted to concealment, and was so skilfully turned to account by the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his opposition to our passage of the river, or to accurately gauge his strength; but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning of the 13th.

3. On that morning I ordered the British Forces to advance and make good the Aisne.

The 1st Corps and the Cavalry advanced on the river. The 1st Division was directed on Chanouille *via* the canal bridge at Bourg, and the 2nd Division on Courtecon and Presles *via* Pont-Arcy and on the canal to the north of Braye *via* Chavonne. On the right the Cavalry and 1st Division met with slight opposition, and found a passage by means of the canal which crosses the river by an aqueduct. The Division was therefore able to press on, supported by the Cavalry Division on its outer flank, driving back the enemy in front of it.

On the left the leading troops of the 2nd Division reached the river by nine o'clock. The 5th Infantry Brigade were only enabled to cross, in single file and under considerable shell fire, by means of the broken girder of the bridge, which was not entirely submerged in the river. The construction of a pontoon bridge was at once undertaken, and was completed by five o'clock in the afternoon.

On the extreme left the 4th Guards Brigade met with severe opposition at Chavonne, and it was only late in the afternoon that it was able to establish a foothold on the northern bank of the river by ferrying one battalion across in boats.

By nightfall the 1st Division occupied the area Moulins-Paissy-Geny, with posts in the village of Vendresse.

The 2nd Division bivouacked as a whole on the southern bank of the river, leaving only the 5th Brigade on the north bank to establish a bridge head.

The IInd Corps found all the bridges in front of them destroyed, except that of Condé, which was in possession of the enemy, and remained so until the end of the battle.

In the approach to Missy, where the 5th Division actually crossed, there is some open ground which was swept by heavy fire from the opposite bank. The 13th Brigade was, therefore, unable to advance; but the 14th, which was directed to the east of Venizel at a less exposed point, was rafted across, and by night established itself with its left at St. Marguérite. They were followed by the 15th Brigade; and later on both the 14th and 15th supported the 4th Division on their left in repelling a heavy counter-attack on the IIIrd Corps.

On the morning of the 13th the IIIrd Corps found the enemy had established himself in strength on the Vregny Plateau. The road bridge at Venizel was repaired during the morning, and a reconnaissance was made with a view to throwing a pontoon bridge at Soissons.

The 12th Infantry Brigade crossed at Venizel, and was assembled at Bucy Le Long by 1 p.m., but the bridge was so far damaged that artillery could only be man-handled across it. Meanwhile the construction of a bridge was commenced close to the road bridge at Venizel.

At 2 p.m. the 12th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of Chivres and Vregny with the object of securing the high ground east of Chivres, as a necessary preliminary to a further advance northwards. This attack made good progress, but at 5.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery and machine-gun fire from the direction of Vregny became so severe that no further advance could be made. The positions reached were held till dark.

The pontoon bridge at Venizel was completed at 5.30 p.m., when the 10th Infantry Brigade crossed the river and moved to Bucy Le Long.

The 19th Infantry Brigade moved to Billy Sur Aisne, and before dark all the artillery of the Division had crossed the river, with the exception of the heavy battery and one brigade of field artillery.

During the night the positions gained by the 12th Infantry Brigade to the east of the stream running through Chivres were handed over to the 5th Division.

The section of the bridging train allotted to the IIIrd Corps began to arrive in the neighbourhood of Soissons late in the afternoon, when an attempt to throw a heavy pontoon bridge at Soissons had to be abandoned, owing to the fire of the enemy's heavy howitzers.

In the evening the enemy retired at all points and entrenched himself on the high ground about two miles north of the river along which runs the Chemin-des-Dames. Detachments of infantry, however, strongly entrenched in commanding points down slopes of the various spurs, were left in front of all three corps with powerful artillery in support of them.

During the night of the 13th and on the 14th and following days the field companies were incessantly at work night and day. Eight pontoon bridges and one foot bridge were thrown across the river under generally very heavy artillery fire, which was incessantly kept up on to most of the crossings after completion. Three of the road bridges, *i.e.*, Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Vailly were temporarily repaired so as to take foot traffic and the Villers Bridge made fit to carry weights up to six tons.

Preparations were also made for the repair of the Missy, Vailly, and Bourg bridges so as to take mechanical transport.

The weather was very wet and added to the difficulties by cutting up the already indifferent approaches, entailing a large amount of work to repair and improve.

The operations of the field companies during this most trying time are worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers.

4. On the evening of the 14th it was still impossible to decide whether the enemy was only making a temporary halt, covered by rear-guards, or whether he intended to stand and defend the position.

With a view to clearing up the situation I ordered a general advance.

The action of the 1st Corps on this day under the direction and command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skilful, bold, and decisive a character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting on the north bank of the river.

The Corps was directed to cross the line Moulins—Moussy by 7 a.m.

On the right the General Officer Commanding the 1st Division directed the 2nd Infantry Brigade (which was in billets and bivouacked about Moulins) and the 25th Artillery Brigade (less one battery), under General Bulfin, to move forward before daybreak, in order to protect the advance of the Division sent up the valley to Vendresse. An officers' patrol sent out by this Brigade reported a considerable force of the enemy near the factory north of Troyon, and the Brigadier accordingly directed two regiments (the King's Royal Rifles and the Royal Sussex Regiment) to move at 3 a.m. The Northamptonshire Regiment was ordered to move at 4 a.m. to occupy the spur east of Troyon. The remaining regiment of the Brigade (the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) moved at 5.30 a.m. to the village of Vendresse. The factory was found to be held in considerable strength by the enemy, and the Brigadier ordered the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment to support the King's Royal Rifles and the Sussex Regiment. Even with this support the force was unable to make headway, and on the arrival of the 1st Brigade the Coldstream Guards were moved up to support the right of the leading Brigade (the 2nd), while the remainder of the 1st Brigade supported its left.

About noon the situation was, roughly, that the whole of these two brigades were extended along a line running east and west, north of the line Troyon and south of the Chemin-des-Dames. A party of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment had seized and were holding the factory. The enemy held a line of entrenchments north and east of the factory in considerable strength, and every effort to advance against this line was driven back by heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The morning was wet and a heavy mist hung over the hills, so that the 25th Artillery Brigade and the Divisional Artillery were unable to render effective support to the advanced troops until about 9 o'clock.

By 10 o'clock the 3rd Infantry Brigade had reached a point one mile south of Vendresse, and from there it was ordered to continue the line of the 1st Brigade and to connect with and help the right of the 2nd Division. A strong hostile column was found to be advancing, and by a vigorous counter stroke with two of his battalions the Brigadier checked the advance of this column and relieved the pressure on the 2nd Division. From this period until late in the afternoon the fighting consisted of a series of attacks and counter attacks. The counter strokes by the enemy were delivered at first with great vigour, but later on they decreased in strength, and all were driven off with heavy loss.

On the left the 6th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to cross the river and to pass through the line held during the preceding night by the 5th Infantry Brigade and occupy the Courtecon Ridge, whilst a detached force, consisting of the 4th Guards Brigade and the 36th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, under

Brigadier-General Perceval, were ordered to proceed to a point east of the village of Ostel.

The 6th Infantry Brigade crossed the river at Pont-Arcy, moved up the valley towards Braye, and at 9 a.m. had reached the line Tilleul-La Buvelle. On this line they came under heavy artillery and rifle fire, and were unable to advance until supported by the 34th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, and the 44th Howitzer Brigade and the Heavy Artillery.

The 4th Guards Brigade crossed the river at 10 a.m., and met with very heavy opposition. It had to pass through dense woods; field artillery support was difficult to obtain; but one section of a field battery pushed up to and within the firing line. At 1 p.m. the left of the Brigade was south of the Ostel Ridge.

At this period of the action the enemy obtained a footing between the 1st and IInd Corps, and threatened to cut the communications of the latter.

Sir Douglas Haig was very hard pressed and had no reserve in hand. I placed the Cavalry Division at his disposal, part of which he skilfully used to prolong and secure the left flank of the Guards Brigade. Some heavy fighting ensued, which resulted in the enemy being driven back with heavy loss.

About 4 o'clock the weakening of the counter attacks by the enemy and other indications tended to show that his resistance was decreasing, and a general advance was ordered by the Army Corps Commander. Although meeting with considerable opposition and coming under very heavy artillery and rifle fire, the position of the corps at the end of the day's operations extended from the Chemin-des-Dames on the right, through Chivy, to Le Cour de Soupir, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade extending to the Chavonne—Soissons road.

On the right the corps was in close touch with the French Moroccan troops of the XVIIIth Corps, which were entrenched in échelon to its right rear. During the night they entrenched this position.

Throughout the Battle of the Aisne this advanced and commanding position was maintained, and I cannot speak too highly of the valuable services rendered by Sir Douglas Haig and the Army Corps under his command. Day after day and night after night the enemy's infantry has been hurled against him in violent counter attack which has never on any one occasion succeeded, whilst the trenches all over his position have been under continuous heavy artillery fire.

The operations of the 1st Corps on this day resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners, some field pieces, and machine guns.

The casualties were very severe, one brigade alone losing three of its four Colonels.

The 3rd Division commenced a further advance, and had nearly reached the plateau of Aizy, when they were driven back by a powerful counter attack supported by heavy artillery. The division, however, fell back in the best order, and finally entrenched itself about a mile north of Vailly Bridge, effectively covering the passage.

The 4th and 5th Divisions were unable to do more than maintain their ground.

5. On the morning of the 15th, after close examination of the position, it became clear to me that the enemy was making a determined stand; and this view was confirmed by reports which reached me from the French armies fighting on my right and left, which clearly showed that a strongly entrenched line of defence was being taken up from the north of Compiègne, eastward and south-eastward, along the whole valley of the Aisne up to and beyond Rheims.

A few days previously the fortress of Maubeuge fell, and a considerable quantity of siege artillery was brought down from that place to strengthen the enemy's position in front of us.

During the 15th shells fell in our position which have been judged by experts to be thrown by eight-inch siege guns with a range of 10,000 yards. Throughout

the whole course of the battle our troops have suffered very heavily from this fire, although its effect latterly was largely mitigated by more efficient and thorough entrenching, the necessity for which I impressed strongly upon Army Corps Commanders. In order to assist them in this work all villages within the area of our occupation were searched for heavy entrenching tools, a large number of which were collected.

In view of the peculiar formation of the ground on the north side of the river between Missy and Soissons, and its extraordinary adaptability to a force on the defensive, the 5th Division found it impossible to maintain its position on the southern edge of the Chivres Plateau, as the enemy in possession of the village of Vregny to the west was able to bring a flank fire to bear upon it. The Division had, therefore, to retire to a line the left of which was at the village of Margu rite, and thence ran by the north edge of Missy back to the river to the east of that place.

With great skill and tenacity Sir Charles Fergusson maintained this position throughout the whole battle, although his trenches were necessarily on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy on the southern edge of the plateau, which was only 400 yards away.

General Hamilton with the 3rd Division vigorously attacked to the north, and regained all the ground he had lost on the 15th, which throughout the battle has formed a most powerful and effective bridge head.

6. On the 16th the 6th Division came up into line.

It had been my intention to direct the 1st Corps to attack and seize the enemy's position on the Chemin-des-Dames, supporting it with this new reinforcement. I hoped from the position thus gained to bring effective fire to bear across the front of the 3rd Division which, by securing the advance of the latter, would also take the pressure off the 5th Division and the IIIrd Corps.

But any further advance of the 1st Corps would have dangerously exposed my right flank. And, further, I learned from the French Commander-in-Chief that he was strongly reinforcing the Sixth French Army on my left, with the intention of bringing up the Allied left to attack the enemy's flank and thus compel his retirement. I therefore sent the 6th Division to join the IIIrd Corps with orders to keep it on the south side of the river, as it might be available in general reserve.

On the 17th, 18th, and 19th the whole of our line was heavily bombarded, and the 1st Corps was constantly and heavily engaged. On the afternoon of the 17th the right flank of the 1st Division was seriously threatened. A counter-attack was made by the Northamptonshire Regiment in combination with the Queen's, and one battalion of the Divisional Reserve was moved up in support. The Northamptonshire Regiment, under cover of mist, crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's trenches and charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line. This new line was enfiladed by part of the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles, which wheeled to their left on the extreme right of our infantry line, and were supported by a squadron of cavalry on their outer flank. The enemy's attack was ultimately driven back with heavy loss.

On the 18th, during the night, the Gloucestershire Regiment advanced from their position near Chivy, filled in the enemy's trenches, and captured two maxim guns.

On the extreme right the Queen's were heavily attacked, but the enemy was repulsed with great loss. About midnight the attack was renewed on the 1st Division, supported by artillery fire, but was again repulsed.

Shortly after midnight an attack was made on the left of the 2nd Division with considerable force, which was also thrown back.

At about 1 p.m. on the 19th the 2nd Division drove back a heavy infantry attack strongly supported by artillery fire. At dusk the attack was renewed and again repulsed.

On the 18th I discussed with the General Officer Commanding the IInd Army Corps and his Divisional Commanders the possibility of driving the enemy out of Condé, which lay between his two divisions, and seizing the bridge which has remained throughout in his possession.

As, however, I found that the bridge was closely commanded from all points on the south side and that satisfactory arrangements were made to prevent any issue from it by the enemy by day or night, I decided that it was not necessary to incur the losses which an attack would entail, as, in view of the position of the IInd and IIIrd Corps, the enemy could make no use of Condé, and would be automatically forced out of it by any advance which might become possible for us.

7. On this day information reached me from General Joffre that he had found it necessary to make a new plan, and to attack and envelop the German right flank.

It was now evident to me that the battle in which we had been engaged since the 12th instant must last some days longer until the effect of this new flank movement could be felt and a way opened to drive the enemy from his positions.

It thus became essential to establish some system of regular relief in the trenches, and I have used the infantry of the 6th Division for this purpose with good results. The relieved brigades were brought back alternately south of the river, and, with the artillery of the 6th Division, formed a general reserve on which I could rely in case of necessity.

The cavalry has rendered most efficient and ready help in the trenches, and have done all they possibly could to lighten the arduous and trying task which has of necessity fallen to the lot of the infantry.

On the evening of the 19th and throughout the 20th the enemy again commenced to show considerable activity. On the former night a severe counter-attack on the 3rd Division was repulsed with considerable loss, and from early on Sunday morning various hostile attempts were made on the trenches of the 1st Division. During the day the enemy suffered another severe repulse in front of the 2nd Division, losing heavily in the attempt. In the course of the afternoon the enemy made desperate attempts against the trenches all along the front of the 1st Corps, but with similar results.

After dark the enemy again attacked the 2nd Division, only to be again driven back.

Our losses on these two days were considerable, but the number, as obtained, of the enemy's killed and wounded vastly exceeded them.

As the troops of the 1st Army Corps were much exhausted by this continual fighting, I reinforced Sir Douglas Haig with a brigade from the reserve, and called upon the 1st Cavalry Division to assist them.

On the night of the 21st another violent counter-attack was repulsed by the 3rd Division, the enemy losing heavily.

On the 23rd the four six-inch howitzer batteries, which I had asked to be sent from home, arrived. Two batteries were handed over to the IInd Corps and two to the 1st Corps. They were brought into action on the 24th with very good results.

Our experience in this campaign seems to point to the employment of more heavy guns of a larger calibre in great battles which last for several days, during which time powerful entrenching work on both sides can be carried out.

These batteries were used with considerable effect on the 24th and the following days.

8. On the 23rd the action of General de Castelnau's Army on the Allied left developed considerably, and apparently withdrew considerable forces of the enemy away from the centre and east. I am not aware whether it was due to this cause or not, but until the 26th it appeared as though the enemy's opposition in our front was weakening. On that day, however, a very marked renewal of activity commenced. A constant and vigorous artillery bombardment was maintained all day, and the Germans in front of the 1st Division were observed to be "sapping" up to our lines and trying to establish new trenches. Renewed counter-attacks were delivered and beaten off during the course of the day, and in the afternoon a well-timed attack by the 1st Division stopped the enemy's entrenching work.

During the night of 27th—28th the enemy again made the most determined attempts to capture the trenches of the 1st Division, but without the slightest success.

Similar attacks were reported during these three days all along the line of the Allied front, and it is certain that the enemy then made one last great effort to establish ascendancy. He was, however, unsuccessful everywhere, and is reported to have suffered heavy losses. The same futile attempts were made all along our front up to the evening of the 28th, when they died away, and have not since been renewed.

On former occasions I have brought to your Lordship's notice the valuable services performed during this campaign by the Royal Artillery.

Throughout the Battle of the Aisne they have displayed the same skill, endurance, and tenacity, and I deeply appreciate the work they have done.

Sir David Henderson and the Royal Flying Corps under his command have again proved their incalculable value. Great strides have been made in the development of the use of aircraft in the tactical sphere by establishing effective communication between aircraft and units in action.

It is difficult to describe adequately and accurately the great strain to which officers and men were subjected almost every hour of the day and night throughout this battle.

I have described above the severe character of the artillery fire which was directed from morning till night, not only upon the trenches, but over the whole surface of the ground occupied by our forces. It was not until a few days before the position was evacuated that the heavy guns were removed and the fire slackened. Attack and counter-attack occurred at all hours of the night and day throughout the whole position, demanding extreme vigilance, and permitting only a minimum of rest.

The fact that between September 12th and the date of this despatch the total numbers of killed, wounded, and missing reached the figures amounting to 561 officers, 12,980 men, proves the severity of the struggle.

The tax on the endurance of the troops was further increased by the heavy rain and cold which prevailed for some ten or twelve days of this trying time.

The Battle of the Aisne has once more demonstrated the splendid spirit, gallantry, and devotion which animates the officers and men of His Majesty's forces.

[Here follows names of officers and others mentioned in the despatches].

(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH,

Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief
The British Forces in the Field.

PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY.

August—September—October.

1914.

- The Russo-Japanese War—The Battle of Mukden. Part I. From February 25th to March 3rd, 1905.** Prepared in the Historical Section of the German General Staff. Authorized translation by Karl von Donat. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Hugh Rees, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814.** By Henry Houssaye. Translated from the French by Bt.-Major R. S. McClintock, R.E. 8vo. 8s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Hugh Rees, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Our Many-sided Navy.** By Robert Wilden Neeser. 8vo. 10s. (Presented by the Publishers). (Humphrey Milford). London, 1914.
- La Cavalerie dans le groupe d'armées, l'Armée, et le Corps d'armée.** By Colonel de Cissy. 8vo. 3s. 4d. (Librairie Militaire Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- Evolution des idées sur le mode de préparation de l'Artillerie à la Bataille.** By Colonel Aubrat. 8vo. 1s. 8d. (Librairie Militaire Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- Aircraft in War.** By J. M. Spaight. 8vo. 6s. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Les Grands Hommes de Guerre—Ney.** By René Andriot. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. (Librairie Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- Sea, Land and Air Strategy.—A Comparison.** By Colonel Sir George Aston. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (John Murray). London, 1914.
- La Guerre Turco—Balkanique, 1912—1913.** By Colonel P. Boucaille. 8vo. 3s. 9d. (Librairie Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- The Foundations of Strategy.** By Captain H. M. Johnstone, R.E. Crown 8vo. 5s. (Presented by the Publishers). (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- A New Light on Drake—A collection of documents relating to his voyage of circumnavigation, 1577—1580.** Translated and edited by Zelia Nuttall. (Hakluyt Society). London, 1914.
- With Wellington in the Pyrenees.** By Brig.-General F. C. Beatson. 8vo. 15s. (Max Goschen, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- Les Dragons de Latour.** By Lieut.-Colonel Cte. F. de Grunne and Captain A. Dewinter. 8vo. (Presented by Commandant R. Maton, Belgian Military Attaché). (G. Mertens). Brussels, n.d.
- Panoramic View of Sebastopol.** By Lieutenant E. A. Perceval, 88th Regiment. Oblong fol. (Presented by Alexander Murray, Esq., formerly British Vice-Consul, Sebastopol). (M. & N. Hanhart). London, 1857.
- Memorials of the Brave; or, Resting Places of our Fallen Heroes in the Crimea and at Scutari.** By Captains the Hon. John Colborne and Frederic Brine. 2nd Edition. Imp. 8vo. (Presented by Alexander Murray, Esq., formerly British Vice-Consul, Sebastopol). (Ackermann & Co.). London, 1858.
- Naval Recollections, 1852 to 1914.** By a Retired Flag Officer. Crown 8vo. (Presented by the Author). (Army & Navy Co-Operative Society, Ltd.). London, 1914.
- 40 Jours de Guerre dans les Balkans—La Campagne Serbo-Bulgare en Juillet, 1913.** By Alain de Penennrun. Crown 8vo. 2s. 8d. (Librairie Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- Siège et Prise d'Andrianople, Novembre, 1912—Mars, 1913.** By Colonel Piarron de Mondesir. 8vo. (4s. 6d. (Librairie Chapelot). Paris, 1914.
- Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy.** By Sir Thomas Barclay. 4to. (Presented by the Author). (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd.). London, 1907.
- Germany and England.** By J. A. Cramb. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. (John Murray). London, 1914.

- Text Book on Wireless Telegraphy.** By Rupert Stanley. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Presented by the Publishers). (Longmans Green & Co.). London, 1914.
- War against War.** By A. D. Lindsay. (Oxford Pamphlets, 1914). Pamphlet. 2d. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Oxford University Press). Oxford, 1914.
- The Retreat from Mons.** By H. W. C. Davis. (Oxford Pamphlets, 1914). Pamphlet. 3d. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Oxford University Press). Oxford, 1914.
- Oxford University Press Large Scale War Map—Central Europe, 2 sheets—Scale 16 miles=1 inch.** 18s. 6d. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Humphrey Milford, M.A.). London, 1914.
- A History of the Peninsular War—Vol. V., October, 1811—August, 1812.** By Charles Oman. 8vo. 14s. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Humphrey Milford). London, 1914.
- L'Offensive Contre l'Allemagne.** By Colonel Arthur Boucher. 8vo. 1s. 1d. (Berger-Levrault). Paris, 1912.
- Might is Right.** By Walter Raleigh. (Oxford Pamphlets, 1914). Pamphlet. 2d. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Oxford University Press). Oxford, 1914.
- The Navy and the War.** By J. R. Thursfield. (Oxford Pamphlets, 1914). Pamphlet. 3d. (Presented by the Delegates, Clarendon Press). (Oxford University Press). Oxford, 1914.
- Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, First Governor-General of Bengal.** By the Rev. G. R. Greig. 3 Vols. 8vo. 12s. (Second-hand). (Richard Bentley). London, 1841.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

History of the 12th (The Suffolk) Regiment. By Lieut.-Colonel E. A. H. Webb. Spottiswoode & Co., Ltd.

During the last few years regiments have added substantially to our military literature by the records which they have compiled of their past services. Colonel Webb has had a very fine theme in chronicling the past life of the Twelfth Foot, a regiment which, having been raised in 1685, has enjoyed more than two and a quarter centuries of glorious life. Raised by the Duke of Norfolk for the King, in the year when Monmouth's rebellion made necessary an augmentation to the military forces of the Crown, it had been little more than four years in existence when it was required to transfer its allegiance to William of Orange, and fought stoutly for him in Ireland at Carrickfergus and the Boyne and throughout that distressful campaign. During the closing years of the seventeenth century, the 12th proceeded to France and Belgium and marched and fought over much the same ground on which the present generation of the regiment has lately been so desperately engaged. During the next five-and-forty years the regiment served in Ireland, in the West Indies, in Spain and Minorca, and, embarking again for Flanders in 1642, fought all through the war of the Austrian Succession, distinguishing itself greatly at Dettingen and at Fontenoy. When the Seven Years' War broke out and England sent an army to fight under Ferdinand of Brunswick, the 1st Battalion—a second battalion had then just been added to the establishment—was one of the first to proceed to Germany, and fought in all the great actions in which Lord Granby's command was engaged—at Minden, Warburg, Vellinghausen and Wilhelmsthal. Space does not permit of doing more than merely

mentioning some of the scenes of the great services of the Twelfth Foot; it served under Elliott at Gibraltar, in the West Indies, in the campaign in Holland under the Duke of York; in the operations against Tippoo Sultan, in the Kafir wars of the middle of the last century, in New Zealand, Afghanistan, on the Indian Frontier and in South Africa, always with credit and in a way to add fresh lustre to the good name of the old regiment.

Colonel Webb has prepared a careful record and has acquitted himself well of a task always difficult for one who has no connection with the corps. The appearance of the book is altogether satisfactory; there are many interesting reproductions of old prints and portraits, and the appendices contain a mass of regimental information invaluable for all those who now belong to or in the future may join a regiment so rich in tradition as that whose life-story is here recorded.

Naval Recollections: 1852 to 1914. By a retired Flag Officer. London. Army & Navy C.S., Ltd.

Any memories covering upwards of sixty years of life in the Royal Navy must be of interest; and the writer has seen much, served everywhere, and has a good memory for all that he has been through in the old Navy, and in that new one which is the old. The author has been fortunate in seeing a good deal of active service, beginning with Burma, continuing with the Baltic and ending with the China War, when he was wounded at the engagement off the Taku Forts in 1859. Thereafter he seems to have suffered from the uncommon complaint of accelerated promotion, which generally permitted him to enjoy for only a very limited time such commands as his promotion brought him; he was commander-in-chief on the Australian station and also at the Nore. During his sixty-two years' service in the Navy the writer witnessed many changes, but does not appear to have shared the extreme conservatism of those of his contemporaries who viewed with something of dismay the transition from sails to steam; on the contrary, he seems to have from the first done what he could to go with the times and to discard anything, however excellent might have been its uses, which had become obsolete. These "Recollections" have been printed for private circulation and will consequently appeal most to a limited circle, but none the less they contain much interesting information about places and waters which our men-of-war do not so often visit in these days, about events which in their day were of very real importance, and in regard to naval life and surroundings generally which have changed and passed away.

The Foundations of Strategy. By Captain H. M. Johnstone, late R.E. George Allen, Unwin & Co., Ltd.

This is a book on a subject of which everybody in Europe wants to learn something at the present time, but the study of which has hitherto been regarded as rather beyond the limitations of the ordinary layman. Captain Johnstone's book makes a very opportune appearance and is something of the nature of a primer on the subject of which we all hear so much. The author deals clearly and concisely with main principles, emphasizing the importance of the real, as opposed to the faulty, ill-balanced initiative—when everything that matters is subordinated to the idea of striking the first blow—and what he very appositely calls "full strength"—the latter being explained as not merely concentration at a decisive point, but as the assurance of securing that all bodies are doing something to make good the main result aimed at. Captain Johnstone does not, however, confine himself to providing his readers with a mere diet of general principles, for his text is everywhere illumined and his contentions and comments are enforced by historical examples drawn from all the campaigns of the past, from their failures equally as from their successes. These chapters must have been completed long

before the present war broke out, but readers will be struck with Captain Johnstone's prescience; he has foreseen much that has happened and warns us of many mistakes of strategy which have been and which might easily have been made—notably does he express himself strongly in urging that in the event of a British expeditionary force taking the field on the Continent against the armies of Germany, our troops should under no circumstances be committed to anything of the nature of a flank attack made independently, but that we should be employed "in close touch with a flank of the French army." Equally has Captain Johnstone, like other thoughtful military students, foreseen the great part to be played by an intelligent use of railways in modern European war. Altogether a very welcome book of the day for soldiers and civilians, well-written and usefully mapped.

Historical Records of the Services of the 33rd (Queen Victoria's Own) Light Cavalry. Orphanage Press, Poona. 1914.

Raised at Sirur, in May, 1820, as the 3rd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry by squadrons furnished by the 1st and 2nd Regiments then already in existence, the 33rd has now completed close upon a century of distinguished life. It was first called upon for service in some of the petty disturbances, amounting scarcely to insurrections, which marked the first quarter of the nineteenth century in India, but it was not until the first phase of the first Afghan War had come to an end, that in April, 1841, the 3rd Light Cavalry marched via Quetta to Kandahar, there to join the force collected under General England. The regiment was with General Nott at Ghuznee in September of the year following, entered Kabul with him and returned to India via the Khyber and Peshawar. The 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry was not permitted long to rest in cantonments at Ferozepore, for it was ordered in January, 1843, to join at Hyderabad, Scind, Sir Charles Napier, who had recently defeated the troops of the Ameers at Meanee, and who was unable, owing to the numerical weakness of his force, to risk another action until he received the reinforcements then being hurried up. The 3rd had a very hazardous march, but arrived in time to take part in and to win hearty praise from Sir Charles for their services at the battle of Hyderabad. The campaign over, the regiment was under orders for the Punjab, but these were cancelled and for some time the 3rd Light Cavalry remained in charge of the Scind frontier. Their next service was in Persia, and here at the action of Khoosab the officers and men distinguished themselves in such a manner that Sir James Outram—one of the best judges of military valour—recommended no fewer than ten officers and men for the Victoria Cross, the occasion being when 120 of the 3rd charged and broke a square 800 strong, composed of one of the best of the regular regiments of the Persian army. This historic charge is now too little known, but at the time, both in India and in England, it created a great impression.

The 3rd took part in the Central India campaign under Sir Hugh Rose, being engaged at Jhansi, Kalpi and Gwalior, and doing much good work subsequently in the disturbed districts. In 1867 the regiment was again selected for active service, accompanying the expeditionary force sent to Abyssinia, and ten years later was honoured by the Prince of Wales, the late King Edward, becoming honorary Colonel. When the second Afghan War began, the 3rd proceeded to Kandahar and formed part of General Nuttall's cavalry brigade, and as such was engaged in the ill-fated action at Maiwand, of which a very careful account is given. The regiment served in China during the Boxer troubles and was renumbered the 33rd in 1903.

From this brief review of the records now published it will be seen that the regiment has served all over the East and always with distinction. A feature of this publication are the excellent maps by which the letter-press is accompanied and made clear.

